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The Labour Party hoped that legislation passed during the war which 
began in 1939 would bring multilateral schools or at least parity between 
the three main existing types of post-primary schools in terms of buildings, 
access, finance and public esteem. Officials at the Board of Education, 
whose influence on these aspects of the legislatioh was greater than that 
of ministers, were for the most part committed to the tripartite develop- 
ment of post 11 education on Hadow lines. They expressed their views in 
the Green Book which they used to confine discussion and which on all 
major issues affecting secondary education survived unscathed all sub- 
sequent negotiations. TheNorwood Committee, which was greatly influ- 
enced by Board officials, endorsed their view; Spens, whose pre-war 
report went too far in some respects for the officals, was denigrated; 
publication of the 
' 
Special Flemind Report, which was politically un- 
acceptable to Butler because it wanted the abolition of fees in direct 
grant schools, was temporarily suppressed. 
The Labour Party was inhibited as an instrument for reform by its 
Roman Catholic and non-conformist membership, its parliamentary weakness, 
and poor relations between Ede and its Education Advisory Committee. 
During the parliamentary debates it became clear that there would be no 
legislative commitments to a leaving age of 16, parity, or the abolition 
of fees in direct grant schools. War engendered consensus, which made 
reform possible, also required that it be uncontroversial. 
The Act was neutral on the organisation of secondary education, thanks 
partly to Ede, but the officials' views had not changed and were reiterated 
in The Nation's Schools issued by the caretaker Conservative Government, 
but accepted by Ellen Wilkinson. The leaving age was not raised to 16 and 





THE CONTEXT FOR CHANGE 
1. Obstacles to Labour's Policies 13 
2. The making of the Green Book 35 
3. The reaction of the Labour movement to the Green Book 54 
FROM GREEN BOOK TO WHITE PAPER 
4. Questions of strategy 85 
5- Parity versus segregation 101 
6. Raising the leaving age 134 
7. Public and direct grant schools 149 
8. Labour's deputation to the Board 172 
FROM WHITE PAPER TO ACT 
9. The White Paper 178 
10. Remaining problems: direct grant schools, questions of 
strategy, N. A. L. T's views 223 
11. The Bill 247 
EPILOGUE 
12. 'The Nation's Schools' Labour's Debacle 270 




B. L. British Library 
G. L. C. Greater London Council Record Office 
P. R. O. Public Record Office 
T. H. Transport House, Labour Party Library 
T. U. C. Trades Union Congress Library, Congress House 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1944 Education Act was regarded at the time of its enactment 
as a landmark in the development of education in England and Wales,, and 
its passing was greeted with almost unanimous joy which came close to 
euphoria. This contemporary judgement has been endorsed by historians. 
The Act was, however, far from being a radical measure. It perhaps 
owes its fame largely to the lack of any other social legislation of 
any consequence during the war. It was designed to be and was in 
fact no more than the embodiment of administrative arrangements which 
would bring order to a confused system, and some of which had been 
recommended and accepted as desirable during the previous two decades. 
What were its achievements? All post-primary education was to be 
in schools governed under secondary regulations. Thus all-age schools 
were to be abolished and senior schools were to be governed by the same 
code as grammar schools. But this had been recommended by Hadow 
2 in 
19269 and the re-organisation of the senior classes of elementary schools 
into separate departments or schools was being implemented long before 
1944 and was no. t completed for many years after that date. By 1937 
almost half the children aged 11 and over in elementary schools were 
in departments already re-organised in Hadow terms. In 1960 there 
were still 1,281 all-age schools in which more than a quarter of a 
million children aged between 5 and 14 were being educated. The Act 
was thus no more than one step along a route plotted in the 1920s and 
still being trodden in the 1960s. 
3 
One contribution of the Act to the solution of this problem was the 
increase in state finance for church schools. Butler's negotiating 
skills brought the two opposing attitudes in this long controversy, which 
had bedevilled educational reform for many decades, to a compromise which 
held during the legislative process. One side wanted to deny any state 
contribution to church schools except in return for state control; the 
1 E. g. A. J. P. Taylor English History 1914-1945 , Oxford 196.5, p. 568; and 
H. C. Dent, 1870-1970, Century of Growth in Enalish Education, London 
1970, P-1Z 
2 Board of Education Consultative CommitteelThe Education of the 
AdolescentlLondon 1926 
3 Board of Education lEducation in 1937 Cmnd-5776 P-1-3 and P-107. The 
Board claimed in 1937 at least 45.95% of pupils aged 11 and over in 
public elementary schools to be in re-organised senior departments; 
on the most favourable interpretation the figure was 61.5%. There 
were 666,147 children aged 11 and over in all-age schools, more 
than half of them in county schools, despite the belief that the 
remaining problem was concerned mainly with church schools. 
Ministry of Education Education in 1960, Cmnd, 1439, P-151 jable II 
5 
other wanted church schools to be wholly financed by the state whilst 
remaining entirely in church control. Butlers faced with protagonists 
of 0% and 1000/6 state subsidies for church schoolsq compromised at 50ý/* 
Butler's triumph, 
4 
though doub tless a sine qua non of progress in 
secondary re-organisation, was a testimony to his experience of diplo- 
macy rather than his reforming zeal. And since the inability of the 
churches to raise funds for the capital costs of re-organisation had 
been considered before 1944 to have been the chief obstacle to further 
progres s, it is. interesting to note that in 1960, although the highest 
proportion of the children in all-age schools were in Roman Catholic 
schools, almost twice as many were in county as were in Anglican schools. 
5 
The variety of local education authorities was to be lessened, but 
it was in any case inconceivable that the pre-war local authority 
structure, which included some very small education authorities, could 
have continued after the war. After 1944 there remained a great variety 
in the size of local. education authorities and in the ratable values 
of their areasl so that very significant differences in educational 
expenditure remained* More than two decades after t4e passage of the Act, 
for examples each secondary school child in inner London had E32 spent on 
books and equipment in a yearl the figure for children in outer London 
was only C22, Whereas some variation in educational expenditure, such 
as the decision of Richmond-upon-Thames to spend more than six times 
as much on its psychological services as nearby Kingston-upon-Thames, 
may be regarded as the exercise of a desirable local autonomy in such 
mattersq the London capitation figures show a big disparity in expen- 
diture on basic items which the re-organisation of education authorities 
in the Act had been expected to reduce. 
6 
The raising of the leaving age to 15 was achieved in 1947, but this 
had been brought in by the 1936 Education Act in any case, The 
exemptions for 'beneficial employment', which would have allowed some 
4 M. Cruikshank Church and State in English Education London 1963, 
PP-137'169 ch7onicles the negotiations 
5 Ministry of Education j. Education in 1960, op. cit. iP-151 jable II; 
127,041 pupils were in Roman Catholic schools9901092 in county 
schools and 47,646 in Anglican schools 
6 The figures are extracted from Chartered Institute of Public Finance 
and AccountancylEducation Estimates Statistics 1976-1977, London 1976, 
pp. 8,28 and 24* The precise capitation figures were: Inner London 
Education Authorityq S, *31-85; average of Outer London Boroughs, ýE21-73 
6 
pupils to leave school before the age of 15 if the outbreak of the 
war had not led to the abandonment of the earlier act, were dropped 
in 1944. Raising of the leaving age to 16 was not seriously envisaged 
by the authors of the Act and was not achieved until 1972-3- 
The parity of buildings, staffing ratios and equipment between the 
three types of secondary school, which was regarded as desirable by 
all contributors to the debate over the content of the Act and which was 
an essential element in the justification of tripartism in secondary 
education, was not to be achieved. After 1944 variations in expenditure 
on these items were permitted if differences in curricula could be held 
to justify them. This justification therefore replaced the crude social 
distinctions of the pre-war period, but the result was the same. A 
survey of secondary modern schools in the 1950s f ound that some were 
still housed on the top floor of "three-decker" buildings, with juniors 
below them and infants at the bottom. Practical work was being done 
in huts, and in some cases pupils had to travel a mile or more for 
practical instruction. Many of these schools were in the charge of 
heads who were steeped in the traditions of the senior elementary 
school. H. C. Dent, who conducted the survey, commented., "Small wonder, 
then, that their schools did not rise much, if at all, above highly 
effective senior elementary work. ,7 After 1944 ratios of pupils to 
teachers continued to reflect the greater importance attached to 
selective education, being 22.1 in modern schools, T8.5 in county grammar 
and technical schools and 18.2 in direct grant grammar schools in 1960* 
8 
By the Act fees were to be abolished in aided grammar schools, 
but not necessarily in those receiving grants direct from the Board. 
A larger number of able children, from families which could not afford 
fees, were thus given places in grammar schools which previously would 
have been held by less able children from wealthier homes. In terms 
of social equality this was a gain. But direct grant grammar schools 
7 H. C. Dent. Secondary Modern Schools, 
_ 
An Interim Report, London 1958,1 
pp. 59-60; Dent's assessment was based on surveys conducted in 1952 
and 1956 
8 Ministry of Education Education in 1q60, op. cite, p. 158 Table 61 and 
p. 182 Table 28 
7 
remained as institutions which were socially as well as academically 
selective. 
9 
The abolition of the special place examination was regarded as 
an important step forward. It was heralded in particular as a step 
which would remove a shadow from the primary school curriculum, but 
in practice it was replaced in many areas in the 1940s and 1950sq 
not by a consideration of primary school records supplemented if 
necessary by intelligence tests, as reformers had wantedg but by 
multiple choice examinations in English, mathematics and - lintelligencel 
These examinations were usually timed and were held with some ceremony. 
The fact that little had changed is shown by the use of exactly the 
same argument as had been used against the special place examination 
before 1944 by campaigners for comprehensive schools in the 1950s and 
1960s. Butler's White Paper of 1943 stated, "There is nothing to be 
said in favour of a system which subjects children at the age of 11 
to the strain of a competitive examination... Apart from the effect 
on the children, there is the effect on the curriculum of the schools 
10 themselves"* Yet in 1966 a Labour Party organisation for educa- 
tionists condemned the 11+ examination because, "The work of primary 
schools is distorted by the need to prepare pupils for the selection 
process at 11". 
11 
The following year the Plowden Report in its careful 
survey of primary education concluded that, "The less enterprising 
primary schools are what they now are partly, at least, because of the 
influence of the selective system. " Inspectors had noted that, "the 
ill effects of selection in schools... were lessening, perhaps because 
teachers' estimates were tending to replace externally imposed 
attainment tests. " Plowden welcomed the fact that with "the dis- 
appearance of formal selection arrangements, the work of the junior 
schools is liberated. " 
12 Thus in the 1960s the primary school 
curriculum still needed to be freed from a public examination taken 
9A survey of all but one of the Headmasters' Conference Schools in 
England and Wales in 1964 showed that the fathers of 69% of entrants 
to non-boarding direct grant schools in membership of the C6nference 
were in the Registrar-General's social classes I and II, i. e. 
professional and intermediate occupations, whereas in the population 
as a whole only 19116 of men were in these categor . les 
G. Kalton, The Public Schools: A Factual SurveXtLondon 1966, p. 35 
10 
' 
Infra p. 187 
11 Socialist Educational Association Guide to Comprehensive Education, 
Leeds 1966, p. 4 
12 Central Advisory Council for Education (England) Children and their 
Primy 2 Schools(2 vOls)London 1966, vol. liPP-153-154 
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at the age of 11. But the very considerations of equality ý. hicli were 
on the tongues of reformers in the 1940s ýý, rgued "or these t ions, 
which were thoight to be more objective than the reports of teachers who 
might admit social bias. 
One other change made in 1944 was that the influence of the Board, 
or Ministry as it was re-named, was increased. But this wLs only a 
tilt in the balance of power between local and central government which 
still shared responsibility for education. It is true that after 1944 
Einisters of Education had much greater powers to enforce st, ý. rdards on 
local authorities, but it was observed in 1964 that they had "not been 
the energetic despots which the Act suggests they might be. " 
13 
The 
opinion expressed by Holmes, the Board's Secretary, in 1943 that, "The 
powers conferred on the Board by the Bill are terrific, " 
14 
would hardly 
have been shared by those Labour Secretaries of State for Education in 
the 1960s and 1970s who tried to persuade Conservative local authorities 
to introduce comprehensive secondary education and found that their 
initial expectation, that they could do this without special legislation, 
was ill-founded; the passage of the 1976 Education Act marked the end 
of that expectation. In any case, unlike the changes already noted, an 
increase in the power of central government was not even theoretically 
in Labour's interests in 1944. Until its electoral triumph in 194-5 
Labour had no reason to wish to see an increase in the influence of 
central government at the expense of local government, since it had shown 
much greater ability at winning control of large local authorities, notably 
the London County Council, that it had at winning general elections. 
Labour's chief educational aim in 1944 was to ensure that there would 
be equality of opportunity in secondary education. It was concerned 
that diff6renc6s of income and social attitude should no longer be 
important factors in determining the nature and quality of the education 
which children received. It was committed both by its ani-, iial conference, 
13 T. BurgessA Guide to Enýlish Schools, Harmondsworth 19641p. 25 
14 P. R. O. Edl 36/377, Holmes to Rosevere, 4.11.43 
9 
representing the general view of party members, and by decision of 
its Education Advisory Committee, representing those most actively 
involved in considerinp , educational problems, to a policy of multilLteral 
schools as the means of achieving that aim. 
It has been argued15 that Labour's commitment to multilateral 
schools was less firm that this. Whilst the speed with which 
multilateral schools could be developed depended on resources, especially 
building, and whilst not all sup. Porters of the policy were prepared to 
see an immediate replacement of the three types of secondary school 
even if that were possible in practical terms, the Labour Party was 
committed at all levels to a policy of multilateral schools. 
The Party Conference in 1942 adopted unanimously a resolution 
which included a statement on multilateral schools. There can be no 
doubt about the importance of the resolution, which was one of five 
major resolutions outlining policies for post-war reconstruction, put 
to the Conference by the Party's National Executive Committee. As 
part of the clause on secondary schools the resolution called on the 
"Board to encourage, as a general policy, the development of a new 
type of multilateral school which would provide a variety of courses 
suited to children of all normal types. " 
16 The resolution was based 
on the interim report of the Education Reconstruction Committee. 
In the course of a short debate Alice Bacon, speaking for the N. E. C., 
emphasized the case for multilateral schools. 
17 
Members of the 
party's Education Advisory Committee saw R. A. Butler, President of the 
Board of Education, in February 1943 to put to him its comments on the 
Board's Green Book. They had previously submitted a paper which 
contained. the same statement as in the 1942 Conference resolution 
18 
and again Alice Bacon, as one of the deputation, argued the case for 
multilateral schools. 
19 
The other Labour Party organisation chiefly 
15 R. S. Barker, The Educational Policies of the Labour Party 1900-1961, 
London PH. Dtthesis 1968, p. 218. Barker described Labour's comfflitment 
to a policy of multilateral secondary schools in these terms, "It 
was very far from being a lightening conversion nor, as the events 
of 194-5-51 were to show, one that was completely secure from the 
dangers of back sliding. " Barker's work was O'. one before the Board 
of Education papers on the preparation of the Act were available. 
It is intended to establish by a study of those papers in the present 
work that the Board's officials conceived the war-time legislation 
as a consolidation of post-Hadow secondary re-organisation and that 
they were so successful in achieving their goal that only a well- 
informed and strong post-war minister would stEnd any change of 
altering the proposed course. 
16 Labour Party, Report of Annual Conference, 1942, pp. 140-1 
17 Ibid. 9p. 143 
18 P. R. 0 -Edl 36/266, Labour Party. Matters for Discussion with Rt. Hon. 
R. A. Butler, M. P. 
r- IN L-7 
10 
concerned with education, the National Association of Labour Teachers, 
had long advocated a policy of multilateral school, and it reiterated 
its views in 1939.20 
It is true that the parliamentary spokesmen of the Party in the 
Second Reading debate, Parker and Greenw9od, made no reference to 
multilateral schools, but the Bill itself did not refer to, types of 
secondary schools. This was one change from the White Paper of July 
1943 which had referred to the three types of school. By leaving open 
the question of how secondary schools were to be organizeds the Bill 
rendered pointless any parliamentary discussion of the matter. No 
Labour spokesman could move an 'amendment rejecting tripartism in 
favour of multilateralism, since the Bill did not refer to tripartism. 
For good measure all bodies linked formally or informally to the 
Labour Party, except the Fabians whose attitude was ambivalentg 
declared themselves for multilateral schools. The Trades Union 
Congress, in submitting its views on the Green Book to Butlert asked 
thatl "The Board should undertake really substantial experiments in 
the way of multilateral schools. " 
21 
The Co-operative Union declared 
itself in favour of multilateral schools 
22 
and stated to Butlerl "We 
are definitely in favour of the multilateral secondary school, as a 
new type to be developed... We feel State Education is best given 
in a 'common school', i. e. a school common to all those who are to 
become future citizens of the State. " 
23 
The Workers' Educational 
Associationg although accepting tripartism in terms of courses, none- 
theless argued against the re-appearance of "sharp cleavages" and 
thought that, "The multilateral school... or at least some grouping 
of the three types of school on the same campus... may be the best way 
to insure against such divisions. " 
24 
It can be agreed, therefore, that there was a very'substantial 
measure of agreement in the Labour Party and allied organizations in 
20 N. A. L. T. Social Justice in Public Education London undated but it 
was a response to the Spens Report, which was published late in 
1938, and is presumed to have been published in 1939 
21 The statement first appears in T. U. C., Memorandum on Education 
after the War, London 1942, p. 4. It also appears in the T. U. C. 
statement enclosed in P. R. O. Edl36/250, Citrine to -Butler 23.4.42 
22 J. Thomas , Pla ' 
ns for an Educated DemocracX, Manchester 1942, p. 8 
23 P. R. O. M1367,2_75, Thomas (Director of EducationlCo-operative Union) 
to Butler. 3-3.42, enclosing a statementtP-3 
24 W. E. A., Plan for Education, London 19421p. 26. Its acceptance of 
tripartism in terms of courses was rather naive; grammar was 
equated with literary/scientific, modern with practical etc. 
11 
this matter. If there was aGreement, there was also realism. it 
was clear that, for some years at least after the war, secondary 
schooling would have to take place in existing accommodation. 
Rebuilding of bomb-damaged schools and the building of some new 
schools would afford opportunities for realising the aim of 
multilateral schools, but there had to be policies which would in 
the meantime bring greater equality of opportunity to the de facto 
system of secondary schools. There had to be short-term 
improvements whilst local authority planning and school building 
programmes brought the longer-term. policy closer to being 
implemented. Labour's lesser demand was therefore fox egali- 
tarianism in the tripartite system which already existed. 
This meant that the school leaving age had to be raised to 
16, not only because education per se was regarded as desirable, 
but alsog and more importantlyl because parity between three different 
kinds of secondary school was unattainable if one had an earlier 
leaving date than the others. Equality in the provision of buildings, 
books and equipment and in staffing ratios was essential. The 
abolition of fees in all state-aided schools, especially in direct 
grant schools if they were to take their place in local authority 
schemes, and the solution of the public school problem were also 
regarded as essentiall although no clear policy on the latter existed. 
These goals were seen as an alternative, and less satisfactory, way 
of satisfying the principles of the multilateral policy. Whereas a 
system of multilateral schools in which all children throughout the 
county would receive their secondary education was the ideal, equality 
between three different kinds of secondary schools was the minimum 
acceptable. 
Since neither was achieved in 1944, the Act must be regarded 
as a defeat for the Labour Party. It is the purpose of this work to 
12 
establish how and why that defeat came about and to consiýer why 
Iabour spokesmen were persuaded to join the chorus of accolades 
for what was from a general viewpoint a rather modest Act and from 
a Labour viewpoint a serious defeat. 
13 
THE CONTEXT FOR CHANGE 
Pha'pter 1: OBSTACLES TO LABOUR'S POLICIES 
Before looking at the detail of the negotiations and political 
struggles leading to the passage of the Act, it is necessary to note 
the context in which these struggles took place. There were several 




By 1939 official opinion had set hard against multilateral schools. 
That the advocates of such schools had made considerable progress in 
persuading educationists of all outlooks that the concept had merit 
was shown by the careful consideration given to the matter by the 
Consultative Committee of the Board of Education chaired by Sir Will 
Spens. He had chaired the committee since 1934 when he had taken 
over from Hadow. The committee had been asked in 1933 to look at 
secondary education, but its terms of reference directed its attention 
specifically to grammar and technical high schools. It had no 
responsibility at all to look at senior schools, which were governed 
by the elementary and not the secondary code of regulations, and 
could quite properly have ignored the growing interest in the entirely 
new structure of secondary schooling which the multilateral concept 
involved. Instead it carefully weighed the arguments, giving prominence 
to the topic in the introduction to its report 
1 
and at the beginning of 
the chapter in which it made its main proposals on the structure of 
secondary education. Multilateralists had made enough impact on 
educational opinion at least to be given a serious hearing. 
When Spens reported in November 1938 he acknowledged that, "The 
policy of substituting such multilateral schools f or Grammar Schools, 
for Modern (Senior) Schoolsq and, to some extent, for Junior Technical 
Schools, has recently been advocated and has received considerable 
2 
support. It is a policy which is very attractive*" In particular 
1 Board of Education, Report of the Consultative Committee on Secondary 
Education, London 1938; referred to hereafter as Spens Report 
2 Ibid. p. xx 
14 
the committee accepted the value of a "close association, to their 
mutual advantage, of pupils of more varied ability", and of the 
3 easier transfer from academic to less academic courses & 
Rejection of the multilateral school largely resulted from the 
esteem in which the members of the committee held the work and values 
of the grammar schools. Since the committee's instruction was to 
look at grammar schools and their curriculum it was natural that its 
most active members in this question should have been particularly 
concerned with grammar school and university education. Their objec- 
tions to a multilateral system were based on a preference for small 
schools (a roll of 800 was considered much too large), a belief that 
a sixth form must not only be large to be viable but that it must 
represent a high proportion of the pupils in the school in order to 
be strong enough to exert its beneficial influence on younger pupils, 
a fear that the grammar school curriculum would dominate and destroy 
the modern school curriculum which was in its infancy, and a view 
that the breadth of work in a multilateral school would be too great 
for any one headmaster to direct. 
4 
Spens rejected the idea even as a long-term aim, in view of the 
expense involved in the Hadow re-organisation of senior schools which 
was still incomplete, and because there was not "a substantial 
balance of advantage" in favour of a further re-organisation. The 
only comfort which multilateral ists could draw from the report was 
its recommendation that some experiments should be conducted especially 
in new housing areas and that multilateral schools "ought almost 
certainly to be providedl, 
5 in cases where the grammar school was too 
small to be viable. The latter concession clearly indicates that the 
retention of the grammar school was the committee's chief concern, 
showing that where one could not exist in its own right its sub- 
mergence in a multilateral school was tolerable. 
3 The inappropriateness of the grammar school curriculum to many fee- 
paying pupils who went to the school for reasons of status rather 
than because they had an aptitude for academic study was one of the 
committee's major concerns. 
4 Spens Report, pp. xx-xxi 
5 Ibid., p. xxii 
15 
The rejection was, however, far from dismissive. The idea itSelf 
was referred to as an "interesting and attractive proposal" which would 
confer "many benefits'll and the decision to reject it was reached "with 
some reluctance. " 
6 
Moreover the committee accepted the multilateralists' 
sociological critique of the existing system and also appreciated the 
difficulties caused by the misplacing of children who were consequently 
inappropriately educated. The existence of the problems which 
multilateral schools were designed to solve was admitted, even if a 
different approach to solving them was preferred. The members of the 
committee went further, for, having rejected a multilateral system 
in practice, they believed that the-way forward lay in accepting the 
multilateral theory and applying it to a tripartite system. Its view 
was that, "The multilateral idea, though it may not be expressed by 
means of the multilateral schoolq should permeate the system of secon- 
dary education as we conceive it.,, 
7 Spens used the arguments of the 
multilateralists to define more precisely the functions of the three 
types of schools and to suggest that selection should be solely by 
aptitude. It -was 
urged that every school should "have its special 
educational task clearly in view" and, in noting the need for children 
to go to the right schooll it emphasized the principle that "educational 
considerations alone should determine the parent's choice, just as if 
the different schools were alternative sides of the same school. 117 
It was hoped to answer the socialogical critique of the existing system 
by giving equality, of opportunity to children, in the expectation that 
the public would regard the different schools as being of equal value 
if they were equally accessible and had parity in buildings, staffing 
ratios and equipment. Of prime importance to the achievement of parity 
was a common leaving age, and they considered that a minimum leaving 
age of 16 "must even now be envisaged as inevitable. " 
8 
The committe e 
6 Ibid. 2p. 291 
7 Ibid., p. 292 
8 Ibid. P-311 The words quoted were emphasized with italics in the 
Report. 
16 
thus codified those educational reforms which were becoming common 
ground amongst many educational interests and which were in some 
measure to form the basis of the Bill in 1944. 
The aens Report considered thoughtfully the idea of a multilateral 
system, rejected it except in a few cases which it considered to be 
either experimental or inevitable, and then argued very strongly for 
the achievement of equality in educational opportunity. It recognised 
that the multilateralists' critique of the status quo could not be 
answered and that, if a multilateral system were not to be widely 
adopted, then at least some major ref orms in the present system could 
not be avoided. The committee took their argument a stage further 
than the Labour Party and realised that a more precise definition of 
the educational purpose of each type of school would have to replace 
the largely social distinctions of the past. ýffiat f or Labour was 
seen as the interim stage to a multilateral system was seen by Spens 
as a wider divergence between the types of post-primary school than 
hitherto. A more efficient and politically more defensible tripartite 
ý; ystem was hardly likely to be the harbinger of a multilateral system. 
The attitudes of the ýoard of Education's officials 
Some of the Board's officials regarded the idea of a multilateral 
system with hostility. Indeed,. although they were in 1940 and 1941 
to modify their views under the influence of the wartime demand for 
change and of tactical and political considerations, 
9 in 1938-9 they 
were hostile even to those less fundamental changes which Spens was 
prepared to countenance and even considered inevitable. Since the 
attitude of the Board's chief officers, who were to design the 1944 
Bill, was in 1938 and 1939 uninfluenced by those factors which were to 
modify their view, and thus more truly represented their personal 
attitudes, it is important to note what their attitudes were. 
9 InfraiP 39 
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Its senior staffing structure made it difficult for the Board to 
think in terms other than those of the existing school system. 
The main advice came from principal assistant secretaries, three of 
whom were responsible for and therefore spent their daily lives 
organizing the three separate types of schools providing post-primary 
education. This inability to take a wider view was specially evident 
when the principal assistant secretaries did most of the work in 
preparation for the 1941 Green Book. As we shall sees the long 
disputes initially over whether secondary education should be organized 
on multilateral or tripartite lines and later on whether there should 
be a common course for 11 to 13 year olds and whether that should be 
in multilateral or separate schools, had its basis in the unwillingness 
of principal assistant secretaries and their associated inspectors to 
accept any significant alterations in their particular sectors; for 
examplej the head of secondary branch looked at the multilateral 
concept solely in terms of whether it would solve grammar school 
problems which were his daily concern. 
In 1938-9, however, the Board's attitude, as shown in its reaction 
to Spens, was even simpler, since it set its face against any change. 
The President, De La Warr, received and accepted apparently without 
demur the advice of the Board's officers in a report presented to him 
by the Secretary, Sir Maurice Holmes in January 1939- 10 It conceded 
that some of Spens' criticisms of the status quol especially of the 
influence of factors other than a child's ability and potential on the 
form of post-primary education which he received, could not be countered; 
and that, given no past history and no existing buildings, some of the 
recommendations could be readily accepted. But Holmes made the central 
feature of his report a quotation from a Treasury instruction that no 
department should spend money on new services. Before arguing in turn 
against each of the report's recommendations, he declared his opinion 
10 P. R. 0. Edl36/131, Holmes to De La Warr, 14.1.39 
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to be "almost uniformly adverse to acceptance" of them. fie did not 
expect Spens to be surprised and quoted Spens himself as referring to 
the part of his report containing his proposals on secondary education 
as "the New Jerusalem chapter" -a label which the Board's officers 
were significantlY to appropriate later for their Green Book. 
Holmes specially rejected the Spens'approval of multilateral 
schools in sparsely populated areas. He scathingly dismissed as 
obscure Spens' reasons for approving the 1932 report of a Departmental 
Committee on the public schools and could see no reason for the Board 
to concern itself with such schools. 
11 
Equality between grammar and 
senior schools in size of classes and in the allocation of space to 
each child was rejected on grounds of cost. The proposal to raise 
the school leaving age was seen by Holmes as "by no means inevitable" 
(as Spens had suggested it was) and "a pious expression of opinion. " 
In rejecting the proposal that all post-primary education should be 
covered by one code, he concerned himself not only with the admini- 
strative and financial difficulties, but also with the dilution of 
the grammar schools which he feared might result. Thus the rejection 
was more than the administrator's preference for leaving things as 
they were. It went further than a recognition of the financial 
obstacles to change. It showed a philosophical objection to the 
egalitarian assumptions of Spens. 
Holmes urged De La Warr to reach a decision along these lines and 
to use a question, put down in the Commons by Chuter Ede and to be 
answered two weeks later, to announce the decision. This the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Boardl Kenneth Linsdayl duly did, In 
February 1939 Lindsay told the Commons 12 that the Board would be 
discussing with local education authorities the "constructive recom- 
mendations" of Spens on four aspects of post-primary education, but 
could not adopt the "administrative proposals contained in Chapter IX, 11 
11 Board of Education jPrivate schools and other schools not in receipt 
of grants from public fundso Report of the Departmental Committee, 
London 1932. The Committee had been established by the Labour 
President Sir Charles Trevelyan under the chairmanship of James 
Chuter Ede. Interestingly Holmes served on the Committee, for the 
report of which he now had so little regard 
12 H. C. Debates. volo343tcol-372,2.2o39 
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i. e. all of the proposals concerned with equality of opportunity and 
the restructuring of post-primary education, "for financial reasons. 11 
There is no evidence to suggest that De La Warr and Lindsay con- 
tributed their own thoughts to the decision. Indeed the text of 
Holmes' note tends to suggest that De La Warr had not even asked for 
advice, and that Holmes was moved to submit it by the increasing number 
of requests for a government reaction to Spens, of which Chuter Ede's 
question was the most important and imminent and the least easy to 
avoid. Until R. A. Butler became President and Chuter Ede Parliamentary 
Secretary, the Board's officers seem to have had no respect for their 
political leaders and no need to have much regard for their views. 
It is therefore Holmes# attitude to Spens which was important. His 
rejection of Spens was a defence of the grammar school, albeit with 
admissions based on academic potential rather than on social factors. 
His attitude is clearly shown in his reply to a letter from the Head- 
master of Winchester College, Spenser Leeson, who was a close 
acquaintance of Holmes and was the leading f igure at this time in the 
relations between the Board and the Head Masters' Conference. Leeson 
had expressed the fears of direct grant schools about a loss of 
independence in the wake of the Sj2ens Reportl which had in fact recom- 
mended that such schools should for the time being be omitted from any 
schemes for the implementation of its proposals. 
13 Holmes replied, 
"You need have no fear that we here will take any steps to impair the 
independence of the direct grant schools. " 
14 
Holmes' advice was overridden in only one case and even then he 
had his own way in the end. When he held the discussions with the 
local education authorities which Lindsay had told the Commons about in 
February, he prevailed upon them not to approve action on the questions 
which they were asked to consider; even such a small advance as the 
inspection of private schools was not approved. At Holmest instigation 
13 Spens Re ort P*326 
14 P. R. O. E 31, Holmes to Leesons3l-5-39 
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decisions were reached with very little debate to reject even the 
four minor proposals which one of Holmes' political heads had led 
the Commons to believe were at least to be seriously considered. 
15 
The local authorities did take up one question which had not been re- 
ferred to them. They considered Spens' limited recommendation about 
the formation of multilateral schools by the combination of small 
grammar and senior schools, and, whilst not going as far as Spensq 
urged that for reasons of "economy of building provision" such schools 
should share the same gymnasia and playing fields. When De La Warr ' 
read Holmes' report of the meeting he instructed that differences in 
regulations and teachers' salaries (Holmes' reasons which had per- 
suaded the local authorities) should not be grounds for not adopting 
the best solutions in such areas, and that the Board should look out 
for opportunities to avoid duplication in buildings and amenities. 
16 
That very limited adoption of the multilateral ideal for reasons 
of economy and viability rather than positive educational development, 
was all that was salvaged in the short term from Spens. In practical 
terms it meant. nothing, for the outbreak of war was near. What is 
of interest is the way in which Holmes nullified even this instruction 
from the President, His circular to inspectors, 
17 in which he was 
supposed to be alerting them to the possibilities that the President 
had in mind, tacitly scorned the proposal of his political head. it 
laid down pre-conditions which were very unlikely to exist; for 
example, neither school was to exceed one stream and there was to be 
no risk of friction between the teachers of the two schools. Holmes 
thus killed what remained of Spens' modest proposal on multilateral 
schools. The episode demonstrated the administrator's skill in not 
carrying out the wishes of his political superior. 
Until the arrival of Butler and Ede, the Board was in effect 
15 Ibid. Minutes of meeting of Local Education Authorities' Advisory 
Committee, 30.6*39 
16 Ibid., De La Warr to Holmes, 20-7-39 
17 P. R. 0. Ed22/214 Memorandum to Inspectors E. No. 409,29.7-39 
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beyond political and parliamentary control or indeed influence. 
Holmes was its controller and he showed no desire in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s to countenance the assumption by the Board of a rrjore 
dynamic role. He was content to administer the existing system. 
Inasmuch as he showed his opinions on educational policies, he was 
clearly allied to public school, direct grant school and grammar school 
interests. Since Butler and Ede did not arrive at the Board until 
after publication of the Green Book, Holmes' role in Policy-making for 
the 1944 Bill was of the greatest importance. 
The political context: c, onsensus 
The political context of the late 1930s and early 1940s was hostile 
to radical educational change. The National Governments of the 1930S 
and Churchill's war coalition of the 1940s stifled the controversies 
which must precede attempts to change anything so difficult to change 
as a schools system. Before the outbreak of war it was accepted in 
almost every political corner that the country's economy and later 
the demands of rearmament would not permit an increase in expenditure 
on education. Had an increase been possiblqj it would have been 
used to continue the Hadow re-organization of all-age elementary schools 
to provide separate senior schools, which had been in hand since the 
1920s. When the war started the initial pre-occupation of educationists 
was with ensuring that evacuated city children received any education 
at all. After this initial period many turned their attention to the 
need for educational reform, and it was this upsurge of opinion which 
led people at the time to believe that great changes were in the offing. 
Yet the only major public controversy was not over education at all, 
but over the demand of the churches, and especially the Roman Catholic 
church, for greater public financial assistance towards church schools 
without any loss of church control. This controversy had special 
significance for the Labour Partyl as will be seen, but it was a diversion 
22 
which inhibited and took the place of educational discussion rather 
than carried it forward. Chuter Edel winding up the debate on the 
Second Reading of the 1944 Bill for the Government, opened his remarks 
by apologizing ironically to the Deputy Speaker, "... if in the course 
of my remarks I should, unobtrusively, at irregular and infrequent 
intervals, say a few words about education ... 11 
18 
An acrimonious 
public quarrel over the relationship between religion and education, 
and more particularly over the financing of denominational schoolingg 
was no substitute for a political and educational debate over the 
future structure of the educational system. The fact that the quarrel 
took place and that the 1944 Bill survived did not mean that the Act 
itself was a major measure of educational reform. 
Consensus on the proposals in Spens, most of which were also part 
of the Labour Party's programme, was the order of the day. By 19419 
when the Green Book was published, these proposals were common-place. 
Dessenting voices were for the most part interested bodies such as the 
Part III local education authorities and the direct grant schools. 
This pressure towards consensus was increased by the war. It was 
widely believed by 1943, and to some extent even earlier, that only 
compromise based on the spirit of conciliation encouraged by the war 
would ensure the enactment of a bill and thats once the war was over, 
the chance to make a major educational reform would be lost. Many 
writers were conscious of what they saw as the lesson of Fisherts Act, 
which had been passed in 1918 and which many believed would not have 
been passed in 1919 or later, The publication of Fisher's autobio- 
graphy 
19 
encouraged this view. R. H. Tawney put the point starkly 
to the W. E. A. conference in 1943, when he said, "Either his (Butler's) 
promised Education Bill will become an Act before the end of the war, 
or it will never become one, " 
20 
H. G. Wells made the same point in 
18 H. C. Debatesivol-396, col, 484,20.1.44 
19 H. A. L. Fisher, An Unfinished Autobiography, London 1940 
20 His presidential address was published as R. H. Tawney, Education: 
The Task Before Us, London 1943 
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more detail at a meeting with Butler, arguing that even Forster's Act 
of 1870 would not have been passed if Britain had not felt threatened 
by, Prussia. 21 It was this fear, that unless an act were passed 
quickly no act at all would reach the statute book, that encouraged 
consensus on proposals which by this time were no longer controversial. 
Writers with Labour Party associations were especially conscious of 
this anxiety. The result was a remarkable identity in the suggestions 
coming from many writerss politicans and organisations. H. C. Dent, 
editor of the Times Educational Supplement and author of an unashamedly 
propagandist work on Butler's Bill, seems to have been prominent in 
22 
synthesising these proposals. 
The inhibiting effect of this need for agreement on a common set 
of proposals can be seen in the programme of the Council for Educational 
Advance, a body set up for the very purpose of promoting consensus on 
a limited number of reforms. Its publications show how conscious its 
sponsors were that all might be lost if sectarian problems were allowed 
to assume greater importance than strictly educational goals. They were 
concerned above all with c. arrying reforms which already commanded very 
wide support. Whilst the Council criticized the Government's White 
Paper proposals, claiming that "the Government is in far more danger 
of being blamed for timidity than rashness'19 
23 
the Council itself did 
not go much further in its demands. Although sponsored by the T. U. C., 
the Co-operative Union, the W. E. A. and the N. U. T., the Council did not 
refer to multilateral schools in this or other campaign publications 0 
24 
Since the first three organisations wanted multilateral schoolsq their 
omission was presumably the price to be paid for N. U. T. participation, 
since the N. U. T. 's 1942 Conference decision on the content of a new 
Education Bill had contained no reference to multilateral schools, 
in-spiteof much support for them within the union. 
25 
The prevailing atmosphere was well-described by Sir Frederick Clarke, 
21 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Butler to Holmes, 3-10.41 
22 H. C. Dent, The New Education Bill, What it contains, what it means, 
why it should be supported, London 1944 
23 Council for Educational AdvancejA Statement on the White Paper on 
Educational ReconstructiongLondon undated (? 1943) 
24 E. g. C. E. A., Aims, London undated 01943) 
25 N. U. T., Report of Proposals by the Executive, adopt d by Conference, 
Easter 19429Cheltenham 1942 
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Director of the London University Institute of Education. When 
expressing his congratulations on Butler's speech in the Coffanons debate 
on the White Paper, he wrote, "I am beginning to feel that you have 
achieved something I had long hoped forl the formation of a kind of 
non-political unofficial Education Party. " 
26 Such a consensus could 
not be wide enough to include all of Labour's social and political 
objectives. 
Labour's parliamentary ]Rroblem 
Another problem for Labour was its division in Parliament. Several 
of its leading figures were members of Churchill's war government from 
its formation in May 1940. This silenced them as Labour spokesmen 
and required them to vote with the government in the event of a 
division in the Commons. Labour's strength in the Commons was thus 
reduced. If. as A. J. P. Taylor has suggested, the Parliamentary Labour 
Party revolted only once during the war (over the Beveridge proposals)9 
this would have been of no consequence. But Taylor's view does not 
take into account the divisions during the Committee stage of the 1944 
Bill. He has written that Labour "revolted for the only time in the 
war" over the government's half-hearted response to the Beveridýe, 
Report, and thatl with all Labour M. Ps. except those in office and only 
two others voting against the governments they mustered 121 votes. 
27 
This was certainly not the only revolt by Labour, for the Party divided 
the Commons twice in Committee on the Education Bill and, by supporting 
an amendment on equal pay for men and women teachers moved by a Maverick 
Conservative member, Mrs. Cazalet Keir, actually took part in the defeat 
of the government. On the two occasions when Labour divided the House - 
on the questions of a timetable for raising the school-leaving age to 
16 28 and the abolition of fees in direct grant schools, which were of 
great importance in Labour's programme - the Party mustered only 137 
26 P. R. O. Edl36/45o, Clarke to Butlert3l-7.43 
27 A. J. P. Taylor, 22. cit., p. 567 
28 The amendment on which the vote in fact took place was also moved 
by the Conservative Mrs. Caza-let Keir, but it was supported by 
Labour M. Ps. en bloc. 
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and 95 votes respectively and lost badly. 
Since Labour, even with its full parliamentary strength at the 
disposal of the Whips, could not command a majority in the Commonsq it 
might have been a good bargain to have lost the votes of some M. Fs. in 
return for a voice in the cabinet. Churchill divided his government 
firmly between the very small War Cabinet, which he dominated and 
which determined policy for the prosecution of the warl and a committee 
chaired by the Lord President of the Council which controlled domestic 
affairs, Churchill took no part in the latter, although it is clear, 
from the way in which Butler took the precaution of at least mentioning 
potentially difficult questions to him directly whilst the Bill was 
being prepared, that his dominant role included a concern with 
potentially troublesome domestic legislation, although this may 
equally have reflected the young minister's desire to keep himself in 
the Prime Minister's eye. However, the Lord President's Committeeg 
as it was called, had to approve all legislation and Butler's proposals 
were considered by it at several meetings. 
It was a small committee and Labour was strongly represented. When 
Butler first ou tlined his scheme to them in December 1942 three of the 
six members were Labour, viz. Attlee, Bevin and Morrison. In September 
1943 Attlee became Lord President of the Council. There is little 
evidence to suggest that these prominent Labour f igures used their 
influential position to promote Labour's education policies. Bevin, 
as Minister of Labour, put strong pressure on Butler to plan for the 
raising of the school-leaving age to 16 soon after the war, 
29 but he 
seems not to have carried his struggle into the Lord President's 
Committee, the deliberations of which on the planned legislation were 
in any case slight. 
Nor does Labour seem to have drawn strength from its obviously 
29 Infra., Chapter 6 passim 
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increasing electoral popularity bef ore and during the war. Since 
the 1935 general election, the last to be held until 1945, Labour 
had had a notable series of by-election victories and these continued 
during the war, confirming the general and evident enthusiasm for change. 
Whilst such a strong and obvious trend was no substitute for a majority 
in the division lobbies, it might have encouraged Labour members to 
press their more radical proposals more vigorously. 
The relations of Chuter Ede with Board and party colleagues 
James Chuter Ede -was appointed Parliamentary Secretary at the Board 
of Education in May 1940. As a Labour member of Churchill's coalition 
government and the spokesman for a party which lacked parliamentary 
strength, he was theoretically well placed to promote Labour's aims. 
His past experience was helpful to him to a remarkable degree in 
discharging his new duties. Born at Epsom in Surrey in 1882 he had 
been deeply involved throughout his adult life in the public affairs 
of that area, especially in the f ield of education. His own education 
showed a determination to benefit from the best that was available to a 
boy from a family which was comfortable without being wealthy. Fr om . 
Epsom National Schools he went on to Dorking High School and Battersea 
Pupil Teacher Centre before entering Christ's, Cambridge. Thereafter 
he returned to the area of his birth and upbringingg living at Ewell 
throughout the Second World War. He was a member of Surrey County 
Council continuously from 1914 and its chairman from 1933 until 1937- 
As a teacher he was deeply involved in N. U. T. af f airs and f or much of 
the 1930s and 1940s, including his period as Parliamentary Secretary, 
he remained assistant secretary of the Union's Surrey branch. His 
diary in the early 1940s contains many references to discussions on 
matters arising from his N. U. T. office. First elected to the Commons 
in March 1923 f or the Mitcham Division, he was elected as member for 
South Shields in 1929, losing his seat there in 1931 , but recovering 
27 
it in 19359 being one of the additional 102 Labour victors at that 
election. 
The memoranda written by him at the Board and the many references 
in his diaries show an impressive grasp of the legislation and re- 
Pilations governing Britain's school system. He was no amateur thrust 
into office without experience of the topic for which he was to assume 
some responsibility. He had had experience of working within the 
framework of the Boardts procedures when he had chaired the Departmental 
Committee on private schools in 1932, one member of which was Maurice 
Holmes, now the Board's Secretary. Few men, and certainly not his 
senior colleague Butler, have come to office with such long experience 
relevant to their future responsibilities. Yet Ede had problems in 
his relations with both Board and party colleagues. 
The office of Parliamentary Secretary was a decidedly junior one, 
and Ede would probably have had no influence at all but for his evident 
knowledge and experience. His relations with Butler were good. The 
President was later to refer to Ede as a "consistently loyal and wise 
friend. 1130 Even allowing f or the liberality with which Butler 
awarded accolades in his memoirs to all who worked with him at the 
Boardl the tribute sounds sincere. But the two men do not seem to 
have been intimate. The relationship grew, especially as they worked 
successfully to evolve a formula which was acceptable to the non- 
conformists who were courted by Edeq and to the Anglicans, who were 
courted by Butler, and which formed the basis of the 1944 Act's 
arrangements for dealing with church schools. Yet the relationship 
remained that of professional colleagues rather than intimates, with 
Ede's occupying the subordinate post. 
One problem f or Ede was that he was the outsider at the Board. 
His background was quite different from Butler's and those of the 
30 R. A. Butler, The Art of the Possible, London 1971, P-93 
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Board's officials. It was not a question of their not having regard 
for his views. His knowledge ensured that points made by him had to 
be taken seriously. It was more a question of his different way of 
life. The other contributors to the Board's policy had many things 
in common. Many of them had worked closely together in the past, 
been pupils or students together, or belonged to the same club. 
Ede's was a different world. The centre of his interests was un- 
doubtedly Surrey. Bereft of the references to his work at the Board, 
hi-s diaries would read like those of a suburban professional man, full 
as they are of local engagements, spells of fire-watching, walks on the 
Downs and Saturday morning shopping. Having been to an elementary 
school, he had won his way to Cambridgeq not claimed a place there as 
his birthright. London club life was a closed book to him, and from 
all that one knows of , him one can believe that he would not have wished 
it to be otherwise. He lunched at the Wilton or St. Ermine's Hotel, 
not far from the Board's war-time offices. It is rare for his diary 
to record the name of a lunch companion and he seems to have been alone 
on most occasions, or at least not in the company of one of his Board 
colleagues. Indeed in his diary he mentions his visits to the Board 
in the same tone as he does his visits to Surrey County Hall or his 
local magistrates' court. He was certainly not in the very centre of 
policy-making, except in the question of church schools and the Part III 
local authorities. 
Ede's working relations with those of his fellow Labour Party 
members who were most concerned with education were not close. Ede 
regrettedl even resented this, Being excluded from membership of the 
Party's Advisory Committee, by the rule which denied membership to 
ministers with a direct responsibility for the matterg annoyed him. 
31 
Temperamentally, however, he would not have worked well with them, 
31 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Ede to Butler, 13-10.41 
i 
29 
seeing himself as a practical man tackling real problems and not as an 
intellectual. He freely commented to Butler that members of the 
Advisory Committee were "far removed from the working class parents' 
attitude" (the issue was religious education), 
32 
and he recorded with- 
out comment in his diary the opinion of Lees-Smith, one of his Labour 
predecessors, that-they were "a collection of freaks.,, 
33 
When Tawney 
went to Americal Ede advised Butler that, in his absence, Laski would 
"probably best represent the views of the so-called intelligentsia of 
the Labour movement on educational problems.,, 
34 
This-was hardly a 
warm recommendation, and Ede showed on other occasions serious dis- 
agreement with prevalent Labour opinions, seeing no objection, 
for examplel to the purchase by parents of a better education, the 
opposite of Tawney's view. 
35 
It is possible that he resented the 
social standing of some Labour leaders, for he often made comments 
about the snobbery of some of his fellow Party members. Although he 
made no comment, one senses his pleasure when he recorded in his diary 
an observation of Tawney's thatq "He often feltl when lecturing on 
36 history to some studentsl that he was only spoiling good navvies 0 11 
When Mrs. M. A. Hamilton, daughter of the Glasgow Professor of Logic and 
a former Labour M. P. who was now working in Greenwood's reconstruction 
secretariats submitted her comments on the Green Book, the burden of 
which was that she wanted children from different backgrounds to attend 
the same schooll he endorsed the paper, "no snob like her. , 
37 
When 
he reported to Butler on his meeting with her he was at pains to show 
how he had made a fool of her by displaying his superior knowledge of 
educational law and regulations. 
38 
Such open contempt for party 
colleagues is not isolated. Laterg in an account of a conversation 
he had had with Aneurin Bevan, in which the rising member for Ebbw 
Vale had stated that problems emanating from party demands for 
32 B. L.,, Ede Diary, vol. 6,13-7.42 
33 Ibid., vol. 6914,7.42 
34 T-. R. O. Ed136/215, Ede to Butler, 9.9.41 
35 Infra p . 165 
36 B. L. , Ede Diary , Vol - 7122.1.43 
37 P. R. O. Ed136/215tPaper by M. A. Hamilton, 23-7.41 
38 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 6.8,41 
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contested elections would be Ilendemic", Ede replied to Bevan that 
he "recognised that was his long word for the day., 139 A dislike of 
snobbery did not extend to denying himself the advantages in debate 
of a better education than that of an adversary. Nor did it make 
him sympathetic to more recently established institutions of learning 
which were trying to establish their reputations in competition with 
the ancient seat of learning which he himself attended. Some of 
these universities, including Reading, Southampton and Exeterl were 
dismissed as "little more than teacher training colleges. " 
40 
One 
story told about him was that he had argued at a N. A. L. T. Conference 
that race horse-owners should be allowed to take advantage of the 
beneficial exemption clauses of the 1936 Education Act. 
41 
By these 
clauses certain young workers were exempted from the main effect of 
the Act, which was to raise the leaving age to 1-5. The Act was 
in the event prevented from coming in to force by the outbreak of war 
in 1939, but the story shows how Ede was suspected of abandoning Labour's 
aim of raising the leaving age for all pupils as a result of his identi- 
fication with interests local to his home area which were certainly not 
working class, whilst Tawney and others were campaigning vigorously 
against the principle of exemptions. 
42 
This isolation from his party's 
educational spokesmen in the Advisory Committee extended to the National 
Association of Labour Teachers. Not highly regarded by those prominent 
in the Association's affairs, he kept his eye on developments within 
the Association through his Surrey N. U. T. colleague, J. V. Strudwickq 
who was a member of N. A. L. T. 's Executive Committee. Perhaps his lack 
of regard for N. A. L. T. and the Advisory Committee was partly a response 
to their attitude towards him, but there was also a difference in 
political outlook. He was irritated by what he regarded as their 
undue pessimism and their failure to understand the burdens of office, 
agreeing to address a London N. A. L. T. meeting in order to undo the 
39 B. L., Ede Diary, vol-7,24.2.43 
40 P. R. O. M136/215jEde to Butler, 17.9.41 
41 E. Denington, Secretary of N. A. L. T. 9 interviewed by the present 
writer, 10.3-77 
42 Vide W. E. A. /R. H. Tawney What is Beneficial Employment? London 1938 
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"pessimistic work Cove has been doing, 1143 When party discipline was 
threatened he was amongst those who wrote to Attleel urging that a 
firm stand should be made against rebels. 
44 
He w, as proud that he 
could claim to have voted in every one of the 1,005 Commons divisions 
during the life of the second Labour government. 
Labour's voice at the Board was thus that of a man who had great 
experience and knowledge, but who was not the intimate of either his 
colleagues at the Board or those of his fellow party members who were 
most keenly interested in education. He was to form a successful 
working association with his senior ministerial colleague and was to 
serve the Board well as a link with the non-conformists and the 
teachers, but his relations with his party colleagues were to present 
problems in the promotion of party policies. 
The denominational question 
The controversy over the dual system - the one enormous and un- 
avoidable obsta-cle to the introduction of a bill and a major cause 
of delay in 1942 and 1943 - presented peculiar difficulties for the 
Labour Party. Not only did it threaten to make a new act bef ore the 
end of the war unlikely, but it also divided and weakened the party, 
and had the effect of making it join the consensus already noted. 
There was almost a 'run for cover', a need to be part of a non- 
controversial, non-sectarian, even non-party consensus. 
The Conservative Party had to face the same problem of voters 
and M. Ps. who were as much members of a church as they were supporters 
of a political party. In its case the church in question was for the 
most part the Church of England, which came to terms with the govern- CD 
ment quite quickly* Although the Conservative M. P., Henry Brooke, 
spoke frequently during the Committee stage of the Bill in order to 
improve the Anglicans' side of the. bargain which had been struck 
43 B. L., Ede Diary vol. 6 , 12-7.42. Cove was a Labour M. P. and leading 
member of N. A. L. T. Vide p. 68 
. 44 A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin (2 vols. ), vol. 2, 
London 19671p. 233 
32- 
before the introduction of the Bill, there was no longer any party 
problem for the Conservatives. 
Labour's problem was much more acute, for a high proportion of its 
M. Ps. were either non-conformist or Roman Cathalic themselves or re- 
presented areas where the population was predominantly one or the other. 
The former had the grievance of single-school areas, i. e. village 
elementary schools which were usually Anglican and to which perforce 
non-conformist parents had to send their children in spite of their 
antipathy to the denominational teaching and ethos. The latter, having 
adopted the view that all denominational Roman Catholic schools should be 
wholly financed by the state whilst the priest kept control, denounced 
any proposal which fell short of this as a special levy on Catholic 
parents and an attack on liberty of conscience. The vulnerability of 
Labour M. Ps. to pressure from the Roman Catholic authorities had been a 
significant factor in the failure of Trevelyan's Bill in 1931- Then 
Labour M. Ps., confronted by a campaign waged principally by Archbishop 
Downey of Liverpool, had been issued with a directive to avoid giving 
any pledges. Much to Trevelyan's annoyance many did not feel strong 
enough to hold s. uch a line. 
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Downey was still installed at Liverpool 
and took a prominent part in the negotiations of the 1940s. 
A pre-war dispute in Liverpool had again highlighted the problem 
for Labour and was fresh in people's memories as the campaign for 
educational reform gathered support in the early 1940s. The Labour- 
controlled local education authority was faced with the problem of 
many black-listed schools, more than half of which were Roman Catholic. 
It had tried to hasten the re-organization of its schools by using the 
1936 Education Actl which authorized the payment of grants by councils 
to church school bodies in order to facilitate the raising of the 
45 D. W. Dean, 'The difficulties of a Labour Educational Policy: The 
Failure of the Trevelyan. Bill, 1929-31', British Journal of 
Educational Studies, vol. XVII, no-3, October 1969, pp. 293-299 
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leaving age to 15, to f inance the rebuilding of Roman Catholic 
schools in the city, The Conservatives had responded by conducting 
their municipal election campaign in November 1937 on the basis of 
the slogan, "No grants to denominational schools" and they had won. 
The dispute had national significance and was widely reported. 
The identity between Labour Party supporters and adherents of the 
Roman Catholic faith in this area was evident, and yet no electoral 
advantage had resulted. These events had their impact on the party. 
Such a 11ýortonl s fork" was to be avoided if at all possible. 
46 
A recurrent f eature of the Committee proceedings of the Bill was 
an internecine Labour battle over this questiong with several back- 
bench members - notably Stokes and Tinker - seizing every opportunity 
to move amendments which would increase state aid to Roman Catholic 
schools, and non-conformist Labour M. Ps. warning the government that 
further concessions to the Catholics would provoke a revolt from their 
quarter. Stokes and Tinker had much more to say in Committee than 
most other Labour M. Ps., including the party's front bench spokesmen. 
Similarly the Welsh Labour M. Ps. acted as a defence association for 
the non-conformist position as much as they stood for Labour's educa- 
tional programme. 
The prominence of the denominational question thus presented an 
acute problem for Labour and made it nervous of promoting any 
educational proposal which did not command wide support outside the 
party. As an instrument for change the Labour Party was therefore 
gravely weakened. 
***** 
The conditions for the achievement of radical reform, such as was 
implied by the Labour policy of promoting multilateral schools instead 
of secondary edu. cation segregated into three parts, were thus unpro- 
pitious. Spens and the Board's officials were opposed to it. Labour's 
46 P. R. O. Ed136/145 contains papers on the Liverpool dispute. 
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parliamentary position, its vulnerability to schism on the church 
school question and the relations between its minister at the 
Board and its educational leadership all detracted from the party's 
effectiveness as an agency of reform. In addition the grouping of 
reformers around a set of policies upon which all could agree 
limited the scope for change. On the other hand Labour was in the 
governmentt. albeit as a junior partnerl there was a strong and 
widely-admitted desire for social change, and Labour was evidently 
increasing itselectoral popularity. If there were difficulties in 
achieving the fundamental change in secondary education policy which 
multilateral schooling entailed, there seemed every chance that by 
the end of the war legislation would have been passed to guarantee 
equality between the three existing types of secondary school in 
terms of staffing, building, access and length of school life. If 
there were obstacles to the fulfilment of Labour's objectives, hopes 
for progress were high. Describing the atmosphere of 1940 as a 
"ferment", H. C. Dent commented that-i "In 1941 the ferment spread 
rapidly. " 
47 
Optimism was in order. 
7 47 H. C. DentjEducation in Transition, London 1944, p. 163 
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Chapter 2: THE MAKING OF THE GREEN BOOK 
Two main problems arise from a consideration of the Green Book, 
Education After the War - the contribution of the Board's officers to 
the policy-making which culminated in the 1944 Act: to what extent was 
it not only the starting point for discussions but in some measure 
the limit on all subsequent discussion, and why did the Board's 
officers take so much trouble in their attempts to maintain the 
confidentiality of their report? 
Butler has recorded in his memoirs his view that the Green Book 
"did stimulate thinking about educational reform" even though"many 
of Cits] proposalsl notably those to do with the knotty problem of 
the Church schoolsl did not survive exposure. " 
1 This view cannot 
be sustained by a perusal of the Board's papers. 
2 
The Board's officers began their preparation of the Green Book 
because there was already much thinking about educational reformg 
the drift of which they did not like, and their aim was to channel 
and confine this thinking, not to stimulate it further. The problem 
of the church schools was the only mýýLjor issue, not the most notable 
of many such 'issues, on which the educational system after 1944 
differed in any substantial way from the proposals in the Green 
Book, the authors of which underestimated the strength of the church 
lobbies. The evidence suggests, however, that they were more 
successful in gauging the strength of the political and educational 
lobbies. 
Nor can the secrecy which the Boardts Secretary tried to maintain 
about its proposals be dismissed by quoting approvingly, as Butler 
does, Professor W. O. Lester Smith's famous Phrase about the Book's 
having been "distributed in such a blaze of secrecy that it 
achieved an unusual degree of publicity". 
3 The aim of this secrecy 
was to reach agreement with the professional elements in the 
1 R. A. ButlerThe Art of the Possible, London 197lip-93 
2 P. R. O. Ed13 the main file concerned with the officers' 
drafting of the Green Book 
3 Quoted in R. A. Butlerlop. cit_. tP-93. The quotation is from W. 
O. Lester 
Smith, To Whom Do Schools BeýqpZ7., London 19429p. 15-5 
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education service - the teachers, the local authorities and the 
education officers - and to present a fait acco! ppli to politi- 
cians who would thus be prevented from participating in the policy- 
making. Even these consultations were to be on the basis of a 
firm line already having been agreed, for the Board's officers did 
not generally hold the other sections of the education service in 
very high regardq one of them lamenting "the low average level of 
, 14 Directors of Education at present . The aim, in Holmes' words, 
was to ensure that the local authorities and teachers "should not 
go off on lines which appear to us to be unsound* ,5 
The process of drafting the Green Book excluded all political 
influence. The President and Parliamentary Secretary did not con- 
tribute to it. The Board's officers had exceedingly favourable 
conditions inwhich to make policy. The beginning of their work 
coincided with the evacuation to a hotel in Bournemouth late in 1940 
of all the chief contributors. Only the Deputy Secretary, Robert S. 
Woodq and the President's private office remained with the ministers 
in the Kingswayl London offices of the Board. Thus the gulf between 
the political heads of the Board and its chief officers was not only 
personal, but also physical. Wood occasionally contributed to the 
debate, sometimes with the resigned air of one who knows that he is not 
in the right place consistently to influence major developmentsl but 
on no occasion does his role seem to have been to convey the views of 
the ministers to whom he was close; certainly there is no written 
evidence that he ever did so, for when he did submit papers it was 
clearly on his own behalf and often because of the particular experi- 
ence which his former post as Head of Technical Branch (1936-194o) had 
given to him. 
It was the Deputy Secretary's namesake, S. H. Wood, later described 
by Butler as the civil servant "who kept us on th e progressive path, " 
6 
4 P. R. O. Edl36/212, Note by D. Du B. Davidsongthe Board's Accountant 
General, 6.11.40 
5 Ibid., Holmes to Sir George Chrystal, 24.1.41 
6 R. A. Butlerq w9P*93 
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who took the initiative in setting up committeesto formulate policies. 
7 
Holmes accepted S. H. Wood's proposals and in November 1940 arrangements 
were made to evolve a policy. 
What must be emphasized is the narrowness of the question which 
the participants set out to answer. It was, "Accepting the principle 
of Day Continuation Schools, what should be the school leaving 
8 
age 
and what should be the educational breaks during school life? " The 
question was thus the length of compulsory secondary schooling. 
There were to be sporadic attempts to argue that there was really no 
need to change the existing regulations, which were different for 
grammar,, technical and senior elementary schools, but in reality the 
case for a single code covering all post-primary schooling was accepted. 
Similarly the general case for the abolition of fees was accepted. 
But the implications for the future pattern of post-primary education 
of the main question were profound. The argument over whether 
differentiated secondary education should begin at 11 or 13 was an 
argument between those who believed in a sound general education for 
all pupils and those who believed that specialisation must begin early; 
it was an argument between those who wanted and those who did not want 
selection and segregation. At the other end of the secondary school 
age range the argument over whether the leaving age should be raised 
to 1_5 or 16 was really about whether one of the distinguishing features 
of the senior elementary school, and one which contributed to its lowly 
status, viz. the shorter course which it offered, was to be eliminated. 
These key policy matters were all involved in what Holmes, in a 
reference to the aims of the Green Book, was later to describe dis- 
ingenuously as "an administrative approach to the problem of planning. 119 
In fact the Board's officers worked out this administrative framework 
without having been set any political objectives. For the most part, 
and with exceptions that we shall consider, they based their thinking 
7 P. R. O. Edl36/212, Note by S. H. Wood, undated 
8 Ibid., Minute of meeting on 16.11.40 
9 Board of Education Education after the war, London 1941, p. 6; here- 
after referred to as the Green Book 
P. R. O. Ed136/214 contains a copy of the Green Book 
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on past principles: in particular the Hadow principle* of re- 
organizing the upper parts of elementary schools to provide the 
secondary education for the majority of children, and the 1936 
Education Act's decision (set aside for the duration of the war) to 
raise the leaving age to 15- The Board's officers in general were 
not thinking in terms of major advancesq let alone major changes in 
policy. 
That the Board's oýficers saw themselves as policy-mý-. Rers 
faute de mieux, since they were without political directives from 
their political heads, is not open to doubt. Few Presidents hadrecently 
exercised much influence over the Board. Harold Laski was to approve 
of Butlers when he had been in office fox less than two years, simply 
because he was "the f irst in his of f ice who was not a transient and 
emba-rrassed phantom. " 
10 
In fact in the nineteen years between the 
resignation of Fisher in 1922 and the appointment of Butler in 1941 
there had been eleven tenancies of the presidency, and in general 
they had not been highly regarded by professional educationists, 
The longest-serving of them, Lord Eustace Percy, told a story in an 
after-dinner speech in 1929 about "an old and respected schoolmaster" 
who had said to him, "My dear boy, I am glad to see you in this position. 
I once played bridge with a President and a Parliamentary Secretary of 
the Board of Education. Neither of them knew anything about education, 
and one of them did not even know anything about bridge. " 
12 
It must also be noted however that there is no evidence of the offi- 
cers' ever having sought political directives. In summoning the first 
meeting of the groups which were to plan the Green Book, Holmes noted 
the work which many bodies were doing to prepare their recommendations 
on post-war educational reconstruction and observed, "I think this is 
a matter in which the Board should lead rather than follow. 1113 He 
10 P. R. O. Ed136/266 Memorandum of Labour Party deputation to Butler, 
25.2,43 
11 Charles Trevelyan had been President twice, as had E. F. L. Wood, 
although Wood was known as Lord Irwin and then Viscount Halifax 
during his second term of office 
12 Speaking to Institute of Certified Grocers at Hotel Cecil, London; 
reported in Manchester Guardian. 15.2.29, p. 10 
13 P. R. O. Ed136/212jNote by Holmes, 5-11.40 
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foresaw that at a later stage some representative committee might be 
set up to evaluate all of these policy statements and that, should 
this occur, the Board should have ready its own views on what it 
wanted to happen. His memorandum is explicit. Their work was to 
formulate "our own views as to the educational changes which we should 
like to see in a post-war world. " 
R. S. Wood argued in addition that, for their views to be accepted in 
the political climate after the war, and not rejected in favour of more 
radical solutions, the Board should recognise how far they might have 
to go to accommodate the demand for change which the war had stimu- 
lated. In a note to Holmes, 
14 
remarkable for its insig . ht into the 
radicalism which the war had inspired and for its forecast in 1940 of 
the Labour electoral landslide in 1945, he raised the spectre of the 
Board's advice being rejected. "There is good reason", he wrote,, "to 
think that our masters will not be content to rely solely on the advice 
of officials: advice will also be sought from persons outside, and 
it is not difficult to guess some who may be included in their number. 
. 
At some stage these persons may be brought into association with 
officials or they will be asked to review official schemes... Mean 
and meagre planning will be disregarded and official views discounted, 
and others will be asked to design the tNew Jerusalem9ell Lest it be 
thought that Wood was arguing in favour of the civil servants putting 
themselves in the van of educational reform, it must be stressed that 
he was concerned with the maintenance of their position as the con- 
trollers of educational policy-making. He wanted them to embrace the 
ideas of change only insofar as this was necessitated by the need to 
stave off the intrusion of 'outsiders', viz. politicians. He empha- 
sized that he was not arguing that they should "knock down our edifice 
and start rebuilding afresh. " An example of this hostility to tout- 
siders' was the uninhibited attack on the W. E. A. made by Holmes in 
14 Ibid., Note by R. S. Wood, Policy and Planning for Post-War Education 
dated 17-1.409but must in fact be 17-1.41; P. R. O. Ed136/217 
contains another copy and the date on this has been altered to 
17-1.41 
4o 
January 1941 when he learned that a deputation had seen Greenwood as 
Minister without Portfolio- "I am shocked to learn that Greenwood and 
Chrystal have received a deputation from the W. E. A., of all bodiesq'I 
he wrote to Ramsbothamo 
15 His shock was that ministers should "give 
ear to everybody that has some grievance to air or some axe to grind, " 
adding ironically, "God f orbid that it should be thought that the 
views of officials have any particular validity. " R. S. Wood explained 
that "Chrystal's office... is becoming the repository of all the ideas 
16 
of every crank in the country. " It is worthy of note that the 
deputation of fourg whose audacious attempt to influence the shape of 
Post-war education had provoked this outbursts included Professor 
Tawney and Harold Shearman. 
The method by which the Board's officers reached their decisions 
was important. The Board had no existing means of examining the 
whole of the educational systeml and, as we have seen, they set 
themselves a limited task. At the initial meeting on 16 November 
1940 the group summoned by Holmes divided into a panel of principal 
assistant secretaries and a panel of chief inspectors, the latter 
being required to consult an Educational Theory Panel which already 
existed as part of the Board's consultative arrangements. In the 
event all three panels submitted reports to Holmes, In practice the 
principal assistant secretaries often quoted the chief inspectors 
of their own branches in support of the views which they were advo- 
cating, so that the division into panels was of little consequence. 
What was of consequence was that the principal assistant secretaries 
and inspectors looked at every proposal in terms of whether it would 
solve the problems of the institution (elementary school, secondary 
school or junior technical college) which it was their daily work to 
ponder. Not only was their approach empirical, but their empiricism 
was applied to the institutions which they knew and assumed must 
15 P. R. O. Edl 36/260, Holmes to Ramsbotham, r29.1.41. Chrystal was the 
secretary at Greenwood's office 
16 Ibid., R. S. Wood to Holmes930-1.41 
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continue and not to the educational system as a whole. S. H. 'ý'jood had 
foreseen this difficulty, and it was in order to overcome it that he 
had proposed the setting up of panels in the first pl; ýlice. He had 
predicted difficulties if each branch thought about its problems in 
isolation. Nonetheless, that is what seems to have happened. 
Holmes himself did not take part in most discussions, attending only 
when an impasse had been reached or conclusions awaited final approval. 
The significant figures were the principal assistant secretaries who 
headed the Board's elementary, secondary and technical branchesl 
W. C. Cleary, G. G. Williams and H. B. Wallis. 
William Cleary had entered the Board's service at the age of 24 
in 1910. He had started as a junior inspector of elementary 
education and his experience included four years as a principal 
private secretary to three Presidents (such was the rapidity of change) 
bef ore he became head of the elementary branch in 1940. He was an 
open-minded man, and his situation encouraged such an approach. A 
division was bound to be made between the primary and secondary parts 
of his elementary empire. The senior elementary school was essentially 
a negative institution by origin in the sense that pupils were not chosen 
for it and did not choose it, but went there because continued education 
after 11 was compulsory and it was accepted that the curriculum had to 
be extended beyond the basic skills. In spite of the many promising 
developments in their curricula which educationists notedt such schools, 
in contrast to the secondary schools, had no traditions, no network of 
associations, no vested interests. Yet whilst this meant that they 
were too weak to claim attention equal to that given to the grammar 
schools in the discussions at the Board, their very weakness became an 
argument used by those who wanted segregation to continue. It became 
a stock argument of the grammar school lobby that it did not want the 
attractions and strength of academic study to stifle the promising 
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embryo curricular developments of the senior elementary schools which 
their existing freedom, based of course on their separateness 
the mainstream of secondary education, gave them. 
17 It was Cleary, 
aided by the chief inspector for elementary education, R. H. Charles, 
who argued the case on occasions for the multilateral school and, as 
a compromise, for common schooling between 11 and 13 in modern schools. 
Griffith Williams, head of secondary brancht taught at two public 
schools, Wellington and Lancing, during the 1914-18 war and entered 
the Board's service in 1919. In 1935 he took over from Cleary as 
Lord Halif, -ýxl s principal private secretary and continued in the post 
when Oliver Stanley became President. He was the most committed 
of the three officials. Butler later described him as "the tradi- 
tionalist" in the group, 
18 Certainly he was immersed in public and 
grammar school traditions, knew clearly what these required of the 
public education system, had frequent contacts with all of the 
organizations representing those interests and was very knowledgeable. 
A former Deputy Secretary of the Boards clearly out of sympathy with 
many of the goals embraced by s9me members of the Spens Committee, 
had attributed what he. considered to be the unexpected emergence of 
at least a measure of coherence in the Spens Report to the "clear- 
mindedness of Mr. G. G. Williams" 
19 
who, as an assistant secretary at 
that time, had done much of the committee's drafting. Williams was 
thus applauded as the man who ensured that the Board's views were 
prominent in the key recommendations about the future pattern of post- 
primary education* Williams was also secretary of the Secondary 
Schools Examination Council, which at this time was promoting changes 
in the school certificate examinations. He frequently attended 
meetings of the Headmasters' Conference. He was to be a major influ- 
ence on both the Fleming and Norwood Committees, which he and his 
counterpart in the inspectorate, F. R. G. Duckworth, served as two of the 
17 M. Loukes, 12he Pedigree of the Modern School%British Journal of 
Educational Studieslvol. VII, no. 2, May 1959, pp. 125-139. Loukes 
commented that the '1944 Act only performed the "legal ceremonial 
of declaring the secondary modern school open", for "when it was 
christened it was already a sturdy toddler with a mind of its own 
Loukes' comment exemplifies the attitude that the senior elementary 
school had virtues which deserved to be preserved 
18 R. A. Butlerso ocltoiP-93 3T L 
19 P. R. O. Edl 3ý71-S-l -, E. G. Howarth to Holmes, 13.6-38 
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three assessors appointed by the Board. 
Williams was far better placed than the other two to protect 
his corner and this is how he seems to have seen his function. 
Whilst he saw the need to accept the abolition of fees for the 
tactical reasons which R. S. Wood had outlined, and because fees were 
incompatible with selection by ability, he did not at any stage waver 
on two principles: that a grammar school education had to start at 
119 and that pupils had to be selected for it at that age and be 
educated separately from others. 
Cleary's and Williams' counterpart in the technical branch,. H. B. 
Wallis, was a much less influential figure. It is significant that 
Butler, when listing and commenting upon his "quite outstanding group 
of civil servants", 
20 
does not even mention Wallis, although he was 
head of technical branch t1troughout Butler's presidency of the Board. 
He had been appointed to that post in 1938. He represented the view, 
which was widely held at that time, that Britain's future industrial 
success and therefore prosperity depended on diverting some of the 
ablest children. from the academic tradition of the grammar school 
into a technical or commercial education. He wanted a share of the 
talented children who were going to the grammar school, and believed 
that technical education would tend to flourish if the existing link 
between junior technical colleg-es, and their parent colleges were 
maintained. 
The six policy-makers - Holmes, R. S. Wood, S. H. Woodg Clearyq Williams 
and Wallis, - were all of the same generation, being aged between 50 
and 58- With the exception of Williams, who had not joined the Board 
until 1919, they had all begun their careers there between 1909 and 
1911. They had thus completed about 30 years' work in the same 
government department. They were steeped in the philosophy of Hadow, 
with its re-organization of elementary schools to provide secondary 
20 R. A. Butler, eiP-93 
a 
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education for the mass of the population alongside the school 
for the selected minority. They were also used to change being 
affected at a leisurely pace. Their thoughts were constricted by 
their long experience. 
However conservative were these men's inclinationsl they all had 
to accept that change was inevitable. Butler was later to describe 
his Bill to Holmes as being about making "'progress with social 
evolution". 
21 
The phrase could h&ve been Holmes' own, for he 
and his colleagues aimed to adjust the administrative framework of 
the education service and the pattern of its schools to what they 
conceived to be the new social outlook. This outlook was hostile to 
privilege, but not democratic. The principal change which they 
regarded as inevitable was that entry to secondary schools, now 
increasingly called grammar schools, should be on the basis of 
attainment and that parental income should play a reduced part or no 
part at all. R. S. Wood, for example, considered the case for the 
1122 abolition of fees to be "unanswerable 0 Cleary, and to a lesser 
extent R. S. Wý)odj were to be the only ones to challenge the established 
pattern of post-primary schooling. 
When S. H. Wood sent the draft report of the Principal Assistant 
Secretaries' Panel to Holmes in January 1941,23 he apologized for 
the inconsistencies which resulted from trying to reconcile irrecon- 
cilable views, but in fact strong majority views emerged on three 
main issues. 
Firstly there was no intention to raise the leaving age beyond 
15. The report was divided into long and short range policies. As 
a long range policy 16 was stated to be desirable, but in the section 
on short-range policy it was stated that, "we attach little immediate 
importance to our suggestion that the upper age of full-time compul- 
sory education should be 16.11 Wood, in his letter, made it clear 
21 P. R. O. Edl36/444, Butler to Holmes, 16.12.43 
22 P. R. O. Edl36/212, R. S. Wood's Note of 17-1.41 
23 Ibid., S. H. Wood to Holmes 9.1.41 enclosing Draft Report to the 
Secretary of the Panel of the P. A. Ss 
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that the inclusion of a reference to 16 was "for good tactical 
reasons". The report in fact argued strongly against the raising 
of the school leaving age to 16 on the gr , ounds 
that there was no 
prospect that "the type of education which can be universally pro- 
vided justified requiring every type of child to remain at school 
until that age. " The clear assumption was that modern school 
education was to be of too low a quality to make it possible f or 
public opinion to accept that it should be compulsory beyond 15. 
Secondly the report noted the relevance of schooling to subse- 
quent employment and that the senior schools. were mainly f or "those 
who will find their careers in the humbler walks of industry and 
commerce and domestic occupations. " They saw no need to alter that, 
although they did consider it desirable to divert some pupils from 
grammar to technical education because of the "demands of industry 
and commerce*" 
Thirdly, having considered alternatives, they recommended transfer 
at 11 to modern and grammar schoolst with a second transfer for some 
pupils at 13 from both to technical schools* At 13 also children 
misplaced at 11 were to be exchanged between modern and grammar 
schools. 
The similarity between this scheme and the system of secondary 
education throughout much of England and Wales after the war is 
striking. That it was put together within ten weeks of the initial 
meeting called by Holmes and that it was to survive all the pressures 
of public debate and campaigning over the next few years is evidence 
of its nature as an extension of the policy which the Board had been 
following since the 1920s. 
24 
Although these views were presented to Holmes as the agreed 
report of the P. A, Ss. 1 Panels there were two other views which 
24 Vide B. SimongThe Politics of Educational Reform, 1920-1940, 
London 1974, 
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continued to be pressed. The report was a defeat for R. S. Wood and 
Cleary, but neither gave up their points of view. The two men had 
one thing in common which distinguished them from their colleagues. 
In addition to their appreciation of the administrative problems, 
they understood the social changes which were taking place at the 
time and foresaw the consequences of these for the post-war period. 
They differed only in the extent of their enthusiasm in embracing 
the multilateral school as the means by which these aspirations 
could be satisfied. 
We have already noted Wood's understanding of the social up- 
heaval which the war was causing and his recognition that a change 
in political control might follow the war. He wrote to Holmes that 
"it is clear that the war is moving us more and more in the direction 
of Labour's ideas and ideals and the planning for a national 'New 
Order' will be more towards the left than may generally be imagined 
now. 112_5 Wood felt that these interests would be satisfied by trans- 
ferring all pupils at 11 to modern schools based on the existing 
senior schools, with transfer at 13 to grammar and technical schools. 
He met the objection that some pupils would have to transfer twice 
by observing that under the proposed scheme those going to technical 
school would already have to do so, and by claiming that vocational 
ambitions would be clearer at this later date. He considered the 
multilateral school to be the answer "in many areas where schools are 
not so thick on the ground. " 
26 
Cleary held similar views, although for him the multilateral 
school was the answer, and a common school for all pupils between the 
ages of 11 and 13 a compromise. His reaction to the panel's report 
was to recognize it as a defeat for himself. His criticism of his 
colleagues' approach was fundamental. "Modern large scale war, and 
2_5 P. R. O. Edl36/212, R. S. Wood's Note of 17.1.41. There was one 
particular furrow which Wood ploughed alone amongst the Board's 
officials. He had earlier proposed the revival of the Militia 
Act, but with the lower age of 18, which he thought would "go a 
long way to breaking down class misunderstandings... at any rate 
among the men. " As an afterthought he added that something 
similar would be needed for the vomen. 
26 Ibid., Note by R. S. Wood, Educational Reconstruction, 20.11.40 
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particularly a 'total' war of democracy against dictatorEhip, 
Ermphasizes the essential unity of the nation, the common interests 
of all its members and the need for making a reality of the demo- 
cratic system which we profess to be defending, " he wrote. "This 
tendency of thought and feeling must lead to a greater merging of the 
different sections of the community and the breaking down of social 
and economic barriers and privileges. To this social revolution the 
schools will be expected to conform and to contribute, and indeed 
they may be its chief help as they could be its greatest obstacle if 
the types of post-primary education were to remain as sharply distinct 
as they are at present. " 
27 
Cleary's argument was that Hadow re-organization and the 1936 
Education Act, the bases of his colleagues' thinking, were quite 
inadequate in the circumstances and that the panel must go beyond 
ideas of parity between different institiitions and accept the notion 
of multilateral schools. "The obvious and perhaps the only satis- 
factory answer, "he wrote, " is the multilateral post-primary school 
attended by all children over 11 alike. " He recognized the 
existence of problems, but urged that the idea should not be dismissed, 
since it offered the possibility of "the only full solution of the 
problem of a truly democratic education. " 
Acknowledging his failure to convince his colleagues, Cleary 
tried in February 1941 a direct approach to Holmes. 
28 
He expressed 
succinctly his fear that educational policy might be used to frustrate 
social policy thus, "... inasmuch as higher education is to be given 
in three distinct types of schools, grammar, technical and modern, 
each aiming at different types of careers for its pupils, the schools 
will continue to accentuate the social distinctions between these 
careers which it will be the aim of social policy to eliminate. He 
again advocated multilateral schools, and, as a less satisfactory 
27 
. 
Ibid., Note by Cleary, Post-War Social Development and its Effects 
on Schools, 13-1.41 
28 Ibid., Note by Cleary, Reconstruction Policy in Education. General 
Memo. Note by Mr. Cleary, 1.2.41 
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alternative where practical considerations made them impossible 
immediately, Wood's scheme of common schooling for the 11 to 13 
year olds. 
One of the weaknesses in Williams' case was the difficulty of 
claiming convincingly that all selection at 11 would be accurate. 
Williams and his supporters had tried to answer this criticism, by 
advocating genuine re-assessment and transfer at 13- Cleary 
attacked this argument, pointing out that it would only be possible 
if the courses in the three types of school were the same and that, 
if this were the case, there was no need for three separate schools. 
Accurately foretelling the future, he added, "I do not believe, 
human nature and the pull of the grammar school being what they are, 
that once you get children into a grammar school at 11 you will ever 
get them transferred to a modern school at 13-" 
This conflict between Cleary and the rest of the P. A. Ss. I Panel 
was mirrored in the Inspectors' Panel, where Cleary's elementary 
colleague, R. H. Charles, found himself similarly isolated. The 
29 
report of the Inspectors' Panel, . ; as summarized by Williams, 
followed the lines of the P. A. Ss. ' Panel. After it had been dis- 
cussed between the inspectors and Holmes, Charles sent a memorandum 
to Holmes just as Cleary had done. 
30 He supported the proposal of 
Cleary and R. S. Wood for common schooling between 11 and 13. His 
argument was an educational one, stressing that, "the best foundation 
for speciali6ing in any direction is a sound general education. " 
This could not be completed by 11. He was impressed by the vitality 
of many senior schools and had confidence that, given better buildings 
and more staff, they could undertake the role allotted to them under 
this scheme. 
Wallis, speaking for technical branch, had sympathy with the 
11-13 common school proposal, but for a very limited reason, and 
29 Ibid., Note by Williams, Summary Note on Post-War Policy, undated 
30 Ibid., Charles to Holmes, 11.2.41 
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not the fundamental reason which Cleary had advanced. He was 
anxious to raise the status of technical schools. He criticised 
his panel's view on the ground that technical schools would remain 
the grammar schools' poor relations. 
31 Once he felt that Cleary, 
Wood and Charles had lost their case, he changed courses a little, 
and advocated that children should be selected at 11 for grammar/ 
technical courses on the basis of attainment, and be chosen specifi- 
cally for the one or the other at 13 on the basis of aptitude, not 
attainment. The interests of the majority of pupils not chosen at 
11 for this course did not concern him. 
The battle lines were thus drawn. Cleary and Charles stood 
for multilateral schools, with common schooling from 11 to 13 as a 
compromise which would be supported by R. S. Wood and possibly by Wallis. 
Williams and Duckworth, head of secondary branch and chief inspector 
for secondary schools, defended the needs as they saw them of the 
grammar school. 
Support for the former then came from the Education Theory Panel 
which the inspectors had been charged to consult. Unfortunately for 
the panel, it was. Dackworth who conveyed its views to Holmes and he 
took the opportunity to express his disapproval and to repeat his 
support for a break and segregation at 11.32 
Nonetheless Cleary saw the opportunity which the Education Theory 
Panel's report offeredg Leaving aside his advocacy of multilateral 
schools for the moment, he decided to press the compromise proposal 
of common schooling between 11 and 13- Rather cheekily he sent to 
Holmes on 28 February 
incorporating this pri 
Three days later 
to HolmeS34 he listed 
his own re-draft of chapter 1 of the Green Book, 
: )Posal*33 
Williams responded. In a sharply-worded note 
the support for the break at 11, including that 
of the Spens Committee, and emphasized the practical difficulties of 
31 Ibid., Note by Wallis, Note on S. H. Wood's Draft(i. e. that referred 
to in footnote 22), 11.1.41 
32 Ibid., Duckworth to Holmes, 14.2.4i, enclosing The Breaks in the 
Education System. Duckworth had already expressed his views, 
in support of Williams and as a riposte to Cleary's approach 
to 
Holmes, in conversation with Holmes on 11 and 14 February and 
in a memorandum to him on 17 February 
33 Ibid., Cleary to Holmes, 28.2.41 
34 Ibid., Williams to Holmes, 3-3.41 
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altering course from that followed since Hadow. But when he ca7e 
to his defence of segregation, he was concerned solely with the 
future of the grammar schools. In a revealing comment, he com- 
plained that, inasmuch as Cleary's proposal aimed to achieve parity 
of esteem between different types of school, "the parity of esteem is 
purchased at the expense of the Grammar Scho. ols. 11 Since grammar 
schools unquestionably had the highest esteem, parity of esteem for all 
types of schools could hardly be purchased elsewhere. The remark 
reveals Williams' attitude to thl's aspiraýtion. - 
He clearly did not 
want parity between types of school. He gave his opinion. that, if 
they shared Cleary's goals, the "logical" solution was to abandon all 
notions of separate secondary schools and selection, but that, if 
they were not prepared to follow him that far, they should settle for 
the existing system, modified only to the extent that they should find 
an alternative to the existing special place examination and improve 
the buildings and staffing of senior elementary schools. Williams, 
'New Jerusalem' differed from the old only in these two ways: a new 
means of selection and better conditions in the schools to be attended 
by the majority of children. 
Three more days elapsed before Holmes resolved the conflict in 
Williams' favour. 35 The President was shortly to make a speech at 
the N. U. T. Conference at Morecambe and wished to let his audience know 
that the Board's officials would soon be discussing post-war education 
with the Union. The conflict, which Holmes always described as being 
over whether transfer should be at 11 or 13 although of course much 
more was at stake than that, was holding up progress. He announced 
that the break would be at 11. He attributed the decision to the 
President, Herwald Ramsbotham, although the President does not seem to 
have taken any part previously and can hardly have been in a position 
to do anything but accept a recommendation from Holmes. When Ramsbotham 
35 Ibid., Note by Holmes, 6.3.41 
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addressed the Lancashire branch of the N. U. T. a few days later he 
announced that reconstruction plans were being considered and outlined 
the basis of Board thinking, although the continuation of a break at 
11 was assumed rather than stipulated. He concentrated rather on the 
other end of secondary schooling, which had of course been the subject 
of the question pondered by the officials, stating, "What I want is the 
school leaving age to be raised to 15 as soon as ever circumstances 
permit, day continuation classes for all boys and girls up to the age 
of 18, and - though this is a remoter objective and will take much 
longer to attain -I should like to see our secondary or post-primary 
schools so remodelled and so extend6d. that in due course all boys an d girls 
up to the age of 16 can be furnished with an education suitable to their 
various tastes and capacities. 1136 
Holmes left open the possibility that Cleary could raise the matter 
again, by saying that, if teachers and local education authorities wished 
to discuss the age of transfer, then they were of course free to do so. 
For the moment Cleary had lost his battle, although another opportunity 
was to arise for him to press the point in the future. Two more months 
were needed to complete the Green Book, but no further discussion took 
place on the nature and organization of post-primary education. 
Holmes' handling of the distribution of the Green Book shows 
clearly his belief that all should be settled by the professionals 
before the politicians were admitted to the discussion. Ramsbotham 
was compliant. On 13 May 1941 Holmes handed Ramsbotham the revised 
drafts of chapters 1 and 9, the former dealing with the new structure 
of schools including the vexed question discussed above, the latter 
dealing with the equally vexed question of the dual system. Later in 
the day Holmes sent to Ramsbotham a note asking for his permission to 
print and circulate confidentially the Green Book. 
37 Assuring 
Ramsbotham that the Board was not, committed "in the slightest degree", 
36 Reported in Times, 17-3.41 p. 2 and Schoolmaster, 20-3.41 P. 258 
37 P. R. 0. Ed136T2-12, Holmes to Ramsbotham, 13.5.41 
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he explained that the Board's officers wished to discuss these matters 
confidentially with the teachers, local education authorities and 
education officers, i. e. the other professionals. Only when these 
consultations were complete, i. e. when the professionals had formed 
a view, would the "time for ministerial determination of post-war 
policy" arise. Holmes wanted to be certain however that the Green 
Book did not contain major proposals that were "actually unacceptable" 
to Ramsbotham, since this would be "embarrassing later on". The same 
38 day Holmes had a reply concurring. Thus Holmes had established that 
no po itic an should have access to the. Green Book, whilst he had a 
measure of ministerial backing for its major proposals. To emphasize 
the point the Green Book was endorsed, "Strictly Confidential. For 
Official Use Only. " 
The Green Book was a defeat for the Labour Party's aspirations, 
both long and short term. The school-leaving age was to be raised 
only t015. Not only was secondary education to be in three types of 
school,, but they were specifically given different leaving ages of 15 
in modern schools, 15 or 16 in technical schools, and 16,17 or 18 in 
grammar schools. 
39 Direct grant grammar schools were to remain and to 
charge fees. 
Transfer to the three types of school was to be at 11. The 
casuistry over second transfers at 13 of children considered to have 
been wrongly placed at 11, which Duckworth had elaborated earlier, was 
now enshrined in the Green Book. Noting that grammar schools had to 
have a foreign language and different syllabuses in mathematics and 
science from the age of 11, he had not found this incompatible with 
general education courses between 11 and 13 to facilitate transfers, 
, 140 since "there is more than one kind of general education . The 
Green Book's phrasing was more muted, but it meant the same. If a 
"genuine review" were to take place at 13, the content of education 
38 Ibid., Ramsbotham to Holmes, 13-5.41 
39 Green Book 0 cl t 'p. 10 40 P. R. O. M13ýý2ý -2, 
ýýckworth 
to Holmes, 17.2.41 
ci 
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between 11 and 13 in the three types of school, "though differ- 
entiated in detail should in general be the same. " 
41 
As Cleary 
had pointed out earlier, if the reason why children had to be 
segregated at 11 was that they needed different courses, there was 
no point in then giving them the same course; conversely, if the 
courses were to be similar, there was no need to segregate. 
The definition of parity between the three types of school also 
echoed the views expressed earlier by Duckworth and indeed by Holmes 
himself. Duckworth had suggested that any concessions by the grammar 
school interests could not be made "without seriously lowering the 
"42 
standard of performance in those schools. Holmes' own view had 
1143 been that such a development would be "wholly undemocratic . The 
Green Book now made a similar point, defining parity in terms of equal 
44 
opportunities to enter unequal institutions. 
In short, the Green Book offered little to the Labour Party. 
41 Green Book, op. cite, p. 12 
42 P. R. O. M13ý7ý21-2, Duckworth to Holmes, 17.2.41 
43 Duckworth quoted Holmes to Holmes in the same note 
44 Green Book, op. cit., P. 7 
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ZEACTION 0-'-' THE LABOUR MOVEMENT TO THE BOCK. 
The Labour Party could not react immediately to the Green Book, 
since Holmes' restticted circulation list excluded all politicians. 
But news filtered through to the party, not just from those leaks 
which became public knowledge, but more directly from members of the 
London County Council Education Committee. 
In the arrangements which the Board had for consulting the 
local education authority associations, the L. C. C. Education Committee 
was accorded a special place and had direct consultations with the 
Board. Although the conf idantiality of the Green Book presented the 
L. C. C. with some problems, since both the Council and its Education 
Committee met in public, all members of a sub-committee which met in 
private had copies, in order that they should be able to respond to 
the Board's invitation. l H. B. Lees-Smith, who had been a Labour 
President of the Board of Education for a short while in 1931 after 
Trevelyan's resignation and was still an M. P., commented tartly that 
he was no less responsible than forty members of the L. C. C. , when lie 
2 
successfully demqnded a copy- It was clearly impossible to 
maintain confidentiality when a body as large and as politically- 
concerned as the L. C. C. was privy to the secrets. Members were 
bound to discuss the contents of the Green Book with their political 
colleagues who were not members of the Council, and this was the 
means by which many in the Labour movement came to know of the 
Board's ideas. It was indeed absurd that Members of Parliament, 
who would eventually have to legislate, should be denied access to 
proposals which some of their political counterparts in London local 
government at the other end of Westminster Bridge had been invited 
to discuss. H. C. Dent poured appropriate scorn on the attempt to 
keep secret the proposals whých educationists were keenest to know. 
1 P. R. O. Ed 136/249, Salmon (Clerk to the L. C. C. ) to Holmes, 15.10.41 
2 P. R. O. Ed 136/21.5, Ede to Butler, 5.8.41 seeking his permission to 
give copies of the Green Book to Lees-Smith and F. C. R. Douglas, M. P. 
who was Ede's Parliamentary Private Secretary. The case of 
Douglas exemplifies the restricted nature of the circulation. 
Butler readily agreed to the request. 
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"What was this famous Green Book,? " he asked, answering, "I 
cannot sayq because I was not a member of any of the bodies to 
which copies were sent. I havel. like many other interested 
people, a fairly full summary of the document, but it would be 
improper of me either to reveal how I obtained this or to use it 
for the illumination of those to whom the Board of Education in 
its wisdom, decided not to make known its contents 
0 Other 
sources of information on the Green Book's contents were the 
W. E. A, the T. U. C. Education Committee and the Co-operative Union, 
all of which were sent copies by the Board. 
4 
It was not in fact until October 1941 that the education 
dommittees of the three main parties were officially given copies 
of the Green Book. It was J. S. Middleton, General-Secretary of the 
Labour Party, who touched Butler in a tender spot and brought about 
the change of heart. It is not clear whether Middleton acted 
knowingly or whether he merely 'stumbled upon the threat which worked. 
In conversation with Chuter Ede he asked for a copy of the Green Book 
and, when he received the familiar explanation for why this was not 
possible, threatened to write to Churchill. 
5 
By this time Butler was already in a dilemma. The previous 
month he had begun to prepare Churchill for changes in the education 
system requiring legislation. Churchill's reaction was wholly 
negative. He replied, "I certainly cannot contemplate a new 
Education Bill., 116 From that point onwards Butler had to tread 
warily, continuing his preparations, but allowing no controversy to 
surface which would attract the attention of Churchill, f or whom 
educational change meant the religious controversies of 1902 and a 
divisiveness in the nation that his public persona existed to prevent. 
Butler had therefore begun to enlist the support of other members of 
3 H. C. Dent, Education in Transition, London 1944, pp-2CA-205 
Dent late*r observed, 'Viost of the organisations which were sent 
the Green Book replied volubly, and with no pretence at secrecy. 
Many sent their replies simultaneously to the Board of Education 
and the Press", H. C. Dent, 1870-1970 Century of Growth in English 
Education, London 1970, P. 116 - 
4 I. R. O. Ed. 136/293 contains a copy of the circulation list 
5 P. R. O. Ed. 136/215, Unsigned memorandum of the Middleton-Ede 
conversation and Butler's subsequent action, 2.10.41 
6 Quoted in R. A. Butler, op cit., p. 94 
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the cabinet. Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council, 
for example agreed with him that there were "distinct stirrings 
below the surface in the realm of social affairs" and that the Board 
should continue to "do work behind the scenes" in order to be ready 
when the time was right. 
7 
Butler also asked Holmes to DreDare a 
note on how much of the Green Book's proposals could be carried out 
without legislation. 
8 
Middleton's threat to approach Churchill 
might have upset this clandestine technique of promoting educational 
reform. 
Butler had always been embarrassed by the decision to be 
secretive. The decision had been taken technically by his 
predecessor Ramsbotham, although in rhality by Holmes, and Butler 
had never been happy about it. Indeed, soon after taking up office 
he had considered how he could extricate himself from this difficulty. 
His initial idea9 had been to establish in the Summer of 1942 a joint 
committee of both Houses of Parliament with all parties represented. 
The Board would have spent the interim formulating its proposals 
which the joint committee would have been invited to consider. The 
joint committee would have heard views from all interested parties 
and, if it produced an agreed report, legislation would have been 
assured an easy passage through Parliament. Such a procedure would, 
of course, have released Butler himself from having to reach some 
difficult decisions and may have held attractions for him for that 
reason, but it does seem that he also had a genuine desire for wider 
discussion. One of the arguments which he put to Holmes was that, 
by confining discussion to those professionally involved in education, 
they would not be sure "that the whole English character is 
represented, nor shall we be able to hold the confidence of the 
7 P. R. O. Ed. 136/215, Butler to Holmes, 1.10.41; the quotations are 
from Butler's report of Anderson's views. 
8 Ibid., Holmes to Butler, 30-9.41 was Holmes' reply to Butler's 
request 
9 Ibid., Butler to R. S. Wood, 2.9.41 
57 
country, since fears will grow that a 'corner' is being effected. " 
There were, however, far too many difficulties in the way of Butler's 
scheme, not least the objections of Chuter Ede, but Butler's attempt 
to widen discussion shows his discontent with Holmes' posture of 
secrecy. 
Butler now headed off Middleton's approach to Churchill and 
attempted to widen discussion at*the same time. He saw Attlee, who 
agreed that the Green Book could not -be published but made the point 
that the T. U. C. and other bodies which were privy to the Green Book's 
contents were inextricably bound up with the Labour Party, and that 
it would be more sensible to let the Labour Party Education Committee 
have a copy, and that similarly the Liberals and Conservatives should 
be sent copies. The letter to the three political parties again 
10 
stressed the need for secrecy. Even then the means by which the 
Labour Party was to receive its copy was indirect. Arthur Greenwood 
was authorised to send it to Middleton, having submitted the covering 
letter to the Board. 
Butler also said that he would put a copy in the Commons Library. 
In fact he seems not to have done this, for, when he was asked in 
April 1943 to make the Green Book available to the Commons, he urged 
members to await a more developed scheme and specifically refused to 
place a copy in the Commons Library. 
12 The reason for saying in 1941 
that a copy would be made available to M. Ps. was that Churchill could 
then be told, if he were dissatisfied with Butler's action, that this 
was "more likely to keep the issues out of the forefront of public 
attention" than any other action he was at liberty to take. 
13 
Later in October Butler published a list of headings, which 
indicated to the public the main topics which were under discussion. 
14 
He later claimed that, by doing this, 
light" the Green Book's proposals. 
15 
he had pushed "forward into the 
The claim that he was 
10 Ibid., Greenwood to Butler, 8.10.41 refers to this 
11 B. L., Ede Diary, vol. 1,3-10.41 
12 H. C. Debatesq Vol-388, col. 79198.4.43 
13 Supra, footnote 5 
14 H. C. Debates, vol. 3749cols-1937-1939,23.1o. 41; written answer 
15 R. A. Butlersop. cit. tP-95 
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publicising the Board's views was not justified. Proposals were 
not included in his list, which consisted only of a brief reference 
to each topic; for example, all that was included on the question 
of the leaving age was this, "The raising of the school leaving age. 
Should there be exemptions after 14 as contemplated by the Education 
Act, 1936? " That possible legislation would include a decision on 
the leaving age and on the highly controversial aspect of a recent 
act was hardly a revelation. Butler's list was accompanied by a 
reiteration of the view that the Green Book was a confidential 
document for the Board's use in discussions with its partners in the 
education service. "Such consultations cannot properly and profitably 
be conducted in open forum", he stated. Requests for further 
information were still rejected. When Lord Justice Scott, for 
example, asked Butler for a copy of "the now famous but still mystical 
embodiment of your draf t proposals", Holmes suggested that the same 
refusal as in the past should be sent. 
16 And Butler continued to 
17 reject requests from M. Ps. 
Middleton had created more anxiety at the Board than perhaps he 
realised. The result, however, was 
of the Green Book were known to all 
concerned with -education. The only 
Association of Labour Teachers, butj 
sufficiently close contacts with the 
informed and indeed to make the most 
analysis of the Board's plans of any 
radical viewpoint. 
that by October 1941 the contents 
sections of the Labour movement 
exception was the National 
as will be seen, that had 
other sections to be well- 
thorough and trenchantly critical 
that were made at the time from a 
The National Executive Committee 
Until the Autumn of 1941, i. e. the time when the Labour Party 
16 P. R. O. Edl36/215, L. Scott to Butler, 2.2.42, endorsed by Holmes 
17 E. g. Ibid., Butler to Sir Patrick Hannon M. P., 25.6.42 
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received its copy of the Green Book, the body which was chiefly 
responsible for formulating the party's policies on education was 
the Education Advisory Committee, a sub-committee of the N. E. C. 
In October the Reconstruction Education Sub-Committee took over. 
This reported to the Reconstruction Central Committee which Harold 
Laski had persuaded the Labour Party to establish. Laski's scheme 
when proposed to the Party was sufficiently detailed to include 
suggestions about who should serve on the new Sub-Committee. 
Amongst the names were Alice Bacon, William Cove M. P., Barbara Drake, 
Hugh Franklin, H. B. Lees-Smith M. P., Lady Simon of Wythenshawe, 
Rev. E. Sorenson M. P., R. H. Tawney and George TomlinsonM-P. 
18 
All of 
them were duly appointed to the new Sub-Committee, 
19 
and since each 
of them, except Alice Bacon,, had served on the old Education Advisory 
Committee at various times between 1938 and 1941, there was thus 
continuity between the two bodies. 
At its meetings between 1938 and 1941 the Education Advisory 
Committee had formulated policies on several major aspects of 
education. In February 1939 the committee considered the Spens 
Re. port and came down strongly in f avour of multilateral schools as 
the basis of secondary education. Devoting two pages out of seven 
to arguing their case on this topic, they strengthened the commitment 
to a multilateral policy which had been included by Barbara Drake in 
the paper drafted by her as the basis of the discussion. She had 
made the limited point that there was "a strong case to be made f or 
a general development of multilateral schools as the goal of a long 
term policy, " 
20 but the committee removed this general aspiration, 
and in its place stated that, "The time has now come when local 
education authorities should be required to plan a systematic 
development of multilateral schools as an immediate practical policy. 1121 
18 T. H. qLabour Party RecordslReconstruction Central Committee 
Minutes, July 1941 
19 T. H., Labour Party Records, Reconstruction Education Sub-Committee 
Minutes, hereafter referred to as R. E. S. -C. Minutes, 25.9.41. 
All except Tawney attended this meeting; his membership dated 
from the meeting on 1.1.43 
20 T. H., Labour Party Records, Local Government Department Papers, 
L. G. 106, Memorandum on the Report of the Consultative Committee, 
January 1939. The emphasis was hers. 
21 Ibid., L. G. 109, February 1939 is the amended paper. 
T. H., Labour Party Records, Education Advisory Committee Minutes, 
hereafter referred to as E. A. C. Minutes, 13.2-39 
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Copies were despatched to Labour M. Ps. and the T. U. C. Education 
Committee. 
At its next two meetings the committee adopted two papers by 
Hugh Franklin. 22 These took the discussions much further, for 
Franklin not only argued the case against segregation and for 
multilateral schools on both educational and social grounds, but 
gave in his-second paper a detailed description of how a multi- 
lateral school should b. e organised. The committee was no longer 
looking dimly into the future. Now they had been given a model. 
Franklin's description of how a multilateral school should 
be organised bears a striking resemblance to what some educationalists 
in the mid-1970s were to regard as the ideal comprehensive school. 
He favoured a five-form entry school admitting 150 pupils a year. 
The classes would be unstreamed; 'pupils "should all feel as equal 
on entry to the multilateral school as they did on entry to the 
junior school four years earlier-" A common balanced curriculum 
would be followed for the first three years with setting by subjects. 
At the end of the third year, two-year specialised but non-vocational 
courses would begin, ýo be followed by two-year sixth form courses. 
Franklin's proposals required the end of fees, raising the school 
leaving age to 16 and the end of university-controlle, d 16+ 
examinations. 
His views differed from those of his successors in the 1970s 
only in three respects. He wanted sets to be all-age, i. e. a first 
form pupil could be alongside a third form pupil in mathematics if 
he were exceptionally advanced. The courses in the fourth and fifth 
years were to be quite heavily biased towards science, literary 
subjects, etc. He wanted all examinations at 16+ to be replaced by 
22 T. H., L. G. 112, Draft Synopsis for Post-Primary Education, March 1939, 
adopted by E. A. C. J3.3-39 
T. H., L. G. 114, New Schools for Old, April 1939, adopted by E. A. C., 
24.4-39 and referred to N. E. C. 
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a detailed school record of set placings in the lower school, 
staff assessments and a general account of a pupil's school life. 
Franklin gave the committee a sight of the future. It was a 
remarkable paper. 
He also argued that the plan was within the bounds of 
practical politics. All new buildings, of which there would in 
any case have to be many, would be designed f or the new type of 
school. Existing buildings could be used by selecting the largest, 
whether they be elementary or secondary, for the multilateral school 
and re-allocating the smaller ones for primary schools. He 
estimated that the annual cost for implementing the scheme within 
five years would require a rate of 3d in the ýE for London and 
slightly less for the home counties. He omitted the capital cost 
of new buildings which would have to be met whatever scheme were 
adopted, and based his calculation on the reduction of former 
elementary school classes to a maximum of thirty and on the 
achievment of equal salaries. 
The Education Advisory Committee then considered the politics 
of achieving its goal. It had been asked to do so by the London 
Labour Party which had declared itself in favour of a system of 
multilateral schools at its annual conference in November 1938. 
In its reply 
23 the committee assumed that, if there were a Labour 
Government, there would be no difficulty because a system of 
multilateral schools would be introduced "under the impetus of an 
Act of Parliament or Board Circular. 11 Again the committee was 
ahead of its time, for it assumed something that was not to happen 
until 1965,24 despite the election of a Labour Government in 1945. 
It gave the L. C. C. advice on how to proceed if a Conservative 
Government were in power and were hostile to the plan. The 
23 T. H. , L. G. 129 London Labour Party Resolution on Multil ateral. Schools, Junel939 
24 D. E. S., Circulax- 10/651issued by C. A. R. Crosland 
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suggestions offered were in part the basis of Labour's schools 
re-organisations in London in the post-war period, except that they 
were carried out under a Labour and not a Conservative gz)vernment. 
When the war started the Education Advisory Committee in comnon 
with all other educational bodies concentrated on the initial 
problems of war-time schooling. When it emerged from this pre- 
occupation, disagreement arose within the committee over the strength 
of its commitment to multilateral schooling. At its meeting in 
January 1941 a "certain difference of opinion as to the desirability 
of advocating a general policy of multilateral schools" was evident. 
2-5 
The problems of providing schooling for evacuated children still held 
the attention of most members of the committee, however, and the 
problem was shelved. At the next meeting consideration of a paper, 
criticising the aens Report and advocating multilateral schools as 
the answer to the problems which that report had recognised but 
failed to solve, was deferred. 
26 
This was the rather 'confused situation when the Reconstruction 
Education Sub-Committee took over. A thorough study of the policy 
on multilateral schools had been made. It had been agreed as desirable 
and practicable, but a note of doubt and dissent had entered the 
discussions following the reference of the policy to the N. E. C. 
The last contribution of the E. A. C. to the formulation of policy 
before it handed over to the Reconstruction Education Sub-Committee 
was to agree the phrase which was to. become the basis for compromise. 
At its last meeting it approved a paper which urged that the Board 
should "encourage, as a general policy, the development of a new 
type of multilateral school which would provide a variety of courses 
suited to children of all normal types. " 
27 
This formula was 
incorporated in an interim statement agreed by the new committee at 
25 T. H., E. A. C. Minutes, 29.1.41 
26 T. H., L. G. 187, The Spens Report and Multilateral Schools, April 1941 
E. A. C. Minutes, 14-5.41 
27 T. H. L. G. 219 Education after the War, Septemberig4i 
E. A. C. Minutes, 8.9.41 
The phrase was echoed in B. Drake, Education for Democracy, London 
1941, p. 40 
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its second meeting, 
28 
and shortly afterwards the Labour Party 
officially received its copy of the Green Book, which made it clear 
that the Board's officials were thinking along quite different lines. 
It was Alice Bacon who acted as custodian of the agreed wording, 
and indeed took the committee's thinking further along multilateral 
lines. In a paper which was the subject of "a prolonged discussion" 
she took the party's commitment to a general policy of enc. ouraging 
multilateral schools as her starting poin't. 
29 
She cleared out of 
the way all side issues, noting the areas in which there was almost 
universal agreement, and concentrated her attack on two points. 
It was her view that, whatever lip-service was paid to parity between 
the three types of school, such parity could not be achieved. She 
also dwelt on the difficulties of selection at 11, and on the 
inadequacy of the standard response that wrong decisions could be 
corrected at 13. She thus concentrated on the two weakest points 
in the arguments. of the Board Is Green Book and of all who wished to 
continue on the Hadow path of segregated post-primary schooling. 
Her paper ultimately tended to confuse rather than clarify the 
issues, however, for she introduced a variant to the usual concept of 
the multilateral school for areas where technical colleges had already 
been established and could not be incorprated. She proposed that 
existing secondary schools should provide all courses - academic, 
practical and commercial - except technical. Pupils wishing to 
have a technical education would be able to transfer to the technical 
college a year before the normal school leaving age, i. e. at the age 
of 14 or 15 depending on whether the leaving age were raised to 15 
or 16, and then follow a two year course; many such students would 
be encouraged to remain longer and would proceed to university. 
28 T. H. Jabour Party Records. Papers presented to the R. E. S. -C-are 
in the R. D. R. series. R. D. R. 9 Education after the War, October 1941 
R. E. S. -C. Minutes, g. lo. 41 
29 T. H., R. D. R. 88, Secondary Education, April 1942 
R. E. S. -G. Minutes, 5-5.42 
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This proposal satisfied in some measure the objectives of 
Wallis at the Board. It did at least separate the start of 
technical education from the academic selection at ll+ which had 
meant in practice that abler children had already been captured 
by the grammar school before places in the technical college 
became available. But it also undermined the fundamental basis 
of the multilateral concept, viz. that pupils should be educated 
together in the same school without selection to other schools and 
colleges. The question was further confused by Miss Bacon's use 
of an example from the West Riding - Bingley Modern and Technical 
School - which lacked the academic or grammar school element and 
which was therefore not illustrative of the solution which she 
favoured. 
It was Shena Simon who now doubted the wisdom of a commitment 
to multilateral schools. 
30 Her thinking was entirely tri-partite. 
For her the only question was whether the three branches of post- 
primary education should be in one or three schools. She noted 
that no multilateral schools existed anywhere in Britain, so that 
there was no experience of them. She saw major difficulties in 
every method of arranging such a school which she could envisage. 
If the school were a combination based on the total size of existing 
schools joined together, it would have more than 1,500 pupils, of 
whom only 90 would be in the sixth form and she doubted whether that 
number could cope. as prefects over such a large number of younger 
pupils. If the school had only 500 Pupils, the academic side would 
be too weak and no choice of subjects at school certificate level 
would be possible. She also took the view, quite common at the time, 
that modern and technical schools were doing splendid pioneering work 
and that this would be stifled in a multilateral school led by a 
former grammar school headl who would be bound by reason of his 
30 T. H., R. D. R. 107, Multilateral SchoolsqJuly 1942 
R. E. B. -C. Minutes. 9.7.42 
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academic qualifications to be appointed to direct the new school; 
it was important for modern and teehnical schools to be "free to 
develop on their own. " She doubted whether the ease with which 
pupils would move from one side of the multilateral school to 
another would be much greater than in a segregated system. For 
Lady Simon the problem of achieving parity between secondary schools 
doing different levels of work would be solved by the abolition of 
fees. If this did not in fact solve the problem, she would be 
prepared "to try the multilateral school-, " but would regret having 
to sacrifice educational to social considerations. Apart from an 
awareness of social considerations, her thinking and the deployment 
of her arguments were similar to those of the Board's officers who 
were defending Hadow. 
In August 1942 the committee was again brought to the point of 
decision, by the need to provide the Reconstruction Central Committee 
with the educational section of a report to be sent to the N. E. C. 
The agreed draft repeated the previous formula and favoured Ilas a 
general policy the development of a new type of secondary school to 
which all children would go, 
01 
Doubts continued to be expressed, however, for in January 1943 
the committee received a paper arguing strongly for a system of 
multilateral schools. The authorship is not clear, 
32 but it bears 
the stamp of Franklin, making exactly the points which he had made 
earlier. The fact that it was felt necessary to re-state these 
views is evidence that they were still meeting resistance. 
The debate within the committee was ended early in 1943. 
There was a need to finalise views which could be approved by the 
N. E. C. and then be presented directly to Butler. Meeting on New 
Year's Day 1943 the committee established a group to list the 
objectives of educational advance which were acceptable to the Labour 
Party. 33 It consisted of Harold Clay, Harold Shearman, the 
31 T. H., R. E. S. -C. Minutes, 28.8.42 refer to'discussion based on 
R. D. R. 124, a paper prepared by Harold Shearman which was approved 
after being amended. This paper is missing from Labour Party 
Records. R. D. R. 1_30 , Draft for Suggested Labour Party Pamphlet, 
September 1942, is R. D. R. 124 as amended. 
32 The paper R. D. R. 167 bears no attribution, and R. E. S. -C-Minutes, 
1.1.43 do not identify the contributor. The arguments bear close 
resemblance to those of L. G. 114 
33 T. H., R. E. S. -C. Minutes, 1.1.43 
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committee's secretary Barbara Drake and the secretary of the 
party's Research Department Morgan Phillips. A fortnight later 
the whole committee met and agreed the list. 
34 
There was no 
dissent on the need for raising the school leaving age to 15 as 
soon as the war ended and to 16 within three years of that, with 
the appointed day specified in the Act. A common code for all 
post-primary education, the abolition of fees and the assimilation 
of public schools into the state system were all agreed. However 
one significant alteration was made in the drafting group's paper. 
Instead of charging the Board to "encourage, as a general policy, 
the development of a new type of multilateral school" as had hitherto 
been the agreed wording, which the drafting group wished to retain, 
the committee now changed "encourage" to "require" . 
35 
The committee's 
view of its demands is also important, for it was emphasized that these 
should be Labour's minimum expectations and that anything less should be 
opposed in Parliament. 
Before the end of January the N. E. C. had approved the statement 
which thus became party policy. 
36 
The. way was now clear for a 
deputation to see Butler on 25 February 1943. 
The National Association of Labour Teachers 
Whilst the National Executive was clarifying its views on the 
Green Book, the party's affiliated body for teachers, the National 
Association of Labour Teacherswas being revived and was entering 
one of the most active periods of its history. It was N. A. L. T. which 
had played the leading part in formulating the concept of the multi- 
lateral school as an alternative to segregated and selective secondary 
1 37 education. In its pamphlet, Education. A Policy, first published in 
1929, it outlined an educational system based on egalitarian principles. 
The re-publication, of this pamphlet in 1935 was occasioned partly by 
the great interest aroused by the multilateral concept and N. A. L. T. 
strongly advocated the establishment of such schools. It was also 
34 Ibid., 14.1.43 
35 R. D. R. 171 is the drafting committee's paper. R. D. R. 182 
incorporates amendments agreed on 14.1.43 
36 T. H. Labour Party Records National Executive Committee Minutes', 
contain a letter from M. Phillips to members of the R. E. S. -C, 
conveying the decision of the N. E. C. 
37 N. A. L. T., Education. A Policy, London 1929. References in this 
work are to the 1935 edition 
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N. A. L. T. 's response to the announcement of Spens' terms of 
reference, which the Association feared would harden the 
distinctions between the existing secondary schools and senior 
elementary schools. N. A. L. T. 's case for the multilateral school 
was closely argued, and included detailed proposals on the internal 
organisation of such schools. Groupings of pupils, house systems, 
size, course biases were all the subjects of recommendations. 
When the. ýýens Report was published N. A. L. T. renewed its 
attack on segregated secondary schooling in a pamphlet, Social 
Justice in Public Education. Criticising the Hadow policy of 
developing new types of post-primary schools alongside old secondary 
schools, N. A. L. T. noted that even the Hadow recommendation of equal 
status for the different types had been ignored over the years. 
But the very notion that there were distinguishable kinds of ability 
at ll+ was denounced. Differences in degrees of ability were 
acknowledged, as was the emergence of subject aptitudes by some 
pupils at a later age. N. A. L. T. 's position was succinctly expressed 
thus, "For a system based upon'competition at the age of 11 for 
unequal opportunitiess in schools of unequal social standing, and 
giving courses of unequal duration under unequal conditions, we 
would ... substitute a system designed to provide the fullest 
equality of opportunity for every child to develop according to 
his natural gifts.,, 
38 
N. A. L. T. 's view of Spens was pessimistic. Its view of the 
Board's response to Spens was even more so. It rejected Spens' 
criticisms of multilateral schools, observing that Eton had 11100 
pupils whereas Spens considered a projected multilateral school of 
800 to be too. large. It noted the contradiction of Spens' having 
recommended multilateral schools in the very areas where they were 
38 N. A. L. T., Social Justice in Public Education, London undated, p. 9 
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bound to be too small. As for the Board's reaction to Spens - 
the statement that nothing could be done about the recommendations 
in Chapter IX of the Report - N. A. L. T. observed that this was the 
very chapter in which the Report made "progressive proposals" about 
parity of conditions, the abolition of fees and the raising of the 
school leaving age. 
39 
These views were formulated at a time when the Association was 
being almost destroyed by arguments over the popular front and the 
admittance of communists. 
40 
The problem continued into the 1940s 
and N. A. L. T. received (and rejected) further requests from communist 
teachers for joint action. 
41 
At its 1942 Annual Conference it was 
in the position of having to resolve to continue in being and to note 
that it was still 
. in affiliation with the Labour Party. 
42 
For the 
Association's secretary, Evelyn Denington, the obstacle to co- 
operation was not that the communists were too left-wing. It was 
that, having turned a somersault over the justness of the war, they 
would brook no criticism of the National Government. Their 
position was in her view analogous to Churchill's, whereas she 
believed that the fight for radical changes in education had to be 
waged. The problem was, however, much less acute in the early 
1940s and the executive was able to devote more energy to reviving 
the Association and formulating a response to the Green Book. Two 
officers were particularly influential in these moves, William Cove, 
the Chairmang and Evelyn Denington. 
An ex-miner who had been educated at University College, Exeter, 
Cove had been an M. P. since 1923, representing Wellingborough until 
1929, when he became the member for Aberavon in place of Ramsay 
MacDonald. Born in 1888, he had by the 1940s already. had considerable 
experience in the field of educational politics, especially in the 
National Union of Teachers, of which he had been President at the early 
age of 34. His association with the N. U. T. was from the Labour Party's 
39 Ibid., p. 14 
40 A. Tropp, The School Teachers, London 1957, p. 216, describes the 
formation of N. A. L. T. as being the result of a split in the 
Teachers' Labour League in 1927 over communist domination, and 
states that N. A. L. T. itself had to fight off communist control 
41 E. g. G. L. C., A/NLT/I/2 Executive Committee Minutes, 12.10.42 
42 Ibid., A. G. M. Minutes, 8.4.42 
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point of view both a strength and a weakness; a strength because 
it gave him contacts and status, a weakness because he was to spend 
many hours when the Bill was in its Committee stage promoting 
amendment after amendment concerned with the rightsof the teaching 
profession (and also defending his constituents' non-conformist 
interests on the church school question) rather than promoting 
Labour's aims. He became Chairman of N. A. L. T. in 1942. His 
commitment to multilateralism was made clear in the commons debate 
on the_ppens Report. 
43 
Cove was a dynamic force in the association. A radical 
Welshman with ability as an orator, he was listened to attentively 
and was in demand as a speaker. His perception and ability to see 
quickly the fundamental point of any issue were much in evidence in 
the association's monthly Bulletin. Leah Manning, a fellow N. U. T. 
sponsored M. P. until 1931, described him in a biting attack as "a 
silly little man" who would have had no political career but for 
N. U. T. sponsorship ahd who "in spite of his gilt-edged chances ... 
1144 made nothing of them. Evelyn Denington, who clearly admired him, 
has explained his lack of advancement in terms of his unreliability. 
She had to spend hours with him in the Commons bar, in order to get 
the Bulletin drafted or meetings prepared. He once told her of the 
occasion when a minister, whom he was serving as Parliamentary Private 
Secretary for a short time, was giving a poor performance and was in 
difficulty in the Commons; Cove. walked out in disgust. "An enormous 
talent, a brilliant talent, largely wasted" is how she has recalled 
him. 
45 
Nonetheless Attlee recommended Butler to consult Cove as a 
Labour M. P. interested in education. 
46 
Evelyn Denington herself had been brought into teacher politics 
by W. H. Spikes, a leading member of N. A. L. T. and a member of the N. U. T. 
43 H. C. Debatesivol-343, col-1769,15.2-39 
44 L. Manning, A Life for Education, London 1970, p. 203 
45 This paragraph and the next are based mainly on an interview 
with Evelyn Denington, conducted by the present writer, 10-3-77 
46 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Memorandum by Butler of meeting with Attlee, 
16.1.42 
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Executive. She had been brought up in a non-political household, 
since her father worked in local government and was not expected 
to be politically active. Her husband was a member of the 
Independent Labour Party and they became active at the time of the 
popular front, taking part in the care of Basque children brought 
to Britain during the Spanish Civil War. It was she who 
successfully proposed the motion in favour of multilateral schools 
at the London Labour Party, Conference in 1938.47 A few years 
before, a similar motion had been debated, opposed by Herbert 
Morrison for the Executive and defeated. Its dispirited supporters, 
who met in the tea-room afterwards, resolved to organise a campaign 
to reverse the decision at a future conference. A campaign of 
letter-writing and meetings followed. An attempt was made to 
contact every constituency party and trade union branch in the London 
area. Two retired teachers did afternoon meetings and Evelyn 
Denington, Spikes and others spoke at evening meetings. At one 
time Evelyn Denington was taking three or four meetings a week. 
The result was that, when she spoke at the Conference, most of the 
delegates were familiar with the case which she was putting. As 
she finished speaking she heard Herbert Morrison on the platform 
behind her say, "She's got them. " Only two or three hands were 
raised in opposition. She was the only primary school teacher 
amongst the small group of central London teachers who ran N. A. L. T. 
during the warg and she developed the primary school arguments for 
the end of selection. 
Evelyn Denington and Cove were the dominant influences in the 
Association. Their mouthpiece was the Bulletin to which Spikes 
also contributed and which was issued in duplicated form monthly 
between May 1942 and June 1944. 'It was a work of remarkably high 
quality, especially bearing in mind the pressures of war-time, the 
47 G. L. C., A/NLT/Vll/l, Final Agenda for the Annual Conference - of 
the London Labour Party. 26-11-38 
T. H., Labour Party Records, L. G. 129, London Labour Party 
Resolution re. Multilateral Schools, June 1939 
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Board's secrecy about its activities and the demands of Evelyn 
Denington's own work as a practising teacher. It is not difficult 
to see why "a remarkable number" of appreciative letters about it 
were received. 
48 
Each month members of the Association were provided 
with information and commentaries, usually perceptive and sometimes 
trenchant, on developments at the Board, in Parliament, and in Labour 
Party and N. U. T. affairs. 
They were almost alone in seeing through the lip-service which 
was being paid to concepts such as "parity of esteem" and through the 
hollowness of commitments to the raising of the school leavi ng age. 
Deeply suspicious of the Boardl they were able to assess - accurately 
as it was subsequently to become clear - the limited nature of the 
objectives which the Board had set itself. The view was widely held 
in the Labour Party and by other members of the N. A. L. T. Executive, 
that there were powerful reforming pressures at work and that, to 
criticise the Board, which was imagined to be with the reformers if 
not exactly in their van, might awaken the slumbering forces of 
reaction. Unwilling to accept this optimistic view, they found 
themselves subjected to criticism and attempts to control the contents 
of the Bulletin by the establishment of an editorial board. 
49 
It was 
felt that they used the Bulletin for the expression of their personal 
views, and in September 1943 it was agreed that statements in the 
name of the executive as a whole would be issued in the Bulletin on 
major questions. 
50 With the advantage of an historial perspective 
it is possible to find a more solid basis for their interpretation of 
the educational politics of the time than for that of their critics. 
Their sceptism, amongst the general euphoria which persisted in 
educational circles at the time, in spite of anxieties about the church 
school question, can be seen in their attitude to Butler. Commenting 
48 G. L. C., A/NLT/I/2, A. G. M. Minutes, 27.4.43 
49 Ibid., Executive Committee Minutes, 20.4.43 
50 Ibid., Executive Committee Minutes, 11.9.43 
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in the Bulletin on one of his Commons speeches, they wrote, "A well- 
attended house, an expectant gallery, hoped for some outlines of our 
new educational world. They expected progress, but were given 
committees ... He is not at the Board to make great democratic changes 
in education; he is there either to do nothing, or to see that we do 
not get too revolutionary. He is not an educationalist; he is a 
diplomat. , 
51 
The flavour of platform oratory in their writing can 
be seen in theii exhortation to Butler., "We say to him, as has been 
said to Cripps, Produce your planb! By all means have consultations 
with various bodies and interests, but get on with the job ... let us 
have an Education Bill. " There were doubts too about Chuter Ede's 
role at the Board. Whilst he was congratulated on his work there, 
the question was raised whether IIh6 is not being used to dull the edge 
of criticism and to divert attention to mere paper schemes. " 
N. A. L. T. had close contacts with the Education Reconstruction Sub- 
Committee and with other branches of the Labour Party. Two executive 
members, Alice Bacon and W. H. Spikes, in addition to Cdve, were members 
of the Sub-Committee. Both Spikes and Cove had previously been 
members of the Education Advisory Committee. Evelyn Denington was 
N. A. L. T. Is representative on the Standing Joint Committee of Working 
Women's Organisations and was a delegate to the Annual Conferences of 
Labour Women. 
The Association began to formulate its response to the Green Book 
(the contents of which it did not officially know) at a summer school 
held in Cambridge in 1941. Tentative decisions were "measured against 
the educational system of the U. S. S. R.,, 
52 - Further discussions took 
place in the executive during the rest of 1941 and the early part of 
1942, and a short memorandum of objectives was approved by the annual 
conference in April. 
53 Its views on raising the school leaving age, 
-51 
G. L. C., A/NI; T/lV/15, Bulletin, June 1942 
52 G. L. C., A/NLT/l/2, A. G. M. Minutes, 8.4.42 
53 G. L. C., A/NLT/Vl/l2/3 is the final version. A first edition had 
been received at the Board in November 1941 and is now in the 
Department of Education and Science Library. This version was 
amended by the Executive Committee on 23.4.42 at the request of 
the A. G. M. held earlier in the month, but no alterations were 
made to the section on multilateral schools. 
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a common code for all post-primary schools etc. were identical to 
those of the Education Reconstruction Sub-Committee. 
On multilateral schools, however, its commitment was much 
stronger. "We are opposed to the maintenance or institution of 
different types of secondary schools, " it stated. Its arguments 
were based on the absence of any known means of satisfactorily 
assessing types of ability at the age of 11 plus (a gap which the 
psychologists and designers of selection tests were shortly' to claim 
they could fill) and on the need for the educational system to foster 
Ita spirit in conformity with a democratic system. " The Association 
considered that, "all children to the age of 13 Plus should receive 
a general education in the same school. Only after that age should 
there be differentiation, but with different courses in the same 
school. " The model multilateral school was very similar to that 
being advocated in the Education Reconstruction Committee by Iftigh 
Franklin. 
In the Bulletin Cove and Denington judged the introduction of 
a multilateral system to be the central aim of secondary education 
policy. "The multilateral school is not a side issue, " they wrote, 
"nor can it be a mere offshoot from the main educational system. 
It is not something that can be experimented with here and there. 
It is a revolutionary conception, designed to supplant, with all the 
ruthlessness of a total war, most of the conceptions of public 
education which have characterised the past ... Entry to the multi- 
lateral school must be as automatic and as free from examination as 
is now the passage from infant to junior school. The multilateral 
school must be the nation's one and only type of post-primary school.,, 
54 
They followed this with further argument and explanation in each 
of the next six editions, quoting G. D. H. Cole in support, 
55 
and giving 
54 G. L. C., A/NLT/lV/l51BulletinMay 1942 
55 Ibid. Bulletin August 1972-. Cole's memorandum on behalf of the 
Nuffield College Social Reconstruction Survey to the Ministry 
of Works and Buildings was quoted to help N. A. L. T. members faced 
with the dilemma of local education authorities planning to open 
junior technical schools which hitherto had been seen as aý 
desirable development 
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a detailed curriculum which included even the number of periods 
a week to be given to each subject. 
N. A. L. T. was not called upon to respond officially to the 
Green Book, but in the Bulletin of April-May 1943 Cove and Denington 
returned to the question of the multilateral school and posed the 
question, "Can we have multilateral schools without a social 
revolution?,, The problem was that, although the Labour Party, 
T. U. C., Co-operative Congress, W. E. A. and the Times Educational 
Supplement had all expressed support for the idea, the teachers as 
represented by the N. U. T., and the local education auth orities, as 
represented by the Association of Education Committees, had not yet 
declared themselves for it. The question was whether progress 
could be made without their support. Whilst recognising that, 
"Fundamental change can be obtained only through social change, " 
Cove and Denington clutched at those straws which were to hand in 
the attempt to arrive at an optimistic view of the Post-war 
possibilities. Amongst these was the Green Book's willingness to 
see a number of experimental multilateral schools established. 
Their view remainedg however, eventually pessimistic. 
Acknowledging that some readers of the Bulletin had been irritated 
by their refusal to be swept along. with the general enthusiasm, 
they remained unrepentantly of that view. "Reaction does not want 
equality of educational opportunity, and - we venture to assert - 
will not have it either. Whatever the new Bill contains ... it 
will not give equal opportunities for children of all classes. , 
56 
N. A. L. T. saw in the Green Book the denial of Labour's aspirations. 
It believed that the Labour movement was being deceived by the 
coalition government. It wanted the party to recognise that Butler 
was carrying out Conservative policies, and that Labour should 
56 Ibid., Bulletin, July 1943 
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respond by dropping the bi-partisan approach and lead a campaign 
which would rally all of those radical forces in ýeducation which 
seemed to be missing their golden opportunity. 
The Trades Union Congress. 
The T. U. C. 's Education Committee had also reacted strongly when 
the aens Reportl had rejected multilateral schools, and its commentary 
on the report had devoted Much space to re-stating its case in favour 
of them under the heading, "Single code welcomed, but not Three Types 
of School. " In doubting whether a single code for post-primary 
schools and equality in staffing, accommodation and leaving age would 
bring parity of esteem if three separate types of institution continued, 
the committee attacked in particular what it recognised as the sop of 
reviews at 13 of wrong decisions taken at 11. "It is well known, " it 
commented, "that where experiments in transfers between post-primary 
, 57 schools have been tried they have not been successful. When it was 
required to react to the Green Book, however, it acquiesced in the 
Spens formula. * The committee considered the Book in great detail at 
ten meetings held between October 1941 and April 1942, one of which 
was attended by the representatives of the W. E. A. In May 1942 the 
General Council approved the draft which was then sent to Butler. . 
58 
The T. U. C. accepted tripartism, demanding that any intelligence 
tests applied as part of-the selection procedures should involve 
external examiners and that the wishes of parents should be considered. 
It is true that the T. U. C. retained its own commitment to multilateral 
schools and wished the Board to "undertake really substantial 
experiments, " noting that, "so long as the three types of school are 
separately housed, the old prejudices will die hard and equality in 
fact will not be achieved. " Harold Clay, whose contribution to the 
September 1942 Congress was noted by the Board's observer as having 
57 T. U. C., Education Committee Minutes, hereafter referred to as 
Ed. C. 17-3-39 
58 T. U. C., Ed. C., 14.4.42. Memorandum on Education after the War is 
attached to the minutes. 
P. R. O. Edl36/25o, Citrine to Butler, 23.4.42 also contains a copy 
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been particularly well received, " demanded a "secondary school 
that is common to all.,, 
59 The T. U. C. 's detailed comments on the 
Green Book, however, show that it was in fact reluctantly willing 
to acquiesce in the tripartite system advocated by the Board. 
Nonetheless it did lay stress on those lesser demands without which 
there was not the slightest hope of achieving parity between types 
of schools. These demands were couched in terms which indicated 
that they were the minimum acceptable, e. g., 'I'vlithout ... a common 
leaving age equal status cannot be achieved. " 
When confronted with the Green Book proposals which were a 
considerable step backwards from Spens, the T. U. C. lowered its 
sights and rallied to the Spens proposals which it had previously 
regarded as inadequate. It seems to have believed that the Spens 
recommendations constituted a line which could be held. 
The T. U. C. was inhibited in its discussions by its fears of 
divisions within its own ranks which could emanate from religious 
controversy. Even the 1942 Congress debate was dominated by a 
Roman Catholic attempt to refer back the memorandum on the grounds 
that the Green Book's recommendations on the dual system were 
unacceptable. The move was easily defeated, but even speakers on 
the main motion, including Clay, showed their awareness of the 
potential hazards, both to the party and to the cause of educational 
reform, which were inherent in sectarian differences. 
The London County Council 
The most significant fact about the L. C. C. 's response to the 
Green Book was that it was largely that of Savage, the Council's 
Education Officer and a former Board of Education man who had moved 
only in 1940 from Kingsway to County Hall. The L. C. C. 's Education 
Committee met in public and could not therefore be allowed to see or 
discuss the Green Book. Discussion was therefore confined to the 
General Sub-Committee. Holmes penned a congratulatory note to 
59 P. R. O. Edl36/250, Buckle to Goodf ellow, 10.9.42 I enclosing a report 
on the T. U. C. debate, 9.9.42 
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Savage on the L. C. C. 's observations, "since they are no doubt your 
handiwork. " 
60 
Holmes' assessment was correct. A special meeting of the Sub- 
Committee was held on 16 September 1941. Members had received 
copies of the Green Book and a report by Savage a week earlier. 
They met again on 29 September and approved their recommendations 
to the, Board. 
61 
Sava2els DaDer was in line with fhirkino- Pf fbP 
Board. In pariicular it looked forward to a post-war leaving age 
of 15, followed by attendance at day continuation schools. It did 
not even mention raising the leaving age to 16. Abolition of fees 
in direct grant schools was recommended, but not as a matter of great 
import, since the lost income was to be replaced by additional grants 
from the Board or local authoritiesq, He rejected the idea canvassed 
earlier by Cleary of a transfer to a -common school at 11 for all 
children, with selection at 13, and stood firmly by the Green Book's 
recommendation of selection at 11 for grammar schooll with a review 
at 13, although he feared the levelling-down which this might 
necessitate. The Sub-Committee was recommended to recall the 
decision of the Elementary and Higher Education Committee in 1934- 
1935 to reject multilateral schooling on the grounds of cost and the 
disruption which would follow from a further re-organisation of the 
elementary schools. Savage suggested that such schools would have 
to have 2,000 pupils and sites which were large enough could not be 
found in London. "The proposals would certainly encounter opposition, 
not least in the Board itself, " he warned. The most that he could 
recommend was that the three types of schools might be grouped, in 
order to allow "as large a measure as possible of common social life 
within each group. " Two members attempted to delete the comments on 
multilateral schools, but their motion was lost on a show of hands. 
60 P. R. O. Edl36/249, Holmes to Savage, 20.10.41 
61 G. L. C. , L. C. C. Records. Education General Sub-Committee 
Minutes, 
vol. 2, Special Meetings on 16.9.41 and 29.9.41; Presented Papers, 
vol-3, Savage's paper, 22.8.4i, presented 9.9.41 
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Savage's views prevailed almost unaltered, and the L. C. C. 's 
deliberations were completed in two meetings. Whilst therefore 
the L. C. C. 's observations were detailed and their criticisms of 
the Green Book sometimes perceptive, they were mild, did not see the 
light of day and were not the subject of any public campaigning. 
It was as if the Board's officials had merely extended their 
deliberations to include a former colleague. 
In terms of the office discussions on the organisation of 
secondary education the observations were' unhelpful to Labour's 
cause, since they exposed the weaknesses in Cleary's compromise 
of common schools or common courses for the 11 to 13 age group, 
without making the case for multilateral schools any more strongly 
than to urge that, "the possibility should not at this stage be 
ruled out. " 
62 
Savage's particular influence was to advocate day 
continuation schools. He accorded them higher priority even than 
the redesignation of senior elementary schools as secondary schools, 
let alone the raising of the leaving age. He, and to some extent 
therefore the L. C. C., were thus held to favour an order of priorities 
which the Board's officials were ki--en to promote. 
The L. C. C. 's memorandum did evince a further clarification of 
the Board's concept of parity. Cleary challenged the L. C. C. 's 
estimates for the cost of secondary re-organisation because they 
assumed that modern school places would cost as much in future as 
grammar school places. He wrote, "Modern school buildings would not, 
unless we modify the curriculum materially, differ from good senior 
school buildings as now planned and the cost per place therefore will 
not be as high as for grammar schools, though it will be higher than 
it is now because of the reduction in the size of classes from forty 
to thirty. " Parity and a common code were not, apparently, intended 
62 P. R. O. Edl36/249, L. C. C., Observations of the Education (General) 
Sub-Committee on the Memorandum from the Board of Education 
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to change things very much. 
Unlike'other bodies which were pressing their particular 
views on the Board, the L. C. C. did not cause the Board's officers 
any anxiety at this stage. Its views were considered so 
unexceptional that no meeting was considered necessary. 
The L. C. C. 's initial acquiescence in Savage's view was, 
however, shortlived, and its attitude was to change radically 
during the next year. There was a division on party lines. 
In "an animated debate" in July 1942 a motion in favour of "the 
establishment of multilateral schools, wherever practicable, on 
an experimental basis'. '- was unanimously sponsored by the Labour 
Party, and energetically opposed by the Conservative members. 
63 
By the time the Bill was before Parliament the L. C. C. was actively 
considering how to replace segregated secondary schooling in 
London by multilateral schools. 
64 
The Co-operative Union 
The Co-operative Union, after'a correspondence between its 
Education Director, Dr. John Thomas, and Butler's secretary which 
included the explanation that the Board had exhausted its stocks 
of the Green Book, was eventually given a fortnight's loan of a 
copy late in November 1941. It submitted its views the following 
March 
65 
and sent a deputation to see Butler and Holmes in June. 
66 
Two main topics are of interest: the raising of the leaving 
age and the multilateral school. The Co-operative Union differed 
from most other Labour groups in that it wanted local authorities 
to have the right to raise the leaving age to 16 as facilities 
allowed, setting the three year period after the end of the war as 
the deadline. It supported this optimistic view of what was 
possible by urging that the school building programme should have 
priority after the war. 
In its written report the Union declared itself to be 
63 SchoolmasterOOo7.421p. 63 
64 Infra p. 287 
65 P. R. O. Edl36/256, Thomas to Butlert3-3.42 
66 Ibid., Minute 13,12o5.42 
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"definitely in favour of the multilateral school. " In the 
discussion at the Board the multilateral school was the only aspect 
of secondary education which was covered. By the Board's account 
the deputation's advocacy of it was less fervent than in the written 
memorandum. There it was stated that the Union's aim was "an 
ultimate one. They wished, however, to see the experiment made; 
if it was a failure, another solution would have to be found. " 
In a booklet published after the deputation Thomas discussed at some 
length the case for the multilateral school, urging that there was 
"room for the 'new' experiment to prove itself in competition with 
the 'old'. " He expected that "in due course the 'new' may itself 
become 'Old' and accepted as established. " 
67 
He referred to the 
deputation. His view was that they had urged the Board to give 
multilateral schools this chance to prove themselves. 
Holmes made an observation to this deputation which was to have 
much significance. He answered the demand for multilateral schools 
by claiming that, with a common code, local authorities would be free 
to experiment and some "would certainly wish and would be free to 
experiment on these lines. " It seemed that the right to plan 
outside the confines of a tri-partite system was being conceded, at 
least theoreticallyt The concession would not, however, amount to 
much if the administrative obstacles to its implementation remained. 
This was the first time that Holmes used the semantic device which 
was in the future to be widely used by cpponents of multilateral 
schools and eventually by opponents of comprehensive education, viz. 
to suggest that these could exist within a segregated system. 
Whatever use was to be made of it in the future, its effect at this 
stage was to deny any purpose to further argument, -since it was being 
suggested t4at under the Act local education authorities would be 
67 J. Thomas, Plans for an Educated Democracy, Manchester 1942, -pl5 
81 
able to adopt whatever system of secondary education they 
preferred. 
The Workers' Educational Association 
The W. E. A. was not, of course, in any way a Labour Party 
body, but a number of Labour's educational planners including 
Tawney, Lady Simon and Harold Shearman were amongst its leading 
f igures. The Board's reactions to its approaches were significant 
because they were uninhibited. 
68 
Although Butler was present for 
the Association's deputation to the Board, the officials did more 
of the talking than usual. A memorandum submitted in November 
1941 formed the basis of discussion at the meeting in January 1942.69 
The W. E. A. perceived that the Green Book was in essence the 
Spens Report with two of its recommendations omitted, viz. the 
view that a leaving age of 16 was inevitable and the encouragement 
given to experiments in multilateral schooling. Its representatives 
pressed these two points as being crucial to the achievment of the 
main Spens prop6sal for parity in secondary schooling. 
Holmes' response was to emphasize the limited nature of the 
Board's aims. The office label for its plans may have been the 
'New Testament I, but what Holmes described to the W. E. A. deputation 
had somewhat humbler aspirations. He explained that the Green Book 
was a civil service document concerned only with those parts of the 
school system which were within state control, and then only with 
what the Board considered to be "realisable, not politically or 
financially, but physically within say three years after the end 
of the war. " 
Labour Party Conference 
A review of Labour Party Annual Conferences from 1939 to 1942 
shows how little thinking and campaigning on education was done by 
the party as a whole until a year after the Green Book was issued. 
Pre-occupied with international questions raised by the war,, the 
thorny question of party discipline and the common front . and the 
urgent and immediate domestic problems caused by the war 
(in education, 
68 Supra p. 40 
69 P. R. O. Ed136/218 W. E. A. Mem. orandum to the Board, November 1941; 
Minute No. 612.1.42 
The memorandum was also published as Plan for Education-A 
W. E. A. Report on Educational Reconstruction, London, 1942 
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mainly the break-down of schooling in many areas and the problems 
of evacuation), the Conference had little time for long-term 
planning. 
The 1939 Conference agenda included a N. A. L. T. motion which 
denounced Hadow re-organisation as a system "designed to maintain 
the class divisions of society" and demanded "Multilateral schools 
which would give eqiiality of opportunity and provide Labour's ideal 
of free secondary education in a single type of school open to 
, 11.,, 70 a An amendment to another motion made a similar point. 
But in the event education was not debated at all. In 1940 there 
were eleven motions on education, but all were concerned with 
immediate problems, especially the war-time eco. nomies in university 
education, and not one refrred to the organisation of secondary 
education. It is true that during the year the ýarty had published 
Labour's Home Policy7l which included the aspiration of "a unified 
system of education through which all children ahallpass, " but it 
contained no view on how secondary education should be organised, 
and again education was not debated at Conference. No debate on 
education took place in 1941.72 
It was not until the Conference held in May 1942 at the Central 
Hall, Westminster that a major debate on education took place. As 
we have seen 
73 the N. E. C. had required the Education Reconstruction 
Sub-Committee to reach decisions which could be included in an 
interim report on reconstruction and this report formed the basis of 
a long resolution on education which the N. E. C. now submitted to 
Conference. The concepts which were offered and the language used 
to describe them were imprecise. Speakers for the motion slipped 
from advocating the abolition of private education to advocating the 
establishment nationally of a single type of local authority post- 
primary school, as though they were speaking about the same thing, 
70 B. L-iLabour PartylAnnual Conference Agenda 1939, R62 
71 Labour PartylLabour's Home Policylundated, but must be 1939 
or 194o, p. 99 
Labour Party, Annual Conference Reports, 1940 and 1941. 72 B. L. 9 
There was a debate on evacuationlinitiated by N-A. L. T. in 194o, 
and on the same subject as a result of an attempt to refer back 
that section of the N. E. C. 's report in 1941. Leah Manning, the 
N. A. L. T. delegate, spoke on both occasions 
73 Supra p. 65 
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as indeed they might have been if the motion had called for both. 
In fact it did not call specifically for either. It wanted 
compulsory attendance by children at schools provided "or licensed" 
by the state; the alternative offered side-stepped the issue of 
private schools. Whilst it included the Sub-Committee's formula 
that the Board should encourage as a general policy the multilateral 
school, it also asked for a common code for ll+ schools with common 
standards of accommodation and staffing. This ambiguity was 
understandable in a motion which had to be concerned not only with 
future planning but also with interim measures. 
Harold Clay, the mover, expressed anxieties about what was to 
become the Norwood concept of 'types of ability'. "We advocate, " 
he said, "the application of the common school principle. We believe 
it is sound that every child in the state should go to the same kind 
of school. The curriculum will be different and will provide for 
varying aptitudes and for varying types of children. We have been 
somewhat concerned at the suggestion that has been made in regard to 
the grammar school, the technical high school and the modern school, 
the suggestion being that there is a difference between certain types 
of children of a character that we do not quite appreciate.,, 
74 
There were perhaps two explanations for a lack of precision in 
the exposition of their goals by Labour spokesmen. On the one hand 
some of them were versed in the arguments of social equality on which 
their party's thinking had been based for many years and had not yet 
made the leap from the concept of equal rights to compete for places 
in unequal institutions to the concept of an institution which could 
cater for the individual needs of every child. Their thinking 
stopped at the point when institutional changes were needed. They 
were not hostile to such changes. It was a question of their 
74 B. L., Labour PartylAnnual Conference Report, 1942, pl42 
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thinking not having progressed. Sliena Simon was typical of many 
prominent contributors to Labour's educational thinking, in that 
she started from a position of respecting the academic ethos of 
grammar schools and wanting more working class children to share 
it, but could not, as we have seen, initially embrace the concept 
of the multilateral school. 
75 
Yet she was soon to bridge that 
gulf and become one of the most ardent advocates, first of the 
multilateral school and then of the comprehensive school. On the 
other hand convinced exponents of multilateral schools like Alice 
Bacon, who replied to the debate on behalf of the N. E. C., were even 
so handling unfamiliar material. Not only did they have to 
theorise and proselytise, they also had to do much thinking. it 
is the reformer's lot that he has to plan in detail, in order to 
justify the proposal which he advocates, and to do this without the 
vast resources of the civil service. 
Whatever the looseness of thinking or of expression at the 
Central Hall in May 1942 two things emerged clearly. Firstly the 
Conference endorsed the commitment to a general policy of 
multilateral schools and did so without controversy; no voice was 
raised in opposition. Secondly Clay committed the party to 
campaigning for an early bill. It was to be nine months before the 
Labour Party had the opportunity to put its views to Butler. By 
that time attitudes within the Board had hardened and policies been 
refined. 
Supra p. 64 
85 
FROM GREEN BOOK TO WHITE PAPER 
Chapter 4: QUESTIONS OF STRATEGY 
It was a commonly-held view throughout the war that, unless an 
education bill were enacted before the end of hostilities, it would 
either be less radical or would not be carried at all. This view 
was often held by those who most wanted change. For example, Tawney 
commented that, "If Mr. Fisher's Education Act had not been passed in 
1918, it would certainly not have become law in the five succeeding 
years. That lesson should be laid to heart. " 
1 
Ede, when urging the 
early introduction of a bill observed that the 1918 Act had been passed 
during war and hoped that the curreni existence of a Conservative 
majority rather than a Liberal one would not prevent a similar result 
in the Second World War. 2 It is a view repeated approvingly by 
historians who draw attention to the coincidence in Britain of major 
educational legislation and war. 
3 This analysis was extended by H. G. 
Wells in conversation with Butler beyond the obvious analogies of 1902 
(Boer War) and 1918 (Great War) to embrace the threat of war and Britain's 
fear of Germany to which he attributed the passage of the 1870 Act. 
4 
In 
a more general way Wells argued that during great crises In history it 
is those who have their plans ready, however esoteric they are (he 
instanced calendar reform), who see their plans implemented. His 
assumption was that the prepared plans would be those of radicals. On 
this occasion, however, it was the Board's officials with their Green 
Book who were clearest in their objectives. 
The basis for this view, that educational reform was best carried 
during war, was partly that the divisive and therefore obstructive 
potential of the church school controversy would be reduced when the 
nation was united in war against a common enemy. The long story of 
antagonism between those who opposed any state finance of church schools 
without commensurat. e public control and those who believed that their 
1 Introduction by Tawney to B. Drake, Education for Democracy, London 
1941, P-7 
2 P. R. O. Edl36/379, Ede to Butler, 22.10.42 
3 E. g. M. Cruickshank, Church and State in EnElish Education, London 
1963, P-113 
4 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Butler to R. S. Wood and Holmes, 3-10.41 
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children should have the right to a church-controlled education without 
cost either to their church or to themselves would, it was hoped, at 
least be more subdued whilst Hitler's bombs were dropping on church- 
goers and secularists alike. 
The other main aspect of the argument was that war, particularly a 
modern war which inevitably involved everybody because of the large 
numbers of people required to fight and to work in munition factories 
and which also caused social upheavals such a-s evacuation, engendered a 
more open and democratic spirit which facilitated change. 
5 
Ernest 
Bevin best expressed Labour's expectations in a message to his union's 
members in October 1939. "We do not desire to serve on any committee 
or body as an act of patronage. We represent probably the most vital 
factor in the state, " he affirmed, adding, "without our people this war 
6 
will not be won. " The difficulty with this line of thought in the 
1940s was that the prevailing atmosphere did not coincide with the 
political realities of the day. Radicals might argue on the one hand 
that advantage must be taken of the national unity, which might be short- 
lived, to hurry through legislation on education., On the other hand 
Churchill gave clear instructions to Butler that, whatever he did in 
the sphere of education, he could not legislate and must not provoke 
7 
controversy which could endanger that unity and undermine the war effort. 
There can be little doubt who was the more powerful - educational re- 
formers or Churchill - between 1940 and 1944. Butler quoted H. G. Wells' 
opinion that, Ifunless I got into hot water he would not consider that I 
had done any good. " Butler knew that, if he got into too much trouble, 
Churchill's blind eye would quickly recover its sight and all would be 
lost. Whatever the validity of the association between war and educa- 
tional reform in the past, the evidence from the early 1940s was that the 
only benefit accruing to the cause of education was that the Board's 
officials, who had earlier rejected the main goals of the Spens Report, 
5 Examples of this view may be found, supra ]pp. 22-24 
6 Quoted in F. Williams, Ernest Bevin, London 1952, p. 216 
7 Churchill to Butler, 13-9.4i, quoted in R. A. Butler, The Art of the 
Possible, London 1971, p. 94 
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accepted that opinion had mbved sufficiently for them to have to go 
part of the way towards it. Otherwise only uncontroversial measures 
could be considered. Butler was later to observe that he was encou- 
raged by the Government Whips' Office to proceed, because for them 
"the beauty of the Bill was that it would keep the parliamentary 
troops thoroughly occupied; providing endless opportunities for debate, 
without any fear of breaking up the government. " 
8 
This view of a strategy for reform was held by many Labour spokes- 
, men. Labour's parliamentary position was weak. The party was easily 
outvoted in the Commons, even without the loss of those votes cast by 
its members in the government. The minister concerned was a Conser- 
vative, albeit with a liberal reputation; and his deputy, although 
Labour, did not have a close association with his party's educational 
spokesmen. 
9 
Nonetheless most Labour spokesmen assumed that the best 
available deal would be one extracted from their opponents under the 
influence of war. They saw that, with their large Roman Catholic 
following in the North West and large non-conformist following in Wales, 
they needed the inhibiting effect of war on sectarian controversies 
rather more than did the Conservatives. Although one of the Board's 
planners saw a trend in January 1940 which he accurately foretold would 
lead to a Labour landslide after the war, 
10 
few Labour spokesmen seem 
to have had his insight, so that few were willing to give up the hopes 
of war-time legislation in favour of taking the risk of waiting for a 
post-war election which might not increase their parliamentary strength 
and which would not even have the compensating advantage of wa-r-engen- 
dered national unity. Labour voices were amongst the loudest of those 
clamouring for legislation before the war ended. 
The strategy of demanding early legislation was proposed strongly 
to the Labour Party Conference at Westminster Central Hall in May 1942. 
8 R. A. Butler, g. cit-, P-117 
9 Supra -pp. 28-31 
10 Supra P-39 
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On that occasion Harold Clay, for the Executive, committed the party 
to a campaign for an early bill. Noting the Nazi use of education 
to destroy democracy, he exhorted Butler to use the schools to t 
strengthen democracy. "The time to lay the foundations of the new 
educational structure is now while the war lastsq'I he declared. 
"We cannot afford to wait until the war is over for a new education 
bill. " He urged the party to put on pressure whilst the readiness 
for change brought about by the war lasted. This rallying cry was 
coupled with a warning from Alice Bacon that the ves. ted interests in 
the present educational structure were powerful and were "making their 
voices heard at the present time in the secret meetings which are going 
on behind the scenes at the Board of Education. " 
11 
When Clav led 
a Labour deputation to Butler in February of the following year his 
theme was the same. Early legislation was needed, not only because 
people were at present receptive to change, but also because educa- 
tionists needed to have now a basis for post-war planning, and industry 
needed to know "what kind of educational framework... [it] ... has to 
conform to., 112 
An alternative view was put to this meeting by Laski. He was at 
one with Clay in recognising that the war presented "a supreme oppor- 
tunity, " but he also saw the danger that whatever bill was passed would 
last for twenty years, and suggested that no bill at all was better than 
a weak bill. The same opinion, although from a conservative viewpoint, 
was expressed by Sir Frederick Clarke, Director of the London Institute 
of Education. He wanted legislation now rather than later for fear 
that the next Parliament "would be more radical.,, 
13 The notion that 
consensus could be equated with radicalism was denounced in the 
, 
New 
Statesman. According to this view, it commented, "We should be well 
on the way to a perfect educational system. But are we? Over 
educational reform, as over everything else that matters, looms the 
11 T. H., Labour Party Records, Annual. Conference Report, 27-5.42, pp. 14o-i4i 
12 P. R. O. Edl36/266, Memorandum of meeting held 25.2.43 
13 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Note by Butler, 20-3.42 
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shadow of 'national unity' ." Its opinion was that, before major 
educational reform could be carried, there would have to be agreement 
on what sort of society Britain wanted. "The trouble begins when any 
,, 14 proposal for reform is specific . 
The attitude of N. A. L. T., as expressed by Cove and Denington in the 
Bulletin, varied. Their ambivalence illustrates well the dilemma of 
those wanting radical reform. On the one hand they joined in the chorus 
demanding early legislation. In June 1942 they exhorted Butler, 
"Produce your plans! ... Let us have an education bill. 
05 Yet the 
same issue was pervaded with scepticism about the roles of Butler and 
Ede, the former being seen as a skilled and experienced diplomat, the 
latter as a possible dupe. Ede was aware of these doubts. 
16 The 
problem for radicals was that the post-war period could offer all or 
nothing. Increased parliamentary strength at the 1935 election and a 
clearly pro-Labour trend at subsequent by-elections seemed to indicate 
that voters were blaming the Conversative Party for the miseries of the 
1930S. They might presage a Labour landslide at the next election 
which would make possible a more radical bill. But nothing was certain. 
War-time legislation provided a guarantee of some advance, however 
modest. The resolution of this dilemma might have been helped if 
reformers had been conscious of what Butler saw as the main reason why 
legislation on education was proceeding whilst legislation on other 
social reforms was not, viz. that he had persuaded the Treasury that it 
would cost very little in the immediate future and would take "at least 
17 
a generation" fully to implement it. 
Crucial to this Labour view of strategy was its ability to influ- 
ence the planned legislation. The Labour leader most concerned about 
this was Ernest Bevin. Of all the legislation being considered 
in 1943 
and 1944 the Education Bill interested him most. Ede's opinion was that 
14 New Statesman, 4.7.42, P-3 
15 G. L. C., A/NLT7IV/15, Bulletin, June 1942 
16 B. L., Ede Dia. ýy, vol. 6, --12.7.42 
17 R. A. Butler, op. cit., P. 117 
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he contributed more to it than anyone else outside the Board, taking 
a great interest in the details of legislative drafts, making many 
suggestions, and offering support for it in the cabinet without which 
it would not have been passed. 
18 
And following Ia meeting of home 
front ministers in July 1942, Ede commented that, "Mr. Bevin, as usual, 
proved a friend of education. " 
19 
. 
When reviewing the past year on the 
last day of 1942 Ede showed a rare animosity for the Conservativesq but 
coupled it with an expression of admiration for Bevin. "I think the 
Tories mean to dish the Labour Paý, ty of. any great measure of social 
improvement, " he wrote, "but Ernest Bevin is a tougher Labour spokes- 
man than any they have encountered. " 
20 
Bevin took up the question of educational reform on his own initi- 
ative, asking one of his officials to obtain an outline of the Green 
Book in September 1941. He was "very anxious to know in what way Labour 
is to have its chance to make its influence felt in the reform of the 
public system of education" and sought a meeting with Butler in September 
1941.21 At the meeting, when the main burden of his argument was that 
the leaving age should be raised to 16,22 he was "most insistent about 
the need for passing a measure of educational reform in the not-too- 
4 23 distant future, 
Ede was at pains to emphasize the identity of views between Bevin 
and the Board - the need to reduce the academic and increase the 
practical and technical content of education, the desirability of some 
residential experience for all pupils - and considered that the diffi- 
culties were confined to the single issue of whether the leaving age 
could be raised to 16 soon after the war. 
24 This was glossing over a 
deep cleavage of opinion. The issue was whether plans were to be 
laid for a leaving age of 16 in terms of building, teacher training and 
curriculum or whether they were not. A decision had to be taken and 
Bevin's success in promoting Labour's objective has to be 
18 A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin(2 vols. ), vol . 2, London 
1967, p. 233 
19 B. L., Ede -Diary, vol. 
6,10-7.42 
20 Ibid., 31.12.42 
21 P. R. O. Edl36/292, R. S. Wood to Butler. 4.9.41 
22 Infra p. 137 
23 P. R. O. Edl36/292, Note by Butler, 4.9.41 
24 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 9.9.41; infra p. 140 
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judged according to his effectiveness in influencing that decision. 
As we shall see, he failed. 
2_5 
The timing of legislation was not only a question of party strategy 
and advantage. Holmes raised objections in September 1941 to Butler's 
plans for a White Paper in the Spring of 1942 to be followed by legi- 
slation in the Autumn, arguing that it would not be possible to imple- 
ment such a timetable in view of the large number of organizations to be 
consulted by his officials. His view was that late Summer 1942 was the 
earliest possible date for a White Paper and the early part of 1943 the 
earliest possible date for a bill. 
26 
Butler was not so much concerned 
about speed as anxious about delaying the more open discussion which he 
considered must take place before the Summer of 1942.27 The difference 
between the two men was on the nature and breadth of public consultation, 
Holmes preferring an agreed policy statement which could be successfully 
defended against most if not all attacks, Butler having greater respect 
for parliamentary rights and perhaps also not wanting to isolate himself 
by identifying himself too closely with proposals unscrutinised by any 
group except those actively involved in the state school system. 
Butler's proposal for extricating himself from Holmes' procedure was 
that a tribunal should be established, consisting of M. Ps. and peers 
from all parties, in the Summer of 1942. The Board's plans would be 
put to this Joint Select Committee which could consult religious and 
industrial leaders and representatives of the public schools. If an 
agreed report emerged, an uncontroversial bill could follow. Whilst 
this proposal would certainly have opened discussion to all and thus 
satisfied Butler's wish to abandon Holmes' secretive stance, it also 
had the obvious attraction of transferring responsibility for all the 
thornier problems from Butler to the J. S. C., insofar that the committee 
would conduct the difficult negotiations and legislation would follow 
only if agreement were achieved. An indication that Butler saw his 
25 Infra p. 147 
26 P. R. 0'. Edl36/215, Holmes to Butler, 1.9.41 
27 Ibid., Butler to R. S. Wood, 2.9.41 
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proposal as a means of containing discussion and limiting change was 
given by his comment after the plan was rejected. "I prefer J. S. C. 
to revolutions, " he observed. terselye 
28 
Ede, whilst seeing several party objections to Butler's scheme, 
came to accept it. For him it was "very desirable" to have legislation 
in the 1942-3 session of Parliament and he accepted with misgivings 
Butler's plan to achieve that timetable. To that end he was prepared 
to accept the Green Book, if it were proved to represent a consensus of 
opinion, and he regarded a solution of the church school problem as 
essential if the modest goals of. the 1936 Education Act, which partially 
raised the leaving age to 15, were to be realised. Consensus on as 
many problems as possible would help in persuading the cabinet to allow 
parliamentary time and in ensuring that this time was profitably used. 
The attractions for him of Butler's scheme were that there was a need 
for wider discussion - present plans for consultation were "too narrow 
and circumscribed" - and that there was some precedent for outlining a 
scheme and then drafting it in detail through Parliament, in that the 
1918 Act had been introduced in the previous session,. considered in 
Parliament, re-drafted and then re-introduced. 
29 
The obstacles which he foresaw were, however, prodigious. Repre- 
sentation according to party strengths would give Labour only four seats, 
including one for himself. Party divisions would be emphasized, with 
M. Ps. considering themselves bound by their 1935 election pledges on such 
matters as beneficial exemptions and secondary school fees. The recent 
"acrimonious debate" on the future of public schools would impinge on 
the discussions and tempers would be raised. The plan involved 
legislation in the eigth year of a Parliament elected in 1935 for five 
years. The involvement of the House of Lords would give representation 
to Anglican bishops to the detriment of Roman Catholic and non-conformist 
28 Ibid., Endorsement by Butler on Ede to Butler, 17.9.41 
29 Ibid., Ede to Butler, lo. 9.41; MSS., unsigned, but in Ede's hand 
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interests. Despite these objections his final verdict was an unenthu- 
siastic acceptance of the plan - "although I am not too optimistic of 
success, it should be tried. " 
It was not the objections of Ede, but those of Churchill and 
Attlee which defeated Butler's plan. Butler argued to Churchill that, 
"Departmental enquiries, though they help greatly, are not enough" and 
he promoted the idea of the J. S. C. as a means of avoiding "a dogfight 
in Parliament itself* , 30 Churchill's reply could hardly have been 
more disappointing. Advising Butler to concentrate on the country's 
war-time educational and industrial needs, and rejecting party politics 
in any form for the duration of the war, he stated categorically, "I 
certainly cannot contemplate a new education bill. 
01 If Churchill's 
edict had been obeyed, not only a J. S. C. but the bill itself would have 
been lost, but planning proceeded as though only the timing of the bill 
had been affected by Churchill's vote, not its existence. - 
Attlee's response was more considered. At a meeting with Ede he 
also rejected the idea of a J. S. C., and proposed a procedure which was 
in part followed. Discussions on the Green Book should be continued, 
but ought, in Attlee's view,, to be widened to include the public schools. 
Legislation should then be considered by a committee of ministers. For 
Attlee the essential point was that "the government should be in control, " 
32 
Butler also had the support of the Lord President of the Council, Sir John 
Anderson, who had responsibility for those major questions of economic 
policy which might in Churchill's phrase "raise the most difficult and 
dangerous political issues.,, 
33 Anderson advised that "work behind the 
scenes" should be done in order that they would be ready to legislate 
when the opportunity presented itself. 
34 
Arthur Greenwood also contributed to the discussion. As-the minister 
with responsibility for reconstruction and a member of the War Cabinet 
until Churchill changed its membership in February 1942, his opinion 
30 Ibid., Butler to Churchill, 12.9.41 
31 Churchill to Butler, 13.9.41, quoted in R. A. Butler, op. cit., -p. 94 
32 P. R. O. M136/215, Ede to Butler, 17.9.41 
33 Quoted in W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowring, British War Economy, London 
1949, p. 219 
34 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Butler to Holmes, 1.10.41 
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should have carried weight, but in reality he was not highly regarded. 
His office was in "rather a mess , 
35 
and he had proved ineffective as 
chairman of the Production Council which had been designed to co-ordi- 
nate the work of the supply ministries and to increase production. 
36 
His suggestion, that a short agenda of the matters to be discussed 
between the Board and the local authorities should be given to Parlia- 
ment, does not seem to have been considered at all at the Board*37 
Early in 1942 Attlee called in Butler to report progress. 
Churchill had gone with the chiefs of staff to Washington for the 
'Arcadia' conference following Pearl Harbour and the entry of the U. S. A. 
into the war, and Attlee was head of the government in his absence. 
Butler's account of the meeting has a superior tone. 
7 58 
The meeting 
seems to have begun edgily, with Attlee's asking what was happening, and 
with Butler's cross-questioning to determine whether there was feeling 
in the Labour Party that progress was too slow. Attlee's reply was, 
"None at all". He thought that his party would want a debate soon. 
This was certainly a time when the Commons was becoming restless and 
Churchill felt the need for a vote of confidence, which he won almost 
unamimously, wh en he returned from Washington. But Atlee did not 
press for any particular policy, smiling when Butler said that he 
"thought Mr. Greenwood desired some educational objectives to place in 
his shop window" and that he would try to provide them, " seeing at the 
same time that they were not too fly-blown'. " 
In April 1942 Ede again argued for an early measure and listed 
twelve points. These indicated the price to be paid for early legi- 
slation which avoided controversy, for they did not include raising 
the leaving age to sixteen or the abolition of fees in secondary 
schools, let alone a policy on multilateral schools. 
39 
The note was 
endorsed by Butler, "For the moment we must tackle religion. " How- 
ever, in October of that year, when Holmes advocated an early bill to 
35 Ibid., Butler to Holmes, 1.10.41 
36 A. Bullocklop. cit., PP-13,38,50 and 70 
37 P. R. O. M13; 7ý21-5, Butler to R. S. Wood, 16.10.41 
38 Ibid., Note by Butler, 16.1.42 
39 P. R. O. Edl36/379, Ede to Butler, 14.4.42 
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carry out the main recommendations on 11-18 schooling with a second 
bill later to cover all other points, 
40 
Ede was quick to reject the 
proposal. His argument was that expectations had been allowed to 
rise and that, if references to social reform were not transla ted into 
legislation, the consequent discrediting of politicians could produce 
results "most harmful to public order and stability in any difficult 41 times that may follow the war. " This argument was similar to that 
of Sir Frederick Clarke; 
42 
legislation was needed to prevent radical 
change not promote it. Ede was opposed at this stage to the separation 
of the church and educational issues; a solution to the former was 
essential to educational reform, since a high proportion of poor un- 
reorganised elementary schools were run by the church. He quoted an 
M. P. who had said that a religious settlment was like a bottle of port 
and should, be consumed as soon as possible after being uncorked. 
What was possible in the Spring of 1943 might not be possible, he 
argued, by the Autumn. 
Butler was quite pessimistic throughout this time. In his 
memoirs he suggests that his reaction to Churchill's denial was one of 
defiance, and that he "decided to disregard what he said and go straight 
ahead. " 
43 
It was certainly the case that planning continued, and 
Butler was of course later able to publish a bill with Churchill's support. 
But before that point was reached there were many difficult moments when 
Butler considered alternatives to a major new bill. Soon after re- 
ceiving Churchill's ruling Holmes had prepared at Butler's request a 
note outlining how much of the Green Book could be brought about with- 
out legislation. 
44 
A year later, when the argument was put to him that 
only a major new bill and not merely amendments to existing legislation 
could achieve the desired goals, he replied that all would depend on 
the parliamentary "time offered and nature of the party truce. " 
45 
Even 
in January 1943, in a speech to inspectors, he would go no further 
40 Ibid., Holmes to Butler, 20.10.42 
41 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 22.10.42 
42 Supra, p. 88 
43 Butler, op. cit., p. 95 
44 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Holmes to Butler, 30.9.41 
45 P. R. O. Edl36/379, endorsement by Butler on Pearson to Goodfellow, 
26.1o. 42 
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than to say that he hoped to have educational reform, but he warned 
his audience that "there were other horses starting in the race. " 
Ede took up the racing metaphor and observed that a-11 the other horses 
were sweating whereas on the Board's coats "there was not a trace of 
moisture*" 
46 
Such a sanguine view was possible only if sails were 
trimmed. 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was perhaps a more important 
factor than Butler's determination in lifting Churchill's prohibition 
on legislation. After the entry of the U. S. A. into the war which the 
Japanese attack precipitated, the anxieties of Churchill about poten- 
tially devisive domestic measures lessened as the prospects of victory 
increased. Pearl Harbour achieved what the British Prime Minister had 
failed to achieve in the months before 6 December 1941. He had been 
haunted by the nightmare of a Japanese attack on Britain's bases in 
Asia and by the lesser anxiety that, even if the Americans were forced 
to participate in the hostilities, they would restrict their involve- 
ment to a war in Asia against Japan, whilst remaining neutral towards 
Germany. He had failed to move the Americans, although no opportunity 
had been missed to persuade them to join the war. These attempts 
included representations by Butler, when still an Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, to Roosevelt's personal aide Harry Hopkins. 
47 
Pearl 
Harbour achieved what all British argUments had failed to bring about, 
, 148 and Churchill commented, "So we had won after all . With the wealth 
and might of the U. S. A. engaged on the British side in the war, prospects 
for victory were now good. Commensurately the willingness of critics 
to speak against the government increased, the demand within the Labour 
Party for contested elections grew, and the risk of a Churchill veto on 
legislation if any controversy surfaced, provided it was kept within 
bounds, was lessened. The Japanese seem to have contributed as much 
as Butler's determination towards the continuance of the deliberations 
46 B. L., Ede Diary, vol. 6,14.1-43 
47 R. A. Butlerlop-cit., p. 86 
48 Quoted in A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, Oxford 196.5, P. 533 
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at the Board. There were still many bridges to be crossed and 
success was by no means assured, but there was a change in Churchill's 
mind. His veto on legislation was related 
" 
to the paramount impor- 
tance which he gave to uniting the nation in its war effort. The 
greatly improved prospects of victory, coming only three months 
after his veto, enabled the flicker of hope to remain and planning 
to continue. 
Difficulties remained, however, and the lessening of Churchill's 
hostility to legislation did. not mean that he was prepared to counte- 
nance the waging of party or sectarian controvprsies. These dif- 
ficulties and Churchill's continuing influence strengthened the 
tendency for reformers to agree on a consensus of limited objectives - 
a movement epitomized by the Campaign for Educational Advance. This 
was a body supported by the T. U. C., W. E. A., Co-c. perative Union and the 
N. U. T. and was established to co-ordinate the demand for legislation 
and to prevent the church school problem from causing delay or failure. 
Yet the demands of the Campaign did not include even some policies 
which each of them supported separately. For example, the first t. hree 
of these organizations were in favour of multilateral schools, and the 
N. U. T. favoured them, baulking only at their universal introduction, 
yet the Campaign did not demand them. It was the nature of their 
coming together that these organizations should make only limited 
demands, in order that they might represent a very wide body of opinion 
which wanted reform and would demand it, despite religious obstacles. 
It- was those obstacles which were in the forefront of people's 
minds in the Winter of 1942 and the Spring of 1943, and they presented 
particular problems for the Labour movement. The T. U. C. debate on the 
Green Book proposals, held on 9 September 1942, was dominated by the 
issue. 
49 
Coles of the Electrical Trades Union demanded that the state 
should not allow educational reforms to be shipwrecked and should not 
49 P. R. O. Edl36/25o, G. M. Buck, le (a Board officer at Liverpool)- to 
Butler, 10.9.42 
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"continue to subsidise sectarian education. " Clay of the T. G. W. U. 
and the Labour Party's Education Advisory Committee insisted more 
discreetly that the minority could not dictate to the majority and 
that the general feeling was for a great step forward. "Let no 
sectional or special interests stand in the way, " he declared. An 
attempt was made by two Roman Catholics to refer back the memorandum 
solely because of their opposition to proposals on the dual system. 
The reference back was defeated by a large majority, but the willing- 
ness of Roman Catholics to force the issue within the Labour movement 
had been shown. 
A meeting of the party's Reconstruction Central C. ommittee held 
on 19 December 1942 was dominated by the discussion of the dual 
system. 
50 The Education Sub-Committee was still preparing its plans, 
but its chairman, Harold Clay, 'wanted the Centrol Committee itself 
to tackle the thorniest problem of all and to declare its opposition 
to the dual system. He argued that it could not be justified on 
educational grounds. Another member, George Dallas, accused the 
Roman Catholics of "blackmailing the Labour movement on this issue. " 
The Welsh M. P., ' James Griffiths, referred to the "growing feeling 
that the party is afraid to offend the Catholic interest" and rejected 
any compromise with the Catholics. Sam Watson, the Durham miner's 
leader and himself a Roman Catholic, argued the opposite case. Dallas 
went on to issue the warning given by Laski later, declaring, "Any 
education act at the present time would be a compromise, therefore 
we should not push it. We should be committed for generations to a 
policy to which we are opposed. " It was Middleton, the party's 
General Secretary, and Greenwood who warned of the danger to the party 
of tackling this issue. Middleton advised that they should ignore the 
matter, letting the Board devise "some sort of concordat" whereupon 
"we should leave it at that. " Greenwood reminded them that the party 
_50 
T. H., Labour Party Records, Reconstruction Central Committee 
Minutes, 19.12.42 
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was composed of people of all outlooks and advised, "We should avoid 
the issue at this juncture. " Shinwell, in the chair, closed the 
discussion by deciding that the matter should be referred back to I 
the Education Sub-Committee with a request that they consider the 
"constructive effects" of the dual system and "watch the Board of 
Education on the concordat. " 
The divisions which Roman Catholics in particular could fo, ment 
within the Labour Party were illustrated by an incident in April 1943. 
The Bishop of Pella had claimed support from Labour leaders for an 
increase in the proposed 50% state contribution to voluntary school 
building. Ede tackled Greenwood about this and was assured that there 
was no truth in the claim. Indeed Greenwood anticipated problems 
in guaranteeing Labour support for the 50%. Ede attributed the 
problem to mischief by Stokes, the Roman Catholic Labour M. P. for 
Ipswich, who was later during the Committee stage of the bill to be 
a tireless manoeuvrer in the interests of increased financial aid and 
independence for Catholic schools. 
51 
The Labour Party Executive itself ran into trouble on the issue. 
Herbert Morrison was personally in favour of ending the dual system, 
but considered it politically impossible to achieve, saying that the 
Executive "would be too scared of their political lives to make a 
declaration against it. 1152 
The N. U. T. conference in April 1943 was also rallied to fight for 
educational advance on the basis of the settlement which Butler and Ede 
had worked out. "No National Government was going to split the nation 
from top to bottom, especially during a war..., on a religious issue, 11 
Mander, the General Secretary, was reported by Ede as telling delegates. 
"The prospects of the Bill are about to enter a delicate political 
phase, " he continued. If Butler and Ede gave anything to right or 
to lef t they would be lost'D Teachers must support the Bill. Mander's 
51 P. R. O. Edl36/378, Ede to Butier, 1.4.43 
52 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 6-5.43 
100 
comments included the statement, however, that a bill which did not 
include raising the leaving age to 16 within three years would not 
be worth having. 
53 
He did not yet know the price to be paid for 
loyalty to the consensus which he was advocating. Ede did, and 
he ended his diary for 1942 with a note of disappointment and acquies- 
cence. Writing about the dual system controversy, he observed, 
"I have had to fight hard to keep the educational cause in the fore- 
front of political interests. I have not been helped as much by 
the interests dearest to my heart as I had hoped but perhaps it is 
asking too great a power of insight from them to expect them to under- 
stand the politicans' difficulty. I believe we have found the 
reasonable basis for a compromise. On it we can build a structure 
that will not be spectacular but which can be used as a storehouse 
of educational treasure from which each section can draw according to 
its need. 154 
Butler was later to claim that the disruptive potential of the 
religious question helped to bring many back-benchers into line, since 
they were anxious, once the Pandora's box had been opened, to close it 
again before the election which was bound to be held as soon as the 
progress of the war allowed. 
55 There can be little doubt that the 
effect of the dual system controversy was to promote a consensus 
around the most modest educational reforms which would be tolerated. 
53 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 28.4.43 
54 'E-. L., Ede Diary, vol. 6,31.12.42 
55 R. A. Butler, op. cit., p. 116 
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Chapte 5: PARlTY VERSUS SEGREGATIO14 
In the spring of 1942 the draf ters of the Green Book returned 
to the question of multilateral schools, but with more open minds 
than hitherto. They were prompted by a paper from Savage, but 
also by their inability to achieve within the Hadow framework the 
goals being set them. 
It was R. S. Wood who set the tone of the new discussion. In 
two discursive and intentionally inconclusive papers he reviewed the 
problems and the possible solutions. 
1 
There was less rigidity of 
opinion than during the similar discussion which had preceded the 
issue of the Green Book. G. G. Williams, who earlier had been the 
unrelenting defender of academic selection and segregation, did not 
change his fundamental attitudes, but he was willing to acknowledge 
that, "There is undoubtedly a wide feeling among secondary school 
teachers that the possibility of multilateral schools should not be 
excluded, " and to declare himself "not unattracted" by the grammar- 
2 
modern bilateral school. Cleary and Charles seized this fresh 
opportunity to argue the multilateral school case anew, conceding 
that building problems made the immediate universal establishment 
of such schools impossible, and recommending the 11 to 13 common 
school as the best compromise which would give the advantages of 
3 the multilateral school without its disadvantages. They envisaged 
all pupils going at the age of 11 to four-form entry schools with 
one stream transferring at 13 to grammar schools. 
Although the issues discussed were the same as before, there 
were new emphases. One problem which exercised them more strongly 
now was the opinion that many of the pupils in secondary schools 
should not have been'there or at least should not have been following 
school certificate courses. It. was naturally the tec)inical branch 
P. R. O. Edl36/300, R 0 S. Wood to Wallis, 13.4.42; a note by Wood, undated 
2 Ibid., Note by G. G. Williams923.4.42 
3 Ibid., Note by Cleary and Charles, undated 
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which held this view the most strongly and it was R-S-Wood, the 
Deputy Secretary and a former head of technical branch, who 
initiated a discussion of the matter. There was not a unanimity 
of opinion about the number of pupils misplaced. R-S-Wood thought 
that only one stream of most three-stream grammar schools should be 
following academic courses, and noted that in 1938 4(Ylo of pupils in 
grant-aided secondary schools had not taken school certificate 
examinations and 25% had left before reaching the age of 16. The 
belief was that many of these pupils should have been taking 
technical courses. Three possible responses to this problem were 
considered. Selection f or grammar school courses could be improved, 
although this would not dispose of the objections that too many 
pupils wanted such courses and that there were too many grammar school 
places. Secondly a proportion of these abler pupils could be diverted 
to technical courses. This was seen as desirable in terms of 
industry's requirements, but the question remained of how to achieve 
it, whether in a bilateral grammar -te chni cal school or in the 
separate junior technical colleges which already existed. The third 
alternative was the multilateral schoolq although the more specialised 
nature of technical courses led technical branch to the view that the 
multilateral school was the worst possible solution. 
4 
The size of multilateral schools was regarded with more 
flexibility than hitherto. There was no longer an insistence that 
such a school need be the size of existing grammar, modern and 
technical schools combined. The view that a multilateral school 
could have about 800 pupils was linked by Woods to his belief that 
only one stream in most grammar schools should in any case be doing 
academic work. 
Although the Green Book had defined parity in terms which 
eschewed any notion of equality, the public demand for institutions 
which were at least regarded as of equal worth was a major influence 
in the discussions. Solutions were assessed according to whether 
4 Ibid., Note by Wallis, 23.4.42 
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they met "the desire to get all forms of post-primary education 
on to more or less the same footing. " In a prescient sentence 
Wood wrote, "The ideal of 'all-embracing' schools, giving young 
people in their early formative years a common training in 
citizenship before they diverge on to different lines of life, now 
commands a good deal of support in certain quarters, and is likely 
to get increasing su pport. 11 
In spite of the-discussions being more open, the participants 
were ultimately concerned as before with the effect of change on 
their own sections. They were still prisoners of the past. 
Walliss for example, was ultimately opposed to any combination of 
schools, whether multilateral or bilateral (grammar-technical), 
making his stand in the end on his confidence that technical schools 
could achieve parity of esteem (with the grammar school, of course) 
on their own merits, provided that transfer at 13 was a 
"reality". Equally Williams, although more conciliatory in tone, 
advanced only arguments which favoured the retention of grammar 
schools. 
Before all of the participants met in Holmes' room in an 
attempt to hammer out a consensus they had two significant 
contributions, one from Williams and the other from a staff inspector 
for classics R. H. Barrow. The influence of these contributions lay 
in the involvement of the two men in the work of the Norwood Committee, 
the former as a secretary of the Secondary Schools Examinations Council 
which had set up the committee, and the latter as the secretary of the 
committee itself. 
Williams presaged the post-war result of this debate - the ll+ 
examination - by claiming that the grammar school could be reformed, 
and the problem identified by Woods overcome, by "better classification 
lo4 
of entrants at 1111 and the introduction of an examination at 16 
which did not include groupings of subjects. A revealing aside 
was his expression of the fear that, if the school certificate 
examination continued at 16 in multilateral schools, "there would 
be a danger of the modern pupils demanding to take it. " 
Barrow, in a confused paper containing many contradictions, 
rejected all alternatives to the existing tripartite diVision 'of 
post-primary schooling. Indeed, he favoured rather more 
divisions. -5 The better grammar schools should remain; the poorer 
ones should be acknowledged to bebilateral grammar-modern schools; 
there should be some separate modern schools, and "some should have 
more prestige than others, since real parity is impossible; " 
separate technical schools were essential because only if technical 
education were on its own could it develop its own ethos and 
reputation. 
On May Day 1942 Holmes, Wood, the three section heads, their 
three chief inspectors, and Barrow of the Norwood Committee met in 
an attempt to bring the debate to a conclusion. Certain views were 
agreed. 
6 
It was held that steps already approved (a common code, 
equality of amenities, the abolition of fees) would go "some 
considerable way" towards achieving equality of status, but that, 
since not all schools could have sixth forms, some were "bound to 
carry a prestige. " The impossibility of immediately establishing 
a multilateral school system with existing buildings was agreedl 
and it was noted that post-war building programmes would present 
opportunities to experiment with such schools. There was an 
acknowledgement that such schools need not be as large -as had been 
thought; 860 pupils was thought to be a likely size, two grammar 
5 Ibid. Note by Barrow undated, interestingly entitled, 'Note on so- 
called multilateral schools I ; no other contributer to the 
discussion felt the need for the qualification 
6 Ibid., Note of discussion in Secretary's Room on Multilateral 
Schools, 1-5.42 
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streams and a sixth form giving 350 Pupilst one technical stream 
giving 150 pupils, and three modern streams for four years giving 
360 pupils. The technical schools were to remain separate, and 
the problem of the 30-40/06 of pupils wrongly placed in grammar 
schools would be solved naturally by certain grammar schools failing 
to produce sixth forms and becoming de facto modern schools. 
Holmes closed the meeting by opining that they should not 
crystallise their views any further until two factors became known, 
viz. whether it would be possible eventually to raise the school 
leaving age to 16 (which would end yet another distinction between 
grammar and modern schools and thus make parity easier to achieve), 
and what Norwood would report. These remarks seem disingenu. ous. 
Holmes was suggesting that, if the raising of the leaving age to 16 
could be envisaged, parity would become a more realisable aim and 
the case for the multilateral school would bediminished; butq as 
has already been seen, Holmes was opposed to the proposal of 16 as 
the leaving age on both educational- and practical grounds. The 
most likely result, if there were indeed any remaining uncertainty 
on the matter at the Board, was for the leaving age not to be raised 
to 16. It took some audacity to use any such uncertainty in support 
of the status quo in secondary school organisation. Similarly, 
although there were uncertainties about the recommendations which 
Norwood might make, there was no doubt about the recommendations 
7 
which Williams and Barrow wished it to make. As will be seen, 
confusion over the scope of the committee's work was to enable 
Williams and Barrow to slacken the reins if they thought the 
committee would acquiesce in their wishes and to take up the slack 
if the committee showed any sign of taking its own direction. 
Butler personally took a great interest in the problem of 
7 Infra p . 114 and pp. 121-124 
lo6 
selection and, like Cleary, was troubled by the dangers in making 
irrevocable choices at 11 which could affect the rest of people's 
lives. In October 1942 he expressed this anxiety, in the course 
of a note to Holmes about the possible content of the Bill, thus, 
"I have for long been concerned to provide an opportunity for 
children to revise their choice of school between the ages of 11 
and 13. That is to say, I am not satisfied that the age of 11 is 
the one and ideal age at which child--ýen should decide upon their 
future lives. " 
8 
Butler was not at this stage privy to the office 
discussions which had been held in the Spring of that year on the 
contribution which multilateral schools could make to a solution of 
the problem. It was not until February of the following year, and 
then as the result of his being given the file on these discussions 
by Heaton whom he had brought into his office to help with the 
preparation of the Bill, that Butler was confronted with the issues. 
His perception of the unresolved and indeed irresolvable dilemma 
was immediate. - Having read the file over the weekend Butler asked 
one question. "How, " he asked, "do we propose to arrange for the 
re-switch between 11 and 13 if we don't have multilateral schools? '19 
An uncomplicated answer from a Board of Education official to 
a similar question a few months later was revealing. A Daily Herald 
reporter was visiting a central school in Kent and asked if children 
who turned out to be suitably gifted had any chance of transferring 
to an academic course and going on to grammar school and university. 
The official replied that it was practically impossible to arrange a 
transferio The President received his direct answer from Barrow., 
11 
It came as a prediction of what the Norwood Committee would say on the 
matter. Norwood would recommend three types of secondary school, but 
each would have a lower school for the 11 to 13 year olds which would 
be "a distinct entity" in the charge of a particular teacher. At the 
8 P. R. O. Edl36/379, Butler to Holmes, 20.10.42 
9 P. R. O. Edl36/300, (? Goodfellow) to Butler, 26.2.43, endorsed by Butler 
10 Daily Herald, 19.8.43tP-3 
11 P. R. O. Edl36/300, Barrow to Heaton, 12.3.43 
9 
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age of 11 there would be "a rough shake-out" Of PuPils into the 
three types of schools, but the curricula in all schools would be' 
Ilroughly similar", although pupils in the &ammar schools would 
start one or two foreign languages. This would be Ila probationary 
period", a "process of diagnosis", and promotion from the lower school 
to the upper forms would not be automatic. The teachers in charge of 
the lower parts of schools would know by the time their pupils were 13 
years old whether they should remain or transfer. Barrow took the 
casuistry of the Green Book 
12 
and elaborated it. The contradiction 
of curricula which had to be sufficiently similar to allow transfer 
but which could not be sufficiently similar to make segregation 
unnecessary was repeated. Two aspects were new. The office of the 
head of lower school was added and the supposed solution was given the 
prospective imprimatur of the Norwood Committee. The vagueness of 
phrases such as "rough shake-out" was-an indication that the notions 
themselves were vague. Butler, who had seen the nub of the problem 
so quickly, might have been alerted. Instead he endorsed the note, 
"I am much comforted-" 
There is one curious aspect of this response to Butler, which had 
had the effect of satisfying him and stifling his interest in the 
matter. Barrow worked closely with Williams, who was himself pressing 
for more effective means of making the academic selection of pupils for 
grammar schools - the antithesis of the crude, preliminary and tentative 
allocation process which Barrow described to Butler. It is necessary 
to consider whether the whole concept of the diagnostic lower school, 
first explored in the Green Book, now used to allay the President's 
anxieties and soon to be publicly elaborated in the Norwood Report, was 
disengenuously devised. Certainly there was a stark contrast between 
the goals of Williams and Barrow as stated in office discussions and 
the goals of the diagnostic lower school. The contradiction was to 
12 Supra, P. 52 
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appear in the Norwood Report itself. 13 
There were other voices besides Savage's raised against 
segregation and sometimes explicitly in favour of multilateral 
schools at this time. Harold Laski conveyed to Ede, who passed 
on to Butler, his'view that, "the Labour Party believed in the 
multilateral school. " Ede's view was that in small towns the 
multilateral school would "form itself", and he asEured Laski 
that the aim of eVeryone at the Board was to give all f orms of post- 
primary education the same educatiohal and social status. His 
examples of what he thought this meant fell short of iýýultilateral 
schools, however, since he mentioned the need to prevent children 
who were taking technical courses from being regarded as "following 
inferior studies or preparing for an inferior life", and, in a 
reference to re-allocation of places at 13+, the need to secure 
"the adjustment of misfits without the infliction of stigma. 
, 14 
Support also came in the form of a booklet, A Democratic 
Reconstruction of Education, 
15 
by four London secondary -school 
headmasters. A significant measure of support came from secondary 
school interests, for many of these schools took a broader educational 
view than did their spokesmen at the Board. The heads' standpoint 
was, in their own view, "uncompromisingly democratic". Amongst 
common-place demands for the raising of the school leaving age to 
16 and more controversial suggestions such as the diversion of public 
schools to other uses, they argued that the future pattern of secondary 
education should be based on community secon dary schools catering f or 
all children from 11 to 16 or 18, providing through a "multi-bias 
curriculum, the appropriate education for every child on a footing of 
equality. " 
In October 1942 the National Association of Head Teachers 
advocated general "cultural education" from 11 to 13 with bias only 
after that age, and stated, "where conditions render it possible, we 
13 Board of Education Curriculum and Examinations in Secondarx 
Schools, j, ondon 194i, pp. 17-18; hereafter referred to as Norwood 
Report 
14 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Ede to Butler, 13.1o. 41 
15 S. R. Gibson, H. W. Gilbert , H. Raymond King 9 F. Wilkinson, A Democratic 
Reconstruction of Education (with Special Reference to Secondary 
Education), London undated 
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are in favour of multilateral secondary schools with absolute 
fluidity of transfer from one section to another, to develop to 
the highest degree the varying abilities of each pupil. " 
16 
The 
Assistant Masters' Association approved without any dissenting 
voices a resolution in November 1941 which asked that, "Full 
advantage should be taken of the post-war reconstruction to 
establish a number of "experimental secondary schools providing a 
variety of curricula. " 
17 
The National Union of Teachers did not positively advocate a 
multilateral re-organisation of existing secondary schools, but it 
did strongly attack selection at both its Easter conference in 1942 
and in its representations to the_Norwood Committee. At its 
conference it adopted a policy which seemed to assume that three 
kinds of school could exist without academic selection. It seemed 
to blur the issue by arguing that transfer to secondary schools 
should be based on junior school records, teachers' recommendations 
and parental wishes, "since no infallible instrument for the 
determination of types of ability at the age of ll+ has so far been 
invented. " If I. Q. tests were to be used in addition they "should 
not result in children with the highest intelligence quotients being 
allocated to any one type of secondary school. " 
18 When four 
representatives 6f the N. U. T., who included W. H. Spikes -a leading 
member of N. A. L. T., met Norwood's committee, their arguments were 
all opposed to selection. Intelligence tests were denounced as 
fallacious; unfettered parental choice, it was forecast, would lead 
to all parents choosing grammar schools; transfers after ll+ were in 
practice rare and bound to be so. One representative argued that 
his own school of 700 Pupils could cater f or all types of children. 
19 
Since a member of the N. U. T. Executive, E. W. Naisbitt, was a member of 
16 N. A. H. T., Education after the War, Surbiton 19421p. 2 
17 London Institute of Education Library, A. M. A. Records, Executive 
Committee Minutes, 15.11.41 
18 N. U. T., Report of Proposals by the Executive, adopted by 
Conference, Easter 1942, Cheltenham 1942 
19 P. R. O. Edl2/479, Norwood Minutes 19,19-20-3.43 
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Norwood's committee, the Union's representatives must have known 
that by the time of this meeting, March 1943, the die had already 
been cast in favour of selection, 
20 
and in any case they did not 
explicitly advocate multilateral schools as the alternative to 
selection. Other N. U. T. spokesmen made their position clearer 
when they met Butler and Ede as part of a Council for Educational 
Advance deputation. They explained that, "opposition to the 
multilateral school was confined to that type of school being made 
21 
universal. " The N. U. T. 's stance against selection was important 
and an obstacle which those planning a tri-partite organisation of 
secondary education had to overcome. 
H. G. Wells railed against selection in a Sunday Despatch 
article which he sent to Butler. 
22 It was a rambling rumbustious 
attack on all that was being planned for the future of education, 
denouncing those plans as an attempt to maintain the class basis of 
English education which would thus ensure Britain's decline. In 
particular he denounced the intention that at ll+ children "are to 
be sorted out into upper class and lower class, according to the 
gifts they have displayed before that age. " 
Multilateral- schools also attracted Conservative support. 
The strongest advocate of their establishment in the Commons debate 
on the Spens Re2ort was a Conservative M. P., Annesley Somerville. 
He was a former teacher (Wellington and Eton) and had been President 
of the Independent Schools Association since 1927 - 'Tlultilateralism 
means providing a sufficient number of sides or of streams in one 
school in order to meet the demands of the aptitudes of the boYs and 
girls in that school, " he said, adding, "That seems to be sound. " 
He took Spens' objections to multilateral schools - size, size of 
sixth form, -the difficulty of finding adequate 
headmasters - and 
20 Infra pp. 122-123 
21 B. L., Ede Diarylvol-7922.1.43 
22 P. R. O. Edl36/215 Wells to Butler, 22.6.42;. Sunday Despatch, 21.6.42 jp. 
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rejected them all. "I would recommend the gradual introduction 
of the multilateral system", he concluded, giving an example of 
how it could be achieved in his constituency of Windsor. 
23 
On the other hand segregation also had its advocates, some 
predictable and some not. A Conservative Party report, Looking 
Ahead, 24 advocated a starkly meritocratic approach to education, 
believing that "much of the class discomfort, of which the nation 
has become so impatiently conscious, is due not to any dislike of 
educational privileges as much to the belief that these privileges 
a. re too often given to the wrong people. It wanted a system in 
which no child would be held back by the demands of general education, 
excepting only-the requirements of moral and social education. The 
exceptional child should be "freed from the normal routine and 
encouraged to follow his bent to its final issue. " 
Less expected was a contribution from the Nuffield College 
Social Reconstruction Committee, of which G. D. H. Cole was chairman. 
In January 1943 Cole sent to Butler an advance copy of a booklet, 
Industry and Education, 
25 
which had resulted from a private conference 
held the previous September. The tenor of its argument was as 
meritocratic as the Conservative Party's and it is easy to understand 
Cole's comment that agreement on it was reached "to everyone's 
surprise". Signatories included Citrine of the T. U. C., Clay of the 
T. G. W. U. and the Labour Party's Education Sub-Committee, Savage of 
the L. C. C., Norwood and Cole himself. Its pre-occupation was with 
an expected shortage of skilled manpower after the war and the need 
to ensure that no talent should remain unfound and undeveloped. it 
is true that the booklet asked for the raising of the school leaving 
age to 16 as soon as possible after the war, and ease of transfer 
between schools, but the aspect of it which Butler seized upon and 
underlined in his copy was the notion of three groups of entrants to 
23 H. C. Debates, vol-343, cols. 1762-1763,15.2-39 
24 Conservative and Unionist Party, Looking Ahead, Educational Aims 
(First interim report of the Conservative. Sub-Committee on 
Education), London 1942, pp. 35-36 
25 Nuffield CollegelIndustry and Education, London, 1943; 
P. R. O. EdlO/272, Cole to Butler922.1.43 
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industry. Here was an industrial rationale for the three types 
of mental capacity which was to justify the three t. Ypes of 
secondary school. 
The role of the Norwood 
_Report 
in swaying the debate in 
favour of tri-partism was important. On the face of it concerned 
only with matters which arose naturally from the interests of the 
Secondary Schools Examinations Council, under the aegis of which 
it was prepared, its actual concerns and its consequences were 
much more profound. The system of public examinations always 
significantly affects the aims and content of education. On this 
occasion the committee under the chairmanship of Cyril Norwood, 
President of St. John's College, Oxford, was keen to go far beyond 
its terms of reference, which were "to consider changes in the 
secondary school curriculum and the question of school examinations 
in relation thereto. " Its members wanted to make policy 
rec ommendat ions on the whole range of post-primary education. it 
was also the case, 
' 
as will be seen, 
26 
that the Board's officials 
were content for this to happen until they realised that the committee 
might reach conclusions which were quite different from those favoured 
at the Board. 
If the special role of the Norwood Committee in the evolution of 
the 1944 Act is to be understood, its origins and workings need to be 
examined. 
27 
In spite of the unpredictability of its chairman, the 
committee was from the outset dominated by the Board's secondary branch. 
G. G. Williams was largely reaponsible f or the establishment of the 
committee and took a close interest in its work as one of the Board's 
assessors. Duckworth, the chief inspector for secondary education 
and Williams' close ally in the office debates on post-primary schooling, 
was another assessor. The committee's secretary was R. H. Barrow, an 
inspector of classics, who was Williams' and Duckworth's nominee for the 
26 Infraip. 114 and pp. 16o-165 
27 P. H. J. H. Gosden Education in the Second World War London 1976, 
PP-367-373 gives a summary of the committee's attempts to go 




28 He was based at Oxford and was therefore already close 
to Norwood. Barrow was a vigorous upholder of academic education 
and pre-selection for it. He was to emphasize the differences 
between the 17 year old grammar school boy and the 15 year old 
elementary school boy, to wonder whether the production of such 
different types was compatible with the same educational experience 
between 11 and 13, and to argue that, "We must have in mind the best 
29 education between 11 and 13, best suited for the best brains. " 
-The relationship between Williams and Norwood was close before 
the committee began its work. Norwood was already chairman of the 
Secondary Schools Examinations Council and Williams its secretary. 
It was the pre-war plight of the public schools, with their capital 
debts from earlier building programmes and their falling rolls, which 
first exercised their minds. In 1938 both men were suggesting that a 
royal commission, rather than a committee appointed by the Board, 
30 might be the best way of achieving progress. Williams considered 
Norwood a possible chairman of such a commission whilst noting that 
he was "by no means popular in some quarters.,, 
31 Williams and 
Holmes were to have this opinion confi, rmed as the discussions between 
them and the public school headmasters developed. 
Having received a long and rambling letter from Norwood in 
September 1941,32 Butler too can have been in no doubt that he was 
about to entrust an important area of policy-making to a man whose 
opinions were wide-ranging and who might have difficulty in keeping 
within narrow terms. Butler's relations with Norwood were also close, 
although quite different from Williams'- Butler had been a pupil at 
Marlborough when Norwood had arrived as master, changed the curriculum, 
and enhanced the college's repu'tation as a winner of university 
scholarships. Butler's later recollections -of Marlborough were not 
all happy; he was out of sympathy with the excessive regard for 
competitive sport and regretted the lack of scope for literary and 
28 P. R. O. Edl36/129, Williams to Holmes, 17-12.40 
29 P. R. O. Edl2/478, Barrow to Williams, 19.3.42 
30 P. R. O. Edl36/129, Norwood to Duckworth, 19-10-38 
31 Ibid., Williams to Holmes, 24-10-38 
32 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Norwood to Butler, 6.9.41 
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debating activities. Nonetheless he regarded Norwood as having 
been a very good headmaster . 
33 
In September 1941 Norwood was giving thought to the terms of 
reference of "our committee", although it seems that when Williams 
and Duckworth visited him at Oxford the problems of the public schools 
were still uppermost in their minds. 
34 
Even when the terms of 
reference were decided Norwood returned again and again to this topic, 
accepting that it was for others to devise a solution only when Lord 
Fleming was entrusted with the task. 
From the outset Norwood and his committee felt entitled by their 
terms of reference to cover much of the ground already covered by Spens 
and the Green Book. It is clear that for a while the Board's 
secondary branch encouraged them in this. When the committee first 
met, after a long delay, in October 1941, Norwood's opening statement 
warned against going over ground already tilled by Spens, but also 
declared that an enquiry into examinations would be incomplete unless 
the content of education were also considered, and that they therefore 
had "an opportunity of reviewing the whole field of secondary education 
after the war. " 
35 When he listed the topics to be considered and 
included the age of transfer to secondary education and the whole field 
of post-primary education including grammar and modern schools, he was 
36 
merely echoing the topics adumbrated by Williams the previous month . 
When Butler mooted the idea of adding to the committee people 
with experience outside the confines of selective education (school and 
university), in event, as he put it, "of the scent being too tempting 
in the field of the modern schools,,, 
37 Williams was quick to block any 
such move. Yet he did not accept the corollary that the committee's 
terms of reference should be narrowly interpreted. On the contrary 
he elaborated an argument which justified both its narrowly-chosen 
membership and its broadly-interpreted terms of reference. 
38 It would 
33 R. A. ButlergThe Art of the Possible, London 19719P. 10 
34 P. R. O. Ed1301-29iwilliams to Butler, 18.9.41 and Edl2/478, Norwood 
to Butler, 20.9.41 
35 P. R. O. Edl2/479, Norwood Minute 1,18.10.41 
36 P. R. O. Edl2/478, Williams to Holmes923-9.41 
37 Ibid., Note by Butler, 27-11.41 
38 Ibid'., Williams to Holmes, 1.12.4i, approved by Holmes 2.12.41 
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be unwise, he argued, to add members qualified to speak for other 
sectors of education. This would tempt the committee to go beyond 
its terms of reference. It might even be unconstitutional, bearing 
in mind the committee's origin as an off-shoot of the S. S. E. C. 
Moreover it was unnecessary, since Duckworth could be relied on "to 
see that the views of his colleagues in elementary and technical 
branches at the Board were properly considered* The ýommittee 
should therefore remain as constituted, but the secondary (i. e. grammar) 
school curriculum could not be considered "in abstraction from the 
organisation of schools" and the place of these schools "in the 
general system of post-primary education. " He gave three examples 
of topics which would have to be considered; the age of transfer, the 
proportion of children to be selected for grammar schools (and 
therefore the proportion left over for the other types of school) and 
the selection of university entrants which was bound to affect entrance 
to technical education. At this stage he even wanted the committee to 
express views on the contribution which the public schools should make 
as the boarding element in the selective school system. Thus the 
committee's right to express a view on the whole spectrum of post- 
primary education was preserved, whilst the membership of the cormittee 
was confined to representatives of selective schools, universities, 
examining boards and local authorities. Holmes endorsed this line of 
reasoning. 
Another matter of interest was the alarmed reaction of the Board's 
assessors to Norwood's assumption that they were full members of the 
committee. This was clearly a mistake. on the part of Norwood who had 
misunderstood the relationship between the Board and its advisory 
committees, but his mistake was understandable in view of the actual 
contribution made by the officials to the committee's decisions. An 




irritable reaction when they did not do as he wished. For 
example, he expressed his annoyance at the way in which members 
"challenge the issues at every point" and especially that a member 
representing an examining board should express views (opposed to 
Williams' own) on the direct grant school question. 
39 Butler 
cleared up the matter in a conversation with Norwood in May 1942,4o 
He ruled that no language could be used which "indicated that the 
Board's officers had actually causeda majority view to prevail in 
the committee. " He agreed that officials "should pull their full 
weight... and should fearlessly indicate their point of view, 
particularly on the subject of the direct grant schools and of the 
examinations. " They should be described as "assessors" and "it 
should be made clear that it-was not they who actually took part in 
deciding the point of view which the committee wished to adopt by a 
vote. " Butler was doing no more than explaining what was normal 
Board procedure, but the anxiety of the Board's officials at 
Norwood's innocence, and the vigour of Butler's response indicated 
both the Board' s increasing anxiety at Norwood's waywardness, and 
Williams' concern that the apparent independence of a committee 
which he was manipulating should be preserved. 
41 
The potential breadth of Norwood's policy review led to a 
clash with Sir Will Spens and it is interesting to note that Holmes 
gave his support wholly to Norwood. The matter came to a head in 
the Spring of 1942 when Norwood's committee was only in the early 
stages of its work. Spens' initial approach to Butler was, like 
Norwood's, the result of his anxiety about the future of the public 
schools. Spens had telephoned Butler on the matter the previous 
summer. 
42 
Spens then met first Greenwood, who was generally 
responsible at that time for post-war reconstruction, and afterwards 
Butler in October 1941. The public schools still caused anxiety, 
39 Ibid., Williams to Barrow, 22.6.42 
40 Ibid., Note by Butler 26.5.42 
41 Ibid., Williams to Savagell. 8.42 shows how Williams attempted to 
sway the committee indirectly. Himself favouring internal 
assessment, and fearing either an anaemic recommendation -on 
the 
matter or a divided committeelhe urged Savage to give 
"a clarion 
call"outside the committee in order to influence 
it. 
42 P. R. O. Edl36/268, Note by Butler, 30.7.41 
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but by now Spens was more agitated at the scope being given to 
Norwood's committee. Speng was "not amicably disposed towards 
the Norwood committee or towards the Board. " Butler sought advice 
from his officials on whether this "rivalry" between the two men, 
as he saw it, would harm the cause of education. 
43 
Holmes tried 
to set Butler's mind at rest by interpreting Spens' hostility as 
jealousy that anybody but himself should be pondering the secondary 
school curriculum,, tfa subject which he regards as peculiarly his own. " 
Butler was further calmed by Holmes' opinion that the educational 
world would be "more ready to put their money" on 14orwood than on 
Spens. 
44 
When Spens met Butler again in March 1942 he was even more 
agitated about Norwood's activities. He expressed "great alarm" 
at what Norwood was doing and "great distrust" of Norwood himself. 
In his view it would be "nothing less than a scandal" if Norwood 
were to rework the ground gone over by his own committee. Butler's 
response was to flatter Spens by*observing that the Green Book owed 
much to his report, and to reassure him by letting him know that 
Norwood's wings had already been clipped to some extent. He refused, 
however, to place further limits on the committee's discussions and 
hoped "to get as much out of Dr. Norwood" as he could. 
45 
Butler was, nonetheless, somewhat troubled by the validity of 
Spens' argument. "There is something in his point about the 
Consultative Committee, " he wrote. Indeed there was. Spens' report 
had been prepared by the Board's Consultative Committee at the Board's 
request and had special reference to grammar schools and technical 
high schools. If the Board wanted advice on the future structure 
of these aspects of post-primary education it was already to hand. 
If it wanted further advice the Consultative Committee was a more 
obvious place from which to seek it than a committee set up by the 
4 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Note by Butler 16.10.411sent by R. S. Wood to Holmes 
44 Ibid., Holmes to Butler, 20.10.41 
45 P. R. O. Edl36/131 Note by Butler, 20-3.42 
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Secondary Schools Examinations Council, which by its very 
constitution was a link between the Board and the school 
certificate examining bodies, and was therefore concerned with 
more narrowly-defined matters. Having had a very carefully- 
prepared report from Spens late in 1938, it was strange that the 
Board, having sanctioned the establishment of a committee by the 
S. S. E. C. less than three years later, should be tolerating, even 
encouraging the discussion of similar topics. 
It was even stranger that Holmes' efforts should have been 
devoted at this very time to undermining Spens' status, by devising 
ways of killing off the Consultative Committee of which he was 
chairman. Ina memorandum to Butler only a week before Spens' 
second meeting with the President, Holmes expressed his view that 
the committee had "outlived its usefulness. " 
46 
The contradiction in 
his advice revealed his true purpose. Whilst claiming that, even 
if the war had not intervened, there would have been nothing left 
for it to consider (a decidedly sanguine view of the state of 
education in 1939 and one hardly compatible with the role devised 
for Norwood), he wanted to substitute for it a small committee to 
advise ministers and officials informally. It is true that this 
alternative was partly "to placate outside opinion", but it was 
also desirable "on merits" and "to assist the Board". His 
problem was that the Consultative Committee was established by 
order-in-council and was therefore a statutory body which the Board 
could not cancel at will. A new order-in-council could, however, 
alter the composition of the Consultative Committee, reduce its size 
and make no provision for a chairman, thus giving Holmes what he 
wanted. As Holmes remarked, "The question of the chairmanship is 
not free from difficulty. " His remark related to the office, but 
his hostility was also to Spens personally. 
46 Ibid., Holmes to Butler, 14-3.42 
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Holmes' argument ran thus: There was nothing left for the 
0 
Consultative Committee to do, but the Board could not wind it up 
without legislation and in any case did need a small group of 
private advisors who would meet not under a Board-appointed 
chairman such as Spens but under the chairmanship of some-one inside 
the Board, possibly even the President. For Holmes to wish to see 
the end of the Consultative Committee was entirely in keeping with 
his view of how educational policy should be made. His preference 
was always to seek privately the views of men in education whom he 
knew personally, rather than those of committees which could be 
thought, albeit informally, to represent interest groups. His 
taste for private rather than public discussion 
47 
received some 
support from one of Churchill's rulings. The Prime Minister had 
said that the number of departmental committees should be reduced 
during the war. Yet when Holmes considered this as an obstacle 
to the establishTent of Norwood's committee, he tried to overcome 
it by not making any public announcement about the committee's 
existence. 
48 
This recommendation was eventually rejected by Butler, 
49 
who had had his fill of Holmes' penchant for secrecy over the Green 
Book. Only a strong motive would had led Holmes to abandon a 
statutory committee and establish an entirely new one against the 
spirit of the Prime Minister's ruling. 
The question is therefore why Holmes should have taken up the 
matter at this particular time, especially when he was content to see 
Norwood's committee concerning itself with issues which sprang less 
naturally from its constitutional basis than they did from the 
Consultative Committee's. The answer may lie in the differences 
between Spens and Norwood, their committees and what they were likely 
to recommend. The former represented both an actual-50 and a possible 
source of opposition to the policies being promoted by the Board, 
47 A. W. S. Hutchings. interviewed by the present writeril-11-78, thought 
that a factor in Holmes' passion for secrecy might have been the 
"famous row" which his father, who preceded him at the Board, had 
had with the N. U. T. over a confidential circular criticising 
teaching standards in elementary schools 
48 P. R. O. Edl2/478, Holmes to Williams, 21-3.41 
49 Ibid., Note by Butler, 25-9.41 on Holmes to Butler, 23-9.41 
50 Supra p. 1_5 Its view that the raising of the school leaving age to 
16 was inevitable is an example. Infra p. 114 Spens had pressed 
this point strongly to Greenwood. 
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whereas the latter might offer support and, if it did not, could be 
told to narrow the area of its discussion and keep more strictly to 
its terms of reference. The distaste, which the Board had for the 
_Spens 
Report, and especially f or its independence, has already been 
noted. Further evidence exists in the correspondence of a member of 
the committee - Shena Simon, then a Liberal and Tawney's nominee as 
his successor when he had retired from the committee in 1931. During 
the deliberations which produced the report she constantly lamented 
the pressures to reduce commitments which might achieve parity between 
the types of post-primary school. 
51 
Holmes gave a further indication that Norwood's committee was 
designed very much to serve the Board's purposes when he justified 
the attention being given to the grammar school curriculum, whilst 
the curricula of primary schools and the other projected types of 
secondary schools were being neglected. 
52 Norwood's committee was 
necessary, he argued, because of the effect on the grammar school 
curriculum of external examinations. No committees, or even 
conferences of 'educationists, were necessary on the curricula of ýhe 
other schools; the Board's own inspectors could do the job. He 
claimed the support of Duckworth, the senior chief inspector, for 
his view. Duckworth was, of course, from the secondary branch of the 
inspectorate and a close ally of Williams and Barrow in their work on 
the Norwood Committee. The distinction between the grammar school 
curriculum and that of other schools was the relevance to it of 
external examinations. That alone, according to Holmes, made it 
necessary for its curriculum to be the subject of a report. Yet, 
as will be seen, when that report was published it comti-., ented on the 
mental capacities of children for whom it recommended technical and 
modern schools. A narrow 'dist inc tion justified its existence, but 
there was to be nothing narrow about its recommendations or their 
consequences. 
51 J. Simon: The Shaping of the Spens Report on Secondary Education, 
1933-38', British Journal of Educational Studies Ivol. XXV, no. 1 I 
February 1977, P O; and vol. XXV, no. 2, June 1977, pp. 170-185 
52 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Holmes to Butler, 20.10.41 
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The Board's officials could not be entirely confident that 
Norwood would produce a report to their liking. For a while it 
looked as though they might find themselves with a very difi. erent 
set of recommendations from the one desired. The com-, ittee was 
not immediately and whole-heartedly willing to adopt tri-partism. 
Early in its deliberations it considered a multilateral solution 
to the problem of pupils' varying needs and continued thereafter 
to flirt with the concept. Initially the view was held that the 
multilateral school could be regarded as "valuable in the limited 
cases in which it was possible.,, 
53 
At the next meeting the 
concept was rejected, but only because of the difficulties of 
, incorporating technical education as it then existed into a 
multilateral school, for at the same time the committee's "adoption" 
of bilateralism was recorded. It was intended that at the age of 
ll+ pupils should have a choice between a teclýnical education and 
a general education, the latter embracing existing grammar and 
senior elementary school curricula "frequently given in the same 
buildings. ', 54 In October 1942 various incompatible views were 
expressed. 
55 On the one hand it was held that differentiation 
at ll+ of pupils into three types was "difficult or impossible", 
since the years before 11+ "provided insufficient evidence for any 
serious attempt at assortment". On the other hand it was held 
that grammar school education must begin at ll+ if tuition in 
languages were to be preserved. Later in the same month a paper 
trying to def ine a multilateral school more clearly was adopted . 
56 
It posed three alternatives: a school of at least 1,500 pupils, a 
school of 800 pupils but with an "uneconomic" grammar school 
element, and a grammar-modern bilateral school with a disproportionately 
high grammar school element alongside separate modern schools. 
Irksome to Williams and Barrow as all of this was, it was the 
53 P. R. O. Edl2/479, Norwood Minutes 315-7-1.42 
54 Ibid., Norwood Minutes 4112-13.6-42 
55 Ibid., Norwood Minutes 10,2-3-10.42 
56 Ibid., COM 38, Multilateral; Norwood Minutes 12,30-31.10.42 
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committee's hostility to the direct grant system which provoked 
them to take firm action. For a while the two men had been hopeful 
that a statement urging the retention of the direct grant schools 
would come from the committee. As soon as it became obvious that 
a vote on this and similar topics would go against them, -57 the whip 
was cracked and there was no hesitation in defining narrowly and 
precisely the matters which were henceforward to be regarded as 
within the committee's competence. 
This was done in a ruthless way. Accepting that they could 
not obtain from Norwood all that they wanted by allowing a free- 
ranging discussion, Williams suggested to Barrow that they might 
have to drop any further consideration of "administrative problems" - 
the Board's term for the structure of the schools system. Barrow 
should draft "a short general chapter on lines which... would command 
agreement. t, 
58 It seems that this was the document presented to the 
committee in October 1942 and discussed in November. 
59 Its object 
was clearly to confine further discussion. In-contrast to the 
previous attitude of the Board's officials, emphasis was now given 
to the word 'Examinations' in the S. S. E. C. of which Norwood's 
committee was an off-shoot. Members were advised that their 
recommendations must not "appear to rest upon something which was 
not the major concern of the Committee". That would invite 
"gratuitous criticism". Their opening should instead be based 
on a sequence emphasizing that they had started with a study of the 
traditional grammar school curriculum, had noted the expansion in 
the demand for secondary education and the consequent need for a 
more varied ctrriculum. They could then see that the traditional 
grammar school educati. on was not suitable f or all secondary schools 
and could consider what other types of school were necessary. Thus 
they could move from factors within the province of the S. S. E. C. to 
57 This topic is considered more fully in Chapter 7 
58 P-"M. O. Edl2/478, Williams to Barrow, 22.6.42 
59 P. R. O. Edl2/479, CCM 40 Layout of the Report; Norwood Minute 12, 
-30-31.10.42; Norwood Minute 13,13-14.11.42 
It is not possible on the available evidence to be certain that 
this was the paper intended by Williams. The Minutes of the Norwood 
Committee are frequently uninformative. For example, the formal 
withdrawal of the public and direct grant school questions from 
the committee's consideration was not mentioned in the minutes, 
and Minutes 21-241which cover the final drafting of the report, 
record only the names of those present and the date of the next 
meeting. 
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a possible layout of secondary education "undertaken with a view 
to clearer definition of the grammar school. " 
This had the effect of ruling out of order those contentious 
matters especially the future of direct grant schools, upon which 
the officials could not persuade the committee, after a strenuous 
effort, to their point of view. It left Williams and Barrow free 
to put bef ore the committee a draft chapter in which a view was 
taRen of the whole field of post-priffary education, seen from'the 
grammar school viewpoint. A. W. S. Hutchings, the representative on 
the committee of the Assistant Masters' Association, has recalled 
"a remarkable discussion" about multilateral and bilateral 
e. grammar -modern) schools which lasted a whole morning. Noting 
that in some areas at that time almost half the pupils aged 11 and 
over went to grammar schools and that some of these schools had 
perforce developed non-grammar 'sides', he has recalled that there 
was by the end of the morning general agreement on the broad division 
of pupils into two groups - those taking and those not taking public 
examinations - in the context of multilateral schools. When 
members returned from lunch the officials produced a paper defining 
three types of child and, although contrary to the tenor of the 
morning's discussion, this was quickly adopted. . Hutchings, who 
clearly admired Williams and thought him to be "a remarkable man" 
who "knew his schools", also considered that, "He would not have 
cared a jot about terms of reference if the committee had agreed 
with him. " 
60 
Norwood argued at the November meeting for amendments, 
and these made the tripartite organisation of post-primary education 
even more specific. In the revised paper, secondary education was 
defined as being of three broad types and the nption of a common 
curriculum between the ages of 11 and 13 was described as "the limit 
of allowable variation. " 
61 
60 A. W. S. Hutchingslinterviewed by the present writer, 1.11.78 
61 P. R. O. Edl2/479, COM 48, Lay-out of the Report (Revised) 
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Barrow and Williams had not only terminated discussion on 
i 
matters which they had been hitherto content to have discussed, 
but had also inserted their own philosophical and administrative 
opinions on the future shape of secondary education. What was 
to become the most significant part of the report in influencing 
the shape of post-war secondary schooling, viz. Chapter One, was 
largely the work of officers from the Board, was in disagreement 
with much of the discussion which had preceded its presentation 
to the committee, but was accepted with little discussion because 
it was issued in the form of an adjudication on the committee's 
terms of reference. 
It was in this way that the notion of three types of child 
came about. The report saw the problem in terms of having "to 
reconcile diversity of human endowment with practical schemes of 
administration and instruction". It accepted what it considered 
to be the de facto solution of this problem, viz. that "rough 
groupings" had established themselves, and dismissed as "not 
necessary to pursue" the awkward questions of whether such groupings 
could be justified in psychological terms, or of whether the 
differences between children were of kind or degree. The report 
then identified the three groups and gave a pen portrait of a 
typical child from each. 
62 
Firstly there was the pupil who loved learning per se; he 
could reason, was interested in causes and could take a 
long view; 
he had the sensitivity to enjoy aesthetically the aptness of a 
phrase or the neatness of a proof. Next there was 
the boy who had 
"an uncanny insight into the intricacies of mechanisms, whereas 
the 
subleties of language construction were "too delicate" 
for him; 
knowledge had to be "capable of immediate application"; if his 
62 Norwood Report, pp. 2-3 
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intelligence were not great, "a feeling of purpose and relevance 
may enable him to make the most of it. " The last group, tthe 
existence of which had been recognised only in recent years, was 
more interested in concrete things, in facts; "relevance to present 
concerns is the only way of awakening [his] interest"; "his horizon 
is near". Apart from the sense of novelty in having discovered and 
acknowledged the existence of a child type which was, according to 
this analysis, to describe the majority in any age group, the most 
useful discovery, from secondary. branch's point of view, was -that 
this last group differed from the other two in that their "mental 
make-up does -not show at an early stage pronounced leanings in a way 
comparable with the other groups. " Nonetheless they had needs which 
had to be "met in as definite a manner as those of other groups. " 
It is impossible to imagine an analysis of children's minds which 
would have fitted more conveniently the pattern of post-primary 
schooling which Williams favoured and which was in essence the 
existing system. The sensitive and reasoning child obviously needed 
a grammar school; the practical type obviously needed a technical 
school; the more limited types could not attend either of these 
schools, because they did not reveal aptitudes so early, but, having 
recognisable needsl had to have schools of their own. 
Taken unawares, not perhaps realising the significance of what 
they were putting their names to or appreciating that it was against 
the drift of their earlier discussions, but in any case coming from 
universities, school certificate boards or secondary schools, the 
committee accepted this analysis of children's intelligence which was 
put to it late in its deliberations. No research was done. The 
groupings in post-primary education which already existed, because 
of the history of schools and the administrators' reluctance to do 
more than adapt the existing framework, were given the semblance of 
an educational, even a philosophical basisý 
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Within seven months of these crucial meetings the cominittee's 
report was on Butler's desk. The following month, July 1943, it 
was in print. It was an effective piece of work by Williams and 
Barr ow. 
Norwood's report recommended, as Barrow had forecast it would, 
both the more highly selective grammar school and the diagnostic 
lower part of all schools including grammar. The problem of 
existing grammar schools was diagnosed as lack of homogeneity, 
resulting from the need to educate all the pupils who attended them. 
merely because such schools were the main source of secondary 
education. They had been required to "serve too many ends. " 
Norwood therefore recommended what Williams and Barrow wanted, viz. 
that grammar schools should be academically more selective, so that 
they could "perform their proper task without distraction. " The 
report went on immediately to describe the diagnostic lower school, 
not, it is true, as such a flexible institution as Barrow had 
described earlier to Butler, but it was nonetheless clearly the 
same beast. Allocation at 11 would "necessarily be tentative in 
a number of cases, 11 there would be "a generally common curriculum", 
and at 13 there would be I-ta review of all pupils" with no automatic 
right to continue in the same school. 
63 
This contradiction, between 
the school with a more clearly defined role on the one hand and a 
closer similarity to schools with different roles on the other, was 
the means by which the separateness and the more selective form of 
entry to the grammar school was to be defended against those who 
favoured equality and parity. It was the same formula as that used 
in the Green Book. 
64 
Such a contradictory policy could never be translated into 
reality. Either the highly selective nature of the grammar school 
would have to be sacrificed or the general nature of 11 to 13 
education in all secondary schools and re-allocation at 13 would 
never become possible. The suggestion that both of these mutually 
63 Ibid., P-15 
64 Supra PP-52-53 
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exclusive features of secondary education policy could co-exist 
served only to dissuade men from pondering the matter further 
until such times as post-war development plans had to be submitted. 
By that time the attitudes of those in charge of the Board and of 
local authorities would have a bearing on the decisions made, 
provided that the Act were to allow flexibility in the organisation 
of secondary education. 
The report did not totally reject multilateralism. It 
rejected the inclusion of technical education in any such school 
on the grounds that association with local industry was an element 
in the success of existing junior technical schools. It allowed 
the possibility of a grammar-modern bilateral school, but contrasted 
what it considered to be the essential largeness of such schools with 
the English tradition that schools should be small enough for the 
headmaster to know every child. The possibility of experiment 
"within the limits of these circumstances" was envisaged. 
Holmes was pleased with Norwood. Whilst including the Board's 
usual disclaimer, although in a very mild form, he welcomed the report 
as "a valuable contribution from an independent source to the solution 
of the educational problems now engaging public attention. " 
65 
The 
views held by Williams and Barrow had been given to and accepted by 
a committee, so that the Board could now welcome back its view as 
from an independent source. Their hand had been strengthenedg not 
only against Cleary but also against the spokesmen for the widely- 
held aspiration of equality in secondary education after the war. 
In spite of the influence of the Norwood Report and the clear 
intention at the Board that the impending 1, egislation should not 
fundamentally alter the Hadow means of re-organising post-primary 
education, there was to be no reference in the Bill to three types 
of school, and it was Edeý the Labour Parliamentary Secretary at 
65 Norwood Report, Prefatory Note. Cf. Holmesl Prefatory Note to the 
Fleming Report a year later, when he stated that Fl6ming's 
recommendations would "require careful and detailed consideration 
by the Board. " 
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the Board, who ensured the omission. The relevant phrases, 
although they were to be amended in detail at various stages, 
were drafted by him early in 1943, i. e. before Norwood's committee 
reported. 
The parliamentary draftsman's initial essay had allowed for 
three types of secondary education clearly differentiated by 
curriculum and length of school life; general secondary school 
finishing at the age of 15, technical school finishing at 16 and 
advanced secondary school finishing at 18. During the afternoon 
and evening of 24 February 1943 Ede worked on his own draf t, aiming 
to produce "a comprehensive definition which would avoid this 
differentiation. 1166 The following day. he completed a long note 
criticising the original draft. His own wording for the clause 
which was to have such importance for the next thirty years and 
more, and which was to be the subject of litigation in the 1960s and 
1970s, is worth quoting in full. He wanted "schools for providing 
for senior pupils secondary education of sufficient variety of types 
as to secure a sufficient choice of studies suitable to the ages, 
abilities, aptitudes and requirements of the pupils, including at 
appropriate stages practical, technical or commercial instruction, 
regard being had to the probable length of the school life of the 
pupils and to the organisation of adequate and appropriate advanced 
instruction for those older pupils who intend to proceed to a college, 
university or 
. 
other place of further full-time education. 167 This 
draft, as sent to Holmes f or discussion within the Board, dif f ered 
from Ede's draft of the previous day in only one significant way: 
he added "aptitudes" to the criteria by which the sufficiency of 
variety in types of education was to be judged. 
The question to be considered is whether on the one hand Ede 
66 B. L. Fde Diary, vol-7124.2.43 
67 P. R. 'O'*. Edl36/389, Ede to Butler, 25.2.43 
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was facilitating the achievement of the long-term Labour objective 
of multilateral schools or at least the short-term goal which Cleary 
had sponsored of common schooling from 11 to 13, or whether on the 
other hand he was objecting to the administrative straitjacket which 
too specific legislation would impose on future governments and local 
authorities - whether his purpose was political and educational or 
merely administrative. 
The evidence suggests that Ede's ideas on secondary education 
were not settled. In'1941 in a facetious memorandum of a conversation 
he had had with Mary Hamilton, who had advocated that child-ren from 
different backgrounds should go to the same school, 
68 
he "expressed 
the view that what was needed in education was not unification but 
diversity. " 
69 
Hamilton's paper had reached Ede via Arthur Greenwood's 
Reconstruction Office, and Greenwood's views seemed to echo Edels, for 
he wanted to end the division of schools by parental income and replace 
it by "a variety in schools adjusted to the variety in children's needs 
and capacities. 1170 Shortly afterwards Ede wrote to Butler that, 
"The common school for all up to 11 or 13 years of age with suitable 
diversified schools for the next stage to be entered by appropriate 
merit alone is an ideal difficult to realise in an old-established 
class-ridden society such as ours. , 
71 Less than six months later he 
was arguing that, "the right age at which to have the common school is 
from 11 to 16 years, when pupils are graded more and more by aptitude 
than by attainment. That is the period at which the respect of a 
craftsman in one line should be secured for a craftsman in another 
line by association in a common tradition, a common life and a 
realisation of the dependence of each on the other. , 
72 That sounds 
like a committed advocacy of the social case for the multilateral 
school, but twolfactors have to be borne in mind. The context was 
68 'P. R. O. Edl36/215, Comments by M. A. Hamilton on the Green Book923-7.41 
69 Ibid., Ede to Butler96.8.41 
70 Ibid., Education Policy. Memorandum by A. Greenwoodgundated 
71 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 9.9.41 
-72 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 28.1.42 
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a note in which Ede had condemned the idea of abolishing preparatory 
schools and establishing common schools at the primary level in most 
extreme terms, stating bluntly that some children were not clean enough 
for others to be required to sit alongside them, and he seems to have 
advocated the common school from 11 to 16 because he wanted to end on 
a positive note and, one can suspect, wished to balance his views on 
primary education realising that Butler may have found them surprising 
and even shocking. 
73 The other point to note is'his distinction 
between aptitude and attainment, and his belief that education after 
the age of 11 was determined more by the former. He seems to have 
accepted that children from different backgrounds would tend to show 
aptitudes in certain directions, attainment being of less significance,, 
and would follow these into certain jobs. What was needed was respect 
by all workers, at whatever level, for other workers. He developed 
this theme in a London speech after the publication of the White Paper, 
expressing the hope that "we should learn from this war that a skilled 
craft was at least as creditable as a clerical occupation", and noting 
that competition for Surrey County Council scholarships to grammar 
school was much stronger now than when he had won his place as the 
74 thirty second candidate in the results list for thirty-two places. 
The separation of aptitudes from attainment was significant for him. 
By the Autumn of 1942 he had reached the opinion that choice of 
secondary school could be achieved by administrative action and that 
legislation was not necessary for this purpose. His conception of 
secondary schools was now much more open, for he hoped that "the width 
of the curriculum in the new secondary schools will enable a wider 
choice to be exercised inside any given school than is now the case. 1175 
When Ede saw the draftsman's first essay his denunciation of the 
section which differentiated three types of secondary schooling was on 
the ground that it was "in direct contradiction to all I have been 
trying to do,,, 76 and he made it clear that, "not merely the wording 
73 Infra p-158 
74 Speech to National Women Citizens' Association in Londonlreported 
in Times Educational 
_Supplement, 
30-10.43, P-522 
75 P. R. O. Edl36/379, Ede to Butler, 22.10.42 
76 B. L., Ede Diary9vol-7124.2.43 
131 
but the spirit of the suggestions will require drastic attention.,, 
77 
ýut, as he explained to Holmes, his own draft was based on the section 
of the 1921 Act relating to central schools, "which had enabled 
senior schools to develop in diversity suiting themselves to local 
needs.,, 
78 
Although Ede's own draft did not state that the variety 
of education need be provided in different schools and therefore left 
the possibility of multilateral schools open, it did specifically refer 
to practical, technical and commercial instruction, and mentioned 
different lengths of secondary schooling and advanced education for 
those continuing their education after school. It seems clear, 
therefore, that it was the rigidity arising from a legislative 
commitment to three types of school which offended Ede and that his 
own draft was not intended to promote the multilateral school, but was 
rather aimed at ensuring that there might be greater variety than that 
encompassed by the three types envisaged in the parliamentary draftsman's 
paper. That this was the case tends to be donfirmed by the reaction of 
Holmes and Williams to Ede's criticism, which they shared even though 
they wanted tripartism. When noting this, Ede observed that he 
expected Holmes' constructive suggestions to be different from his own. 
Williams visited Ede in his room at the Board to say that he was 
"disturbed" by the original draft, but this was, as Holmes noted, 
because Williams had found six types of voluntary schoolt Also 
supportive of this view is a much later comment attributed to Ede by 
Leah Manning, a member of the N. U. T. Executive and a Labour M. P. in 
the 1930S. Her words need to be read with caution, for she writes 
in a flamboyant style and with a deep dislike of Cove and an emptional 
attachment to Ellen Wilkinsont but she quotes Ede as saying to her, 
"Don't encourage this comprehensive school idea. When it's sound 
educationallyl O. K., where it's prompted by philosophical or political 
ideas, it's so much poppycock, , 
79 
77 P. R. O. Edl36/389, Ede to Butler, 25.2.43' 
78 B. L., Ede Diary, vol-7,25.2.43 
79 L. Manning, A Life for EducationlLondon 19709p. 188 
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Ede's draft v-, as accepted by others at the Board. He did not 
participate in the discussion and his diary therefore- sheds no 
further light on his motivation or that of the other contributors. 
He returned from a weekend visit to his constituency at South 
Shields to be told by Butler that the others (Williams, Cleary, 
R. S. Wood and Butler himself amongst them) had had a meeting the 
previous Friday afternoon, that they had found his draft very 
helpful and had adopted it in shortened form, In fact the only 
alterations 
, 
were textual: the first "sufficient" was cha*nged to 
"such"; the second "sufficient" was omitted; the phrase "including 
at appropriate stages practical, technical or commercial instruction" 
was omitted and replaced by "and practical courses" after "studies"; 
"of the pupils" after "school life" was omitted; everything after 
"older pupils" was omitted. The clause was thus simplified by the 
removal of even more references to existing courses, but retained 
the notion of variety in the types of education provided. When 
Ede had time later in the day to compare his draft and the one now 
agreed he noted that the omitted phrases were of "no great 
significance" and that the clause "by its broad general enabling 
outlook suited me very well. " 
80 
The latter phrase is significant. 
Ede had removed references to a specific pattern of secondary 
education and had left future governments and local authorities 
considerable freedom to determine , as they saw fit at the time, the 
organisation of secondary education in particular areas. Butler 
was later to tell A. W. S. Hutchings that he had tried to write the 
three types of school into the Bill, but it had proved impossible 
to do so. 
81 
Later drafts gave greater emphasis to particular aspects Of 
the clause. For example the third and f if th draft had reference 
to the nature of the curriculum to be followed in particular schools, 
but did not specify particular curricu'la and did not therefore limit 
local authorities, when submitting development plans, to any 
particular organisation of schools. 
80 B. L., Ede Diarylvol-71l-3.43 
81 A. W. S. Hutchings, interviewed by the present writer, 1-11-78 
w 
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Thus by the Spring of 1943 it was intended that future 
legislation should contain no references to three types of school 
and was, in the sphere of secondary education, to be of an enabling 
nature. It was equally clear, however, that nobody at the Board 
had changed his mind about the pattern of secondary schooling which 
he wished to see emerge after the war. All would now depend upon 
the attitudes of the government and local authorities at that time. 
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Cha_pter_6: RAISING THE LEAVING AGE 
If an end to -segregation were not to be achieved and parity 
between separate schools were to be the lesser goal, raising the 
school leaving age to 16 would become an even more crucial goal for 
the Labour Party. The. argument for it was not only that education 
was regarded as desirable 
_per se and 
therefore more of it for everyone 
a political aspiration, but also that it was a pre-requisite for the 
achievement of'equal st. atus by the different types of school in the 
eyes of parents. There were some who thought that parity of esteem 
was an unattainable goal even with a common length of course. There 
were few who thought it attainable without it. Since 16 was the age 
at which grammar school examinations were sat, and there was no 
proposal to alter that (although of course the Norwood Committee had 
been set up to change the rules of 16+ examining), raising the school 
leaving age to 16 in modern and technical schools was regarded as 
essential if these were to compete for parental favour. As the N. U. T. 
put it in its 1942 Conference resolution, "The minimum range should be 
1 the same whatever type of school attended. " The E* xecutive of the 
Assistant Masters' Association made a similar point, stating that, if 
modern schools were to have a leaving age of 15, it would mean that 
"the popular demand for 'secondary education for all' was not being met. " 
2 
In a leader headed, "Half Measures" the Times Educational Supplement 
declared, "No system of education for democratic living is possible 
0 within a framework erected on the foundation of a leaving age of 15. 
Ernest Bevin was the most forceful Labour champion of raising the 
leaving age to 16, and it is clear that his initiative was personal and 
not departmental. After a conversation between R. S. Wood of the Board 
and Tribe of the Ministry of Labour, Wood wrote that Bevin had "taken 
up the question of edu'cational reform of his own motion" and that his 
views were "apparently quite his own. 114 As Minister of Labour Bevin 
could talk to Butler as an equal, although he had to contend with the 
1 N. U. T. Report of Proposals bff the Executive adopted by Conference 
Easter 1942, Cheltenham 1942 
2 London Institute of Education Library, A. M. A. Records, Executive 
Committee Minutes, 15.11.41 
3 Times Educational Supplement, 25-7.42 , P-363 4 P. R. O. Edl36/312, Note by R. S. Wood, 9.9.4i. Tribe was a principal at 
the Ministry of Labour; he was appointed Secretary at the Ministry 
of FVel and Power in 1942 
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hostility of the Board's officials who thought that it was not his 
concern and that he knew nothing about the matter. Another problem was 
the attitude of Sir Frank Tribe, who worked closely with R. S. Wood in 
coping with what both seem to have regarded as the initiative Of an 
5 
uninformed layman. An even greater problem for Bevin was the in- 
sinuation that the Labour leadership and its education lobby were out 
of step with their own supporters in the country who, it was alleged, 
did not want a longer school life for their children. This view had 
been put, even before the drafting of the Green Book, by Davidson, 
the Board's accountant-general, who argued in November 1940 firstly 
that the quality of education in state schools was too low to justify 
an increase in the amount of time children were compelled to remain in 
them, and secondly that day continuation schools were a better way of 
extending the education and training of manual workers beyond the age 
of 14 let alone 15- The "gratified surprise" at the character and 
personality of elementary and grant-aided secondary school products, 
whom he and others had apparently met for the first time in apprec- 
iable numbers in the first months of the war, did not extend to the 
intellectual content of the education which they received. As a 
result there was in his opinion a "marked absence of enthusiasm" for 
any raising of the leaving age beyond 14. The only exception to this 
general opinion was amongst Labour leaders, but he felt that even these 
were only "giving lip service to a formula. " There was "an equal 
unanimity in expecting, indeed demanding, some form of continued 
education beyond the compulsory age. " 
6 
Coupled with the suspicion that the working man was more concerned 
with the loss of income from his children than with the continuance of 
their education, this argument was powerful because it suggested that 
the man in the street could be expected to support the status quo rather 
than follow the leadership of the Labour Party and the T. U. C. Davidson's 
5 P. R. O. Ed136/292 Wood to Butler, 4.9.41; Wood to Tribe, 5.9.41 
6 P. R. O. Edl36/212, Note by D. Du B. Davidson, 6.11.40 
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arguments gave those who opposed the raising of the leaving age the 
opportunity to separate the main body of the Labour movement from its 
intellectual and trade union leadership. The opposing of raising the 
leaving age to 16 and day continuation schools as rival claimants for 
scarce resources was to be a recurring theme for those at the Board 
who did not wish in any case to raise the leaving age. Bevin's role 
was the more important because of his working class and trade union 
background. He could not be dismissed as an intellectual socialist 
-out of touch with the common man. "We must not strive to make giants, 
but to elevate the human race, " he had declared to teachers of Columbia 
University on the eve of the war. 
7 
Ede's role was again crucial. If he had strongly advocated the 
raising of the leaving age to 16 within the Board and allied himself 
to Bevin at the Ministry of Labour, the cause of raising the leaving 
age would have been greatly strengthened. In fact his attitude seems 
to have been hesitant. In his interview with Mary Hamilton in August 
1941, when he seems to have been in a point-scoring mood, he argued 
that the Spens Report "had not recommended 16 as the leaving age, " but 
had merely regarded it as "inevitable". Ede recorded in his diary 
that he added, "So did I in the distant future. " He pointed out to 
her that the 1936 Act, in raising the leaving age to 15, had done 
nothing about bringing senior elementary school accommodation and 
staffing up to secondary standards. To do that and to raise the 
leaving age to 16 would more than double the costs of senior elemen- 
tary schools. 
8 
Steeped in the history of state education since 1918 
he seems to have regarded raising the leaving age to 16 in the same 
light as the Board's officials - something which in due course would 
come about in the slow evolution of secondary education on Hadow lines - 
not as an essential reform to be given priority in the interests of 
7 Quoted in F. Williams, Ernest Bevin, London 1952, p. 227 
.8B. 
L. Ade Diary, vol. 1, ý77.771_. EdTe_was wrong about the Spens_ Report, 
which had said, P. 311, after arguing strongly for parity between 
schools, that, "Parity among schools... implies the raising of the 
minimum leaving age to the same general level in all schools... 
The adoption of a minimum leaving-age of 16 years may not be 
immediately attainable, but in our judgement must even now be 
envisaged as inevitable! ' 
i 
137 
parity and equality. He was in this sense the Board's rather than 
the Labour Party's man. The historical, administrative and practical 
difficulties weighed more heavily than did political factors. He ,- 
certainly accepted the officials' view that raising the leaving age to 
16 within three years of the end of the war was "impracticable" on a 
national scale, and thought that an alternative way -forward would be 
to give local authorities the right to raise the leaving age for their 
areas by by-law when local conditions made it practicable to do so. 
9 
This alternative created its own problems and was eventually rejected 
by his Party spokesmen, 
10 but he continued to advocate it from 1941 
to 1943- 
Bevin's first attempt to influence policy-making caused excite- 
ment at the Board. At Bevin's request Butler met him early in 
September 1941. ' 11 Bevin had heard of the Green Book's existence and 
was anxious to press his views on the President. His opening remarks 
aimed to set aside the religious aspect of educational reform; 
echoing Marx's phrase he dismissed religion as chloroform and hoped 
that Butler would keep out of the "toils of the Archbishops. " His 
main argument was in favour of raising the leaving age to 16 and 
against day continuation schools. In his note of the conversation 
Butler recorded the strength of Bevin's views on the leaving age. 
"He was quite clear about this, "wrote Butler, "and thought that if we 
did not do it now we should not have another opportunity for another 
twenty years. " Bevin offered practical help in the form of Ministry 
of Labour camps which could accommodate 270,000 people and provide 
valuable residential experience as well as additional school places. 
Butler outlined the practical difficulties and summoned in support of 
his policy "the point of view of parents, whom we should probably not 
carry with us. " Bevin's reply to this point was that "parents should 
not have as much pay as they had done in education, nor should the 
9 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Ede to Butler, 13.10.41 
10 Infra p-174 
11 P. R. O. EdI36/292, Note by Butler, 4.9.41; R. S. Wood to Butler, 4.9.41, 
and 8.9.41 enclosing the Ministry of Labour's record of the 
conversation 
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teachers. " He was insistent that Butler "must at any rate think 
about the raising of the leaving age to 16,11 although Butler gave no 
hope that it could be carried out. The emphasis in the Ministry of 
Labour's note of the meeting was rather different, for there Butler was 
quoted as saying that "raising of the age to 16 was certainly not 
excluded from consideration, " but the facts in the two accounts agreed. 
Bevin wanted the age raised to 16; Butler did not. 
The-reaction within the Board to this 'interference' was hostile in 
the extreme. R. S. Wood's alarm was due to his enthusiasm for the idea of 
, 
day continuation schools. He was keen to enlist Butler's support for 
these, and regarded opposition to them as coming mainly from proponents 
of raising the leaving age to 16. "That is, " he wrote, "of course, 
extremely doctrinaire, and I imagine that Mr. Bevin has no sympathy 
with that particular attitude. " In a sense this was the case of the 
biter bitten, for many Labour advocates of a leaving age of 16 favoured 
day continuation schools also, but for the 16 to 18 year olds. They 
had thought of the two goals as rivals only when the day continuation 
schools had been piýt forward as an alternative to school-based full- 
time education for the 14 and 15 year olds. It was the authors of the 
Green Book - the Board's officials - who had set the order of priorities 
which favoured day continuation schools by taking in November 1940 as 
the question to which their thoughts were to be addressed, "Accepting 
the principle of day continuation schools, what should be the school 
leaving age and what should be th e educational breaks during school 
lif e? " The day after the meeting between Butler and Bevin, Wood 
wrote to Tribe in order to arrange that they should lunch together. 
12 
Holmes' reaction was less considered and rather petulant. The 
notion of raising the leaving age to 16 at once was "hardly one which a 
responsible person with even a nodding acquaintance with the educational 
conditions of today would make, " he wrote. 
13 Apart from the practical 
difficulties, his chief objection was based on the principle that 
12 P. R. O. Edl36/292, R. S. Wood to Tribe, 5.9.41 
13 P. R. O. Edl36/312, Holmes to Butler, 8.9.41 
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completion of Hadow re-organization must precede raising the leaving 
age to 16. Otherwise, "to compel children to remain until the age 
of 16 in an all-age elementary school would be a fraud on the parents 
and a gross injustice to the children themselves. " His historical 
perspective dominated his thoughts. Since it had taken twelve years 
from 1927 to 1939 to increase the. percentage of 11+ children in the 
senior departments of elementary schools from 8 to 52, leaving 48% 
still in all-age schools, he could not see any prospect of the task's 
being completed in less than ten years from the end of the war, 
especially without a very radical solution to the voluntary schools 
problem. The ability to offer "a decent and appropriate education" 
to all pupils attending senior schools was for him not only a pre- 
requisite of compulsory attendance at such schools to 16, but one which 
he saw no prospect of achieving. Equality and parity were not amongst 
his ideals. A week later Holmes sent a longer paper to Butler, again 
putting the case against raising the leaving age. 
14 
His apology for 
its length showed his contempt for amateurs, amongst whom he clearly 
included Bevin since his paper was in response to Bevin's overtures. 
Length was "inevitable if the difficulties are to be made clear to 
the layman, " he wrote. He suggested a formula for a clause in the 
Bill which would enable the government, if it wanted to include raising 
the leaving age to 16 in principle, to do so without actually having to 
commit itself to a time-scale. His proposal was that the leaving age 
should be raised to 15 by an appointed day (i. e. a firm date) and to 
16 "from such date as the Board of Education may by order determine. " 
This formula conceded the principle without requiring any government 
at any time to do anything to achieve it. This was a crucial note., for 
it gave Butler what was henceforward to be his usual line of argument, 
having the merit that it relieved him of any necessity to discuss 
raising the leaving age to 16 itself, since there was no need to argue 
14 Ibid., Holmes to Butler, 15-9-Yl 
14o 
against the principle when there was no legislative obligation to do 
anything about the matter. 
Ede's contribution was supportive of Bevin's ideas in general, 
but lacked his sense of the need to plan urgently for raising the 
leaving age to 16 and to give priority to overcoming the practical 
problems involved. He claimed the support of Butler's predecessor 
for the notion of camp schools in which pupils would spend a minimum 
of three months and linked Bevin's preference for a greater practical 
bias in education to the Board's own desire to reduce the number of 
pupils receiving a traditional academic education. In his view the 
difference between Bevin and the Board could be narrowed to that of 
practicalities. On this question Ede accepted the Board's view and 
proposed a compromise on the basis of raising the leaving age to 15 
at once with "possibly permissive powers" given to local authorities 
to raise the age to 16, and with the Board's having the right to raise 
the leaving age to 16 when sufficient progress had been made to do 
this nationally. The only significant difference between Bevin and 
the Board, in his view, was over the practicalities of carrying out 
the reform soon after the end of the war. 
15 
A month later Bevin renewed his pressure, sending to Butler a 
note headed, "Summary of Proposals for Post-War Developments in 
1116 Education and Juvenile Employment I and addressing an Institution 
of Production Engineers' luncheon on educational reform. 
17 On both 
occasions he took the opportunity to argue for a leaving age of 16. 
In hisnote Bevin conceded nothing to his opponents. On the 
contrary, he wanted the leaving age raised to 16 "immediately after the 
warlt and only accepted a delay of up to three years after the war 
if 
practical problems were insuperable. Even then he wanted 
the maximum 
of three years to be stipulated in the legislation. 
He offered 
15 P. R. O. Edl36/292, Ede to Butler, 9.9.41 
16 P. R. O. Edl36/292, Bevin to Butler, 11 . lo. 
41 
17 Ibid., Tribe to Wood, 16.10.41 enclosing an extract of the 
-speech 
made by Bevin on 26.9.41 
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solutions to both of the main problems - buildings and --taff. 
Accommodation could be provided by an emergency programme and could 
include hostels, training centres and camps already owned by the 
government. As for staffing, not only could'additional teachers be 
obtained, but also teachers who were more appropriately experienced 
for the new type of education to be provided, if the government were 
to "widen the field of recruitment for teachers and call upon people 
outside the academic world. " At the luncheon Bevin commented that 
the raising of the leaving age to 16 was already twenty years overdue. 
The first draft of a reply. from Butler began, "I myself would not 
rule out a school leaving age of 16 as an ultimate goal, " before re- 
hearsing the familiar catalogue of practical difficulties. Butler 
sought the "advice of Bournemouth", i. e. Holmes, on the draft and 
asked for a "sympathetic" tone in. his reply to Bevin. It is signi- 
ficant that the second draft omitted the opening conciliatory sentence 
of the first, and thus did not even hold out the hope of 16 as an 
ultimate goal for the school leaving age. 
18 Ede's contribution showed 
a lack of commitment to his own party's policy and a_ lack of support 
for Bevin. Noting that Bevin was demanding "strict Labour Party 
policy" he reiterated his view that three years was insufficient time 
in which to make the necessary preparations. 
19 Ede's comments high- 
lighted the difference in attitude between the Labour spokesmen: for 
Bevin the goal was to be pursued with vigour and practical obstacles 
were to be acknowledged only in order that they should be overcome, 
whilst for Ede the worthy goal would come about in due course as the 
Board's plans for the re-organisation of all-age elementary schools 
gathered pace. 
The letter to Bevin which finally emerged from these deliberations 
was conciliatory in tone but uncompromising in content. 
20 For example, 
Butler noted that it would be impossible at the end of war to raise the 
18 Ibid., Two- drafts of the letter, and Butler to Wood, all undated 
19 Ibid., Ede to R. S. Wood,? 10.41(day of month not given) 
20 P. R. O. EdI 361312, Butler to Bevin, 6.11.41 
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leaving age to 15, let alone 16, and "simultaneously to introduce that 
parity of treatment of all forms of post-primary education which both 
you and I desire. " He suggested that two stages were needed: raising 
the leaving age to 15 at the end of the war provided that there was no 
further serious damage by bombs to school buildings, and a provision in 
the Bill to improve all senior schools to the level of existing secondary 
schools by a date determined by the building priority won for education 
after the war. There was only one new argument. Butler expressed the 
apprehension which he felt because of uncertainty about the kind of 
education which should be provided for the children who would be required 
to stay on at school if the leaving age'were raised to 16. This would 
have been more convincing if the Board's officers had not taken steps 
strenously to prevent a review of the secondary modern curriculum similar 
to that which they had instituted under Norwood ostensibly to consider 
only the grammar school curriculum* 
21 
In January 1942 Bevin, accompanied by his Parliamentary Secretary, 
Tomlinson, again met Butler who was accompanied by R. S. Wood. Although 
Butler began with a similarly uncompromising statement that "after con- 
sultation in many quarters" he could not agree to the raising of the age 
to 16 in one step and kept firmly to his order of priorities in which day 
continuation took precedence over a leaving age of 16, Bevin and 
Tomlinson tried to demolish the Board's arguments. They wanted the 
Board at least to take in a bill the power to fix an appointed day, 
even if such a day were not specified in the bill itself. They linked 
this to the need to plan for an adequate supply of teachers, and Bevin 
offered to help by building up a reserve of teachers in the colleges and 
by supporting the Board in any plans to provide refresher courses for 
teachers now in the armed services. Bevin argued that the new curri- 
culum should be planned now and that a pre-requisite for this was a 
commitment to a leaving age of 16. This would make it clear to 
21 Supra pp. 114 - 115 and p. 120 
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employers and trade unions that they must think in such terms when 
fixing their standards and industrial practices. When discussion 
centred on the part-time education of young people over the age of 15, 
it became clear that the Board was not thinking of a compulsory scheme. 
It was thought that, whilst engineers might need part-time continued 
education, young cotton operatives might not. Bevin denounced this 
attitude, arguing that they should abandon the notion of boys and girls 
from 15 being "completely at the disposal of the employers. " 
Bevin and Tomlinson made no progress, however. Butler acknow- 
ledged the wide support in education and in enlightened industrial 
circles for the raising of the leaving age to 16. Indeed he used it 
in defence of his decision to avoid a commitment, taking the view that 
raising the age as a goal was safe when it had such widespread support. 
In practicable terms, however, he could not see its being achieved for 
another seven to ten years. Even more revealing was Holmes' reaction 
after the meeting. Butler's private secretary, Sylvia Goodfellow, 
sent a note of the meeting to Holmes, drawing his attention to Bevin's 
offer about the supply and retraining of teachers, and innocently 
enquiring whether this called for "early action. " Holmes replied 
tartly, "I trust not. These are matters which will engage the 
attention of the forthcoming committee.. 6" 
22 McNair 23 was called 
forth by Holmes, whilst an offer of priority treatment for teacher 
supply by the Minister responsible for Labour and National Service was 
spurned. 
If Bevin were almost alone amongst those with the power directly 
to influence the content of impending legislation in demanding a 
leaving age of 16, he'did not lack support from important figures both 
within and outside the Labour Party. Indeed Holmes himself acknow- 
ledged not only that "the majority view" wanted the raising of the 
leaving age to 16 to be included in the Bill, but also that the 
22 P. R. O. Edl36/292, Memorandum of meeting on 23-1.42, with endorse- 
ments by Goodfellow, 5.2.42 and Holmes, 6.2.42 
23 Sir Arnold McNair, Vice-Chancellor of Liverpool University, was 
appointed chairman of a committee in March 1942 to enquire into 
the supply and training of teachers. The committee's report was 
issued as Board of Educationjeachers and Youth Leaders, London 
1944 
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majority would want it "in such a way that it is bound to come up for 
consideration by Parliament at some specific date. " 
24 
The "majority view" certainly included such an authoritative figure 
as Spens. He had, of course, already taken the view in his pre-war 
report that the raising of the leaving age to 16 was "inevitable" 0 
25 
In a conversation with Arthur Greenwood in October 1941 he reiterated 
this opinion. 
26 
Greenwood himself sharpd SnpnRl viPw.,: z_ TndpPti- 
Butler thought that Spens 
Greenwood's own views, as 
included a leaving age of 
a curriculum based on the 
soon. 
27 
was responsible for Greenwood's "conversion". 
expressed in a note reacting to the Green Book, 
16 and, if this were not immediately possible, 
assumption that it would be achieved very 
Support also came from H. C. Dent, editor of the Times Educational 
Supplement. He favoured a more radical action than raising the leaving age, 
developing a concept which Bevin himself supported. This was that young 
people should be regarded as being under the guardianship of the state 
until they reached the age of 20 or 21. Bevin saw this in terms of full- 
time education at least until the age of 16 and then, if in industry, 
under supervision at least until the age of 20, so that the educational 
and vocational needs of young people would be protected whether they were 
in education or in employment. 
28 The T. E. S. leader on 4 October 1941 
took this idea further and argued that the concept of any leaving age 
was out-of-date and should be replaced. 
29 
Dent wanted every child below 
the age of 21 years to be a "ward of the community". In the sense that 
it wanted an end to the separation between schooling and society it was 
also an attack on the inadequacy of the day continuation principle and 
supportive of Bevin's ideas. Some supporters of 16 as the leaving age, 
however, saw at once that Dent's idea gave opportunities which their 
opponents could exploit. Lady Simon wrote to. ask whether the, T. E. S. 
would happily countenance the abandonment of 14 as a leaving age, making 
24 P. R. O. Edl36/312, Holmes to Butler, 20.10.41 
25 Sara P. 136 
26 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Note by Butler of conversation with Greenwood, 
16.1o. 41; and P. R. O. M136/312, An extract of the same note 
27 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Note by Greenwood, Education Policy, undated 
28 P. R. O. M136/312, Note by R. S. Wood, 9.9.41 
29 Times Educational Supplement, 4.10.4i, p. 475. In the edition of 
18.10.4l, p. 493 Dent ma e it clear that he did not want the abandon- 
ment of statutory school attendance, but wanted instead an 
"obligation to attend wherever the education authority directs 
until the period of tutelage be at an end. 
" The argument was 
partly over the definition of "school" 
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the point that some date had to be stipulated and that 16 was better 
than 14. She advanced an argument which was concerned as much with 
the future of grammar schools as with the achievement of parity with 
those schools by the other types of secondary school, drawing attention 
to the fact that, without compulsion to attend until they were 16, 
many children capable of taking grammar school courses refused to go 
to a school where they were expected to remain until that age, whilst 
others who did accept places left early thus 'wasting' the place* -30 
Harold Shearman wrote in similar vein on behalf of the W. E. A. a 
fortnight later. 31 The following Easter the N. U. T. demanded the same 
minimum age in all types of school. 
32 
Bevin's position vis-a-vis the Board of Education was not strength- 
ened by the apparent attitude towards him of his party's leader, Attlee. 
In January 1942 whilst temporarily head of the government in Churchill's 
absence, Attlee summoned Butler to report progress on educational reform. 
Butler's account of their meeting is rather supercilious in tone. if 
his account is accurate, Attlee seems to have been rather indiscreet 
about members of his own party and Butler seems to have enjoyed this. 
One such indiscretion was Attlee's comment that, "Mr. Tomlinson knew 
more . about education than the Minister of Labour. 
03 Bevin's position 
was further undermined by G. D. H. Cole. In a meeting between himself, 
Laski and Butler, after which the last was relieved to note that the 
Labour spokesmen had been "far from revolutionary", Cole gave his order 
of priority for reforms. Raising the leaving age to 15 was his first 
priority, day continuation schools were second; raising the leaving age 
to 16 was not mentioned at all. 
34 This was a hostage to fortune which 
Board officials who were opposed to the leaving age of 16 were to use 
on several occasions, especially since Cole headed the Nuffield College 
Social Reconstruction Survey. 35 Indeed, Holmes had already advanced 
the argument in a note to Butler the previous month. He wanted to 
30 Ibid. 111.10.41, p. 
487 
31 Ibid., 25.10.41, p. 499 
32 Su_pra p. 134 
33 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Note by Butler, 16.1.42 
34 Ibid., Note by Butler, 12.5.42 
35 T-hFe-Nuffield College Reconstruction Survey was established at the 
request of the government at the beginning of 1941 and with the co- 
operation of two ministers who had responsibilities for planning 
post-war reconstruction - Lord Reith, Minister of Works and Buildings, 
and Greenwood, Minister without Portfolio. Its working method was to 
conduct local surveys, which were evaluated at Oxford, where con- 
ferences were also held. Its Education Sub-Committee published some 
of its views in three books: The Open Door, London 1943; Industry and 
Education,, London 1943; Religious Education, London 1943 
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concede a leaving age of 15 "immediately after the war" and "in 
advance of the completion of re-organisationoo* if only to keep children 
in the 14-15 age group off the Labour market. 1136 But thereafter his 
order of priorities was as determined before the Green Book was written, 
i. e. day continuation schools were to precede the raising of the leaving 
age to 16.37 
Ede's contribution to the discussion on strategy which was taking 
place within the Board at this time was even less helpful to Bevin. 
Listing twelve points to be included in early legislation he did not 
include raising the leaving age to 16 at all. 
3ý 
The view of those at the Board, including Butler, who thought that 
workers were not in favour of raising the leaving age gained support in 
the response to a survey, the results of which were available to Holmes 
by October 1942. The answer to a question about worker attitudes to 
the raising of the leaving age and whether the exemptions of the pre- 
war Act raising the age to 15 should continue read, "The replies to this 
question surprised me... very surprised to find a substantial majority 
against raising the leaving age at all. The replies revealed that-the 
workers are not yet ripe for raising the leaving age, especially if it 
involves any financial sacrifice to the parents. 
09 
As 1942 ended and 1943 began Bevin became totally isolated. He 
had one more opportunity to press his point. In December 1942 Butler 
presented a paper to the Lord President's Committee of the War Cabinet, 
the committee for dealing with domestic affairs. This gave a broad 
outline of the proposed educational reforms. It asked for the raising 
of the leaving age to 15 as soon as possible after the war "with 
possibly, provision for subsequent raising to 16. " 
40 
Bevin asked for 
a precise date for the raising of the leaving age to 16. He seems to 
have received no support from Attlee and Morrison. Butler rehearsed 
the Board's objections and stated that the Board favoured the intro- 
duction of a new system of further education before the raising of the 
36 Only Holmes and Churchill used this argument. Vide p. 180 
37 P. R. O. edl36/379, Note by Holmes, 13.4.42, discussed with Butler, 
15.4.42 
38 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 14.4.42 
39 P. R. O. Edl36/377, A type-written extract without heading, endorsed in 
Holmes' handwriting, "See Miss Goodfellow, M. G. H. 12.10.4? (year is 
unclear) 
40 P. R. O. Edl36/378, War Cabinet-Lord President's Committee. Educational 
Reform. Note by the President of the Board of Education, 10,. 12.42 
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leaving age to 16.41 Thai was the end of the matter. 
Early in the new year Holmes conLmented that it would not be 
possible to fix any appointed days in the planned legislation. 
42 
Ede replied at once that the Labour Party would not be satisfied 
unless an appointed day for raising the leaving age to 15 were speci- 
fically named in the Bill, although even for the age of 15 he thought 
that the party might accept a phrase such as "the end of the present 
war unless His Majesty shall by Order in Council have previously fixed 
the appointed day. " 
43 
Ede did not even mention raising the leaving 
age to 16, knowing and accepting that the die had by now been cast. 
At the end of March he attended the Administrative Committee of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party and reported to Butler the same day that, ' 
although no vote had been taken, it was clear from the discussion that 
the Party in Parliament was "obviously in favour of introducing day 
continuation schools prior to the raising of the school age to 16.11 
He summed up the views of his fellow M. Ps. thus, "There will be great 
disappointment if 16 is not mentioned in the Bill, but the feeling 
this morning was that considerable educational improvements in the 
arrangements for non-bookish children between 14 and 16 years of age 
will have to be made before the schools will be suitable places for 
retaining them for so long. " 
44 
By the Summer of 1943 the situation was clear. The school leaving 
age would not be raised to 16. If any mention of the reform were to be 
made in the Bill it would be merely as a gesture to the widespread 
demand for it, but with no intention of ever doing anything to achieve 
it. Any attempt to tie the hands of the Board for the future and to 
introduce a deadline for the introduction of the reform would be re- 
sisted. The Labour leadership, as represented by Attlee and Morrison 
in the cabinet and Ede at the Board, fully accepted the position. The 
Parliamentary Labour Party, at least as interpreted by Ede, could be 
41 Ibid., Conclusions of a meeting of the Lord President Is Committee, 
11 F. 72 .42 42 Ibid., Note by Holmes, 4.1.43 
43 Ibid., Ede to Holmes, 5.1.43 
44 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 30-3.43 
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relied upon to acquiesce in the Board's order of priorities which 
placed a new system of part-time education ahead of continued full- 
time education for the 15 year old age group. Bevin, alone of 
Labour spokesmen in office, had fought for the reform which was an 
essential element in the party's programme, and he had lost. 
45 
4.5 A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin(2 vols. ) vol. 2, 
London 1967 does not mention Bevin's important but unsuccessful 
efforts to carry this reform. 
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[C AND DIRECT GRANT SCHOOLS 
The question of the public schools exercised men's minds greatly 
in the late 1930s and early 1940s, in spite of the problems of the war. 
It has been held that the question engaged the attention of the general 
public more than the controversies over the dual system which took up 
so much of Butler's time and that of his officials. 
1 
What was not known to the general public or to those in the Labour 
Party and elsewhere who were making vague demands for 'reform' was that 
anxious discussions had been started before the war, riot with the object 
of opening up the public schools, but with the aim of solving their 
financial crisis, possibly by means' of subsidies in the form of fees 
paid on their behalf by local authority-nominated applicants. Many 
public schools had embarked upon major building programmes in the 1920s. 
Those which were inadequately endowed found themselves in financial 
difficulties by the late 1930s, when the demand for places fell and the 
fee income declined but the capital charges of the earlier expansion 
still had to be met. 
The concern for the schools at the Board was out of proportion to 
the number of places which they provided. It reflected both the 
emotional regard for public schools which their former pupils who were 
now senior officials at the Board had for them, and the inevitable 
overlap in curricular matters between maintained, voluntary and 
independent secondary schools. There was a problem for the Board's 
officials, however. The public schools were so jealous of their 
independence, of each other but even more of any public authority, 
that they could not be expected to welcome any approach from the Board. 
Equally the Board had no statutory right, let alone obligation, to 
concern itself with such schools at all. Not only was this a fact, 
it was one which the Board's officials, because of their sympathy with 
the status and aims of the public schools, were wont to proclaim loudly 
1 P. E. J. H -Gosden, Education in the Second 
World War, London 1976, P. 332 
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whenever suggestions were made that the government sl-. ould 'do 
thing' about the public schools. 
Williams, head of secondary branch, had very close contacts with 
the public schools, as did Holmes himself. They resolved their 
dilemma by discussing a solution unofficially with some public school 
headmasters, whilst denying publicly that any such conversations were 
taking place. Their dialogue started with Canon Spencer Leeson who 
not only was Headmaster of Winchester and soon to be chairman of the 
Headmasters' Conference, but also had the considerable advantage of 
having worked at the Board itself from 1919 to 1924, i. e. as 
colleague of Holmes and Williams, when he had held posts as private 
secretary to the Parliamentary Secretary and to the Permanent 
Secretary. 
Leeson outlined the problem in a confidential memorandum to a few 
other headmasters, a copy of which he sent to Holmes in October 1938.2 
"I foresee that practically every school in England will be faced with 
the problem of falling numbers, " he wrote. "I foresee a period of 
years during which governing bodies will commit themselves to expendi- 
ture upon equipmentýand general window-dressing, in the hope of attrac- 
ting parents; and a systematic hunting after boys by competitive 
bribery and reductions in fees and wholesale advertising. The rules 
against advertising that the Conference [H. M. C. 
] have adopted will, I 
f ear, be tacitly abandoned and a new atmosphere will come into English 
higher education, with serious effects upon the morale of it and upon 
the values which we try to uphold. " The danger then would be that 
governing bodies, "overwhelmed with debt", would apply to the Board 
which would have to set up a statutory commission "with wide powers 
for the closure of superfluous schools. " What he wanted therefore 
was a policy which would enable the public schools to continue without 
P. R. O. Edl36/129, Leeson to Holmes, 14.10-38 
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government or statutory control but with some guidance and possibly 
help from the Board. 
His view was shared by Holmes, Norwood and Spens. 1ý 
345. 
'orwood 
was alarmed at "the progressive lowering of professional standards" 
amongst headmaters, many of whom were "spending half their time in 
commercial travelling and touting on preparatory school doorsteps. " 
-The effect on educational standards of this competition also alarmed 
him. - "All sorts of intriguing illegal commission paying and com- 
petitive reduction of fees are taking place", he reported. "The 
effect is that the worse drives out the better currency: the adver- 
tising headmaster succeeds, the headmaster who minds his proper 
business, and puts education first, fails. " Headmasters were being 
appointed, not on merit, but for their ability to ingratiate them- 
selves with preparatory school headmasters. Norwood preferred a 
royal commission to a departmental committee as the means of finding 
a solution, perhaps mindful that the report of such a committee, 
chaired by Chuter Ede in 1932 and concerned with the lesser question 
of private school inspection by the Board, had not been well received 
by the schools and h&d not been implemented. 
6 
Holmes was clear about one thing. If an unequivocal request 
came from the schools themselves for the Board to institute some 
machinery for devising a solution, the Board would have a duty to 
respond, but the request would have to come from the schools and the 
Board would have to appear to be responding to it. As he wrote to a 
colleague in the Cabinet Office who had approached him as a public 
school governor, "The Government would be incurring a heavy responsi- 
bility in declining to set up a royal commission if formally asked 
by the H. M. C. to do so. t, 
7 Williams was to spend part of his not 
inconsiderable energies for almost four years in ensuring that the call 
3 Ibid., Holmes to Leeson, 13-10-38 
4 Ibid., Norwood to Duckworth, 19-10-38 
5 P. R. O. Edl36/268, Spens to Holmes, 24-7.41 
6 Board of Education, Private schools and other schools not in receipt 
of grants from public funds, London 1932. Other members of the 
departmental committee were Holmes, R. H. Charles(the elementary 
school H. M. I. ) and Mrs. Leah Manning; there were sixteen members in all. 
7 P. R. O. Edl36/129, Holmes to Howorth 27.2-39 
I 
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eventually came to which the Board could re-pond. ', Iolý,. es was also 
to give freely of his time, for example meeting public school head- 
masters and governors at the United Services Club for dinner in 
December 1938 because "the subject is one which interests me greatly. 
Williams was initially optimistic that the schools would respond 
quickly to his approaches. Before the end of October 1938 - the month 
in which the conversations between him, Holmes and Leeson began - 
he had drafted the terms of reference of a royal commission and had 
begun drawing up lists of possible members to serve on it. 
9 
It was 
not going to prove quite so straightforward. Some of the public 
school headmasters regarded their independence as more important than 
survival. When Norwood outlined his anxieties about the public schools 
in a Spectator 
10 
article, he called forth upon his head a vitriolic 
denunciation from the provost of Eton, who thought that it' was "pure 
totalitarianism" and that "the Brown House at Munich is evidently his 
spiritual home. " 
11 The notions which called forth this attack was that 
there was a need to reduce "the class division" between public and state 
schools, that the private schools would have to compromise by accepting 
transfer from preparatory to public schools at the age of 12 for example, 
that public schools should admit at least 10% of their intakes from 
elementary schools, and that financial problems should be further 
solved by adopting more Spartan regimes similar to that which already 
existed at Christ's Hospital. Norwood's motive was not philanthropic 
or even concerned primarily with social factors. It was the same as 
Leeson's. He wrote that, "the nation cannot afford to lose them, or 
allow them to pass into unmerited decay. " Nonetheless he was denounced 
by a leading public school figure. Not all Conservative local 
authorities accepted the principle that private schools could both 
retain their independence and receive public subsidies. When Williams 
discussed this idea with Sir Henry Richards, deputy chairman of 
8 Ibid., Holmes to Elliott, 22.11-38 
9 
_Ibid., 
Williams to Holmes, 24.10-38 
10 Spectator, 9.2.4o, pp. 175-176; 16.2.4o, pp. 2o6-207 
11 P. R. O. Edl36/129, Lord Hugh Cecil to De La Warr, 21-3-40 
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Hertfordshire Education Committee and a governor of Mill Hill school, 
he was surprised to learn that Richards' attitude was "no control, 
no public money". Williams was surprised that the representative of 
Hertfordshire should have this opinion-in view of "the feudal character 
of the area. " 
12 
When the Headmasters' Conference rejected the proposal of a royal 
commission by 51 votes to 35,13 Leeson campaigned for a departmental 
committee to be set up by the Board. 
14 
It took another three years of 
negotiations, much soul-searching by the schools themselves, the 
nurturing of "an extraordinary and unprecedented confidence on the 
part of the schools in the Board"15 , and 
ihe activities of Geoffrey 
Fisher, then Bishop of London and a future Archbishop of Canterbury, to 
brin Ig this alternative proposal to, fruition. 
16 
Williams' and Holmes' 
success came with the appointment of Lord Fleming's committee in July 
1942. 
In addition to Holmes' usual preference for secrecy, the need for 
discretion arose from his wish to help schools for which his Board had 
. 
no responsibility and which in any case were not rushing to ask for help, 
and this led him to the very bounds of honesty if not beyond. The 
whole nature of the exercise was that it was sub rosa. That did not 
prevent whispers. Harold Shearman showed knowledge of the talks taking 
place during a W. E. A. deputation to Greenwood, who was responsible for 
post-war reconstruction plans, in January 1941.17 Leaks led in turn to 
questions which demanded answers from Holmes. In response to an un- 
solicited and unwelcome offer to serve on a committee of enquiry into 
the public schools, Holmes explained in March 1940 that the Board was 
unlikely to set up such an enquiry because it had only "a very slight 
18 
connection with the public schools. " A reply from Ramsbotham, when 
he was President, in the House of Commons also lacked frankness. Asked 
whether the Board and public schools were holding discussions to make the 
12 Ibid., Note of conversation with Sir Henry Richards by Williams, 
lo. lo. 41 
13 Ibid., Leeson to Holmes, 29-5-39 
14 Ibid., Leeson to Williams, 29.6-39 enclosing Leeson's memorandum of 
9.6-39 to members of the H. M. C. 
15 Ibid., Leeson to Holmes, 9.1.40 
16 A full account of these negotiations is given in P. H. J. H. Gosden 
OP-cit., PP-334-345 
17 P. R. O. Edl36/260, Note of W. E. A. deputation to Greenwood, undated 
18 P. R. O. Edl36/129, Holmes to Haig-Brown, 13-3-40 
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schools "more accessible to the public", he replied, "No sir. 11 
19 
Similarly a reply from Ramsbotham's predecessor, De La Warr, lacked 
honesty as a description of the Board's role, although it is possible 
that he may have been kept in ignorance of the negotiations' origins 
and that he may have maintained his own integrity. Writing on the 
reasons for the royal commission which still at that time looked a 
possibility, he claimed that, "The move came entirely from them (i. e. 
the H. M. C. )". 
On this question, unlike others, Butler was at one with Holmes in 
favouring secrecy. Before meeting the Bishop of London he wrote to 
ensure that their conversations would be "absolutely private". As he 
explained, "If we do not meet unofficially we cannot talk to the 
benefit of those great institutions which you are doing so much to 
help. 11 20 Whilst he was waiting for the call from the public schools, 
which he and Fisher were trying to bring about, he too had some 
difficulty in answering critics. He told Sir Frederick Clarke, for 
example, that he "would if necessary poke the fire, but did not feel 
inclined to do so until I found some hope of flame. " 
21 His Boa-rd had 
of course been poking the fire since 1938. 
When the establishment of Fleming's committee was announced, it 
was accepted as being concerned with the opening up of privileged 
institutions. When Butler made his announcement in the Commons, 
Cove rose and asked, "Is it to report upon the facilities that the 
public schools will provide for students from, say, elementary schools 
to get into them? " Butler replied, "Yes, I think the honourable 
Member has summed up the position beautifully. " 
22 That it was in- 
tended partly to devise the means of channelling into those insti- 
tutions public funds without which some of them might not be saved 
from extinction was unknown to the public. The committee's terms 
of reference, which were "to consider means whereby the association 
19 H. C. Debates, vol-359, cols. 1119-1120,18.4.4o 
20 P. R. O. Edl36/129, Butler to Fisher, 4.1o. 41 
21 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Note by Butler, 20-3.42 
22 H. C. Debates, vol-38o, col. 1416,16.6.42 
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between the Public Schools... and the general educational system of 
the country could be developed and extended", seemed in line with the 
prevailing desire, if not to end privilege, at least to blur its edges. 
There are two important aspects of the Labour Party's approach to 
this question. The ]Varty's own objectives were vague; and the Party, 
like most other groups, was not privy to the events of 1938-42 and 
was completely ignorant of one of the purposes of Fleming. 
Whilst the Labour Party had a general feeling, shared by quite a 
wide ppectrum of opinion in thý early part of the war, 
23 
that there was 
something wrong about the public school systeml it was not successful 
in analysing its dissatisfaction and had hardly even begun to evolve a 
policy for tackling 'the problem'. It was in the position of feeling 
that a problem existed, it could argue in general terms against 
snobbery, privilege and the anti-democratic effects of the old boys' 
network, but it was far from having made up its mind about what it 
wanted to be done. At the 1942 labour Party conference, for example, 
the two main speakers for the National Executive Committee, Harold Clay 
and Alice Bacon, both called for common schooling, the latter relating 
the demand particularly to the continuing separation of a minority of 
children in independent schools, yet the motion to which they were 
speaking called only for an "acceptance of the broad democratic principle 
that all children of school age shall be required by statute to attend 
schools provided or licensed by the state. " 
24 
Attlee wanted the Green 
Book discussions widened to include the public school question, without 
indicating the lines of any policy. 
25 
G. D. H. Cole wanted the public 
schools to become the boarding element in the national educational 
system. 
26 
Barbara Drake attempted to devise a scheme which would give effect 
to some of these aspirations, and Tawney supported it to the extent of 
23 E. g. P. R. O. EdlO/272, Report of Nuffield College Conference, 27.6.42; 
H. C. Dent was reported as holding the view that, "The defects in 
our educational system were almost entirely due to the obstructive 
policy of the 7 per cent minority who refused to come into the 
common school system" 
24 Labour Party, Report of the 41st Annual Conference, London, May 1942 
25 P. R. O. Edl36/2-15, Ede to Butler, 17.9.41 
26 Ibid., Note by Butler, 12-5.42 
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writing a sympathetic foreword, but the scheme showed both the lack of 
clarity in aims and the intrinsic difficulties of the problem. She 
advocated an increase in state scholarships to 50% of places initially, 
increasing eventually to 100%, when fees would be abolished. Pupils 
would have in many cases to be of grammar school standard, although 
she hoped that some schools "may prefer to develop from the start on 
1127 multilateral lines 0 Children on public assistance could be sent 
and could spend their holidays with their new friends "as a paying 
guest". One particular problem - the teaching of classics in existing 
secondary schools which was "notoriously... a weak spot" could be 
solved, as could the smallness- of some grammar school sixth forms, 
by sending pupils to the more famous public schools. This mixture 
of social idealibm, high regard for the most ancient aspects of the 
public and grammar school curriculum, and the lack of understanding 
that taking the p-ublic schools on their own terms would undermine rather 
than foster progress in the state secondary school system, was typical 
of the confusion. 
Cries for abolition of the public schools were few. There were 
imprecise plans for using schools locally where possible and adapting 
for vague national purposes those which could not be used. Often the 
favoured solution was a variant on the social widening of admissions. 
The Labour Party was therefore singularly vulnerable to the approach of 
Williams and Holmes. 
Fleming's committee was acceptable to the Labour Party which did 
not, of course, know that it had had its origins in a desire to find 
ways of baling out those public schools which were living financially 
on a term-to-term basis with no capital reserves and considerable 
capital debts. When Butler received Cole and Laski in May 1942 the 
latter indicated to him that the Labour Party would be satisfied with 
it 28 an earnest of our intention. " Butler did not then reveal the plans 
27 B. Drake, Education for Democracy, London 1941, pp. 25-26. The aspects 
of this book which related to public schools were analysed at the 
Board; vide P. R. O. Edl36/216 
28 P. R. O. Td--136/215, Note by Butler, 12-5.42 
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which he had already formulated for a committee on the topic. When 
the committee was appointed, two months later, it could be held that 
the Labour Party had received what Laski had said it wanted. If there 
were any doubts they would have been assuaged by the appofntment of 
Clay and Cole to the committee. 
A separate but related issue to which Labour spokesmen gave their 
attention at this time was that of the common school from 5 to 11 or 13. 
The term common school was occasionally used to describe multilateral 
and later comprehensive schools, but at this time it usually referred 
to the primary and preparatory stages of the state and private educational 
systems. Ede identified the clear distinction between private prepa- 
ratory schools and independent secondary schools; the former were run as 
businesses for profit and could not therefore receive public grants by 
any method. 
29 
If the private sector of education were a problem which 
needed to be tackled, therefore, solutions being considered for the 
public schools were not applicable to preparatory schools. Ede re- 
garded the notion of the common school as ideali st-30 and not worthy of 
serious consideration by-practical men. His objection to it was wholly 
and starkly on social grounds, which was all the more surprising in view 
of the abhorrence of social snobbery which he exhibited on other occasions. 
As surprising as Ede's attitude was the approach of other policians 
and Holmes himself. The matter was considered at the Board after an 
approach to Butler early in 1942 by Sir Percy Harris, a Liberal M. P., 
who was chairman of the All-Party Panel on Education. He wanted all 
children to go to a similar school from 5 to 11 or 13 before branching 
out into different types of secondary schools. Shena Simon expressed a 
similar view. Butler's reaction was paradoxically both sympathetic 
and dismissive. Whilst remarking facetiously that he was "continually 
inspired by relics of the belief that we are a free country", he conceded 
29 P. R. O. Edl36/597, Ede to Butler, 13-1.42 
30 E. g. P. R. O. Edl36/125, Ede to Butler, 9.9.41 
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that there was logically much to be said in favour of the common school 
and that he would not mind his own children going to one, "provided 
they have an opportunity of going to boarding school later and the 
preliminary education is good. 
01 Holmes thought that only public 
inspection of private schools was required, but also considered that 
fewer parents would be able to afford preparatory schools after the war 
and that common schools would come in the future. 
32 
Since a Liberal spokesman, a Conservative President of the Board, 
and the senior civil servant thought in_these. terms, the attitude of the 
Labour spokesman closest to the seat of power was surprising. "Logically, 
in an ideal world in which lice and skin troubles had been eliminated, " 
he wrote, "the case for the common school would be unanswerable, but 
those unpleasant troubles - and others - exist... Have we the moral 
right to compel a parent to send his child from a clean and healthy home 
to a school which lousy, scabious children attend? t, 
33 Perhaps recog- 
nising that he had delivered a broadside which would be unexpected from 
his political corner, Ede went on to argue that they should wage war on 
poverty and strive for mutual respect between men in different walks of 
life. His outburst, however, effectively killed discussion now, and he 
expressed himself publicly in similar vein three months later. Mrs. 
Cazalet Keir asked whether "as a preliminary to post-war educational 
reforms" the Board would consider requiring all children up to the age of 
11 to attend the same schools. As a minister Ede could not, of course, 
have agreed to the proposal, but he could have shown some sympathy if the 
notion were indeed "an ideal" as he had suggested. Instead he replied, 
"I fear it might be a first instalment on the road to a Fascist State. " 
Thus the Conservative member for Islington East received her reply from the 
Parliamentary Secretary. 34 
Laski raised the matter again later in the year and regarded "the 
institution of something approaching the constitution of the common schools" 
31 P. R. O. Edl36/294, Note by Butler, 23-1.42 
32 Ibid., Holmes to Butler, 26.1.42 
33 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 28.1.42 
34 H. C. Debates, vol-379, col-317,16.4.42; the idea continued to be 
discussed, e. g. W. Kenneth Richmond, 'A State Common School, What 
should the curriculum be? 'Jimes Educational Supplement, 25-7.42, P-361 
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as one of two matters about which Labour was keenest. By this term 
he seems to have meant the end of Private preparatory schools and 
perhaps a common code for secondary education. His observation was not 
in line with the standard Labour demands (for the other chief concern, 
as stated by him, was the training of teachers) and in any case Butler 
turned aside the demand with a reminder that Ede had chaired the 1932 
departmental committee on private education and with a claim that Ede 
had been "unsparing in his attempts to follow up the common school .,, 
35 
The lack of clarity in the Labour Party's thinking on the questions 
of public schools and the common primary school was in contrast to its 
singularity of thought on the direct grant schools. The Party was at 
one in wanting all parental fees abolished in such schools. Ede 
expressed this view to Butler in September 1941.36 The party's policy 
was confirmed at the annual conference in May 1942, when a National 
VII Rxecutive Committee motion, calling for the abolition of fees in all 
37 grant-aided schools, including direct grant schools, was adopted. 
Some Labour Party members favoured the abolition of the direct grant 
system itself, but on the question of the abolition of fees there was 
unanimity. It is this other aspect of the Fleming Committee's work 
which is the more important for this study. 
The establishment of the Fleming Committee absolved Butler and the 
Board from the need to reach one of their more difficult decisions, at 
least for the moment. The committee's terms of reference were con- 
fusing, since public schools were defined as those in membership of the 
Governing Bodies' Association or the Headmasters' Conference. These 
included a high proportion of direct grant and aided schools. Indeed, 
even included were some maintained schools whose association with the 
general educational system could hardly be developed at all. Since 
the committee was also charged to consider the question of girls' public 
schools and defined those as schools in membership of the Governing 
35 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Note by Butler, 12.5.42 
36 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 9.9.41 
37 Labour Party, Report of the 41st Annual Conference, London Nay 1942 
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Bodies of Girls' Schools Association, a further group of direct grant 
schools came within the committee's purview. The direct grant school 
question was quite different from that of the independent schools. 
It impinged much more directly on the future pattern of secondary 
education, since many of these institutions were selective schools 
serving local needs. If they were to retain their status, as schools 
independent of the local authority, recruiting some of the ablest 
children in the area and charging fees, many secondary school 
development plans wcmld be prejudiced from the start. Whilst the 
question of the independent schools troubled a Labour Party which 
was well-versed in Tawney's sociological critique and was concerned 
at the existence of a privileged private sector of education 
nationally, the continuance of direct grant schools, catering in 
many cases for a solely local need and yet maintaining their indepen- 
dence of the local authority by means of fee income and grants from 
the Board, was a more direct threat to the aspiration of parity in 
secondary education and at the same time one where the solution looked 
much easier to achieve. 'Doing something' about the independent schools 
seemed difficult; abolishing the system of direct grant schools seemed 
relatively easy. 
The attitude of Holmes and Williams in wishing to defend the direct 
grant system was as strong as that of the Labour Party in wishing to 
abolish it. The matter was considered fully by Norwood's committee 
before Fleming's was established. Williams stated his view unequivocally 
to Barrow, the secretary of the Norwood Committee, thus, "The one sheet 
anchor to cling on to is that at all costs the principle of a number of 
grammar schools retaining direct relations with the Board in the matter 
38 
of grants should be preserved . Barrow saw two reasons for keeping the 
direct grant. He was opposed to 
. 
the demand for "pla-in, flat, humdrum 
38 P. R. O. Edl2/478, Williams to Barrow, 24-3.42 
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equalitarianism, that is levelling all down to the lowest plane", and 
he was not prepared to satisfy the "greed of directors" of education by 
handing the direct grant schools over to local authorities. 
39 One 
problem for them was that the existing list of such schools included 
many anomalies and would have to be amended. There would then be a 
need to lay down new criteria for admission to the list and these might 
embrace some schools which were at that time maintained. Barrow was more 
interested in extending the direct grant list by transferring some main- 
tained schools to it. He looked sympathetically at an idea floated by 
Norwood that schools could have direct grant status as "a reward" for 
having shown their efficiency and their ability to stand on their own 
feeý without local authority guidance or support. That went too far 
for Williams who realised that local authorities would not countenance 
the notion of efficiency's being something which could not be achieved 
and maintained under their control. He was content to defend the 
status quo, recognising that this would be difficult enough, in view of 
the "universal and uncompromising opposition of L. E. A. s. and the N. U. T. " 
Williams felt that, "The greatest adroitness is called for in this matter. " 
His recommendation was to "let the details of the direct grant problems 
simmer while holding on tightly to the general principle*" 
40 
In spite of Williams' advice Barrow and Norwood pursued their notion 
of maintained schools' becoming direct grant if they could prove their 
ability to function efficient4, and Barrow produced a paper along these 
41 
lines in May 1942 which Norwood approved. One problem posed, but not 
resolved, in the paper was how they would react to an application from 
a non-grammar school for direct grant status. It seems to have been 
only a passing thought. At all other times the assumption was that 
they were talking about grammar schools. Barrow's scheme allowed for all 
schools, maintained as well as aided and existing direct grant schools, 
to apply for direct grant status if they could show that they could be" 
financially viable when in receipt of grant, that they were efficient 
and could claim some individuality or special role, and that they had 
39 Ibid., Barrow to Williams, 23-3.42 
40 -Ibid Williams to Barrow, 24-3.42 
41 Ibid:, Barrow to Williams, 11.5.42, enclosing Direct Grant Schools, B. 
162 
stable and active governing bodies which included local authority 
representatives. Local authorities could object to the "loss" of a 
school, but not on principle; only if they could prove "discrimination" 
against their own schools and no resultant advantage to the area would 
their objections prevail. 
Williams would have none of this dangerous imprecision which could 
provoke still greater opposition to the very notion of schools linked 
directly to the Board. His alternative was a much simpler defence of 
the main principle. 
42 
He was willing to allow only aided sI chools, in 
addition to existing direct grant schools, to apply for direct grant status, 
and wished to limit any new applications to non-local schools. He also 
accepted that direct grant schools should "conform in all respects to the 
general policy as regards fees in other secondary schools", i. e. if fees 
were abolished in all other grammar schools, maintained and aided, that 
would have to be accepted for direct grant schools as well. In his scheme 
local authorities would have the right to appoint one third of governors 
and to determine the number of places which they "may reasonably require". 
The Board would then meet all the school's costs, except for L. E. A. 
contributions for children whom it sent (and these were not to exceed the 
cost of places in its own schools) and any contribution which the L. E. A. 
cared to make at its own discretion towards capital expenditure. He 
accepted Barrow's criteria for the award of direct grant status. For 
Williams, therefore, the direct grant school was to be defended as a 
selective, perhaps highly-8elective institution, serving a local need 
as perhaps the only but certainly the best grammar school in the area. 
A direct grant from the Board was to give some grammar schools a measure 
of independence from local authorities and a status which would set them 
apart from all other secondary schools. 
It was Williams' view whi. ch prevailed and his paper, not Barrow's 
which was presented to a meeting of the committee in June 1942.43 Even 
42 Ibid., Williams to Barrow, 26-5.42, enclosing Direct Grant Schools, a 
note by Williams, 15-5.42 
43 P. R. O. Edl2/479, Norwood Minutes4,12-13.6.42; and comA, which is 
Williams' paper as above 
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this paper did not produce agreement, and it was accepted that either 
a compromise would have to be reached or a statement made that the 
committee could not agree, At the next meeting later in the same 
month, Norwood referred to the "acute feeling on both sides" and called 
for compromise. 
44 
By now discussion of the wider public school issue had been 
removed from Norwood's consideration by the decision to appoint 
Fleming's committee. Norwood had received the news in early June and 
had, according to Barrow, taken it quite well, realising, as he had- 
put it, that "we have been headed off the topic. " 
4,5 
Fleming's committee 
was officially appointed in July. It is strange- that Williams and 
Barrow did not immediately accept that the direct grant question was 
also more appropriate to Fleming's terms of reference than to Norwood's. 
There were well over a hundred direct grant and aided schools which came 
within Fleming's terms of reference. 
46 
Instead of dropping the matter, 
the officials exerted themselves at this very time to secure the 
inclusion of a statement favourable to the direct grant principle in 
the Norwood Report. 
The greatest obstacle for them to overcome was the attitude of the 
local authorities, which were at one with both the N. U. T. and the 
A. M. A. in being "strongly" in favour of the direct grant schools being 
converted into aided schools. 
47 
Williams' and Barrow's manipulation of 
the committee is clearly illustrated by their work on the conversion of 
local authority representatives. Norwood arranged two private meetings 
with Sir Percival Sharp, secretary of the Association of Education 
Committees. In expressing to Barrow his pleasure at this news, Williams 
assumed that Norwood's "main object will be to secure his agreement on 
direct grant schools and the university scheme. " 
48 
Norwood was successful 
44 Ibid., Norwood Minutes5,26-27.6.42 
45 P. R. O. Ed. 12/478, Barrow to Williams, 11.5.42 
46 Board of Education, The Public Schools and the General Educational 
S, ystem, London 1944, referred to, hereafter as Fleming Report, pp. 
124-wIZ8 lists the schools in three categories: 
6_5 direct grant and aided schools in membership of the 
Governing Bodies Association 
99 direct grant, aided and maintained schools in membership of 
the Headmasters' Conference 
58 direct grant schools in membership of the Governing Body 
of Girls' Schools Association 
The 65 schools in the first category are all included in the second 
category, so that the total of boy, -tl schools is 99, but the second 
category includes some maintained schools 
47 P. R. O. Ed. 12/478, Williams to Barrow, 17-3.42; N. U. T. Report on Proposal.. 
by the Executive, adopted by Conference, Cheltenham 1942; London 
Institute of Education, A. M. A. Records, Education Su. b-Committee Minutes, 
1.11.41 
48 Ibid., Williams to Barrow, 14-5.42 
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and was able to report to Williams that Sharp had accepted the continuation 
of the schools on the lines of his (Williams 1] pAper. 
49 
Notwithstanding 
this success, when Barrow wrote to Williams a fortnight later to give him 
a break-down of voting intentions within the committee, his news was bad. 
Certainly three members would be against them, and four others would 
probably be so. Only four could be regarded as certainly in favour of 
them. 50 Barrow arranged for Sharp to attempt to convert another local 
authority representative, Dr. P. D. Innes, Birmingham's chief education 
officer. 
51 But by now Williams, whilst still holding. out hopes that 
his paper might be endorsed, accepted that what he had hoped for was not 
now possible. "We cannot come out with a strong recommendation in favour 
of them, " he wrote. 
52 His irritation with the members who opposed him on 
this topic was revealing. He was outraged that "people like Shurrock 
should express decisive views of the recognition or otherwise of direct 
grant schools. " His objection was presumably that Shurrock's membership 
of the committee was due to his office as secretary of London University's 
Matriculation and Schools' Examinations Council. He had no such objection 
to Dr. J. E. Myers' views, which were the same as his own, even though 
Myers was on the committee as principal of a college of technology and 
formerly a chairman of the Northern Universities' Joint Matriculation 
Board - qualifications which did not per se entitle him to talk with more 
authority on the topic of direct grant schools than did Shurrock's. The 
fact was that Williams had been trying to obtain from the committee a 
statement on a topic which was not really within its terms of reference. 
Whereas he was to succeed in a similar objective in relation to the tri- 
partite division of secondary schooling, 
53 he realised that on the direct 
grant school question he could not succeed. He therefore advised Barrow 
to concentrate the committee's attention narrowly on examinations and the 
curriculum. If he could not have the favourable reference to direct grant 
schools which he wanted, he would have none at all. 
49 Ibid., Norwood to Williams, 6.6.42 
50 Ibid., Barrow to Williams, 18.6.42 
51 Ibid., Barrow to Williams, 22.6.42 
52 Ibid,, Williams to Barrow, 22o6.42 
53 SH2ra, pp. 122-123 
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The role of Chuter Ede in the debates on the public and direct grant 
. 
school questions was not without its ambiguities. He was closer than 
anybody else in the Labour Party to the work of Holmes, Williams and 
Butler, even if he was not privy to all that went on. It is not clear 
whether he appreciated the extent to which a consideration of the public 
schools' place in the educational system had originated with anxiety 
for their survival. The claim that the Green Book was concerned solely 
with state education and that it could not therefore include a 
corýsideration of this topic was acceptable to him and he was therefore 
willing to see the problem tackled outside the context of impending 
legislation. 54 He was also concerned about the "acrimonious debate" 
on the subject, and seemed to regard it as having the same potential 
for dividing the nation as had the dual system controversy, and thought 
it better kept separate from the main issues of the state system. 
5-5 
In his attitude to the question itself he showed his party's general 
feeling that something should be done and its vagueness about what could 
be done. He referred to Britain's "class-ridden society" and argued 
that "something more than reform of the public schools is necessary. , _56 
But, unlike some Labour spokesmen, he did not take the view that the 
ability to purchase education was intrinsically wrong and a privilege 
incompatible with the greater social equality which it was common-place 
to advocate at that time. He put his view very bluntly to Mrs. M. A. 
Hamilton, a former Labour M. P., whose thoughts on the matter had reached 
him through Greenwood's office, making it clear that he had no objections 
to people buying better education. -57 Indeed, as we have seen, 
58 he 
felt that the parents of preparatory school children had the right to 
expect an improvement in working class hygiene before they could be 
expected to accept compulsory association in school between their children 
and those from Council schools. Later, when speaking in the Commons on the 
White Paper, he compared the notion of a state monopolty in education to the 
Nazis' use of schools. 
59 In an interview with H. C. Dent editor of The 
54 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Ede to Butler, 6.8.41 and lo. 9.41 
55 Ibid 
' ., 
Note to Butlerjunsigned but by Ede, 10.9.41 
56 lbid., Ede to Butler, 9.9.41 
57 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 6.8.41; B. L., Ede Diary, vol. 1,5.8.41 
58 Supra. p. 158 
59 H. C. Debates, vol-391, col. 2035,30-7.43 
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Times Educational Sup_plement, he exalted this view to a principle 
involving fundamental liberties, saying that he was "definitely 
opposed to a state monopoly in education" which he regarded as 
A 1160 tyrannical and dangerous. 
His views on what should be done, whilst no clearer than the rest 
of his party's, included a rejection of local solutions as advocated 
by Tawney. 
61 
When Tawney put this opinion to Butler, Ede quickly 
opposed it on the grounds that the geographical distribution of the 
schools precluded their use in local authority schemes. He was, 
however, in agreement with Tawney that a small number of free places in 
public 
'schools 
was not an acceptable solution. 
62 
Apart from wanting a 
national rather than a local solution, Ede was clearer about what he 
opposed than what he favoured. 
He attempted to clarify his views in January 1942 when he drafted 
two papers which were reactions to a note by Fisher, Bishop of London 
and spokesman for the Governing Bodies Association, a letter from 
Leeson and a paper from the Headmasters' Conference. 
63 
Although he 
was at pains to be "emphatic on those points on which I feel certain 
Labour Party opinion will be inflexible", his papers are not entirely 
helpful in explaining his position because of their nature -a response 
to the views of others rather than a straightforward exposition of his 
own views - and he did not himself make proposals, having been assured 
by Butler that "no government policy is being formulated. " 
Ede was hostile to the claims that public schools enjoyed greater 
freedom and variety - both curricular and administrative - than main- 
tained schools. "In the post war world in which democracy will be 
triumphant", he wrote, "are head teachers of secondary schools alone 
to be withdrawn from its beneficent influence? " He was also insistent 
on the constitutional point that any institution in receipt of public 
monies, however received, must accept a degree of accountability to 
60 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Ede to Butler, 8.5.42 
61 Ibid., Note by Butler on conversation with Tawney, 5-9.41 
62 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 9.9.41; B. L.,, Ede Diary, vol. 1,8.9.41 
63 P. R. O. Edl36/597, Ede to Butler, 9.1.42 and 13-1.42. The digest of 
his views which follows is taken from both papers. 
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Parliament which had voted the assistance. This might include a 
requirement of Parliament that all entrants - those privately-financed 
as well as those financed by the state - should reach minimum entrance 
standards, i. e. that the public schools should replace social selection 
with academic selection. 
For Ede it was the boarding aspect of many public schools which 
was their distinctive feature. In countenancing an extension of 
public school education he thought entirely in social terms, i. e. 
providing boarding education in public schools for those children who 
needed it but did not receive it in the state system. In view of the 
falling birthrate he considered that this need could be met'in existing 
public schools without the provision of additional places. Apparently 
aware that the public schools were 'cap in hand', he expected them to 
sacrifice some principles in return for the state 'cash which they were 
seeking. 
His most important and most forcefully expressed view was that all 
fees should be abolished in direct grant schools. He acknowledged that 
the authors of the Green Book had changed their opinion and now shared 
his views. We 
. 
have seen how Williams' views had been modified. 
64 
In 
Ede's view the public school lobby needed to understand that this change 
had taken place. The assumption that the direct grant itself would 
continue was tacitly accepted by him. 
Thus Ede was emotionally hostile to the public schools and sceptical 
about the advantages which they claimed. He doubted whether boarding - 
their distinctive feature - was necessary in many cases, and though he 
saw the possibility of a link between them and the state system by their 
providing boarding education for those who really needed it but could not 
have it, he expected a measure of public control to accompany any 
financial contributions by the state. Most importantly he believed that 
local direct grant schools should conform to the general pattern of 
64 Supra, p. 162 
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secondary education and not charge fees. At no stage does he seem to 
have argued for the abolition of the direct grant system and he seems 
to have been content that such. schools should continue to be highly 
selective academically. 
The main area of controversy had thus narrowed to that of the role 
to be played by- direct grant schools in local schemes of secondary school 
re-organisation. On the one hand it was argued that, if direct grant 
schools were to charge fees, they could not be fully involved in the 
local provision-of secondary education. This was the view which now 
prevailed at the Board. Ede had always held it. Williams - the most 
knowledgeable and influential official in the sphere of secondary 
education - had come to hold it partly as a position which could be 
defended (the vital question being that of the direct grant itself), 
and partly because it accorded with his long-held opinion that grammar 
schools needed to be made academically more selective and socially less 
Sol, On the other hand there were those, including the public school 
lobbyists themselves, who believed that fees were an essential element 
in the independence from the local authority which they considered to be 
the justification for and distinctive advantage of that type of school. 
Butler's position on this matter was more difficult than on any 
. other, for it was the principal issue on which there was a clear-cut 
division of opinion between the Board and a section of his own party. 
Many local authority members of his party took the view that the local 
direct grant schools should become L. E. A. schools, but some M. Ps. and 
ministers held the view that liberty and parental rights were involved. 
His own opinions vacillated but eventually fell in line with those of the 
Board. In October 1942, in response to a note from Holmes which had 
outlined the essential contents of a bill, he wrote, "I should prefer, as 
at present advised, not to abolish the fees in direct grant schools, as 
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distinct from other forms of secondary schools. " 
65 
Ede responded 
quickly to this news. He urged Butler to make a distinction between 
local and non-local schools, and said that there was no case for keeping 
fees in the former. 
66 
In February 1943 Butler wrote to Lord Fleming 
and asked to have his committee's views on the question of fees in grant- 
aided schools as a matter of urgency. On 2 April Fleming responded with 
an interim report. 
67 
The committee was divided, but a clear majority 
favoured the abolition of fees in direct grant schools; the voting was 
eleven to seven. Their reason was that the schools could fulfil the 
role of the highly-selective grammar school in each area. Local direct 
grant schools should become L. E. A. schools. Only if all local secondary 
school places were free could the projected transfer of wrongly-placed 
pupils take place at the age of 13- The direct grant list should be 
reconstituted for non-local schools, and although governing bodies 
should include L. E. A. representatives, it was the governing bodies of 
these schools and not the L. E. As. which should set selection tests for 
admission. The L. E. A. would then pay in full for these places, amd the 
remaining places would be subsidised by a grant from the Board. They 
accepted that the abolition of fees would not be justified in a few 
schools and that these might have to become independent. 
68 
The Special Fleming Rep ort thus supported the views currently held 
at the Boa-rd. It accepted the principle of segregated secondary 
education. The motive for the abolition of fees was the desire that 
the direct grant schools should continue to perform their role as 
selective grammar schools in a system which would now be free. Butler 
was persuaded. Two days before he officially received the report he 
informed Holmes that he wished to accept the majority view and he suggested 
that the abolition of fees be included in the draft bill. He foresaw 
problems, however, and doubted whether he would succeed in winning the 
65 P. R. O. Edl36/379, Butler to Holmes, 20.10.42 
66 Ibid., Ede to Butler, 22.10.42 
67 Board of Education, Abolition of Tuition Fees in Grant-Aided Secondary 
Schools, London 194ý-, referred to hereafter as Special Fleming Report 
68 Ibid., pp. 12-17 and p. 19 
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support of some ministers in cabinet. 
69 
He did not publish the report, 
which was endorsed, "For official use only0l' 
Support for the unpublished views of the majority report came from 
all quarters. A County Councils' Association deputation favoured the 
abolition of fees in all grant-aided schools, including those direct 
grant schools which formed an essential part of local provision. When 
one of the deputation expressed forcefully his personal opinion, which 
was contrary to C. C. A. pol: icy, that the abolition of fees was "a direct 
attack on the freedom of parents, " Butler specifically rejected that 
70 
view. The Association of Education Committees expressed its concern 
to ButTer about the continuing vagueness over direci grant schools and 
he acknowledged the basis for their concern, citing Coventry as an 
example of the places where almost all existing secondary provision was 
in direct grant schools. 
71 Curiously Ede was unenthusiastic about the 
report which supported his paLrty's goal, recording that he was "not 
1172 moved by the majority or minority . 
The position by the Summer of 1943 was thus that there was a very 
strong movement in favour of the abolition of fees in local direct grant 
schools which were to become part of the normal L. E. A. secondary school 
system. Teacher and local authority organisations were agreed; a 
majority of the committee which he had set up concurred. Butler too 
was converted but, conscious of division within his own party and 
especially of opposition from Conservative M. Ps. and ministers, he did 
not publish the Fleming recommendations. Instead he sent a note to 
Holmes in which he indicated his dilemma and the rationale of his way 
forward. He almost apologised to Holmes when he wrote, "you should 
realise that I do not regard this only as a political problem - though 
it has that aspect. I am anxious not to lose tradition in education, 
and have realised that I shall have to have an answer to the Fleming 
Committee. Moreover, I don't want all schools gleichgestaltet. I 
69 P. R. O. Edl36/389, Butler to Holmes, 31-3.43 
70 P. R. O. Edl36/378, Note of deputation from C. C. A., 14-3.43 
71 Ibid., Note of deputation from A. E. C., 11.8.43 
72 B. L., Ede Diary, vol-7,26.4.43 
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prefer a shading off. Otherwise you'll have the social problem left 
isolated and more clearly defined at the 'rich' end .,, 
73 Publicly 
Butler gave hints that were comforting to the schools in question. 
Speaking at Felsted School, one of the independent schools included in 
Fleming's enquiry, he said, "Our system has grown up by stages; some- 
times in a haphazard way, but it is none the worse for that. In some 
ways we are bound to overhaul this system, to make it more complete 
and more orderly. But we do not want all our schools to be uniform 
in type or control. On the contrary, we want schools to fit the needs 
of all kinds of boys and girls, with a wide variety of schools of 
, 174 different grades and types . Reform there had to be, but there was 
a good prospect that it would be kept to a minimum, and the virtues 
of variety were now coming more to the fore at the expense of the ideal 
of parity. 
73 P. R. O. Edl36/389, Butier to Holmes, 16.5.43 
74 Reported in Times, 3.7.43, p. 2 
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Chapter 8: LABOURIS DEPUTATION TO THE BOARD 
Although Labour's views had been made known to Butler and the 
Board in various ways whilst policy on multilateralism, the leaving 
age and the direct grant schools was under discussion, it was not until 
25 February 1943 that a deputation from the Labour Party went to the 
Board. The meeting was one of the last on the Green Book. The tardi- 
ness of the Labour Party's deputation was well-illustrated by the fact 
that it took place on. the same day that Ede, unbeknown to his fellow 
party members, completed his re-draft of the important clause which 
dealt with the organisation of secondary schooling. 
Whilst the deputation was too late significantly to influence the 
Board's thinking, there seems to have been no doubts about its importance 
at the Board, for officials prepared well for it. They had had a copy 
of the Labour Party's paper and they prepared a very detailed brief for 
Butler's use, including some political observations, so that he could 
explain why some of the party's proposals were not in accord with the 
projected legislation. The officials were again defending a line of 
action which had already been determined. The discussion was to be 
far from open. 
Butler was accompanied by Ede, Deputy Secretary Wood, the former 
adversaries Williams and Cleary from the principal assistant secretaries' 
committee, and Heaton, the private secretary brought in by Butler to 
help him on the Bill, amongst others. The Labour deputation was headed 
by Harold Clay and included Alice Bacon, Cove, Spikes, Shearman, Franklin 
and Barbara Drake, as well as Laski and others. We are fortunate to 
have both the Board's 1 and the Labour Party's 
2 
minutes of the discussion. 
Clay began by stressing the need for early legislation. Butler 
was re-assuring to the point of boastfulness. He excused the delay to 
date by referring to the lack of preparation which he had found when he 
came to the Board, an observation which may have been true in terms of 
1 P. R. O. Edl36/266 contains the Labour Party's paper, the officials' 
brief to Butler and the Board's memorandum of the interview. 
2 T. H., Labour Party Records, R. D. R. 197/March 1943 is the Labour Party's 
record of the meeting. 
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drafting a Bill but which ignored the fact that his officials' Green 
Book pre-dated his appointment and was not going to be much altered 
as a result of it. The Bill was now being drafted, which was "more 
than could be said of the other measures of social reform, " and he 
was hopeful that he would be able to present his Bill, "as early as 
possible this year. " 
At the head of the Labour Party's list of proposals was the raising 
of the leaving age to 15 at the end of the war and to 16 within three 
years by an appointed day to be specified in the Bill. The inclusion 
of the appointed day was of "vital importance" and an "imperative 
necessity. " All of the arguments were -rehearsed but Clay stressed the 
unusual degree of unanimity amongst educational spokesman on this matter, 
and its relationship to the achievement of parity in secondary schooling 
about the desirability of which there was also widespread agreement. 
As it was put starkly by Shearman, "A school with a leaving age of less 
than 16 would not be a secondary school. " Clay in fact gave Butler a 
warning that this was a minimum demand by stating that, "Unless it was 
possible to make provision for the raising of the school leaving age to 
16 by a definite date there was no possibility of the President's reaching 
to 
agreement with the deputation or with the Party in the House. 
Butler in reply did not follow his officials' brief. His approach 
was much blander, his manner more conciliatory. The officials had 
suggested that he should reveal the Board's intentions to include only 
the raising of the age to 15 as soon as possible after the war "With, 
perhaps, provision for it to be raised to 16 when circumstances permit. " 
They suggested that he should rehearse the practical difficulties, argue 
that there was no unanimity of opinion on the matter, and even try to 
exploit what they perceived to be the admission of a higher priority 
for the establishment of day continuation colleges in a Nuffield College 
report of which Clay was a signatory. 
3 
The forthrightness of Clay"s 
3 Nuffield College, Industry and Education, London 1943; vide p. 145., 
footnote 35 
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statement, the particular arguments which he and others had developed, 
and the short shrift which he gave to Butler's attempt to exploit the 
Nuffield College report made the forthright approach unpromising in any 
case, but Butler, the experienced negotiator, was wise enough to contrive 
that the deputation should leave in the belief that he was sympathetic 
if not committed to its view. He argued that the main problem over the 
party's timescale was the slow pace of Hadow re-organisation and that 
the educational case for requiring pupils to remain to 16 in all-age 
schools was weak. He invited the deputation to consider whether it 
could approve. a scheme for raising the leaving age to 16 in those areas 
where it was practicable, whilst keeping it at 15 elsewhere. This 
idea was rejected at once. Ede also invited them to consider a five- 
year difference between raising the age to 15 and to 16. 
There seems to have been some misunderstanding on the strength of 
Butler's feelings, or perhaps the nuances were such that one or both 
sides had difficulty in finding the right words, for whilst the Board 
recorded that Butler regarded raising the leaving age to 16 as "desirable", 
the Labour Party recorded that, "on educational grounds, he believed that 
16 was essential. " On the merits of the case, whichever record be the 
more accurate, the deputation could feel that Butler was at one with them. 
Rather more important was the fact that the Board's officials did not 
wish to raise the leaving age to 16. 
The point of difference between the Labour Party and Butler in the 
sphere of secondary school organization was the view to be taken of 
multilateral schools. The Labour Party's paper which had been sent to 
the Board in advance accepted tripartism and asked for a common code 
for all post-11 schooling "in whatever type of school it is conducted. " 
It also asked for common standards of staffing and accommodation. The 
officials' brief to Butler noted that these demands had been accepted by 
4 
.L(.; ý 
the Board. On multilateral schools, however, there was a difference 
of opinion. The officials had no objections to "experiments in 
suitable cases, " but cited the inadequacy of existing buildings, the 
problems of too great a size, the smallness of sites especially in 
cities, and the inability of headmasters to cope with the whole range 
of abilities as obstacles to the "general policy" for which the Labour 
Party was calling. Clay put the party's case for, such schools in his 
opening contribution, but it was Alice Bacon who again took up the 
point most vigorously, *emphasizing that ll+ selection was premature 
and that 1_3+ transfers were difficult. Butler again portrayed the 
Board as being at one with the deputation, instancing Alice Bacons 
remarks aboutý the difficulties of 13+ transfers as evidence of the 
identity between their views. Mentioning his recent visit to Scotland 
he expressed his admiration for the Glasgow senior secondary schools, 
regretting only that they were too large, and commented that, "they did 
go a long way towards removing snob trouble. " He assured them that, 
"he would certainly encourage experiments in this country. " A reference 
to the Norwood Committee, whose report he was expecting in the summer, 
was enough to leave the question of secondary school reorganisation open. 
A reference to the Fleming Committee, whose report he was expecting 
"Shortly", was sufficient to avoid discussion of the direct grant and 
public school issues. 
T%-- 
xrom both the Board's account and the Labour Party's it is clear 
that the Board's mailed fist was in a Yery soft velvet glove indeed. 
The Board's officials had no desire to raise the leaving age to 16, 
yet Butler gave the impression that he wished to see it so raised. 
They were committed to a nationally-directed institutionalisation of 
the ad hoc tripartism in secondary education which had followed Hadow, 
yet Butler gave the impression that North of the border he had seen an 
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alternative, had been impressed by it and was sympathetic to a start 
being made in England. On other matters the appointment of committees, 
to give the impression that authoritative and independent advice from 
outside the Board would sway decisions, allowed Butler to avoid discussion. 
The question of whether Butler was a dissembler or the creature of 
his ministry has to be considered. Was it the performance of a man who 
was having to spend many hours softening the edges of sectarian contro- 
veisies (and who had had similar experience in India earlier in his career) 
and had transferred this bland approach to the key educational issues 
which had to be resolved in time for the publication of his Bill, or did 
he really have an open mind on these issues and believe that he had re- 
opened his officials' minds? -The evidence tends to support the former 
analysis. 
The consensus approach to politics is disarming. If issues can 
be expressed in such a way that everybody seems to agree on aims, but 
differ only on means or perhaps only on the apparently even less important 
matter of timing, controversy is avoided. The disagreement on raising 
the school leav-ing age to 16 was at this time, and was to remain in the 
parliamentary debates, about the apparently subsidiary issue of whether 
an appointed day for it was to be included in the Act. There was no 
public debate of consequence on its merits. It was accepted by all but 
the Board's officials as desirable. It was acknowledged that talk of 
common standards was meaningless without a common date to end basic 
courses. It was further acknowledged that talk of transfers at 13+, 
admittedly difficult to arrange in any case, would be made even less 
likely to happen if a two year course in one school were to be followed 
by perhaps less than a two year course in another. Yet the position of 
the Board's officials at the time of the Green Book and now at the time 
of the Labour deputation was that no case for raising the leaving age to 
16 had been made. The official position was hostile to the proposal, 
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yet Butler gave the impression that he favoured it and saw only practical 
problems. 
The Labour Party deputation could come-away feeling that there was 
little disagreement about the contents of. a bill, that their aspirations 
were shared by the President and his ministry, and that little more 
needed to be done by them to influence policy. Events were to reveal 
that the reality was somewhat different. 
178 
Chapter 9: THE WHITE PAPER 
The deliberations and negotiations which had been taking place 
since the issue of the Green Book in 1941 bore fruit with the 
presentation to Parliament of the White Paper, Educational 
Reconstruction on 16 July 1943.1 Butler prepared his ground well, 
taking care to ensure the acquiescence of Churchill, the en'thusiastic 
response of educational reformers and a favourable press reception. 
As we have seen 
2 the Prime Minister had initially rejected any 
thought of legislation on education and Butler had had to' tread warily 
as he continued his negotiations, especially those with the churches 
about the voluntary schools. In October 1942 he wrote to the 
Government Chief Whip and suggested that there should be a reference 
to educational reform in the King's Speech at the opening of Parliament. 
3 
At the same time he wrote to Sir John Anderson, by then Lord President 
of the Council, to seek advice on a timetable for legislation. 
Outlining the prospects for a religious settlement agreed by all the 
churches, he had to omit any mention of the Roman Catholics who were 
still hoping for 100% grants, but he expected agreement and observed 
that, "If ... this ancient stumbling block is circumvented, the case for 
a major advance on the educational front will be strongly pressed*" 
4 
Churchill's recollections of change in education were mainly about 
the church school controversy of 1902 and, when Butler talked to him 
about an agreed syllabus for religious instruction in local authority 
schools,, he called it the "County Council Creed" and asked Butler if 
he were founding a new state religion. -5 Of great help to Butler was 
Churchill's ignorance of the educational system, especially the state 
system, and his lack of interest in it. If these had not worked in 
the interests of progress - as they ultimately did, for Churchill's 
indifference was not churlish and he did not stand in the way of changes 
1 Board of Education. Educational Reconstruction 9 Cmnd. 6458, presented 
to Parliament 16-7.43; referred to hereafter as: White Paper 
2 Supra P- 93 
3 P. R. O. Edl36/377, Butler to James, 16.10.42 
4 Ibid., Butler to Anderson, 19-10, i42 
5 R. A. Butler. Art of the Possiýle, London, 19719P-99 
1.79 
which did not interest him - it would have been irksome for any 
minister planning school reforms to have had to listen to his comments. 
These included a quotation from Campbell- Bannerman in 1906 to the effect 
that the President's job was about "smacking children's bottoms and 
blowing their noses", the observation that Butler's job was to provide 
"powder monkeys" to relieve pressure on the gun sites, and, as part of 
Churchill's congratulations on the Board's plans, his view that the most 
6 
important task was to maintain the population level. Even at the time 
when he was discussing the main lines of legislation, Churchill passed 
over most points without comment and then tried to promote nursery 
education for two year olds on the basis of Mrs. Churchill's having read 
a book, Our Towns, which revealed "the disgusting habits of certain 
children and their families. " He quoted a foreigner who had said that 
the common people of Britain were more common than those of other 
countries, and he was anxious about housewives "whose charm faded with 
each succeeding child. "? At a meeting of the War Cabinet on 13 JulY, 
when the decision was being reached to present the White Paper three 
days later, Churchill asked Butler an irrelevant question about the 
use of instructional films in schools. 
8 
The only result of Butler's efforts by the Autumn of 1942 was a 
reference in the King's Speech to the fact that conversations on 
changes in education were proceeding. Although the reference was 
quite prominent, in that it was separated from other references to 
domestic progress and was awarded its own paragraph, it emphasized 
the consensus approach to reform. The Government's hopes were that 
"these discussions will result in such a wide measure of agreement 
being reached that further progress can be made with plans for the 
better education of My people. 119 According to Butler's later 
- recollections, even this was a concession which had to be won, 
6 Ibid., pp. 108-109 
7 ý. R-. O. Edl36/392, Confidential, Butler to Ede and Holmes 
8 P. R. O. Edl36/4o5, Minutes of War Cabinet, 13-7.43 
9 H. C. Debates, vol-3859cols-7-8,11.11.42 
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and the omission of a reference to legislation was deliberate. 
10 
In March 1943 Butler was inviteds with Churchill's confidant 
Lord Cherwell, to stay overnight at Chequers. The Prime Minister 
was planning a broadcast on home affairs which would promise a 
general election as soon as Hitler was defeated and the opportunity 
for voters to give their verdict on a four-year plan for post-war 
reconstruction. Churchill was clearly already giving thought to. the 
means of retaining power after the war. He had not become Prime 
Minister as a result of winning an election and perhaps saw that 
being the war leader was not a guarantee of post-war electoral 
popularity. Butler's visit was intended to give Churchill the 
opportunity to rehearse the section of his speech about education. 
In Churchill's draft this was largely high-flown generalisation 
ranging from Disraeli's views to a hint that the old school tie 
should be abandoned in favour of a meritocracy. One problem for 
Butler was that it also included a statement that the leaving age 
must be raised to 16. His daughter Mary had been the author of 
this assertion, claiming that a leaving age of 16 had been promised 
and that the promise should be kept. Churchill's own thought was 
that there was a need to keep 15-year olds off the labour market. 
11 
Butler tactfully suggested that he might scrutinize the wording of 
the speech. Initially rebuffed by Churchill, who did not want him 
"messing about" with the text, he was then given the entire speech. 
Cherwell pursued Butler to his room and insisted on his locking the 
draft securely away. They then joined Churchill in the cinema and, 
equipped in the front row with armchairsl gout stools and cigars, 
whilst locally-based soldiers made up the rest of the audience and 
A. T. S. girls did the waiting, they watched a film about a nineteenth- 
century Tsar who acquired radical ideas from his French-trained wife 
10 R. A. Butler, op. cit. 1p. 109 
11 Holmes also expressed this viewsupra P-146, but it is an opinion 
at odds with the general expectation of a labour shortage after 
the war. Curiously a shortage of building labour was often cited 
by Holmes as one of the reasons why the raising of the leaving 
age could not be carried out soon after the end of the war. 
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and was murdered for his pains. As they left, Cherwell whispered 
somethin' to Churchilll who rounded on Butler and demanded, "Give me 9 
my speech. " When Butler fetched it, Churchill tore out and handed 
back the four pages on education and Butler returned to his room to 
begin at 1 a. m. the rewriting of the section. 
The effect of his work was to make the commitment to raising the 
leaving age vague - it was to be "progressively prolonged", to add 
references to continued part-time education, and to soften the "rather 
rude remarks" about the old school tie. These changes, which could be 
regarded as only textual, ensured that the Prime Minister's wishes, 
which in truth had been formulated without much thought, were 
subordinated to those of the Board. The next morning Butler was 
surprised to learn that Churchill might not want to see him. However 
at mid-morning he was summoned. Churchill was very rude to him, 
saying amongst other things that his cat, by keeping him warm, was 
doing more for the war effort than was Aptler, but he accepted without 
discussion all of-Butler's amendfnentse 
12 
The hand of Butler was evident when the speech was broadcast. 
Equality of initial opportunity was coupled with differentiated 
schooling thus, "Human beings are endowed with infinitely varying 
qualities and dispositions, and each one is different from the others. 
We cannot make them all the same... It is in our power, however, to 
secure equal opportunities for all. " Religious toleration was coupled 
with the continuance of religious instruction in schools, for the 
latter was a "rock" and a "fundamental element" which should not be 
abandoned. The leaving age was to be "progressively prolonged" (for 
the President was in the event more influential than the Prime Minister's 
daughter) and was coupled with "part-time release from industry.,, 
13 
Although time-consuming, Butler's visit to Chequers was time well spent 
in the Board's interests and, after the broadcast, he appropriately 
wrote a note of appreciation to Churchill. 
14 
The following month Butler again went to see Churchill and, on 
12 R. A. Butler. op. cit., pp. 109-116 
13 Broadcast by Churchill on 21-3.43. Published in C-Eade(editor), 
The War SDeeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill (5 vols. ), 
vol. 2, London 1952, P. 433 
14 P. R. O. Edl36/3779Butler to Churchill, 23-3.43 
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the advice of Anderson, was accompanied by him as well as by1the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood, and the Chief Whip. 
Churchill commented on the abolition of fees in secondary schools and 
on the religious question. He was willing. to accept Butler's 
settlement of the latter issue, but said that the minister "must go 
bail for the Concordat'llwarning him that, if there were trouble, 
there would be no bill. The continuing demands of the Roman 
Catholics were brushed aside. In Churchill's view they were doing 
very well already; 'it was a question of "Rome on the rates". Both 
the Lord President and the Chancellor defended the settlement and said 
that, without it, the progress already made on educational reform would 
be lost. The agreed aim after the meeting was for Butler to present 
a draft bill to the Lord President's Committee as soon as possible,, and 
for a debate to be held on first or second reading in the summer, 
preferably in June or early July. 
15 Butler therefore required increased 
pressure on Ram, the parliamentary draftsman. Ram was not optimistic 
that he could comply with the new timetable. That was one problem. 
Another was the pre-occupation of the Lord President's Committee itself 
with work on pensions. 
Butler referred to both of these problems in papers to the Lord 
President's Committee. Later in April he asked that an "explanatory 
paper" should be published and a general debate on a bill should be held 
before the summer recess. 
16 He was worried lest the ground won over the 
religious question might be lost, and he thought that the government 
should forestall this by making its intentions known. The lay 
authorities were accepting the religious settlement only as a pre- 
requisite for educational reform, and would not tolerate it in isolation. 
In a paper in June he submitted a printed draft of the Bill, but reported 
that it was not yet complete. He also submitted a draft White Paper, 
15 P. R. O. Edl36/392, Butler to Holmes, 16.4.43; a much fuller account is 
given in a confidential note of the same date to Ede and Holmes 
16 P. R. O. Cab7l/12, L. P. (43)89, Memorandum by President of the Board of 
Education, 27. ý. 43 
3 
which distinguished between those measures which required legislation 
and those which could be affected by administrative action alone. 
If the Bill could not be introduced until the next session, he wanted 
a debate on the White Paper before the summer recess. Again he 
referred to the "general expectation" that the government's intentions 
were to be published soon and expressed his apprehension that, if this 
were not done, he might not be abie to maintain the consensus rea. ched. 
17 
In a note to Anderson he referred to the dangers of rumours and 
impatience. 18 
Besides the difficulties of the parliamentary draftsman and the 
pre-occupation of the Lord President's Committee with another reform, 
there was a third obstacle to progress, viz. the need to conclude 
detailed arrangements with the Ministries of Labour and Health and with 
the Home Office. 19 Butler himself added to these problems by wanting 
at a late. stage to include a change in the Board's title, a definition 
of the new Minister'6 responsibilities and a revised constitution for 
the consultative committee. 
20 At the same time he was insisting that 
the inclusion of any point in the 13ill should be determined by 
"whether it can go in without raising trails and amendments which will 
delay. " In spite of his own demands on his officials, everything now 
argued for the greatest possible speed. The main lines of the 
religious settlement were agreed and, although the Roman Catholics 
were divided and might still cause difficulty, Butler could decide to 
keep his head down in the hope that the ship would not founder and that 
there might be fair weather ahead. If the church school question argued 
for speed, speed in turn argued against any further change in the purely 
educational aspects of the reforms. Sir Frederick Mander had made the 
point emphatically at the N. U. T. Conference in April. Ede reported his 
warning to Butler thus, "The prospects for the Bill were about to enter 
17 P. R. O. Cab7l/l3, Lp(43)l47 Educational Reconstruction. Memorandum by 
the President of the Board of Education, with draft Bill and draft 
White Paper, 24.6.43 
18 P. R. O. Edl36/378, Butler to Anderson, 24.6.43 
19 Ibid., Butler to Holmes, 20.10.42 and 3.2.43 
20 Ibid., Butler to Holmes, 3.2.43 
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a delicate political phase. You and I 
[i. 
e. Butler and Ede] had to be 
constant to our line. We could give nothing more either to the right 
or left. If we did, we should be lost.. " 
21 
Landfall was imminent, 
nobody should rock the boat. 
Nonetheless, by early July 1943 there was still uncertainty about 
the extent of parliamentary discussion which could be allowed. On 
5 July Ede was call, ed to a conference with Butler, who asked whether 
he would agree to the publication of a White Paper now and a delay 
until the Autumn of a debate in Parliament. Ede was reluctant to 
accept this arrangement, arguing that in the interval between 
publication and debate objectors would be vociferous and supporters 
silent. Ministers would have no means of steadying a worsening 
22 
situation. The next day Butler and Ede went to the Lord President's 
Committee. Ede felt that Morrison was trying to delay publication, 
although he divined no reason for this. Bevin seized the opportunity 
to emphasize the importance of raising the leaving age, arguing that 
until the length of school life was settled no steps in post-war 
23 
reconstruction could be undertaken. In spite of these difficulties 
it was agreed to recommend to the War Cabinet that the White Paper be 
published, debated if possible, and legislated upon in the next session, 
24 
On 7 July the White Paper was sent to the Stationery Office for printing 
in paper proof form. 
25 
The next day its main proposals were revealed in most newspapers, 
an event which caused Butler a little embarrassment in the House. 
Lindsay had already given notice of his intention to ask about the date 
of the expected White Paper's appearance; his question was but the 
latest of several on the matter in June and July. Butler had 
stonewalled. Shinwell thenseized the opportunity to ask whether the 
press accounts were accurate. Butler still stonewalled. Another M. P. 
suggested that the leak had been a deliberate public relations exercise. 
21 P. R. O. Edl36/378, Ede to Butler, 28.4.43 
22 B. L. 2, Ede Diary, vol. 795.7-43 
23 Ibid. 16-7.43 24 P. R. O., Edl36/403, Conclusions of a Meeting of the Lord President's 
Committee, 6-7.43 
25 B. L., Ede Diary, volo7t7o7.43 
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Butler ignored the remark and the House passed on to other matters, 
26 
On the same day as the press leak Ede had a talk with Bevin at 
the House. The Minister of Labour urged Ede to go "full steam ahead" 
with the plans, arguing that the fixing of the school age was crucial 
and the decision on which everything else depended. In Bevin's view 
Churchill was the greatest obstacle. "He wants to have nothing done 
on any subject, " Bevin complained, "but we must overcome that. " 
27 
On 13 July Butler went to a meeting of the War Cabinet chaired 
by Churchill and held in the Prime Minister's room at the House of 
Commons. The progress of educational legislation took little of the 
Cabinet's time. 28 According to the minutes Butler presented his 
statement and evoked only three observations. One was Churchill's 
irrelevant enquiry about the use of instructional films in schools 
which has already been noted. Butler passed this over by offering 
to send a note to the Prime Minister on the matter. The only point 
of significance was made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He 
proposed that the phrase which tied the start of reform to "the end 
of the war in Europe" should be shortened to omit "in Europe". Thus, 
when this was agreed, the timetable for the introduction of reforms 
was put back. Ede recorded in his diary that Churchill responded 
to anxieties about religious difficulties by saying that there should 
be a free vote of the Commons on the understanding that, if the scheme 
were defeated, the most generous example of religious toleration in 
the history of the world would be destroyed. 
29 It is not surprising 
that this view, even though it came from the Prime Minister, was not 
recorded in the minutes, for it was not the intention of anybody 
concerned with educational reform to allow anything so unpredictable 
as a free vote of the Commons on this issue. The remark is yet 
another example of Churchill's uninvolvement in educational reform and 
26 H. C. Debates, vol-390, col. 2240,8.7.43 
27 B. L., Ede Diary, vol-7,8.7.43 
28 P. R. O., Cab65/35 Minute 98(43), 13.7.43 
A comment of Ellen Wilkinson's partly explains the scant attention 
given to the matter. "When Mr. Attlee is presiding in the absence of 
the Prime Minister the Cabinet meets on time, works systematically 
through the agenda, makes the necessary decisions and goes home 
after three or four hour's work. When Mr. Churchill presides we 
never reach the agenda and we decide nothing. But we go home to bed 
at midnight conscious of having been present at an historic 
occasion. "Quoted in K. Martin, Harold Laski, London 1953, P. 158 
29 B. L., Ede Diarylvol-7913-7.43 
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incomprehension of the issues. The essential decisions seem to have 
gone through on the nod. It was agreed to publish a White Paper on 
16 July, hold a debate two weeks later, and introduce legislation in 
the next session. 
The announcement of the White Paper's publication on 16 July was 
an anti-climax. Fewer than fifty M. Ps. were in the Commons to hear 
Butler's statement and receive their copies. The diarist in the 
London evening newspaper, the Star, headed his item, "Playing Truarit". 
His explanation was that the Board did not give much notice and that 
it was the first Friday sitting of the House for more than three years. 
Many M. Ps. had left for their constituencies. Nonetheless it was the 
fulfilment of long negotiations and marked a consolidation and 
elaboration of the plans laid in the Green Book two years earlier,, -30 
Both in its statement of aims and in its specific proposals for 
secondary education the White Paper accepted the Hadow scheme with 
its segregated secondary schooling and did little more than follow some 
of that scheme's proposals to their logica 1 conclusions. Its opening 
sentences referred to the need to develop "various talents" in children. 
"The new educational opportunities must not, therefore, be of a single 
pattern, " it announced. "It is just as important to achieve diversity 
as it is to ensure equality of educational opportunity. " It is true 
that the next sentence reassured those who saw the vocational and social 
implications of this approach, for it read, "But such diversity must not 
impair the social unity within the educational system which will open 
the way to a more closely-knit society. " The need for segregated 
education was immediately emphasized, however, thus, "After 11 secondary 
education, of diversified types but of equal standing, will be provided 
for all children. 
Ol Having described the three types of existing 
Post-primary schools it announced, "Such, then, will be the three main 
7n -. 
. 
3v Star 16-7.43, p. 2 
31 Paper, P-3 
167 
types of secondary schools to be known as grammar, modern and 
technical schools. 132 
The reader might have expected a section denouncing the defects 
of selection within the Hadow scheme to presage some radical change 
in those aspects of it. "There is nothing to be said in favour of 
a system which subjects children at the age of 11 to the strain of 
a competitive examination on which, not only their future schooling, 
but their future careers may depend. Apart from the effect on the 
children, there is the effect on the curriculum of the schools 
themselves, " it stated. The irrevocability of decisions taken at 
the age of 11 was criticised thus, "it is obvious that a final 
selection at the age of 11 makes no allowance for the child who 
develops later than the majority of his fellows. ', 
33 The retention 
of fees was roundly condemned thus, "A system under which fees are 
charged in one type of post-primary school and prohibited in the 
other offends against the canon that the nature of a child's education 
should be determined by his capacity and promise and not by the 
financial circumstances of his parent., 134 Yet when the reader came 
to the proposals for removing these defects he saw that the different 
schools were to serve quite different purposes and that local education 
authorities would have to define the nature of the education to be 
given in them. The only hope offered to junior schools was that "other 
arrangements for the classification of the children at 11" would 
enable them to "devote themselves to their proper task. " Announcing 
that competitive tests on children would be abolished, the authors of 
the White Paper had needed considerable drafting skill to produce an 
alternative means for deciding which children should go to which schools, 
and it must have been difficult for readers to imagine what was intended 
by "an assessment of their individual aptitudes largely by such means as 
school records, supplemented, if necessary, by intell igence tests, due 
32 Ibid., p. 10 
33 Ibid. 1p. 
6 
34 Ibid., P. 7 
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regard being had to their parents' wishes and the careers they, have 
in mind. 
05 It was acknowledged that the existing secondary school 
to completely overshadowed all other types of school for children over 1111, 
because of the tradition of English grammar schoolsq their superior 
premises and staffing, and the long school life of their pupils. Whilst 
accepting that "choice" (which seemed to be regarded as different from 
selection and allocation and implied that the choice would be made by 
pupils and parents) required conditions in the different types of school 
to be "broadly equivalent", it did not propose to end any of those 
advantages of the grammar school which it had acknowledged, except to 
offer that the leaving age might be raised to 16 at a later date 
36 
and that conditions in the modern schools would be "assimilated to those 
of the grammar schools" in such matters as standards of accommodation 
and the size of classes. 
37 Thus the crucial differences between 
existing secondary schools and existing senior elementary schools were 
to remain; these were that the secondary schools - the new grammar 
schools - were to have longer courses, different courses leading to 
better careers, better-educated I teachers and the exclusiveness which 
followed from having pupils who were a selected minority. 
The wording of the sections on fees in secondary schools and on 
the direct grant schools needed careful reading. It was argued that 
bringing all post-primary schools into one general system of secondary 
education would remove the "justification for continuing fees in any 
type of maintained secondary school. "38 The important word was 
"maintained"; there was no commitment to abolish fees in voluntary or 
direct grant schools, although the decision had in fact been taken 
that they should be abolished in the former. The direct grant school 
question was to be left on one side until the report of the Fleming 
3-5 Ibid., p. 9 
36 Ibid., P. 7 
37 Ibid. 1p. 11 38 Ibid., p. 11 
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Committee was available, but it was claimed that this was a side 
issue and that postponement of a decision would "in no way prejudice 
09 the general reconstruction of secondary education. 
There was only one concession to specifically Labour demands. 
(The inclusion of all post-primary education under one secondary code 
and the abolition of fees in secondary schools other than direct grant 
schools were universally desired). Having reviewed the three types of 
school, the White Paper stated that, "It would be wrong to suppose that 
they will necessarily remain separate and apart. Different types may 
be combined in one building pr one site as considerations of convenience 
and efficiency may suggest. In any case free interchange of pupils 
from one type of education to another must be facilitated. " This could 
be read as an allusion to multilateral schools but it will be noted that 
convenience and efficiency, not educational principles, were to be the 
criteria for determining whether such developments could take place. 
This was an echo of the Spens Report, which had foreseen the need for 
multilateral schools in areas where the demand for secondary places 
was too low to make possible the creation of separate schools whilst 
rejecting them as part of the normal pattern of secondary education. 
The White Paper was the final confirmation that Ede's success in keeping 
any reference to the three types of school out of the draft Bill was not 
a political coup which would leave a future Labour government with a 
clean slate. The development of secondary schooling on strictly Hadow 
lines was to be continued and the omission of a reference to the types 
of school merely reflected the view that legislation which might last 
for decades should not include specific and restrictive definitions of 
the school types which local authorities would have statutorily to 
provide. 
In a reference to Churchill's wireless speech about a four-year 
39 This matter is discussed more fully, infra pp. 223-232 
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programme of general social advancement, the reorganisation of the 
schools into primary and secondary stages with a break at 11 and 
with a leaving age of 15 and with compulsory part-time education to 
18 were identified as the limit of possible achievements within that 
programme. 
40 
The Board's order of priorities and particularly the 
relegation of raising the leaving age to 16 to a position below that 
of continued part-time education were thus confirmed. In every point 
on secondary education the Wh-ite Paper was identical to the Green Book. 
Only one Green Book proposal was not yet confirmed and that was the 
retention of fee-paying in direct grant schools. 
The most marked feature of the White Paper was the contrast 
between its strong condemnation of the past, in particular the 
consequences of selection and segregation of children at 11, and 
its proposals which by and large continued these practices into the 
future. The two parts were almost contradictory. It was as though 
there was scant connection between the initial critique and the 
subsequent proposals. This may have resulted from the contribution 
of Ede. A few days before the publication of the White Paper Attlee 
had asked that some introductory paragraphs should be added to explain 
the main proposals. This was done at the Board on 6 July, just ten 
days before the White Paper was officially unveiled and only two days 
before it was unofficially reviewed in most of the daily newspapers. 
Ede recorded in his diary that he contributed "several descriptive 
phrases" to these paragraphs. 
41 
It may be that these polemical 
opening sections of the White Paper were mainly a Labour contribution, 
having been requested by Attlee and partly drafted by Ede. The rest 
of the work was firmly rooted in the soil which the Board's officials 
had tilled in the Spring of 
. 
1941 and was clearly their work. That 
would explain why the critique of the past was more radical than the 
40 White Paper, p. 4 
41, B. L. Ede Diary, vol-7,6.7.43 
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proposals for the future. 
The White Paper was very well received by the press which sent 
twenty-five lobby correspondents to Butler's press conference, 
42 
and its nature as a work of concensus was emphasized. The Times 
gave a four-column summary and in a leader it welcomed it as 
representing an agreed solution to Britain's educational problems. 
"The unmistakable trend of the public discussion of educational reform" 
guaranteed little opposition. Butler's "success in these all-important 
preliminaries promises that, in the field of education, the coalition 
will be justified by its fruit. " The. Manchester Guardian, which also 
gave a long summary, commented similarly. "Preparation has been so 
careful and the whole proposals so thoroughly discussed with interested 
parties", wrote its London Correspondent , "that the Government has 
been encouraged to believe that wide acceptance has already been 
gained for the proposals. " In a leader it hailed the White Paper as 
marking "the opening of a new era. " Seeing it as a clarion call, the 
editor said, "The Board, with Butler at its head, has sounded the advance 
all along the line. " To emphasize its uncontroversial nature the 
newspaper added that, of its proposals "few are novel. " The, Times 
Educational Supplement called it "a landmark" and offered Butler 
"unstinted congratulations and thanks". The Schoolmaster, organ of 
the N. U. T., published the White Paper almost verbatim and warned that 
the proposals should not be wrecked by "institutions, forms and interests" 
which aimed "to conserve a hold on the educational system which has 
outlived its day. " 
43 
The Daily Herald's education correspondent, Maurice Webb, had the 
headline, lIZ6?, 000,000 more for education" over one of his two prominent 
articles which appeared the morning after the White Paper's publication. 
42 Ibid., 16.7.43 
43 Times, 17-7.43, P. 5: Manchester Guardian, 17-7.43, p. 6 and p. 8; Times 
Educational Supplement, 24-7.43, P. 355, Schoolmaster, 22-7.43, P. 54 
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He saw that not all shades of opinion would be satisfied and expected 
"some uneasiness and apprehension about certain features of the White 
Paper, notably in its references to the school-leaving age being raised 
to 16-at a later date. It is to be hoped that the coming bill will 
give much more precision to this rather nebulous promise, " but he 
recognised that the training of more teachers and the completion of 
re-organisation must precede this. He had expressed a similar anxiety 
at Butler"s pres -s conference. 
44 
His assessment was that, "there will 
be no virulent controversy about the main features of the plan but it 
will however require some adjustment before it reaches the stage of 
legislation if it is to have completely united backing in the Commons. 
45 
Webb's assessment was shrewd as far as the Labour movement was 
concerned. Four days after the publication of the White Paper, Ede 
went to the Administrative Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
to discuss it. By his own account 
46 
he listed the seventeen points 
which the Labour Party had put in its deputation to Butler in February 
and related each of them to a section of the White Paper, achieving 
general agreement that the government's proposals satisfied Labour's 
requirements. That part of the exercise was rather carelessly carried 
out by members of the committee. The first Labour demand, for a leaving 
age of 15 immediately the war ended and of 16 within three years of that, 
was related to the White Paper's section 22 which offered much less. 
The second demand was for a common secondary code and standards, and 
included the stipulation that the Board should "require" the development 
of multilateral schools as a general policy, whereas the White Paper 
reference to multilateral schools was quite different. By pointing to 
the fact that the White Paper mentioned most of the points in Labour's 
list of demands, Ede seems to have convinced the members of the committee 
that there was some similarity between the two documents, whereas the 
44 B. L.,. tde Diary, vol,?, 16.7.43 
45 Daily Herald, 17.7.43, p. 1 and p-2 
46 B. L.,, Ede Diary, vol-7,20-7.43 
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actual proposals in the White Paper did not match Labour's demands 
on these points or on others such as the mandatory provision of 
nursery education and the abolition of the direct grant system. 
Ede may have been helped at this stage by members' unfamiliarity 
with the text of the White Paper or by their having been impressed 
by the radical sentiments expressed in its opening paragraphs. Ede 
also used the disarming argument that the proposed legislation was to 
be enabling not limiting; this argument required the deferment of 
judgement until a post-war government acted. 
Ede may well have been helped by a disarming interview which 
Butler had given to the Sunday Times the previous Sunday. It was 
not so much an interview as a long statement in question and answer 
form, with Butler framing both parts. On the question of the 
leaving age he stated, "I arp personally in favour of a school leaving 
age of 16... The fact is that the principle of raising the school 
age to 16 is accepted by the government. " Until re-organisation was 
completed, however, the reform would be a sham. The variety of 
schools was portrayed as a feature not of selection but of parental 
choice. "Will it, for example, still be possible for parents to 
send their children to schools of their own choice? " he asked himself. 
"Yes, " he replied, ".... One of the main features of the plan is that 
diversity of choice is reserved for parents - hence the retention of 
various kinds of school. " 
47 
By his own account Ede seems to have been discomforted only by 
one question at the party meeting. Shinwell asked him what would 
happen if too many children wanted to go to the grammar schools. 
That went to the heart of the matter and Ede's limp reply was that it 
was a matter for local administration and that the local authority 
would have to adjudicate. Whether the significance of that response 
47 Sunday Times, 18.7.43, p. 4 
194 
was evident to the members of the committee, we do not know, but it 
was clear from Ede's reply that the availability of places and the 
decision of the local authority were to be the decisive factors in a 
child's allocation to one of the three types of school and not his 
parents' wishes or educational factors. The fact that the system 
would perforce be competitive rather than related to the individual 
needs of children was starkly revealed by Shinwell's shrewd question. 
That apart, Ede seems to have been very successful in presenting the 
White Paper as the fulfilment of Labour's wishes for, although the 
committee was not prepared at this stage to endorse the religious 
settlement, it did endorse the secular proposals of the White Paper. 
The same day Ede began to collect the opinions of Labour M. Ps. 
He lunched with George Strauss who warned him that Tribune, which 
Strauss owned, was going to be critical. George Ridley, the new 
chairman of the National Executive Committee, thought that the 
proposals were good, but he relayed the opinion of Harold Laski that 
they were too vague especially in the matter of dates. Ede's response 
to this was that dates were not appropriate to a White Paper, although 
he knew of course that it was not the intention at the Board to include 
dates in any case. The claim by Aneurin Bevan that the White Paper's 
reference to Churchill's four year plan was unconstitutional 
(presumably on the ground that it assumed Churchill would be Prime 
Minister then) was telephoned by Ede to Butler. Ede claimed the 
support of Shinwell in rejecting this view. 
The next day Ede attended the Parliamentary Labour Party meeting, 
where Greenwood read out the innocuous motion to be laid before the 
Commons welcoming the government's plans. Cove intervened to say that 
some of his friends and he did not wish to be bound by the motion, and 
he disparaged the White Paper. Ede defended it as the "greatest state 
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document ever issued on education" and received Morrison's 
congratulations. When urging his party to press for an early 
raising of the leaving age to 16, however, he was asking them to 
do what he had himself singularly failed to do within the sanctum 
itself. 
48 
Two days later a specially-summoned meeting of the Labour 
Party's Reconstruction Education Sqb-Committee was held to discuss 
49 
the White Paper. Those who had taken leading parts in the 
earlier discussions to formulate party policy - Clay, Bacon, 'Cove, 
Franklin, Shearman, Drake - were all present. Their reaction to 
the White Paper took the form of a resolution which welcomed its 
exposure of the defects in the present system and its intention to 
carry through reforms, but expressed anxiety about "uncertainty" 
over raising the leaving age to 16 which was "of crucial importance 
for the realisation of equality of educational opportunity at the 
secondary stage. " It was also anxious about the relation of 
progress in implementing the plan to prevailing financial conditions. 
This might cause the whole plan to "fade away under pressure from 
reactionary interests. " It sought "definite and specific pledges" 
that social equality in secondary education would be achieved. 
Having stated its view, it did not meet again until January 1944, 
when the Bill had been published, presumably considering that others, 
M. Ps. for example, now had the responsibility to win the pledges 
which it had demanded. 
Clay put his views to a wider audience the following day in a 
Daily Herald interview with Maurice Webb. 
50 He' was introduced as 
chairman of Labour's Education Committee and "a man who has been 
prominent in the long private discussions which took place before 
Mr. Butler issued his White Paper. " The government's plans were 
"a very considerable advance" in his view, and "the general conception 
48 B. L., Ede Diary, vol-7921.5.43 
49 T. H., Labour Party Records, Reconstruction Education Sub-Committee, 
Minute 18,23-7.43 
50 Daily Herald, 24-7.43, p. 2 
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is... one which we should approve. " His fears were about timing and 
priorities. "Mr. Butler will have to give us more... specific 
assurances on these thinGs than he has yet supplied, " he said, conveying 
the demand of his committee made the previous day. He considered that 
the statement on raising the leaving age to 16 was "too vague and non- 
committal. " He wanted the government to appraise realistically the 
situation and include an appointed day for the reform which it could 
reasonably expect to honour. Local authorities needed a target. On 
the pattern of secondary education he considered that the White Paper 
proposals were an advance. "In many ways the proposal to have diversity 
of types of secondary education available to all children is sound and a 
big step forward, " he commented. "It is at least something to get the 
word 'elementary' and all it connotes removed from the educational 
system. " His own preference was for multilateral schools which he 
defined as "one comprehensive secondary school which would provide the 
three types of education under one roof, " but, "if we can't yet have 
that, we must acce pt the White Paper plan as an undoubted improvement 
on the present position. " His third reservation was about the vagueness 
on the question of fees. For him "it would be intolerable if we allowed 
any monetary or social distinctions to remain in any school receiving 
money from public funds. " Thus he had three major reservations which 
all related to Labour's hopes for secondary education which was equally 
available to all without social or financial distinction. But his final 
verdict was that "in general... Labour should give its backing to the 
ideas embodied in the new conception of education". 
The National Association of Labour Teachers was more forthright in 
its condemnation of the White Paper's failure to meet Labour's demands. 
Its chairman, Cove , in the Tribune article which 
Strauss had forecast, 




Cove's article reminded readers that Butler had been noted for his 
role at the Foreign Office during the Spanish Civil War when he had 
stolidly defended a policy of non-intervention, thus helping to give 
fascism its first great military victory. Cove took up this theme 
and related post-war social policy to the sacrifices being made by 
working men in their defence of freedom against fascism now. 
"Measured by these standards, " he commented, "it is a White Paper of 
mocking cynical impudence. " He noted that the crucial proposals were 
vague and wondered whether some of them would ever come to fruition. 
"These appointed days may never come, " he warned. His headline was, 
"Stonewall Butler". A few days later a message to M. Ps. from 
N. A. L. T. 's Executive received good coverage in the press. 
52 It too 
was very critical of the White Paper. The headlines it spawned tell 
their own story. "Teachers see false hopes in school plans, " 
announced the Daily Mirror. The Northern Echo took N. A. L. T. 's message 
to be, "Privileges more fortified. " "Labour teachers severely criticise 
new education scheme, "-was the Morning Advertiser's verdict. -Maurice 
Webb in the Daily Herald proclaimed, "Labour teachers'say education 
scheme does little very slowly. They demand better school plan. " 
The Times Educational Supplement quoted N. A. L. T. 's view that the Board 
was "doing as little as possible as slowly as possible. "53 Ede 
commented bitterly in his diary that it was "clearly Cove's handiwork. . 
54 
All of these reactions occurred in the fortnight between the 
publication of the White Paper and the two-day Commons debate on 
29-_30 July. Butler's presentation of the White Paper began with a 
reference to the 1902 religious controversies, and he claimed that 
"personal, sectarian and political feelings" had in 1943 been 
"subordinated to the interests of the children. " This was the apogee 
of the consensus argument. The subduing of political as well as 
sectarian objectives was now explicit. He went on to acknowledge that 
52 G. L. C., A/NLT/I/2. Minute of meeting ? 7.43, states that, after 
discussion Spikes was to draw up a statement which was to be 
approved by Cove and published. The statement was in the form of 
a two-page duplicated papersigned by Denington. The Minute of 
-hat it was sent only to Labour M. Ps. 11.9.43 indicates 11 
53 D ily Mirror, p. 2; Northern Echo p. 2; Morning Advertiser, p.. 5; 
Daily Herald 
)P*3; all 
27-7.43. Times Educational Supplement, 31-7.43, 
P-363 
54 B. L., Ede Diary, vol-7,21-7.43 
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"we may all desire to put our own points, " but the clear implication 
was that nobody should in fact do so. The strategy of Butler and Ede 
was to stand by every important decision which had already been taken, 
for to allow doubts to arise about their resolve on any one point would 
invite further discussion of them all. The continuing anxiety that 
the church school controversy might yet become a major obstacle is 
evidenced by Butler's devoting more of his speech to it than he did 
to the whole of secondary education. Since trouble was now likely to 
come mainly from the Roman Catholic corner, the Labour Party was 
reminded by the intervention of two R. C. Labour M. Ps. during Butler's 
speech of the special difficulties which it might encounter. 
55 
Butler's speech-56 showed that the White Paper's vagueness about 
how pupils should be allocated to the three types of secondary school 
was not just a failure of drafting, although he now seemed to acknowledge 
the inherent incompatability of selection and parental choice. 
Welcoming the end of the special place examination which was "hanging 
over the whole of the junior world", he looked forward to the future 
when "a child may be selected according to its talents for the various 
different types of secondary education. " Thus selection was to remain 
and only the method of doing it was to be altered. The role of parents 
was somewhat ill-defined, for he said only that the government would try 
to bring them in "to making the choice for the secondary opportunities 
which we propose to give to the children after the opinion of the teacher 
has. been given. " Such phrases avoided an explanation of where final 
authority would lie, such as Ede had offered to Shinwell a few days 
earlier. In a frank passage during which he admitted his initial doubts 
about tri-partism but also implicitly rejected multilateral ism, he 
confessed that he had wondered whether the three choices in fact existed. 
But he explained that, as a result of his visits to schools around the 
country he had concluded that "we can offer in this country secondary 
55 H. C. Debatesvol-391, col. 1836,29-7.43; the M. Ps. were Logan and Stokes 
56 Ibid., cols. 1825-1845,29. ý. 43 
199 
choices so adequate and varied that in our own way and according to 
our own tradition, we shall be building a system of secondary 
education for all which will serve our purposes as a compact nation 
just as well as the high school system serves the purposes of the 
great American democracy. " When he turned to the first of the three 
types of school - the senior elementary now to be named modern school - 0 
he referred 
- 
to "those idealists" who wanted multilateral schools,, and 
hoped that "more than one type of secondary education may from time to 
time be amalgamated under one roof and that we may judge from 
experiments what is the best-arrangement. " It is interesting to 
note that he left Ede to deal with the technical school when winding 
up the debate the following day - perhaps an indication týat the 
technical school was already a misfit and a poor relation. Ten years 
later it was to be observed of the tripartite system that, "one of the 
thing's three legs is frequently underdeveloped or atrophied and that 
it is only in men's imaginations that the true triplex formation, with 
a real place for organic development on the technical side, is to be 
found. "57 From the decisions already taken by July 1943 it could 
hardly have been otherwise. It is interesting to see that doubts 
about the success of tripartism, which had in the past been expressed 
strongly by Cleary and had been a major plank in the arguments of one 
side in the Board's internal debate over the respective merits of 
common and differentiated schooling for the 11 to 13 year olds, now 
made a brief appearance in the first major speech in the Commons by 
the ministerial architect of the educational reforms. 
Butler evaded the issue of the direct grant schools. He referred 
to the decision to make secondary education free and concluded that, 
"thus, all three types ... will be equally accessible, 
" but he left the 
future of the direct grant schools on one side until Fleming had 
reported. His position, as we have seen, was uncertain on this topic. 
57 A. V. Judges, 'Tradition and the Comprehensive School', British Journal 
of Educational Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, November 1953, p. 5 
200 
He had, of course, already received the interim report from Lord 
Fleming. -58 
In his comments on the raising of the leaving age Butler was more 
confident of his position and consequently more open. As ever, there 
was no discussion of the merits of a leaving age of 16; these were 
tacitly accepted. The matter was discussed as always in the context 
of timing; and the suspected reluctance of working class parents to 
see their children's schooling extended if it meant yet another year 
in an all-age school following an elementary curriculum was exploited. 
Butler shrewdly observed that he could not compel parents to send their 
15-year old children to an all-age school with perhaps only two or 
three teachers. He was not able to be definite about how soon the 
leaving age could be raised to 16, for that would depend upon the 
supply of building materials and teachers, but he did say that it 
"must depend upon the virtual completion of re-organisation. 11 Holmes' 
formula for satisfying the demand that the leaving age should be 16, 
without committing the Board to any action whatsoever, which he had 
first advanced in September 1941, -59 found its way into Butler's White 
Paper speech when he announced that legislation would give the 
government the power to do it by order-in-council. The leaving age 
would be raised to 15 without exemption as soon as possible after the 
end of the war. 
Just as the opening of Butler's speech was the high point of the 
consensus argument, so Ede's speech 
60 
made plain the limitations 
imposed by his role as a Labour 
speech was as a government, not 
it ýLs that. Ede's role during 
own party's spokesman and illus 
knowledge to discomfort his own 
pressed. Already at the party 
man in a National government. His 
a Labour spokesman, and we must read 
the debate was rather unkind to his 
trated well his use of his-superior 
side when party policies were being 
meeting when had defended the White 
58 SVpra p. 169 
59 Supra P . 139 60 H. C. Debates, vol . 391, cols. 2033-2047,30-7.43 
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Paper he had turned aside a question from Creech-Jones and gained 
a laugh at his expense. Creech-Jones had asked him whether he 
had made an analysis of the T. U. C. Memorandum. Ede had responded 
that he owed no allegiance to the big bosses of the trade union 
world, a reference to the fact that Creech-Jones was Bevin's 
Parliamentary Private Secretary. 
61 
Now Creech-Jones was Labour's 
opening speaker and, when probing the vagueness of the White Paper 
on the question of the direct grant schools, he made the mistake of 
referring to them as grant-aided schools, a label which included 
secondary schools other than those receiving their grants direct 
from the Board. It was obvious which schools were the object of 
his doubts and he might have been forgiven the error, which arose 
because of the White Paper's pledge to abolish fees only in maintained 
schools whereas the government had intended to give a pledge to 
abolish all fees except those in direct grant schools, on which a 
decision had ye't to be taken. Ede was not content to let the error 
pass, I or to correct it briefly, but intervened three times. 
62 
There was dissatisfaction from his own party about the purpose of 
Ede's speech as soon as Butler indicated in his own speech that he 
was going to leave some points to be covered by his Parliamentary 
Secretary at the end of the debate. Cove interrupted Butler to ask 
whether it was intended that Ede would be dealing with new matters 
when according to normal practice he should be replying to the debate, 
and Creech-Jones also pressed this point. 
63 
That was indeed the 
intention and Ede's speech was not successful either in dealing with 
topics left over by Butler or in replying to the criticisms of M-Ps. 
It was Ede's lot to speak about technical schools, for example, 
but he did not even mention them by name and he did little to 
enlighten his listeners on how these would fit into the general scheme 
61 B. L., Ede Diary, vol-7,20.7.43 
62 H. C. Debates, vol-391, col. 1852,29-7.43 
63 Ibid., cols. 1838-1839,29-7.43 
202 
of secondary education -a problem which had exercised the minds 
of the Board's officials for many months, limiting himself to the 
generalisations that they wanted to acknowledge the nobility of 
skilled craftsmanship and to "give greater attention than we have 
given hitherto to the individual aptitides and wishes of the pupils 
committed to our care. " His comments indicated plainly his 
acceptance of the segregationist argument and confirmed that his 
objection to the tripartism iniended for the text of the Bill was 
related to the rigidity of the scheme and the difficulty of giving 
it legislative embodiment rather than to segregated secondary schooling 
itself. His hope was that "the craftsman who, because nature meant 
him for a craftsman, gives of his best in his craft is regarded as an 
equal citizen, no more and no less, with the lad whose gifts are in 
literature and mathematics. " Cove's incredulous interjection, "You 
give that dignity in this White Paper? " was brushed aside. 
64 
He did, 
howeve, r, emphasize his point and argued that schools should be geared 
to vocational objectives, saying that, "What our educational system 
ought to do more than it does is to see that the right person is doing 
the right job. " 
As a reply to the two-day debate Ede's speech was disappointing. 
He did not refer to problems of selection for secondary schools, and 
the raising of the leaving age was not mentioned at all. The latter 
point was clearly in his mind when he talked about the timetable of 
reform, but his Labour listeners cannot have been re-assured by his 
perspective. He recalled listening to the debate in Parliament on 
the 1902 Education Bill and had vivid memories of Haldane's speech, 
which he said had been drafted by Sidney Webb and which he considered 
the best ever delivered on education in the Commons. Every point 
raised in the two-day debate which he was concluding had, he claimed, 
been covered by Haldane more than forty years earlier. "I am not so 
64 Ibid., co-l-. 2-039930.. 7.43 
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much impressed by the inevitability of gradualness, " he commented, 
"as by the gradualness of inevitability., ' He could hardly have been 
more dispiriting to his own party. His aphorism may have aptly 
described the slow evolution of secondary education for all in schools 
with separate objectives and standards and with pre-selection of pupils 
at the age of 11. But his perspective had to serve not only as a 
general answer to the detailed criticisms which had been made during 
the debate, but also as the response to those Labour M. Ps. who wanted 
to welcome the White Paper whole-heartedly but who saw that without a 
commitment to a timetable it might all be a delusion. As he sat down, 
Butler said to him that his speech was "great, just the thing. " 
65 
The reaction of Labour M. Ps. to the White Paper combined 
congratulations, which reflected an appreciation of the gains promised, 
the hurdles still to be crossed and the dangers of rocking the boat, 
with reservations and anxieties lest those reforms most keenly desired 
by Labour might be the very ones which would not be achieved. Webb's 
report on the N. A. L. T. paper had finished with his observation that 
in the coming Commons debate Labour leaders "will have many criticisms 
of detail to offer ... But on the whole it may be expected that they will 
take the view that the White Paper offers an advance which Labour should 
1166 approve . This reflected the Labour dilemma. 
Creech-Jones, in opening Labour's contribution to the debate, was 
pleased that a complete plan and not piecemeal changes had been presented. 
But he had "many misgivings ... as to whether the citadel of privilege has 
yet been finally taken, as to whether concessions of too important a 
character have been made to certain interests, and as to whether the 
vigorous spirit required for educational reform is sufficiently evident 
in the White Paper. " The rest of his speech 
67 
listed profound anxieties. 
There were parts of the plan which were not yet ready, notably the role 
proposed for the public schools and the future of direct grant schools, 
65 B. L. jEde Diary, vol-7,30-7.43 66 Daily Herald927-7.43, P-17 
67 'ý-C-Debates, vol-391, cols. 184-5-1856,29-7.43 
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both of which issues were "highly controversial. " He contrasted 
the White Paper's expresse'd desire for "social unity" and the need 
not to have fees in one type of school whilst they remained in others 
with the continuing doubts about the future of the direct grant schools. 
lie did not officially know, of course, that the majority interim report 
of Lord Fleming's committee had already recommended the abolition of 
fees in local non-boarding direct grant schools. As long as there 
were doubts'about this I'some schools will enjoy, as in the past, a 
special status" and "some ves , ted interests in education will be 
preserved". The plans for the dual system were a "compromise rather 
than a solution" and there was concern about "the price the President 
is prepared to pay for a settlement. " Referring to the new categories 
of secondary schools Creech-Jones made the point, remarkable for its 
neglect by other commentators and politicians, that the extension of 
the dual system in the secondary stage of education was made much more 
complicated by the requirement that there should be three types of 
school. Clearly, if the churches were to mirror'the types of the 
state system in their own secondary schools, a major extension of 
church-run schools would be required. As Creech-Jones obseryed, 
"important bodies ... would have wished to end the dual system altogether. " 
It is significant that he did not identify his own party as one of them. 
A "profoundly; disturbing" aspect of the White Paper was its reference to 
timing. Labour wanted "priority" for education and "an eager urge 
forward. " Particularly to be regretted was the lack of "a target 
date for raising the age to 16. " There were even caveats, he noted, 
about raising the leaving age to 15, and he was concerned to read the 
White Paper comment that "the needs of industry will have to be 
considered. " Noting that the financial appendix to the White Paper 
did not envisage raising the leaving age to 16 for at least eight years, 
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he commented, "I cannot see how it is to be possible to work the 
secondary arrangements if certain types of education are to have 
a four-year period and a grammar school type of education is to 
have a five-year period. .. instead of achieving a common status in 
the various types of secondary school, we are again perpetuating 
the rather superior status of the grammar school whose normal leaving 
age is 16. " The effect of the rec en tly- published Norwood Report was 
evident in his comments on tripartism. Referring to the report's 
advocacy of three types of school he acknowledged that, "There is a 
difference of view as to whether it is a desirable type of change 
to bring all types of secondary education under one roof, " but he 
"hoped that there will be established a number of multilateral 
schools" and the rest of his observations argued for such schools. 
"If there is to be a common code and a common status, and if we are 
to attach in education just as much importance to technical as to 
narrow academic or grammar subjects, " he argued, "it is obvious that 
the more you bring together the children under the same roof who are 
pursuing different paths the more likely are you to get a common 
standard and a common code operating between one kind of education 
and another. " 
On the second day of the debate Arthur Greenwood opened for 
Labour and he questioned both the segregation of children at 11 and 
the weakness of the commitment to raise the leaving age. 
68 
Ile 
regretted that they were going to bring about "this parting of the 
ways at the age of 11 plus. " Teachers could not foresee how a child 
would develop and any "hiving off in a particular direction ... would... 
be a profound mistake. " For that reason "there is something to be 
said for easiness of transfer, for what are called the multilateral 
schools. 11 Short of that he wanted "a constant review" of children's 
progress to ensure transfers. The raising of the leaving age he 
68 Ibid. cols. 1937-194-5, -30.7.43 
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considered to be "long overdue". He thought that the government 
should be courageous and fix dates in the Bill which were "not too 
far ahead". If they were not in the event able to implement the 
reforms by those dates, having done all that was possible, they should 
then come to Parliament for pardon. Thus he wanted to put a 
legislative obligation on the government which it would need 
Parliament's permission not to honour. This was in line with his 
desire to jerk the Board out of its "unduly pessimistic" attitude and 
to see the President as "the chief crusader for education. " 
Cove joined in the general praise for Butler, but his praise 
was heavily qualified and his contribution to the debate more 
politically aware than other Labour spokesmen's. 
69 
He observed that 
Butler had gone only as far as the political interests which he 
represented would permit. The result was a White Paper which was 
too cautious and which was produced "under somewhat difficult political 
circumstances. " He regretted that they were debating an evolutionary 
White Paper wherea's the post-war situation would demand a revolutionary 
one. Addressing his own party he said that they had played a part in 
ensuring that Hitler should be fought. That was a political decision 
and his party had a responsibility to ensure that in the educational 
sphere as in others there should be a new world after the war. This 
part of his speech echoed his Tribune article and also an article in 
the N. A. L. T. Bulletin of February 1943 entitled "Must we lose the 
peace? " in which the need to transform post-war Britain was seen as an 
obligation, particularly on the Labour Party, which arose from the 
decision to make war on fascism-70 He was made despondent by the 
Sunday Times interview in which Butler had warned that the reforms 
involved a steady increase in expenditure and that they would be 
brought in when equipment and money allowed. "That had the effect 
of at orpedo, " he commented. His anxieties were the same as Creech- 
69 Ibid. cols. 1958--1962, -30.7.43 70 G. L. C. A/NLT/lV/15/10, Bulletin, February 1943 
207 
Jones' and Greenwood's. He expected the appointed days to be the 
same as in the Fisher Act, i. e. "the appointed day that never arrived. " 
He was doubtful whether secondary education for all even now was to 
become a reality. Observing that the special place examination was 
"not an examination to select but an examination to exclude", he 
commented that nothing was gained by changing the method of exclusion. 
The only answer was to have genuine secondary education for all which 
would not be achieved by bringing all post-primary schools within the 
same code. Raising the leaving age to 16 was essential, and he 
regretted the absence of any financial provision to bring it about. 
The abolition of all fees was essential, yet the retention of fees in 
direct grant schools was still a possibility. 
T. M. Sexton, who sat for Barnard Castle in Durham, feared that the 
recommendations might be postponed "for another generation". Speaking 
as a teacher7l he explained how hard it was for a working class child 
to rise up the educational ladder, and he 
cautious about the separation of children 
"Perhaps it would be wiser to have multil, 
"This would prevent the evil of competing 
labels - 'gram. ', Itec. 1 and 'mod. ' being 
alternative position on this question was 
advised that they should be 
into three different schools. 
ateral schools, " he said. 
grades and the abbreviated 
applied to them. " The 
taken by Denman, the member 
for Leeds, Central. He applauded Butler's use of the word 'diversity' 
and urged'members to "beware of the pursuit of equality". For him 
equality of opportunity was a chimera which could lead only to uniformity. 
Bluntly he stated, "I welcome what the President said about grammar 
schools. '172 Kenneth Lindsay, the National Labour M. P. d. for Kilmarnock 
Burghs and Ede's predecessor as Parliamentary Secretary at the Board, 
countered Denman's argument with the claim that, "You can have equality 
of access to an agreed standard of physical provisionot, 
73 
71 H. C. Debatesvol-391, cols. 1862-1866,29-7.43; he was an elementary 
schoolmaster and headmaster of Stanhope County School for 26 years 
72 Ibid., cols. 1882-1883,29.7.43 
73 Ibid., col. 1946,30-7.43 
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The M. P. for Dartfordl Mrs. J. L. Adamson, who had won the seat for 
Labour from the Conservatives in a 1938 by-election by increasing 
her party's vote by more than ten thousand and who was Labour Party 
Chairman, contributed Bevin's oft-repeated argument that, "Until the 
age is raised to 16, secondary education... cannot be provided for the 
mass of the people of this country, whatever name we give to the 
new secondary school. " She was sceptical about the arrangements 
for selection at 11 and transfer for misfits, at 13- "1 believe 
it is impossible to determine at the age of 11 a child's bent, " she 
argued, "No test has yet been devised to do that .,, 
74 Even more 
sceptical was C. W. Key who had succeeded George Lansbury as Labour 
member for Poplar (Bow and Bromley) in 1940. As an elementary 
schoolmaster he had "doubts and misgivings" about the White Paper's 
"lack of determination to see that the things talked of are translated 
into fact. " The timetable which required four years to raise the 
leaving age to 15 was "a deadening doctrine. " Like Cove he alluded 
to the patriotic effort to defeat fascism, in which the national 
interest had predominated over financial interests. It was the 
failure by Butler to insist upon the same attitude towards post-war 
educational reform which disappointed him. He attacked the failure 
to deal with the direct grant school question and "this supine crawl 
which the financial table in the Appendix reveals as the pace at which 
the Board of Education anticipates educational advance will take 
place. 1175 
A contribution of special interest was that of A. G. Walkdenj the 
member for Bristol South who had been a railway clerk in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, general-secretary of the Railway 
Clerks' Association for thirty years and Chairman of the T. U. C. General 
Council. When Ede had learned from Strauss of Cove's imminent 
74 Ibid., col. 2015,30-7.43 
75 Ibid., cols. 2019-2020,30-7.43 
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Tribune article, he had telephoned Walkden and asked him to speak 
in the ý-V'hite Paper debate. Walkden had agreed, saying that he 
would gain much pleasure in counteracting Cove's pessimism. 
76 
His contribution did not quite lite up to this undertaking. it 
was true that his speech was littered with rather sycophantic 
plaudits for Butler who was thanked for his "hard work", his 
"delightful speech" and fo, r havi-ng "worked terribly hard", but 
like other speakers for the Labour side he ývanted more precise 
dates and a shorter time-scale. In particular he wanted the 
abolition of fees, saying that they "should wipe away this class 
distinction.,, 77 He did not refer to Cove and, although his tone 
was milder, his general themes were similar to those of other 
Labour members. He did not prove especially valuable as Ede's 
place-man. 
The Labour Party was reminded by the contributions of some 
of its Roman Catholic members to the debate that, as a body pressing 
for educational reform, it had an Achilles' heel. It 
* was a 
Conservative, Sir Harold Webbe M. P. for Westminster, who observed 
that "there are indications, not only in all our postbags but in 
this House today, that the storm may break. " Although Henry Brooke, 
M. P. for Lewisham, spoke briefly in the Anglican interest, those 
indications in the Commons to which Webbe referred were mainly from 
the Labour side. A Conservative, Sir John Shute who represented 
Liverpool Exchange, denigrated the T. U. C. decision to recommend the 
end of the dual system. His concern was mitigated by his certainty 
that this view was not shared by a majority of Labour M-Ps. He 
was also able to draw comfort from the comment of "an important 
Labour leader" from the Liverpool area that it would help the 
Conservative Party. The consensus argument was again to the fore; 
76 B. L., Ede Diary, vol-7,20-7.43 
77 H. C. Debates. vol-391, cols. 2002-2004,30-7.43 
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he believed that the existence of a coalition government would 
help to solve this problem. When his fellow Liverpool M. P., 
D. G. Logan, who held the Scotland division in the Labour interest, 
advocated the Roman Catholic caseq Alexander Walkden made it clear 
to the House that such sectarianism was rejected by Labour and that 
Logan was speaking for his church and not for his party. 
78 
Whilst the Roman Catholic agitation was inhibiting to Labour 
and whilst the tenor of the Parliamentary Labour Party's response 
to the White Paper was to welcome it and praise its authors, there 
was sufficient anxiety for most Labour speakers to express scepticism 
about the government's true intentions on those aspects which were of 
especial importance to Labour - the impossibility of forecasting at 
the age of 11 children's abilities, the need for multilateral schools, 
the imperative requirement that plans should be made at once to raise 
the leaving age to 16. There was muchdisquiet in Labour's parliamentary 
ranks. 
Labour M. Ps. were not alone in their anxieties. ' By far the most 
radical and trenchant criticisms, amounting to a despairing denunciation 
of the White Paper, came from Sir Richard Acland, the maverick 
Independent M. P. Acland had been elected as a Liberal to represent 
Barnstaple, but he had quarrelled with his party and, as leader of 
the Common Wealth Party, had already indicated his intention to look 
for another seat at the next election. His critique was like that 
which an uninhibited Labour spokesman might have made . 
79 Willing to 
divide the House if anybody would support him, he attacked the White 
Paper for its subordination of worthy aims to financial criteria. 
Looking at the proposals with an historical perspective, he regarded 
the aapirations of the last twenty years as "not altogether a bad 
target, " but one approached "at a gentlemanly crawl. " The new target 
was good. "But let us face the fact, " he admonished the House, "that 
78 Ibid., cols. 1858,1911,1893,2003,29-30-7.43 
79 Ibid., cols. 1966-1969,30-7.43 
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we have done nothing whatever about the pace at which we approach 
it. " He did not admire the U. S. S. R. 's use of education, but he 
did admire its ability to build the schools which it needed once 
it had abandoned the Tsarist taxation system and capitalist industry 
and "put all their resources on one balance sheet. " This argument 
was similar to Cove's in the Tribune. There was a splendid scheme 
which would not be realised because the priorities of a capitalist 
industrial system would not be challenged. The will of the Commons 
was less important than "the rigid financial conditions imposed on 
this House and the country by the economic system we maintain. " 
The postponement of decisions about the public schools particularly 
attracted his scorn. "How clever, " he scoffed. His, however, was 
a lone voice. 
Multilateral schooling and the principles on which it was founded 
were favoured by a Conservative, albeit one of independent outlook, 
11rs. Cazalet Keir who represented Islington East. She must have been 
in some distress,. for her brother and fellow M. P., Colonel Victor 
Cazalet, who had been liaison officer with Polish forces since 1940, 
had been on board General Sikorskils 'plane when it had left Gibraltar 
on the 4 July for England and he had suffered the same fate as the 
Polish Prime Minister. She expressed doubts about the proposed tri- 
partite division of secondary education. Acknowledging that both 
Spens and Norwood had recommended this arrangement, she preferred all 
secondary schools to be similar, but to have biases. For her, 
education from 11 to 15 or 16 should be general with vocational 
training taking second place. "I am very glad to hear that the 
children will be freely interchanged between the schools, " she 
declared. 
80 
That was . an optimistic view of what might happen, but 
she was merely accepting at its face value the answer given by 
advocates of segregated education to those critics who worried about 
8o Ibid., col. 1922,29-7.43 
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misplacements. Henry Brooke (Lewisham West), who was to act 
mainly as an Anglican spokesman and defender of direct grant schools 
in the Commons debates, was perhaps a more typical Conservative. 
He hoped that "the three kinds of schools will be kept close together... 
and that the practical means of moving children from one type of school 
to another ... will be made as easy as possible. It will be easiest 
when all three types of school are on the same site or in close 81 
proximity. " Misgivings about tri-partism and sympathy for 
multilateralism were not confined to Labour's ranks. 
Some of the manipulation of committees and the use of apparently 
independent bodies, which would advise the Board to do what in any case 
it intended to do, became manifest at this time. The publication of 
the Norwood Report, between the publication of the White Paper and the 
Commons debate on it, ensured that Norwood's views on tripartism could 
be called in support of the Board's plans. Certainly the press saw 
the Norwood Report as complementary to the White Paper and the timing 
of its publication ensured that this was so. The Manchester Guardian 
carried a two-column summary of the report and commented that it "fills 
out the programme. " Noting that the government was already committed 
to secondary education in three types of schools, the newspaper 
commented that Norwood gave "a conspectus of the 'secondary education 
for all' to which the government is now committed. " 
82 
The Times' 
comment also connected the two publications. The Norwood Report gave 
"body and substance" to the White Paper proposals. It considered 
that "perhaps its most significant feature" was that it had "a defined 
philosophy of education", viz. to retain unaltered the existing 
"traditional grammar school curriculum", and to place it in a school 
structure divided between primary education which was concerned with 
basic skills and secondary education which had to cater for special 
81 Ibid., col. 1911,29-7.43 82 Manchester Guardian, 26-7.43, P-3 and p. 4 
f 
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interests and aptitudes. The Times did regret that the committee 
was, limited to a consideration of grammar schools, but nonetheless 
thought that its "proposals will carry a preponderance of informed 
opinion with them-" 
83 
The Daily_Mirror noted that Norwood followed 
"the government's declared policy that secondary education will be 
provided for all in three types.,, 
84 
The Times Educational 
_Supplem_ent 
also noted Norwood's confirmation of the three types of school, but 
also thought that he had left the door "fairly wide open for 
experiments in multilateral ism. " 
85 
The timing of the report's publication was hardly fortuitous. 
Firstly the White Paper was published and then a few days later the 
Norwood Repo appeared, as "a valuable contribution from an 
independent source-" As we have seen 
86 
Norwood discovered and 
described three types of mentality which conveniently fitted the 
three types of secondary school which already existed and which were 
to continue on even more rigidly differentiated lines. It seems 
that the desire to publish at this time led to the constitutional 
indiscretion of not referring the report first to the Secondary Schools 
Examination Council. It will be recalled that Norwood's committee had 
been set up on the initiative of the S. S. E. C., of which he was chairman, 
and the members of the council had quite properly expected the committee 
to report to them and not directly-to the Board. If that procedure had 
been followed the publication of the report would have been delayed, 
especially since some of its recommendations on examinations might have 
been (and in the event proved to be) controversial with many examining 
boards represented*on the S. S. E*Co 
87 
There were other criticisms of 
it which would have caused delay at the S. S. E. C. The committee had 
wandered far beyond the topic which the Council had in mind when 
resolving to set it up. The report was also critised because it listed 
those bodies which had submitted evidence and gave the impression that 
83 Times,, 26-7.43, P-5 
84 Daily Mirror, 26-7.43, p. 4-5 
85 Times Educational Supplement,, 31-7.43, P. 367 
86 Supra, p. 124 
87 P. H. J. H. Gosden, Education in the Second World War, London 1976, 
pp. 382-383 
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they had been consulted on all mattersq whereas in practice the 
committee had adopted the unusual procedure of restricting 
respondents to making comments on only certain aspects of its 
studies. Some organisations realised, when they saw the report, 
that, besides those aspects on which they had been invited to 
submit their views, there were others on which they had not been 
invited to submit their views even though they were keenly interested 
in them. The committee was thus suspecteý of manipulating evidence, 
and some examining boards did not take kindly to being so treated. 
J. A. Petch, who as secretary of a large examining board was privy 
to these events, later commented, "The circumstances in which the 
Norwood Report was published could serve as a perfect example of 
that departmental procedure which to the uninitiated seems like 
official chicanery. " He described how the Secondary Schools 
Examination Council was treated. Members were summoned to a two- 
day meeting in November 1943 with the Norwood Report as the only 
substantial item on the agenda. "On assembly the members were 
bluntly informed that their part was to receive and not to question; 
when it began to appear that considerably comment was likely, the 
chairman unceremoniously dismissed them after only two hours. " 
They did I not meet again until after the war. 
88 
But reactions such 
as Petch's were largely private at the time, so that publicly the 
report helped the Board in its plans. At last there seemed to be 
some philosophical even psychological support for a tripartite 
organisation of secondary education. Not only that, but it came 
from an apparently independent group of educationists. Norwood 
had served the Board well. 
Members of Parliament were not entirely gullible and Spens, 
whose position had been undermined to make way for Norwood, 
89 
did 
not lack friends in the House, for questions were asked in the Spring 
88 J. A. Petch, Fifty Years of Examining. The Joint Matriculation Board, 
1903-1953, London 1922, p. 165 
89 Supra pp. 116-120 
215 
and Summer of 1943 about the Board's Consultative Committee 
of which he was chairman. In April Graham-Little asked Butler 
about the membership of the Consultative Commitee, and he was told 
that the members' periods of office had expired and that the 
Committee was "in abeyance during the war" -a strange state of 
affairs when major legislation was being planned and there was 
apparently a need for advice on many of those matters which were 
the very subject of the committee's last report, and some of which 
were now covered again by Norwood. 
go The contrast between the 
government's treatment of the English and Welsh Consultative 
Committee and that of the Scottish Advisory Council on Education 
was marked. Percival Sharp, the local authorities' spokesman, 
noted in his weekly comment in Education that , "In this period of 
educational ferment the Consultative Committee has been put to sleep. 
The Council Chamber is empty and derelict. Things are different in 
Scotland. " He went on to describe the Scottish Advisory Council, 
noting especially its representative composition and its authority 
to initiate its own studies. It was "a parliament on education. "91 
The point was emphasized when the Secretary of State for Scotland 
referred to the reconstitution of the Scottish body and to its 
present remits in the week before the White Paper debate. 
92 The 
day before the White Paper debate began Lipson asked for the names 
of the Consultative Committee members and asked how often it had met 
since the beginning of the war. 
93 Perhaps to forestall criticism 
of the Consultative Committee's disappearance, which by implication 
was an attack on Norwood, Butler paid tribute to Spens, some of 
whose recoihmendat ions were in fact to be given effect by the 
forthcoming legislation, at the opening of his White Paper speech. 
In January 1944 Graham-Little was still asking his question and still 
receiving the same answer. 
94 
90 H. C. Debates, vol. 388, col. 1070,13.4.43 
91 Education, 8.1.43, P. 17 
92 H. C. Debates, vol-391, col-933,21-7.43 
93 Ibid., col-1593,28-7.43 
94 H. C. Debates, vol-396, col-698,26.1.44 
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Lord Fleming's committee could not be handled with as much 
ap. lomb as had been Norwood's. Butler might be considered to 
have misled the Commons in his references to Faeming. A week before 
the publication of the White Paper Lindsay asked Butler whether he 
expected before the end of the year reports from Norwood, McNair and 
Fleming. In a Commons written reply Butler said that he had no news 
on Fleming. 
95. This was not true. He still awaited the final 
report, but he had received an interim report. Although the 
committee had been divided, a majority ýad recommended the abolition 
of fees in all direct grant schools, except a small number which might 
have to become private schools, and also the end of direct grant 
status for schools which were in practice local grammar schools. 
Butler had received this information at his own behest. It was less 
than open of him to say that he had to await Fleming. He knew, as 
Parliament did not, that he had sought guidance and received it three 
months before the publication of the White Paper. 
In his White Paper speech Butler repeated the deception, claiming 
that consideration of the direct grant school question must await the 
publication of the Faeming Report. The main Labour spokesman had 
obviously heard of the interim report, not surprisingly since 
G. D. H. Cole and Harold Clay were signatories of it. In spite of 
Butler's observation Creech-Jones asked whether the government had 
received any report. He understood that a definite recommendation 
had been made that such schools receiving public money should be free. 
He asked that this report should be given to the House and its 
recommendation put into effect. 
96 This was a direct challenge which 
could not be ignored. In his reply to the debate the next day Ede 
could not avoid taking up the question. He revealed that a special 
report dealing with the question of fees for direct grant schools 
95 Ibid., col. 2279,8. ý. 43 
96 H. C. Debates 9 vol . 391, col . 18 53,29-7.43 
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would be published in August. In a disarming way he said that 
everyone would agree with the decision to Tvblish before the 
recess, so that they would not deprive themselves of its guidance. 
He asked M. PS. "who have been rather suspicious as to what we are 
going to do in regard to the direct grant schools to wait until they 
have seen the recommendations in this report. '197 The implication 
for Labour M-Ps. who had knowledge of the Fleming Committee's 
recommendation was not only that their knowledge was confirmed but 
also that the government intended to accept the' recommendation. 
This was as misleading as Butler's pronouncements on the matter. 
It seems likely that there had been no intention to publish at 
this stage until Creech-Jones had revealed his knowledge of the 
special report. Butler would not have given his reply to Lindsay 
on 8 July, have made the same point in the White Paper itself on 
16 July and have repeated it in his Commons speech on 29 July, if 
he was about to publish the recommendation which he had received 
in April. There was no problem, other than Butler's political 
dilemma, in publication. The Special Fleming Report had been 
on Butler's desk before the Norwood Report and there were no 
constitutional proprieties to be observed before its publication, 
such as were abnormally set aside in the case of Norwood. 
Publication seems to have been forced upon the Board by Creech- 
Jones' revelation and question. Even Ede's undertaking now was 
ambiguous. He gave the impression that M. Ps. would have it before 
leaving for the summer recess, yet it was not published until 
27 August. Thus it could not provoke immediate parliamentary debate. 
This chicken came home to roost in October when Butler was asked 
by Lindsay when he had received it and why he had not published it 
earlier. Butler admitted that he had had it in April but said that 
97 Ibid., col. 2043,30-7.43 
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it was concerned "almost exclusively" with a problem, the 
consideration of which, it had been explained in paragraph 32 
of the White Paper, had been postponed for the present. 
98 
This was a curious reply. The paragraph cited by Butler 
explained that some of the schools were an integral part of the 
local secondary school provision whereas others served no local 
purpose. It was not yet possible to reach a decision about the 
schools as a class. As some of them fell within Fleming's 
terms of reference 
, 
consideration of their future would have to be 
postponed. 
99 The White Paper left its readers with the clear 
impression that Fleming was holding up a decision on the matter. 
Butler was fortunate that Lindsay did not press the point, for 
it was obvious that it-was the recommendation of the Fleming 
majority report and the difficulties within his own party which 
these presented for Butler which had caused consideration of the 
matter to be deferred, rather than the deferment which had obviated 
the need to publish the report. It was a neat trick and Butler got 
away with it. 
Some M. Ps. who took a keen interest in educational matters 
suspected that these reports were being used by the Board to 
promote its own goals, and that the reports were published or 
suppressed in accordance with that criterion, but the inhibiting effect 
of consensus prevented them from pressing the point. Lipson, for 
example, obviously knew that the Consultative Committee had not met 
in the last two years and he was making a point rather than asking 
a question, but he does not seem to have taken the matter any further. 
Graham-Little did not need to ask the same question twice; again he 
was making a point, but did not press it. Similarly Lindsay's 
question about the concealment of the. Special Fleming Report, until 
after the White Paper debate was not followed up. The belief 
98 H. C. Debates, vol-392, col. 1510,21.10.43 
99 White Papersp. 10 
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existed that the future of educational reform was still in the 
balance and nobody wished unduly to embarrass Butler. The prompt 
and convenient publication of Norwood, the delay in the publication 
of Fleming's interim report and the demise of Spens all illustrate 
the Board's attitudes to its advisory committees and the purposes 
which they were intended to serve. 
It will be recalled that in Holmes' view a scheme of reform 
should be formulated in detail before presentation to Parliament 
when the public at large could influence it through their elected 
representatives. Until that. stage was reached he had resisted 
public discussion of the proposals. He argued always for secrecy 
and for private consultation with those professionally or managerially 
involved in education rather than for public debate. That did not, 
of course, prevent public debate, some of which influenced the 
Board's thinking; but until a comprehensive scheme, which hung 
together and could be defended as representing a consensus of those 
engaged in education, could be _presented, 
Holmes did not want any 
party political involvement in the process. The White Paper 
represented, in Holmes' scheme of things, the time for public debate. 
Butler had at first resisted Holmes' view of consultation, 
100 but by 
1943 he seems to have succumbed to his Secretary's view. He had 
indicated in September 1941 that a copy of the Green book would be 
placed in the Commons library, but it had not in fact been so deposited. 
In April 1943 Butler was asked about the Green Book and he had to stone- 
wall. He explained that its purpose had been to help the Board's 
officers in "preliminary discussions" with representatives of the 
education service, and that it had fulfilled that purpose. It was 
in any case out of print and would not be reprinted. He was asked 
repeatedly by three M. Ps. if he would make a copy available to the 
House, since members were constantly having it quoted at them. He 
100 Supra P. 56 
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resisted all such requests, arguing that it would not now 
serve a useful purpose. M. Ps. should ; 3wait "a rather more 
developed scheme. " 
101 He obviously had his projected White 
Paper in mind. But by the time that was availableg the drafting 
of the Bill itself was at an advanced stage. At its meeting on 
13 July the cabinet had not only a draft White Paper but galleys 
from the prints of the Bill itself. Holmes' view was constitutionally 
correct, for M-Ps. could of course alter the Bill as they wished, but 
to suggest that there was much scope for an. open discussion by them of 
the principle issues was to overstate the role allotted to them in the 
preparation of the reforms. No doubt sensing this, Rhys Davies, 
Labour M. P. for Westhoughton, got up on 16 July, when Anthony Eden 
was answering a question about a debate on the White Paper which 
Butler had just presented, and asked whether the debate would aim to 
establish a consensus of the House, so that the Bill would be based on 
that, or whether the Bill was already drafted. Eden's reply that, 
"It would not be true to say that the legislation is already in draft, " 
did not reflect the true state of affairs. 
102 Although the first 
part of Rhys Davies' question was not answered, Eden's reply might 
have given him the impression that the answer was in the affirmative. 
In presenting the White Paper, Butler referred to past discussions 
between the Board and other bodies, and announced that they had now 
reached the stage for "the public examination of the plan.,, 
103 This 
echoed a phrase of Holmes' and also his own statement of early July 
when he had said that, "There had been a long period of private 
discussion. Now there must be time for public consideration. " 
104 
Butler had come to accept his view of the nature of the public debate 
on the proposed legislation. The reply of Eden and the comment of 
Butler seem to have led Greenwood to believe that a new and more 
101 H. C. Debates, vol. 388, cols-790-791,8.4.43 
102 H. C. Debates, vol-391, col. 541., 16.7.43 
103 Ibid., col. -540,16.7.43 104 As reported in Times, 3-7.43, p. 2 
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democratic procedure was being initiated. In his contribution 
to the White Paper debate he described it as "this new technique" 
and thought that the purpose of the two-day debate was for everybody 
to think aloud about a "White Paper committing nobody to anything, to 
be followed, if the government are wise, by legislation which takes 
account of what has been said in the House" and that it would be 
followed by a period of public discussion "before the Bill is 
finally produced. " 
105 In a sense he was right, for progress to 
a Bill depended on a measure of agreement, but it was a misreading 
of the situation. Any attempt to change significant features of 
the proposed legislation might jeopardise the prospects for a Bill, 
especially if it concerned church schools, so that the test was not 
the forthrightness of debate but the acquiescence of the country in 
what had already been decided. 
The timing of the debate ensured that it passed off with the 
minimum opportunity for dissent in Par. liament. Butler wanted 
publication before the recess because he was anxious about maintaining 
the measure of consensus already achieved. without some indication of 
the government's intentions to increasingly restless reformers. The 
White Paper appeared in mid-July, being unveiled to a thinly-attended 
House on the first Friday sitting for more than three years. A 
fortnight later it was debated for two days in the Commons. At the 
opening of the debate Butler gave a broad hint that it would come to 
nothing if dissent were widespread. The debate was held on the 
Thursday and Friday before the August Bank Holiday weekend which, in 
spite of the war, was celebrated by a rush to the coast. The Commons 
returned to work on Tuesdayq but went into recess at the end of that 
week, not returning for seven weeks. The timing of the debate could 
not stimulate a lively parliamentary discussion of the proposed 
reforms. From the Board's point of view their ship was no longer 
105 H. C. Debates, vol-391, col-1937,30-7.43 
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in danger of foundering and fair winds were carrying it safely 
towards harbour. 
223 
Chapter 10: RE14AINING PROBLEMS: direc questions of 
strategy, N. A. L. T. 's view 
With the White Paper published and debated the Board's plan 
had passed an important stage. Legislation was a certainty unless 
some major church school problem arose, which now seemed less likely. 
After catching their breath during the holiday season the Board's 
critics now prepared more considered objections to its proposals. 
Chief amongst these was the remaining uncertainty about the direct 
grant schools. Public discussion of this matter had been avoided 
at the White Paper stage, but Creech-Jones' question in the debate 
ensured that the interim Fleming Report had to be published. This 
itself brought the matter to the fore. The wider public school 
issue was not, from the Board's point of view, an outstanding matter; 
for Holmes as a matter of principle and for Butler as a matter of 
tactics the public schools were not involved in legislation which 
had a bearing only on the state education system. 
1 The direct grant 
schools, however, were a different matter. They linked the private 
and the state school systems. 
The interim Fleming Re_port,, although representing the views of 
only a majority on the committee and not its chairman, nonetheless 
had great authority. After its publication the issue of fees in 
secondary schools was clarified in most people's minds. As the 
Times Educational Supplement explained, there was now only one matter 
to be decided. As fees could not be introduced in modern schools, 
they had to be abolished in all county and voluntary schools, and it 
followed that they must also be abolished in those direct grant 
schools which were local grammar schools. Only the future of direct 
grant schools which took pupils from outside their areas remained to 
be decided. 2 The force of this argument was self-evident. As the 
Manchester Guardian commented, "The arguments by which that proposal 
The exception to this view was the decision that private schools 
should be inspected by the Board. 
2 Times Educational Supplement, 11.9.43, p. 437 
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(i. 
e. the abolition of fees in direct grant schools] is supported 
are not easily answered. Their authors have rendered an important 
service to education by the force and persuasiveness with which they 
have stated them. It only remains for the government which has 
sought the advice of the committee, to be prompt in acting on it.,, 
3 
The Times was similarly emphatic. It observed that the White Paper's 
proposal for the unification of secondary education precluded the 
abolition of fees in some secondary schools and their retention in 
others. Once the decision to promise secondary education for all 
children was taken, it became an obligation not a privilege and must, 
be free. It had to be "equally accessible" to all children. "The 
logic is irreproachable, " stated the Times, concluding, "To the main 
question, that of the terms on which universal obligatory secondary 
education shall be offered, the Fleming Committee seems to have giveh 
the right and inevitable answer. " 
4 
The future of these schools was still undecided because they 
presented Butler with a party problem. As in all things concerned 
with secondary education, G. G. Williams was a major influence, but on 
this occasion he suffered his only defeat on a matter of policy. 
The explanation is that this was one of the few questions when the 
decision was party political. Williams wanted grammar schools to 
be more rigorously selective academically and held no brief for those 
who wanted to maintain the socially-selective nature of these schools. 
The interim Fleming Report's recommendations satisfied his objective. 
He was content that local direct grant schools should become the free 
grammar school element in the tripartite system. Those which served 
no local purpose would be protected by the special arrangement 
envisaged by the Fleming majority. Butler was also well disposed 
to this proposal but, as we have seen, lacked confidence in his 
ability to carry it in cabinet and Parliament, and decided therefore 
3 Manchester Guardian, 27.8.43, p. 4 
4 Times,, 27.8.43, p 
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to suppress it, publishing the report only when directly challenged 
by the main Labour speaker in the White Paper debate. In the 
Autumn Williams tried to win over the headmasters of the direct 
grant schools whilst Butler attempted to mollify Conservative M. Ps. 
Williams' meetings with the headmasters were a consequence of 
Butler's having met the Headmasters' Conference. Those members of 
the Conference whose schools were direct grant asked for another 
meeting with Butler, who pleaded a full diary and passed them over 
to Williams. The head of Secondary Branch as always seized the 
opportunity. Inviting the H. M. C. 's direct grant schools committee 
to meet him, he sent them all a background paper in which he observed 
that, "On the question of tuition fees in direct grant schools, while 
the need for complete abolition may not be accepted, there is a very 
widespread conviction that admission to all vacancies in schools 
recognised for grant from public funds should be accessible to all, 
irrespective of class or income. "5 
A prompt and hostile response arrived at the Board in advance 
of the projected meeting. It came from Crichton-Miller, the headmaster 
of Taunton School,, who argued the case of those parents - "a section of 
the middle class ... not at present very strongly protected by any 
political party" - who had previously been able to afford something 
which in his view was better than the general state provision even if 
they could not afford to buy a place at a public school. He wanted 
the Board to adopt the general principle of supporting by direct grant 
those projects which were of value to the community, efficient and 
short of funds. 
6 
This was a notion which had already been promoted 
by Barrow in the Norwood Committee, and it had been rejected firmly 
by Williams.? Williams was now as quick off the mark in rejecting 
this re-emergence of the notion that the direct grant could be retained 
under the guise of Board patronage of worthy institutions, although his 
.5P. 
R. O. Edl36/424 Williams to all members of H. M. C. Direct Grant 
Committee, 21.10.43 
6 Ibid., Crichton-Miller to Williams, 25.10.43 
7 Supra pp. 161-163 
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rejection was less direct than when he had been addressing one 
t 
of the Board's inspectors. He had earlier regarded the direct 
grant as the point to be defended at all cost and his view was 
unchanged. The abolition of fees was essential in order to 
render the direct grant defensible. This view was now put to 
Crichton-Miller. He saw "no objection" to the idea of Board 
patronage through a_direct grant, but nonetheless he stood by 
the view that, "In the future w. e cannot admit the principle that 
a parent can buy an education for his child at fees which are less 
than the full cost (because of public grants) to the possible 
exclusion of poorer but equally well qualified children. " If the 
direct grant school had "something superior to offer ... it should 
be accessible to all. " If it did not, a parent was paying merely 
for its exclusiveness, "hardly a sound reason within the public 
system. " Williams went on to propose two avenues which the direct 
grant schools could follow; some should become free schools, whilst 
others should have all "special places" in the existing sense, 
i. e. all of their pupils could qualify for remission of fees 
according to their parents' income. 
8 
Although he did not elaborate 
his schemes, his intention was clearly that the first path should be 
trodden by the local direct grant schools which were needed as the 
grammar element in the tripartite system, whilst the second path 
should be taken by the direct grant boarding schools. Crichton- 
Miller was converted. The day after the meeting he sent a note to 
Williams describing the scheme as "quite first class and exactly on 
the right lines. A new class of "State Public Schools" would be 
created. 
9 
If the other headmasters had been similarly impressed Williams 
would have won. But the confident predictions of Crichton-Miller, 
who had had to leave the meeting early, that Williams' scheme will 
8 P. R. O. Edl36/424 Additional Note from Williams to all members of 
the committee; undated but precedes meeting on 27.10.43 and was in 
response to a letter dated 25-10.43 
9 Ibid., Crichton-Miller to Williams, 28.10.43 
-"7 
"not have a hostile reception if the matter goes further" and 
that some independent schools might wish to become direct grant 
on these terms, were ill-founded. The general reaction of the 
headmasters was to stand by the status quo, fees as well as a 
direct relationship with the Board. 
10 
Crichton-Miller's role in 
this question was similar to that of Spencer Leeson in the question 
of the public schools. Both of them believed that they were living 
in radical times and that their fellows should adopt the conservative 
strategy of accepting some change in order to preserve their essential 
rights, in the one case independence from local authorities and in the 
other complete independence. By the end of the year Crichton-Miller 
had his back to the wall. His fellow heads were solidly behind a 
defence of their present arrangements with the Board. Crichton- 
Miller admitted that he was "at variance with the committee in 
believing that there is great value in continuing the discussions on 
the basis of the suggestions Mr. Williams has put forward. " 
11 The 
dialogue between Williams and the direct grant school headmasters was 
over, and the Board knew that any attempt to abolish fees in local 
direct grant schools would be opposed by the schools. 
The Conservative Party's own committee on educational policy 
also represented a problem for Butler. Ironically it was Butler, 
charged with the organisation of the Central Committee on Post-War 
Problems, who had decided to establish a Sub-Committee on Education., 
12 
That was before his own appointment to the Board. Now the sub- 
committee which he had created was proving troublesome to him. 
Chaired by Geoffrey Faber, the publisher, its views coincided with 
those of the minority in the interim Fleming Report. 
13 Its opinion 
was expressed in its third report, Looking Ahead, when it defended 
parents' rights to choose the kind of education they wanted for their 
children, and added, "So far as we are concerned, this is a vital 
10 Ibid., Williams to Goodfellow, 6.11.43 attaching a minute of the 
meeting on 27.10.43 
11 Ibid., Crichton-Miller to Williams, 28.12.43, enclosing Memorandum: 
Birect Grant Schools and the Iýiture, which he had sent to -other 
members of the committee 
12 P. R. O. Edl36/215, Butler to Ramsbotham, 12.7.41 
13 D. W. Dean "Problems of the Conservative Sub-Committee on Education, 
1941-1945', Journal of Educational Administration and ILilsto Y, E, 
vol. jjj, no. l, December 19709P. 34 
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position that nothing would persuade us to abandon.,, 
14 
Meanwhile Butler was making no more headway with those 
Conservative M. Ps. who had direct grant schools in their 
constituencies. On 23 September Kenneth Pickthorne, Henry Brooke 
and Henry Willink met Butler at the last's request. A few days 
before this meeting the indefatigable and ubiquitous Williams 
"happened to. meet" Willink who had been elected to the Commons 
in 1940 and was now Minister of Health. In a report to Butler15 
he conceded that Whitgift School, in Willink's constituency of 
North Croydon, was an example of a school where the abolition of 
fees was difficult to justify. Eight hundred pupils, 75% of whom 
came from outside the area and many a considerable distance, paid 
C_30; in return for its direct grant the school was required to admit 
10% of pupils free. But Williams was also able to record that 
Willink had "reluctantly" agreed to the abolition of some fees, 
although he favoured the retention of about 150 fee-paying direct 
grant schools. Williams, in his conversation with Willink and his 
recommendation to Butler firmly supported the views of the majority 
Fleming Report,. His preferred way forward was to emphasize 
paragraph 52 of that report which allowed special treatment for 
some schools where the abolition of fees was difficult to justify. 
By hinting that this way out might be used by more than the small 
number of schools intended by the report's authors, he hoped to 
defend their main proposal. Williams' basic position was unchanged. 
"I remain clear, " he wrote to Butler, "that the Majority Report is 
the right one. " The I. A. H. M. principle that fees should be retained 
in all existing state-supported secondary schools or abolished in all 
of them was called in to support his position as was the recent 
Nuffield Report signed by the knights Cyril Bailey, Cyril Norwood and 
14 Conservative Party, Looking Ahead: the Statutory_ Educatipn System, 
London 1944, p. 20 
15 P. R. O. Edl36/428, Williams to Holmes and Butler, 17.9.43 
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Richard Livingstone, all of whom had public school backgrounds. 
16 
But Williams was equally sure that he had not changed Willink's 
position, admitting "I do not think that I succeeded in the least 
in convincing Mr. Willink. 11 Before the meeting with the M. Ps. 
Williams gave Butler a copy of his paper arguing for the distinction 
to be made between free local direct grant schools and the larger 
non-local boarding schools which would offer all of their places on 
the ba8is of pupils being entitled to remissiory of fees in accordance 
with parental incomeq the deficit being made up by the Board as grant. 
The only variant on his earlier statements was that he expected some 
free local pupils to attend the latter at the expense of the local 
authorities. 
17 
At the meeting it became clear that Willink's objections were 
fundamental. He disliked not only the White Paper's acceptance of 
the view that ability not parental income should determine a child's 
admission to a school, but also its view that the different types of 
secondary education should enjoy equal standing. This was water 
under the bridge and Butler had no intention of abandoning the 
statement of such objectives, even if the proposals to be embodied 
in legislation might not fulfil the hopes thus evoked. Williams 
again outlined his scheme for direct grant schools with all places 
"special" in the sense of being subject to remission of fees and 
therefore not so clearly open to the objection that poor children 
were excluded. By now the idea "appeared to find some favour. 11 
18 
Nothing definite was said to the M. Ps., but the next stage in 
Butler's strategy was by now clear. Firstly Williams' proposal 
about 100% special place arrangements for the non-local boarding 
direct grant schools was accepted by Butler and could be justified 
within the terms of the majority Fleming Report by reference to the 
loophole about schools in which the retention of fees was di fficult 
to criticise. The number might be larger than that intended by the 
16 Nuffield College, The Open Door in Secondary_ Education London 1943. 
All of course were educated at public schools; Bailey was a governor 
of two public schools and a member of the Council of Marlborough 
College - Butler's and Norwood's school; Livingstor4 now 
President 
of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, had taught briefly at Eton during 
the First World War 
17 P. R. O. Edl36/428, Williams to Goodfellow, 21.9.43 
majority report signatories, but that was a question for the 
future and need not cause much difficulty at this stage. This 
position was not specifically endorsed by Butler until the middle 
of the Committee stage of the Bill in the Commons, 19 but the hope 
of a solution which would not greatly affect the schools dearest 
to the hearts of M-Ps. would be sufficient to keep them at bay. 
Secondly Butler portrayed himself as the holder of the ring, 
letting the M-Ps. into the secret that, whilst he would not ignore 
the view of majority report signatories such as Sir James Aitken, 
Chairman of Lancashire Education Committee, he had personally 
encouraged Geoffrey Fisher, Bishop of London and leader of the 
Governing Bodies Association, to express his views in the minority 
20 
report. Thirdly, the fact that the final Fleming Report was 
still awaited was used as the reason for not taking a final decision 
on this matter, even though the interim report had been sought by 
Butler specifically to assist in the reaching of a decision which 
could be embodied in legisla tion. When Williams had first seen 
Willink he had reported to Butler their agreement that no policy 
could be settled until the final Fleming Report was received. Butler 
had circled this comment and endorsed it as a "most important 
statement". 
21 The straw was clutched with gratitude. 
Whilst Butler had a strategy for avoiding trouble with the 
direct grant schools themselves and their supporters in his own party, 
there remained the difficulty that in this matter he was resisting a 
policy which, if not universally supported, certainly enjoyed very 
widespread support. We have already noted the cleavage between local 
authority and parliamentary Conservatives with most of the former 
seeking the abolition of fees in local direct grant schools. This 
policy was also siIpported by those schoolmasters most actively 
engaged in secondary education - members of the A. M. A. and I. A. H. M., 
the male quarters of the "Joint Four" secondary teachers' associations. 
22 
19 Ibid., Williams to Butler 24-3.44; Williams' notes were endorsed by 
Butler as being "on sound lines. " 
20 The Governing Bodies Association had been set up at a meeting in 
Grocers' Hall in July 1941. Fisher chaired the committee which drafted 
its constitution and he was the Association's first chairman. 
P. H. J. H. Gosden, Education in the Second World War, London 1976, P-338 
21 P. R. O. Ed! 36/428, Enclors-2ment by Butler on Williams to Holmes and 
Butler, 17.9.43 
22 Incorporated Association of Assistant Masters, Memorandum on the 
Education Bill, London 1944, p. 8; P. R. O. Edl36/470, Taylor (Sec. of 
I. A. H. M. ) to Butler, 10.1.44 
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The wish of the local authority associations to end fees in these 
schools was made clear to Ede and Butler in August. 
23 
A Fabian 
booklet, whilst regretting the intention to keep governors' places, 
accepted the main recommendations of the majority Fleming Report as 
the best obtainable. 
24 
Shena Simon argued closely the case for'democratic 
local authority control of all schools, and specifically the direct grant 
schools. 
25 The T. U'. C. demanded the abolition of fees in all types of 
direct grant schools. 
26 Butler himself even -went so far as to 
recommend to Roman Catholics the advantages to them of allowing their 
direct grant schools to become aided. 
27 A problem for Butler was that, 
if pressure to abolish fees were not decreased by his delaying tactic 
but were on the contrary increased, the consensus argument could lead to 
the isolation of those in his party who wanted to keep the status quo. 
It was a very difficult party question for Butler and, whilst it had its 
dangers, putting off a decision held great attractions for him. 
In this matter the attitude of Ede was again important. The. Labour 
Party was the obvious spearhead of any movement to press the point. 
Unlike multilateralism, this was not a matter in which leading party 
spokesmen had recently undergone conversions. It was a longstanding 
party objective. The attitude of its spokesman inside the Board was of 
obvious importance. Ede favoured the abolition of fees in local direct 
grant schools but was willing to help Butler with his political problem. 
A month before the publication of the White Paper, BUtler had written to 
Holmes about the direct grant school question and instructed him to keep 
Ede informed on the matter. "He was anxious to be helpful about the 
secondary problem., " wrote Butler about Ede, adding, "You know my desire 
to keep him informed and [I know you will do this in the right way. " 
28 
Ede was thus not likely to be the instrument by which the Labour Party 
would be advised to gird its loins and even less the warrior to lead 
23 P. R. O. Edl36/378 Note of Interview. Association of Education Co mmittees' 
deputation, 11.8.43 
24 G. G. Leybourne, A New Charter for Education, London 1943, pp-35-36 
25 S. D. Simon, The Four. Freedoms in Secondary Education, Bickley, Kent, 
undated but presumed to be early 1944 since she referred to the 
Education Bill 
26 T. U. C. Ed. ClO/144.43,11.8.43, Statement on the White Paper, p. 2 
27 P. R. O. Edl36/378, Butler to Archbishop of Liverpool, 27.9.43 
28 P. R. 0-Edl36/389, Butler to Holmes, 16.5.43 
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it into battle. 
The question of the direct grant schools apart, most sections 
of the Labour Party saw the battle as largely over by the Autumn of 
1943. Anxieties expressed in the White Paper debate dominated 
Labour thoughts. Foremost amongst these was that, without a 
shorter and more definite timetable, the much-discussed reforms 
might never materialise. A specific commitment to a leaving age 
of 16 as an essential part of the arrangements to achieve parity 
between the different elements in secondary education was the main 
demand which the Labour movement made and which was likely to lead 
to a breach between itself and the Board and therefore the coalition 
government. Bevin was still pressing for 16 as the leaving age, 
but seemed to think that it was catered for within the Board's plans 
and would be implemented by political , administrative and trade 
union rather than legislative action. "The government were agreed 
there had to be a raising of the leaving age, " he was reported as 
telling the T. U. C. conference in September. "The trade unions should 
begin now to compel the government to keep its word. Every new 
agreement they concluded should be based on the assumption that the 
school age was to be raised and continued education provided, and 
that industry had got to adjust itself. That was the way to see 
the reforms were woven into hours of labour, time off, and all the 
rest of it. " Clay took the commoner view that a legislative 
commitment to 16 was "of fundamental importance. " 
29 Most of the 
remaining questions were regarded as matters for the legislative 
wing of the party. The Education Reconstruction Sub-Committee saw 
no need to meet again until the Bill was published, seeming to take 
the view that it had done its job in formulating party policy, of 
which the Parliamentary Labour Party was now the custodian. 
The question of strategy was still important. It has been 
29 Reported in the Times, 7.9.439p. 2 and 8.9.43, p. 8 
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suggested that by the Autumn of 1943 Labour critics had adopted 
the role of "sympathetic allies of the government who were concerned 
solely that the provisions of the Bill would be put into effect with 
speed and. vigour. 1130 To the extent that Labour supported Butler and 
the Board in carrying legislation against the forces which could 
defeat it and in the sense that a consensus on reforms had all along 
been the basis for legislating, that view is correct. There was 
a widely-held view that a rocked boat could still founder. This 
interpretation, by suggesting that Labour's role was that of 
uncritical supporter of the government, overlooks both the consensus 
aspect of educational reform at this time and the vulnerability of 
the Labour Party to schism on the church school question. 
That Labour spokesmen criticised rather than condemned the 
government's legislative plans is not evidence that they had abandoned 
their principles. Their dilemma was acute. They believed that by 
pressing for more they might lose all. At some stages ill-served by 
their own man at the Board, although they knew not to what extent, 
Labour educationists were now dependent for further progress on their 
parliamentary spokesmen. Most of these had shown by their comments 
on the White Paper that they favoured multilateral schools as much as 
did the party's extra-parliamentary wings. But there was the problem 
of the M. Ps. who were Roman Catholics first and Labour Party members 
second. Butler would not have progressed as far as he had with his 
legislative plans if he had not been satisfied and had not convinced 
the cabinet that the Roman Catholic agitation in the country could be 
contained. Throughout the Autumn Butler watched the situation closely 
and anxiously. Late in September he spent a week seeking reactions to 
the White Paper from M. Ps. Labour spokesmen were unanimous in 
wanting early legislation for two reasons: once the religious issue 
had been raised the sooner it was settled and closed again the better, 
30 R. Barker, Education and Politics 1900-195q, Oxford 1972, p. 97 
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and the political situation, i. e. the war-inspired consensus, 
was expected to deteriorate as M-Ps. became more confident of 
victory against Germany. Cove, Greenwood and Denman, who had 
spoken for Labour in the White Paper debate, all took this view. 
Butler was impressed with the fortitude of M. Ps. who were being 
deluged with letters. "Members appear to be standing up to this 
very well, " he noted with relief. Two Liverpool M. Ps. one 
Labour the other Conservative, were refusing public meetings, -in 
order to avoid being drawn on the matter. Other Labour M. Ps., 
including Muff, the member for Hull, wanted to increase the 50% 
share to be contributed by the state to the cost of building new 
Roman Cathlic schools, but Butler noted his reluctance to embarrass 
31 the government. One helpful factor was a division in the 
Catholic ranks. The day after recording the reaction of M. Ps. 
Butler had to report to the Lord President's Committee the advice 
of the Pope to his British flock that they should "stand out" for 
more money. He was relieved to record also that the English 
Catholics did not like this direction from Rome and were split in 
their ranks over whether to continue the agitation. 
32 Here were 
grounds for hope, but success was not yet assured. In October 
newspapers carried the defiant statement of the Archbishop of 
Liverpool, Dr. Downey to a Roman Catholic "education demonstration" 
in Liverpool Stadium, that, "We shall never cede our schools or 
retire from the educational field.,, 
33 There was, of course, no 
government proposal that they should do so, but the statement showed 
the strength of Roman Catholic feeling as did a march of Catholic 
women in East London in a procession more than a mile and a half 
long. 34 The Labour problem was well-expressed in the T. U. C. 
statement on the White Paper thus, "The General Council maintain 
their view that if denominational bodies wish to have their own 
31 P. R. O. Edl36/378, Confidential note by Butler, 23-9.43 
32 Ibid., Private note, 24.9.43 
33 Times Educational Supplement, 23-10.43, P- 510 
34 Daily Herald, 18.10.43, p. 2 
schools, they might well be expected to pay for them. They 
do n, ot wish, however, that this ancient controversy should be 
allowed to wreck or retard the promise of educational advance 
on a wide front, which the White Paper offers. 
05 
An M. P., 
George Griffiths, seconding the address on the King's Speech in 
1ýovember 1943 summed up the general feeling. Referring to 
Butler's discussions "behind the scenes", he trusted that the 
President would "stand pat by the White Paper. 06 That 
epitomiped the widespread view that all who wanted reform should 
rally to the government's published intentions. 
Another problem for the party in the Commons was that many 
of its members were not well-informed on educational matters. 
A small example of the ease with which some of them could be 
detached from the party's egalitarian outlook had occurred earlier 
in the year when a group of eleven Labour M. Ps. led by Muff had 
accepted an invitation to visit several public schools and had 
expressed their appreciatiorý in a correspondence in the Times and 
in their contributions to the White Paper debate. Whilst it is 
true that on this aspect of policy the Labour Party was at its most 
vague, this little episode - dubbed "Muff's circus" - demonstrated 
the superficial appreciation, by some M. Ps. who were not especially 
interested in education, of the Tawney-inspired principle that 
education should be available irrespective of parental income, let 
alone the more radical notion of multilateralism. 
37 Interestingly 
Ede congratulated Muff on having the courage to write his letter. 
38 
The Parliamentary Labour Party had its weaknesses as the 
instrument by which Labour's remaining expectations of educational 
reform were to be fulfilled. The difficulty of opposing what 
seemed to be a widely acclaimed series of reforms, the danger of 
dividing a movement which seemed to have evolved a consensus, the 
35 T. U. C. EdClO/144.43,11.8.43, Statement on the White Paper, p. 2 
36 H. C. Debates, vol-395, col. 20,24.11.43 
37 The correspondence in the Times was started by a letter from 
Muff on 8.7.43 and was prominent in its columns throughout 
July. It was Guy, M. P. for Poplar South, who expressed his 
admiration for the schools in the Commons, and Mack, M-P-for 
Newcastle-under-Lyme who publicised the label "Muff's circus". 
H. C. Debates Vol . 391, col. 1896,29-7.43 and col. 1982,3o. 7.43 38 B. L., Ede Diary, vol-7,8.7.43 
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particular problem of the Labour Party's Roman Catholic 
supporters and the weakness of the parliamentary party as an 
instrument for change in education were all factors which 
inhibited Labour's educational leaders both in and out of 
Parliament and made them wary of making a full-blooded demand 
for Labour's objectives. Their political opponent, Butler, 
was in addition difficult to attack, for he claim-ed to share 
many of their objectives, having to temper his enthusiasm only 
because he knew, the practical problems better than they did. 
The fact that the political circumstances were unpropitious 
for Labour and posed a strategic question of whether to compromise 
or to'campaign for victory whatever the risks should not lead us 
to assume that the Labour Party had changed its mind on the 
policies of egalitarianism and multilateralism in secondary 
education. 
There was one exception to the general party strategy of 
criticising aspects of the reforms, whilst endorsing them in 
general and supporting their authors; that was N. A. L. T. 
39 Even 
N. A. L. T. did not adopt a hostile attitude without misgivings and 
dissension, such was felt to be the frailty of the movement for 
educational reform. The uniformly hostile reaction of Denington 
and Cove in the Bulletin evoked some criticism at the September 
executive committee meeting, and an unsuccessful move was made to 
have articles signed as personal contributions. The view of 
some members that "too critical an attitude should not be adopted" 
was recorded, and the treasurer, not Denington or Cove, was 
charged to draw up a statement on the White Paper. An outline 
was agreed at the meeting. One contradictory sentence illustrated 
the dilemma of Labour spokesmen. "The modern school must not 
become a dead end and the multilateral school must be stressed as 
39 As the records of N. A. L. T. have become available only recently, 
its views have been summarised in some detail in the present 
work. 
3 
the only democratic solution, " agreed N. A. L. T. 's executive. 
40 
Their need was both to ensure that the part of the undesirable 
tripartite system which had previously been attended mainly by 
working class children would develop into something better, and 
to emphasize their rejection of the tripartite system. Their 
attack had to encompass improvements in a policy which they 
considered to be fundamentally wrong but which may well come into 
being, and the advocacy of their own alternative policy. In fact 
the preparation of this public statement took so long that it was 
not ready until the Bill itself was expected, so that it was 
agreed to delay publication. 
41 
The views of N. A. L. T. as presented 
in the Bulletin were condemnatory of the whole scheme, and it was 
these views which saw the light of day. It was only N. A. L. T. 
which maintained its critique of the planned legislation throughout 
the Autumn. 
After the White Paper debate Cove and Denington clearly decided 
that the government's proposals did not go far enough to justify 
even lukewarm praise. For them the time had come to take off the 
gloves. The authors of the Bulletin were alarmed that so many 
teachers were welcoming the White Paper. They denounced Ede, who 
had not replied to the debate but had given "a characteristic Ede 
speech of pleasing pleasantries and after-dinner reminiscences. " 
42 
They forecast of Ede that, "He will remain Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Board of Education for all time! He is indispensable to 
the Board. They know it, and he is aware of it. Mr. Butler was 
highly pleased with his closing speech of the debate. He was 
interesting, amiable, affable - and withal competent. A good 
lieutenant. " But they also attacked the Labour Party itself for 
not giving leadership on the question of the dual system. "Where 
is the policy of the party? " they asked, "Where is its appeal to 
the nation on this issue? Does it follow Mr. Ede, who follows 
40 G. L. C., A/NLT/I/2, E. C. meeting 11.9.43 
41 Ibid., E. C. meeting 20.11.43 
42 G. L. C., A/NLT/lV/15/16, Bulletin, August 1943; this was a fair 
comment and we have seen (supra p. 202) that Ede did not reply to 
important points raised in the debate, pleading shortage of time 
to those who interrupted him; yet still he took some time to 
indulge his reminiscences of 1902 and to talk anecdotally about 
women's institutes 
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Mr. Dutler? Our business is to explain the nature of the White 
Paper. " This was partly the interests of Welsh non-conformity, 
which wanted an end of church schools, being voiced by Cove. 
But in general the Bulle 
. 
tin's authors were questioning the party's 
parliamentary strategy in relation to the White Paper and its fear 
of a church school controversy. Having read the government's 
plans with care and having listened to the debates in the Commons 
and the Lords, they were convinced that the main objectives of the 
party would not be fulfilled. Yet all around them were welcoming 
the White Paper as 
to see "teachers - 
over themselves to 
year they were to 
who dared to strip 
immediately dubbed 
a major reforming document. They were alarmed 
indeed teachers of the 'left' variety - tumbling 
welcome the White Paper. " At the end of the 
Look back on this period as one in which "anyone 
the paper of its promissory verbiage ... was 
an enemy of educational progress", noting 
particularly that communist teachers "regarded it as sacrilege to 
q, 43 breathe upon its pure white pages . Their response was to urge 
Labour teachers to obtain copies for themselves. This, they were 
convinced would itself open their eyes. Seeing themselves as 
exposers of the truth, they devoted the next few editions of the 
Bulletin to a relentless critique of the White Paper. 
The main argument of this first edition after the publication 
of the White Paper was that, by making the raising of the leaving 
age even to 15 dependent on the re-organisation of local authorities 
and on the re-organisation of all elementary schools, a reform, which 
was fundamental to the object of equal educational opportunity, was 
made conditional on the acquiescence of two reactionary groups - 
the Part III local authorities, which were fighting for their lives, 
and the churches. Moreover, as far as school re-organisation was 
concerned, it was only to be after millions of pounds had been spent 
43 Ibid.. /20, Bulletin, December 1943 
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by the state on building new denominational schools, that raising 
the leaving age to 16, which was not provided for in the White 
Paper, was to be considered. It was as though an alleged pre- 
requisite for reform was being provided, without any commitment 
being given to carry the reform itself. The Bulletin was 
particularly hostile to the Anglican church with its thousands 
of elementary schools in single school areas, i. e. where they 
were the only schools which all children perforce had to attend, 
whatever their parents' religion. It attacked the dual system 
proposal as giving life to the church school system when it was 
on its knees. Reminding its readers that it was the churches 
and their inability or unwillingness to find their share of the 
capital costs which had held up the re-organisation of secondary 
schools, they bitterly resented the fact that even now the churches 
were to be given the power to delay the raising of the leaving age. 
In the September Bulletin 
44 
Cove and Denington returned to 
the same theme. Deeply disturbed that all current debate was 
about Part III authorities and the church schools, they considered 
that, "The educational weaknesses of the White Paper are being 
smothered. " -Although more a piece of rhetoric than a closely- 
argued critique, this edition saw a danger that "instead of building 
roads towards a true democracy we are engaged in erecting bastions 
for the preservation and defence of the capitalist system", and 
cited the priority given to continuation schools over the raising 
of the leaving age as an example. Praise for continued education 
was "fashionable", but in reality could "stand in the way of securing 
a real system of secondary education for all. " Raising the leaving 
age would be made more difficult by the erection of "an elaborate 
system of continuative education from the age of 14 or 15. " They 
stood firmly by their demand for the multilateral school on 
44 Ibid., /18, Bulletin, September 1943 
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educational, social and democratic groundsl and pointed out 
that "under Butler"s proposals children will still be sorted 
out and their careers largely determined at the age of 11, so 
that the abolition of the scholarship examination achieves 
only scholastic and not social significance. " They pointed 
out that better junior schools, smaller classes, the abolition 
of the special place examination and a common code for all 
secondary schools could be achieved without legislation. All 
that was needed was "a minister who will demand and a Chancellor 
of the Exchequer who will grant money. " Of all the desirable 
educational goals, legislation was needed only for nursery schools, 
the raising of the leaving age, compulsory continued education and 
the completion of secondary re-organisation. Yet it was on these 
very matters that the proposed legislative commitments were 
weakest. The purpose of legislation, it was argued, was really 
to strengthen religion, in the form both of a greatly-expanded 
network of denominational schools and of Compulsory worship in 
state schools. Their opinions were summarised thus, "The Butler 
proposals are essentially reactionary, and only those sections 
which we oppose have any promise of implementation. " 
The proposed legislation was also put in a post-war political 
context. 
45 
Under a headline, "Democracy frustrated" and with 
sub-headings such as, "The facade of reation", "The veto of 
minorities" and I'Mr. Churchill's second front", the White Paper 
proposals were explained in terms of the maximum that was possible 
in view of Churchill's veto on controversial measures and the 
obstruction of minority interests which were rigorously pursuing 
their own special objectives. Churchill's attitude was seen as 
hypocritical. In the field of foreign policyq it was suggested, 
he was willing to follow reactionary and controversial policies 
45 Ibid., /19, BulletingOctober 1943 
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and to rely on his Conservative majority in the Commons. In 
September he had rejected Labour fears that, in the wake of 
Mussolini who had fled to Germany, the allies might impose a 
government on Italy rather than foster democratic developments, 
by stating baldly that the government would take its own decision. 
Having decided, the government "was not going to be put off that 
action by any fear that perhaps we should not have a complete 
unanimity on the subject. Parliament does not rest on-unanimity; 
democratic assemblies do not act on unanimity. They act by 46 
majorities. " It was probably to this statement which the 
October Bulletin alluded when it suggested to its readers that 
the consensus, demanded before change could be brought about at 
home, effectively stopped progress which inevitably involved 
controversy; whereas when Churchill himself wanted to carry 
controversial foreign policies, he was unconcerned about consensus 
and ruthlessly used his majority. N. A. L. T. 's strategy for 
combating what it saw as the go vernment's strategy was to try to 
shift the argument from the church school question and to create 
controversy on the educational issues. "The weakness of the White 
Paper, " complained Cove and Denington, "is that on its educational 
side it has evoked a sleepy, complacent, uncritical acceptance, and 
the battle has raged around the dual system. " 
By October N. A. L. T. was claiming in the Bulletin that its 
campaign was having an effect. It reported that several delegate 
conferences of Labour Party, trade union and co-operative 
representatives had been held, and "a remarkable change has come 
over these conferences. " Members were showing impatience with the 
Roman Catholic agitation and seemed "eager to take up the challenge. " 
N. A. L. T. 's own London conference, held at the Conway Hall on 
16 October 1943, seems to have been very successful. 261 delegates 
46 H. C. Debates, vol-392, col. 96,21.9.43 
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representing 134 organisations, - local Labour Parties, trade 
unions, trades councils and co-operative guilds - attended. 
The speakers were Cove and George Thomas. Thomas was a young 
teacher, a member of the N. U. T. Executive, and a member of 
N. A. L. T. 's Rhondda Branch. He had met Ede early in the year 
when the Parliamentary Secretary had visited schools in Tonypandy. 
Ede's day had finished with a speech at a youth meeting at which 
Thomas had proposed the vote of thanks. Thomas had joined Ede 
for supper afterwards and they had had "an interesting talk on 
post-war reconstruction. " 
47 
For him the White Paper reforms 
were "too vague" and showed a "blindness to the possibilities of 
the common man. " A common leaving age of 16 was essential in 
the interests of working class children. He rejected tripartism, 
claiming that "there would never be equality of status for all 
children unless they all went to the same kind of school. The 
only solution was the multilateral or common school to which all 
children would go. " Cove's arguments were similar. As in his 
Tribune article and Commons speech he put them in the political 
context of the democratic purposes for which the war was being 
fought. "The Tories were the best shop window dressers in the 
world, " he was reported as saying. "They made an attractive 
display that looked progressive, but they never gave away the 
actualities of power and privilege. " Some of the proposals 
required only administrative action. Those requiring legislation 
revealed "deep reaction in matters of vital policy-i" He rejected 
the notion that equality could be achieved by a common code for 
three different kinds of school. "The only solution was the 
multilateral school, " he opined. He quoted the Conservative 
booklet Looking Ahead 
48 
to demonstrate that increased religious 
instruction in the form of additional church school places and 
47 B. L., Ede Diary, vol-7925.1.43-He was later to become a Labour 
M. P. and Speaker of the House of Commons. 
48 Conservative and Unionist Party, Looking Ahead. Educational 
Aims, London 1942 
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compulsory religious instruction in state schools were seen 
by the Conservatives as a "bulwark against revolutionary 
changes. " His views were well reported in the Sunday Observer 
and the Daily Herald. The conference ended with the adoption 
of a resolution which demanded an early bill, "the acceptance of 
the principle of the establishment of the common school providing 
a broad highway from the nursery to the university, " the end of 
the dual system ahd the raising of týe leaving age to 16 within 
three years of the end of the war with Germany. 
50 
Evelyn Denington's attack on the White Paper appeared in 
the New Leader,, the weekly publication of the Independent Labour 
Party, in September. 51 Her headline declared that, "The Butler 
Bill will entrench reaction. " Like Cove, she saw a sinister 
motive behind the Board's plans, noting especially the desire to 
reduce the number of children receiving a grammar school education 
in order to increase the number of able children having an 
education which would suit them for design and craft jobs in 
industry. "We have not heard of any proposals for the 'direction' 
of children from the public schools into industry, " she observed. 
In terms of the Tawney interpretation of secondary schooling she 
saw this as the preservation of the higher administrative jobs 
for the public school products to the exclusion of the able working 
class child. Cove had gone further and had linked this reduction 
in the number of children who were to receive a grammar school type 
of education to the reduction in the need for administrative work 
as the British Empire contracted. Denington proposed specifically 
that any bill which did not include the raising of the leaving age 
to 16 within three years of the end-of the war with Germany should 
be rejected. But even this reform would not achieve equality of 
opportunity. Only the multilateral school could achieve that. 
49 Sunday Observer, 17.10.43, p. 5; Daily Herald, 18.10.43, p. 2 
50 G. L. C. A/NLT/l/2, Report of Conference on the Implications of 
the White Paper on Education, Conway Hall, London, 16.10.43; 
the quotations are all from* the report and are therefore in 
reported speech. 
51 New Leader,, 18.9.43, P. 3 
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As in the Bulletin, there was a strong attack on the proposed 
church settlement. "Which of the priorities are likely to be 
operated first? " she asked. Her reply was, "that which will 
give millions of pounds of public money to the churches. " 
Her final verdict was that, "The White Paper is a cloak for the 
further entrenchment of reaction and class privilege. " N. A. L. T. 
thus saw the proposed reforms as potentially reactionary, regarded 
the public acclaim for them as largely misguided, and wanted the 
Labour Party to demand its price for the passage of legislation. 
Meanwhile the Board's officers were resisting any attempts 
to commit their department more strictly than in the published 
proposals. Following a meeting on 13 September 1943 to consider 
drafts of the Bill, one of the officials wrote, "The only definite 
date in the Bill is that on which the Board becomes a Ministry. 
All the other dates are fixed by order- in-c ounc il and need never 
materialise. 11 That was of course precisely the Labour fear. 
The official suggested that "in order to counter the criticisms", 
definite dates should be fixed for setting up the new local education 
authorities and "possibly for the raising of the leaving age to 15. 
Such comments indicated the discrepancy between the Board's intentions, 
or at least expectations, and the public hopes raised by all the talk 
of reform. 
Holmes was insistent that the Board should not be committed in 
legislation to fulfil such hopes. Indeed he was still willing to 
advocate in October 1943 his own order of priorities. He urged 
Butler to give a higher priority to part-time release for young 
workers to attend continuation colleges than to raising the leaving 
age to 15, let alone 16. Thus in 1943, with the White Paper published, 
the chief official at the Board was still hankering after a leaving 
age of 14 which had been abandoned in 1936, when the Education Act had 
52 P. R. O., Edl36/389, Notes on the draft printed on 11.9.43 
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raised the leaving age to 15- ', That Act was complicated 
by the so-called beneficial exemptions and of course it was 
nullified by the outbreak of war in any case. It is 
extraordinary, nonetheless, that Holmes should have thought 
it worthwhile to express such a view when public expectations 
were so mugh higher than they had been in 1936. He recognised 
that his own preference- might not be politically possible, but 
wanted there to be no doubt that part-time education for those 
over 15 was a higher priority than raising the leaving age to 
16. His main purpose now was to persuade Butler that "ill-informed 
pressure to speed up the introduction of the various reforms "should 
be resisted on the grounds that, if they were introduced under 
"unworthy conditions", there might be revulsion against reform 
itself. -53 
The objectives of the Board were suspected by all sections of 
the Labour Party. These suspicions were expressed in the scepticism 
of M. Ps. in the White Paper debate and the outright hostility of 
N. A. L. T. If Labour educationists had been more confident than they 
were that it was not the Board's intentions to transform the 
progressive and radical aspirations expressed in the opening of the 
White Paper into reality, more of them might have decided that a 
strategy of political division rather than consensus was the right 
course for them to take. But this was another aspect of their 
dilemma. It was a matter of judgement whether the Board and it8 
political head were stating their true objectives. There were 
many in the Labour Party who shared the view of Cove's and 
Denington's critics in N. A. L. T., and who were reluctant to doubt 
the sincerity of such an apparently conciliatory political opponent 
who had rarely opposed Labour's objectives on principlet but had 
53 P. R. O. Edl36/378, Holmes to Butler, 22.10.43 
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seemed beset only by practical difficulties about which his 
knowledge was inevitably greater than theirs. 
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Chapter ll: THE BILL 
The Bill was presented to Parliament on 15 December 1943, two 
days before the Christmas recess began. The Second Reading in the 
Commons took the form of a two-day debate starting on 19 January, the 
day after Parliament re-assembled. As with the White Paper the 
timing ensured that few opportunities could arise for questioning 
-the ministers or for discussions amongst M-Ps. outside the chamber. 
There was still anxiety about the Roman Catholic M. Ps. who by now 
were openly acting as an inter-party sectarian group. As soon as 
Butler rose to begin his speech on the Second Reading of the Bill, 
for example, he was interrupted by two Roman Catholic M-Ps., Tinker 
and Logan, both of, whom were Labour. 
1 
When a financial resolution 
was debated a week later one M. P. expressed the gratitude of Roman 
Catholic members for its loose phrasing which allowed the possibility 
of increasing the state contribution to Roman Catholic schools; "that 
augurs well for the future, " he declared. Another Roman Catholic 
member promised that there would be no difficulties in Commitee if 
the President were to meet Roman Catholic M. Ps. on the financial 
question "behind the chair", as blatant an offer to conclude a private 
deal in order to avoid a parliamentary clash as can be imagined. 
2 
Such was the strength of unity between Roman Catholic members, 
irrespective of party, that Labour's opening speaker in the Second 
Reading debate pledged his party's support for Butler in "any struggle 
he may have against vested interests in the House" and against 
Itenthusiastic sectarian protagonists,,, 
3 The potential hazards from 
this quarter necessitated a tight timetable with the minimum scope 
for controversy. The problem for educational - reformers was that the 
desire to hurry onwards, in order to close this Pandora's box as soon 
.1H. C. Debates, vol-396, col. 208,19.1.44 
2 Ibid., Vol. 396, cols. lO75,1081-1082,28.1.44; the M. Ps. were Wing- 
Commander Grant Ferris and Colonel Arthur Evans 
3 Ibid., vol-396, cols. 233-234,19.1.44 
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as possible, also curtailed discussion on the political and 
educational aspects of the Bill. 
Butler opened and closed his speech on the Second Reading 
with the consensus argument. The Bill was the result of two 
years' work by "many active partners in the education service", 
an attempt to create a synthesis between opposing aspirations, 
and the fruit of the nation's new-found unity which had been 
"hammered on the anvil of this war. " As in the Bill there was 
no reference in his speech to the three types of secondary school, 
but no change had occurred in his intentions or those of his 
officials. Local authority plans would not be accepted unless 
they provided for a "variety of instruction", and "the secondary 
stage will be designed, not only to provide an academic training 
for a select few, but to give equivalent opportunities to all 
children over 11, of making the most of their natural aptitudes. " 
It has generally been assumed5 that, because the reference to the 
three types of secondary school in the White Paper was not 
repeated in the Bill, some change of policy had occurred in the 
meantime. As we have seen, 
6 
the decision to omit the reference 
from the Bill had been taken because of drafting difficulties and 
in order not to ossify local authority secondary school plans for 
all time in the absence of amending legislation. Moreover it had 
been taken in February 1943, i. e. long before the publication of 
the White Paper. The subsequent inclusion of the reference to 
the three types of school in the White Paper was confirmation that 
no change had occurred in the Board's intentions for the future 
pattern of secondary schooling. The fact that the Bill was 
published five months after the White Paper misled people at the 
time and has misled us since into thinking that the Bill represented 
4 Ibid., vol. 396, cols. 208-233,19-1.44 
5 E-g. R. Barker Education and Politics 1900-1951, Oxford 1972, pp. 79-80; 
Barker states that Labour worked hard to ensure that the White 
Paper's three types of school did not appear in the BillIbut he 
was writing without the benefit of having read the Board's papers 
which at that time were not available. 
6 S-upra P-132 
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in this matter a response 
, 
to the criticism of the White Paper. 
We now know that the drafting of the-important clause in the Bill 
preceded the publication of the White Paper by several months, 
and this leads to a quite different interpretation. 
13-- 
iq not referring in his Commons speech to three types of 
secondary school, Butler did not directly raise the question of 
segregated or multilateral secondary schooling. In his reference 
to raising the leaving age to. 16 he was similarly disarming. 
"Any educationist would tell you that the arguments for raising 
the age to 16 are conclusive, " he declared, but there were 
practical difficulties. 
On the question of fees in direct grant schools Butler's 
approach again had the effect of blurring the issue. Boldly 
declaring that "these schools... must be accessible to all, whatever 
their financial circumstances, " and stating that "it is essential 
that the local education authority in planning the education for 
its area should be able to count on places in these schools to the 
extent required to supplement the provision in the maintained schools, " 
and also warning the governors of such schools that their continuance 
on the direct grant list would depend upon the views of local 
authorities as well as on their own wishes, he saw no reason for 
prohibiting fees in such schools. On the contrary, he saw a danger 
that, deprived of the right to charge fees and of the independence 
which the schools regarded as inseparable from that right, some 
schools might prefer to become independent with the result that 
places in them would no longer be available to children in the state 
sector. 
7 In a wireless broadcast the following evening Butler did take 
up the question of secondary school organisation, but was not 
specific about the number of branches. He also repeated his vague 
7 P. R. O. Edl36/475, Text of broadcast by R. A. Butler, 20-1.44 
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White Paper statement which purported to show, without going into 
detail and certainly without revealing where final authority would 
rest, that the decision about a child's placement in a secondary 
school would be taken jointly by parents, teachers and the council. 
"We are offering a varied choice and chance to pupils of different 
types, " he said. "Parents are to be brought into the life of the 
school more than they have been. You want to have something to 
say about the sort of secondary school your child may go to after 
the primary stage. We're not going to arrange this all by 
examinations, but rather by a system of sorting - rather like the 
G. P. O. - in which parents, teachers and authorities all come in 
together. " 
The Labour Party's Reconstruction Education Sub-Committee 
had met on 4 January 1944 to consider its response to the Bill. 
Apart from those who had already contributed to the formulation 
of party policy - Clay, Franklin, Lady Simon, Spikes, Barbara Drake, 
Shearman and Tomlinson - two others were present: Ellen Wilkinson 
and John Parker. The latter's presence was occasioned by his 
nomination as the main Labour speaker in the coming debate. The 
M. P. for Romford in Essex, Parker was an unlikely choice as 
spokesman for the Labour Party on this important occasion, Aged 37 
and, like Butler, educated at Marlborough College under the headship 
of Norwood and then at St. John's College, Oxford (to the Presidency 
of which Norwood was later to accede), he had not hitherto shown 
much interest in education. Throughout the Spring, Summer and 
Autumn of 1943 he had spoken frequently in the Commons, but never 
on education. His party background was as a Fabian; he was general- 
secretary of the Fabian Research Bureau. 
Although the relations between the Labour Party's N. E. C. or 
its sub-committees and the Parliamentary Labour Party have sometimes 
- 
--__________ 
been difficult, on this occasion the committee decided upon its 
responses to the Bill and the parliamentary spokesmen faithfully 
voiced them. It was decided that the Bill must clearly be designed 
to achieve a leaving age of 16, that it should be amended so that it 
enforced the majority interim Fleming Report, 's views on fees in 
direct grant schools, that an official party spokesman should 
announce Labour's opposition to the dual system but its acceptance 
of it in the interests of progress provided'no further concessions 
were made, and that there should be parity of status between types 
of secondary schools. Clay, as chairman, and Morgan Phillips, the 
research department head, had met Ede and now reported to members 
their misgivings about his non-commital replies when he had been 
pressed on the two key legislative questions of the leaving age and 
fees in direct grant schools. Clay, disappointed by Ede's response 
on the question of fees, had "left Mr. Ede in no doubt that the matter 
would be raised in Parliament. " They noted that the Bill contained 
no clause to give legislative force to the White Paper promise of 
parity between the different types of school. Franklin raised the 
question of strategy. "If we are defeated on the two main questions 
of fees and the school leaving age, what is the position of the party? " 
he asked. He did not receive a direct reply9although the implication, 
from the agreed assertion that they were criticising a Bill which was 
welcomed despite these defects, was that the unamended Bill was 
better than none at all. 
8 
Parker's speech in response to Butler's reflected this view. 
He welcomed the Bill, even seeing it as evidence of the Conservatives' 
acceptance of progressive ideas. His own stance sought to combine 
the ideals of both the" meritocrat and the democrat. The nation needed 
to seek and train the most talented for the most responsible jobs, 
8 T. H., Labour Party Records, R. E. S. -C. Minutes 19,4.1.44; notes give 
fuller accounts of the views expressed individually by members 
9 H. C. Debates, vol-396, cols. 233-244,19.1.44 
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whilst giving a high level of education to everybody else. Apart 
from a mild attack on the privileges of public schools, his two main 
criticisms presaged the party divisions to come. Noting that the 
headteachers of Charterhouse and Roedean had signed the majority 
interim Fleming Report as evidence of the unradical. nature of the 
proposal to abolish fees in direct grant schools, he regretted the 
Board's refusal to include these schools in the clause abolishing 
fees in maintained and voluntary schools. Secondly he wanted a 
leaving age of 15 in 1945 and 16 in 1948, with prefabricated 
buildings and the integration of the school building programme with 
the ten-year housing programme to achieve these dates. 
These were the points taken up by other Labour speakers. 
Muff, who had earlier led a group of Labour M. Ps. on a series of 
visits to public schools and now took the opportunity to praise 
them as institutions which it would be a privilege for some working- 
class children to enter, nonetheless wanted the direct grant schools 
to become full members of the national schools system. John Wilmot 
of Kennington noted the anxiety of local authorities which were timuch 
disturbed that the system of direct grants should be continued in the 
Bill. " Ivor Thomas of Keighley voiced Labour's scepticism about the 
leaving age. Moelwyn Hughes of Carmarthen regarded the failure to 
abolish fees in direct grant schools as a blot on the Bill and 
foresaw that in many towns there would be two kinds of grammar 
school - the "snob" school with fee-payers and the second-grade school 
without. Lewis Silkin of Peckham was sceptical about the proposed 
tri-partite organisation of secondary education. "Are we doing 
anything more than abolishing the terms? Are the schools to remain 
just the same? ", he asked. He wanted to know how the retention of 
fees in direct grant schools could be justified, since places taken 
by fee-payers must ipso facto be places which they could not win in 
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open competition. Greenwood, opening for Labour on the second day 
of the debate as he had on the second day of the White Paper debate, 
expressed his concern about the government's intentions on the two 
matters of the leaving age and the direct grant schools. 
10 
When Ede replied to the debate on behalf of the government, the 
part of his remarks on the educational aspects of the Bill which most 
excited the House was his reference. to direct grant schools. 
11 He 
replied to Labour criticisms on this point by repeati 
, ng 
Butler's 
undertaking that the direct grant schools would have to provide 
places needed for local schemes thus, "The first charge on direct 
grant schools is to be the places that are required for filling out 
of the local education authority's system of education. " Moelwyn 
Hughes interrupted to ask about the basis for the selection of the 
pupils. Ede replied, "That is a matter between the local education 
authority and the governors of the schools. " His reply evoked a 
chorus of "Ah" from M. Ps. and the remark9 "Most unsatisfactory" from 
Evelyn Walkden, M. P. for Doncaster. Ede's response was to viewthe 
whole question in terms of the evolution of secondary education. 
Coventry, for example, had all of its boys' secondary education 
provided in direct grant schools financed by the Board and all of 
its girls' secondary education in maintained schools financed by 
local rates, a clearly anomalous situation which must be changed. 
He reminded the House of Butler's pledge when he had "stated most 
explicitly that no child is to be debarred from obtaining this or 
any other form of education for which he is suited and for which the 
local education authority is responsible by reason of the fact that 
his parent cannot afford to pay the fee-" To this he added the 
further pledge that the regulations to be made under the Act would 
ensure that nobody "can buy a place for his child to the exclusion 
of another child better fitted to profit by the education given in 
10 Ibid. vol-396, cols. 259,269,303919-1.44; cols. 454-4559469-470, 
1; 5ý411120.1.44 
11 Ibid., vol-396, cols. 484-499,20.1.44 
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the school. " Such pledges did not answer Silkin's point 
that fee-payers were in direct-grant schools for the very 
reason that they had not gained a free place in open competition 
and were therefore bound to be less well-qualified than non-fee 
payers. The pledges could not be fulfilled by the proposals 
currently before the Commons. Ede did not deal at all with 
Labour anxieties about the leaving age. 
Whilst every Labour contributor to the educational debate 
was thus critical or sceptical about the government's intentions 
on these two points, whilst welcoming the Bill as a whole and 
wishing to assist its passage, the debate was dominated not by 
such issues but by the church school question. When Ede began 
his speech with an apology to the Deputy Speaker lest he should 
"say a few words about education" and begged that he be not 
ruled out of order on that account, his irony was fully justified 
by what had gone before. Speaker after speaker had addressed 
the House not as Conservative, Labour or Liberal, but as Roman 
CathdUp, Anglican or non-conformist. The clash between Roman 
Catholic and non-conformist spokesmen was largely, although not 
exclusively, an internal Labour Party wrangle. Greenwood tried 
to mitigate the effects of Labour's divisions by reminding his 
own party that it was composed of people with a wide variety of 
views on religion and that the Parliamentary Labour Party's 
standing orders allowed members to speak against the party line 
on questions of religious belief. The Labour Party accepted that 
Butler had made "a sincere attempt" to solve the problem. it 
wanted the Bill to be passed and not to be "wrecked by religious 
controversy. " Therefore, Greenwood informed the Commons-that the 
Labour Party, in spite of the hostility which many of its members 
felt towards the dual system, would support its continuance "in 
order that we may obtain the educational developments essential' 
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to a democratic community. " This was the statement of principle 
and of strategy which the Reconstruction Education Sub-Committee 
had wanted. Nonetheless speaker after speaker rose to address 
the House solely on the denominational issue, ignoring all other 
aspects of the Bill. It was a non-party M. P., Professor Gruffydd, 
the representative of the University of Wales and a member of the 
Fleming* Committoýe, who reminded the Commons that it was discussing 
an education bill, "not a bill -to.. .. fortify religious convictions. " 
12 
The other aspect of the Bill which interested the Labour Party - 
whether secondary education were to be segregated or multilateral 
and, if the former, whether there was to be parity of conditions 
between the different types of school - was barely discussed. Apart 
from Silkin's scepticism there were few references to it. It was 
as if the matter had been shelved, as in a sense it had, since the 
omission of a reference to types of secondary school in the 
legislation made a discussion of it superfluous. Decisions on 
this matter would now be political and administrative, not 
legislative. 
The response of the Labour Party outside the Commons also 
concentrated on what were now the two main legislative objectives 
of a leaving age of 16 and the abolition of fees in direct grant 
schools. As its meeting before the Second Reading the T. U. C. 
Education Committee re-iterated its commitment to 16 as the leaving 
age; it was an essential part of the "full plan" and war-time 
achievements showed what was possible in terms of building given 
the will. Fees in direct grant schools should be abolished by law 
or, if this were not necessary, by administrative action. 
13 Butler's 
statement on this matter fell short of what the T. U. C. wanted. 
Barbara Drake, a prominent member of the Reconstruction Education 
Sub-Committee, made the same points in a pamphlet, demanding a 
12 Ibid., vol-396, col. 417,20.1.44 
13 T. U. C., Education Committee Minutes 4,13-1.44; Note on the 
Education Bill 
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leaving age of 16 "from the start" and the abolition of fees 
in direct grant schools, envisaging the possibility of common 
secondary schooling in which institutions would "merge" into 
each other if these great obstacles were removed. 
14 
N. A. L. T. 's 
response was in more general political terms. It condemned 
the Bill as hypocritical, noting that much which Labour wanted 
was not certain to be achieved, since it was those very aspects 
of the Bill which depended on future ministerial decision rather 
than present legislative force. It lamented the concessions to 
the churches which, in its view, had been made without the radical 
educational changes for which the sacrifice, as it was regarded, 
15 - 
might have been justified. In another article in the New 
Leader Evelyn Denington denounced the Bill as "a sham", warning 
that "the raising of the age to 16 ... remains a pious hope in the 
misty future. " 
16 
The Committee stage of the Bill began on 8 February and 
lasted until May 1944, taking up the major part of the Commons' 
time during those months. It lasted much longer than Butler had 
hoped. He had asked the chief whip to allocate ten days for 
Committee, which would not allow detailed discussion of a complex 
Bill, but only "a pleasant canter through the main issues. " 
17 
Again the sectarian issue dominated and prolonged discussions, 
with three Roman Catholic Labour M. Ps. - Logan, Tinker and Stokes - 
well to the fore in pressing their church's claims, and Welsh 
Labour M. Ps. retaliating for the non-conformists. Indeed Butler 
once allowed his diplomatic guard to drop and made a party point 
that he did not like "to interfere in the internecine strife on 
the other side, which resembles the situation which so frequently 
arises in the Balkans. " 
18 
The Labour Party's Reconstruction Education Sub-Committee 
met again. There was a slight constitutional difficultY, since 
14 B. Drake, post-War Discussion Pamphlets No. 2. Education, London 
1944, pp. 4-5 
15 G. L. C. , AINLTII V/15, Bulletin, January-February 
1944 
16 New Leader, 1.1.44, p. -'? 1? P. R. O. Edl36/378, Butler to Stuart, 22.11.43 
18 H. C. Debatesivol-397, col. 256,16.2.44 
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the convention was that, once the Committee stage had started, 
matters should be left entirely in the hands of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party, but it had been agreed that the committee could 
make suggestions to the P. L. P. 
19 
It was rather a fine point, 
since the Commons Committee began its consideration of the Bill 
only on the day of the party meeting. Nonetheless it is a fact 
tha 
-t 
party organisations paid little attention to the Bill from 
that day onwards. The Reconstruction Education Sub-Committee 
did not meet again. The T. U. C. Education Committee agreed to 
make one final effort to persaude Parliament to its point of 
view on the two main questions, and to send its notes on these 
points to M. Ps., but thereafter it did not concern itself very 
much with the legislation, correctly divining that no major 
changes were now likely. 
20 N. A. L. T. in its Bulletin continued 
to denouce the Bill as a measure largely concerned with increasing 
state endowments for religious institutions, and went so far as to 
write off the Bill, arguing that a Labour government would have to 
introduce a new one. 
21 T. hus matters were now truly in the hands 
of M. Ps., with all major battles already won or lost, with the 
balance of the parties so one-sided that the government ran no 
risk of defeat, and with M. Ps. speaking increasingly not only for 
sectarian interests, as had already been noted, but also in the 
interests of particular forms of local government and for sectional 
interests such as those of teachers. The pre-occupation of Cove 
with the last of these diversions from the main issues of 
educational reform meant that N. A. L. T. 's parliamentary voice 
was heard much more often on questions of teachers' rights than 
on Labour's educational policies. 
An important amendment was proposed by Butler himself and 
accepted by the Committee. This allowed children to be "educated 
19 T. H., Labour Party Records, R. E. S. -C. Minutes 20,8.2.44 
20 T. U. C., Education Committee Minutes 6,14-3.44 
21 G. L. C., A/NLT/lV/15, Bulletin, April 1944 
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in accordance with the wishes of their parents", provided that 
this was compatible with efficient instruction and avoided 
unreasonable expense. Butler explained that the clause related 
to the number and types of schools to be provided. The 
qualifications were important, however, and might largely nullify 
the apparent respect for parental wishes. The local authority 
would decide how efficient instruction could, best. be provided. 
The clause could not bridge the gulf between the incompatible 
ideals of schooling based on selection by the local authority of 
pupils for segregated schooling with different aims and courses, 
and schooling based on parental wishes. Only in such questions 
as single-sex and denominational schooling could the general 
wishes of parents be reflected in a locality's pattern of schools, 
and even then it was the local authority which had to assess those 
wishes. This same issue came up on a later amendment, when Cove 
expressed the anxiety that such attention to group parental wishes 
would "Balkanise the entire educational system" with schools for 
non-conformists, Jews, agnostics, atheists, Liberals or Tories. 
The origin of the clause was a Roman Catholic complaint that 
parents' rights were being reduced in this Bill. It had nothing 
to do with the individual parent's right to choose a particular 
school for his child. It was concerned only with the obligation, 
highly qualified as has been seen, upon the local authority to 
reflect general parental wishes in the variety of schools which 
it provided. 
22 Butler's handling of the questions on this 
clause was somewhat evasive. The notes provided by the Board23 
suggested that Butler should say that "it will be open to a parent 
to express a preference for, say, a Roman Catholic school, for a 
secondary school of the grammar school type, or for a boarding 
school, 11 but that he should stress that the "wishes of parents 
22 H. C. Debatesivol-397, cols. 138-143,15.2.44; cols-197-Tgg$256, 
16.2.44 
23 P. R. O. Edl36/479, Notes for Butler's speech 
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though carrying much weight cannot be conclusive. " He did not in 
fact volunteer such views, but confined his references to the 
interests of blocs of parents. He was, howeverl asked the direct 
question whether, in the event of a dispute between a parent and 
the local authority over the placement of a child in a modern, 
technical or grammar school, the parent's view would prevail. In 
a long prevaricating reply full of qualifications and exceptions, 
. he nonetheless said 
that he could give the assurance which his 
questioner sought. The clause was agreed on the basis of Butler's 
qualified affirmative reply. 
Lewis Silkin moved an amendment which was important from the 
Labour viewpoint. Noting that, although the White Paper reference 
to three types of school had not been included in the Bill, he 
nonetheless wanted to ensure that there would be "parity of conditions 
for all types of secondary schools maintained by the local education 
authority. " Butliýr successfully asked for the amendment to be 
withdrawn. on the grounds that he did not want any one item which 
would be covered by subse@juent regulations to be isolated and included 
in the Act itself. But he had "no difficulty in accepting the 
principle. 11 
24 The officia-ld advice to Butler was less diplomatically 
phrased, but more revealing. Whilst the regulations would "prescribe 
similar standards" the amendment would make "such parity a statutory 
requirement. " 
25 As with other reforms, Labour was keen to see its 
ideals given legislative force, but it was frequently on those very 
issues that the Board asked Parliament to take its promi8es on trust 
and resisted legislative commitments. 
The two major changes in the Bill desired by the Labour Party - 
a leaving age of 16 and the abolition of fees in direct grant schools - 
were both the subjects of divisions. The amendment on the first was 
24 H. C. Debates, vol-397, cols. 245-246,16.2.44 
25 P -R -O. Edl36/4,? g Note undated and unsigned 
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not, however, moved by a Labour M. P. I but by Mrs. Cazalet Keir who 
had already shown herself to be more in tune with Labour's educational 
ideals than those of her own party. The amendment also stood in the 
name of Creech-Jones for Labour and Clement Davies for the Liberals. 
She was supported by other Conservative members, including Viscountess 
Astor, as well as by Labour speakers. Her amendment required the 
leaving age to be raised to 1ý within a year of the Act's coming into 
operation, whilst allowing the minister the right to come back to 
Parliament each year for three years to seek approval for a one-year 
delay. This was very much in line with Labour's wishes. The Board's 
view was very hostile. Its note to Butler was simple: "The object of 
the amendment appears to be quite outside the bounds of all practical 
politics. " 
26 Cove enthusiastically supported the amendment. Until 
now he considered that the House had been discussing the claims of 
various religious parties. He acknowledged the President's difficulties 
and accepted the need for concessions to the churches, but only if týere 
were "a real educational content in this Bill. " Without aleaving age 
of 16 there was no guarantee that there would be any such content. 
Butler made a long speech in reply to the debate. As was now his 
custom he did not oppose the objective, but emphasized the practical 
difficulties. Greenwood, as leading spokesman for Labour, then rose 
to express his disappointment at Butler's reply. "I really have done 
my best for my right honourable Friend about this Bill, " he said 
sorrrowfully, but found that Butler now accepted the arguments but not 
the measure. The House divided and the amendment was defeated. 
137 M-Ps-, including most of those on the Labour benches who were not 
in the government and some Conservatives, voted in favour. 1? 2 M. Ps., 
including most Conservative and all Labour members of the government 
who were present, voted against. 
27 
A week later, on an amendment from Lewis Silkin, the future of 
direct grant schools was debated. His argument was that the retention 
26 P. R. O. Edl36/481, Note, undated and unsigned 
27 H. C. Debates, vol-398, cols. 71c)-r? 58,21-3.44 
261 
of a system by which some pupils were admitted because of their 
parents' ability to pay rather than their own ability to win a place 
was contrary to the agreed plan for free secondary education. He 
believed that "the vast majority of Hon. Members in this House, if 
they were free to decide, and certainly the majority of the vast 
mblic outside, would want education to become democratic and .C -- 
ayailable to all on equal terms. " Coye, in his longest speech in 
Committee, supported strongly. He argued that, "as a matter of 
high social democratic policy, we ought to sweep the field- clean 
throughout the whole state system. " A Conservatiye supported on 
the principle that "there shall not be any distinction drawn as to 
the kind of secondary education a child shall receive because of the 
financial position of the parents. " By contrast an isolated Labour 
M. P. opposed the amendment, on the grounds that the same result would 
be achieved "by natural eyolution" as excellence in the public system 
reduced the demand for private education and fee-paying. Greenwood 
concluded the debate for Labour. He was conciliatory in tone and, as 
before, somewhat sorrowful that he had to take part in a division. 
"I have not tried to be troublesome about the Bill. I have done my 
best to help my right honourable Friend, even when I went into the 
lobby against him, as I may have to today, " he lamented. Butler's 
defence of fee-paying was limp and reflected his own lack of conviction. 
He knew that he had to oppose the amendment, yet could not convincingly 
argue that fees must be abolished in voluntary grammar schools but not 
in direct grant schools. His officials' advice reflected his dilemma. 
The issue had been raised on an earlier amendment proposed by Cove. 
It had not been called, but Holmes' terse advice finished, "The 
amendment must be rejected. 128 A week before the debate Williams, 
who had taken a keen interest in this question and who favoured the 
abolition of fees, presented Butler with a file of papers on the topic. 
28 P. R. O. Edl36/482, Note by Holmesundated 
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Butler appended a note which indicated that he had read it with care. 
He marked particularly the section giving the educational arguments 
for the abolition of fees. Some-one else later endorsed the file 
with the justified comment that it contained almost no arguments in 
favour of the retention of fees. That accurately reflected Williams' 
view that in fact there was none. 
29 
Thus Butler knew what he had to 
achieve but had few arguments to deploy which he himself found 
convincing. "I have to take the world as I find it, " he told the 
Commons. One of the Bill's fundamental principles was that there 
should be a variety of schools. Having "freed the vast range of 
secondary education, all we say is that, consistent with our 
philosophy, there should be a few schools - there are very few - in 
which it should be possible for parents to contribute to the cost of 
the education of their children. " As if to minimise the importance 
of the question he stated that only 4% of secondary schools were 
direct grant. His generalisations did not hide the fact that these 
schools were being made exceptions to a principle which Butler had 
himself proclaimed in his White Paper, and -that the reason was his 
failure to convince his own party. He went as far as his party 
problem would allow him to go. The Board would "expect the local 
authority to assess its needs and tell the Governors what places 
it requires. " In areas where direct grant schools provided most of 
the grammar school places the Board might have to review the direct 
grant list. Whilst the interim Fleming Report had recommended 
abolition of fees, this was not, he claimed, its principal 
recommendation. (It was, of course, the one matter on which he had 
sought early guidance). The direct grant schools were held to be 
extensions of that desirable variety which hitherto had consisted of 
three types of secondary schools. Butler's response showed all his 
mastery of diplomatic language. When the Committee divided Silkin's 
29 P. R. O. Edl36/432, Williams to Butler, 20-3.44, with note by Butler 
and an anonymous endorsement 
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amendment attracted 95 votes. It was defeated by the 183 votes 
of the Conservatives and of Labour ministers. The latter included 
Attlee who had to support the government of which he was a member 
rather than the party of which he was leader. 
30 
Towards the end of the Committee stage an episode occurred 
which made plain to all the realities of the parliamentary situation. 
The Commons had already passed a motion in favour of equal pay in the 
civil service, and a group of Conservatives now sponsored an amendment 
to the Education Bill to achieve this for women teachers. The 
amendment stood in the name of Mrs. Cazalet Keir, who had already 
instigated the division on the leaving age. She was supported not 
only by such a well-known feminist as Lady Astor, but also by many 
younger Conservative M. Ps. such as Peter Thorneycroft and Quintin Hogg. 
The motion was bound to be supported by the Labour Party and Parker 
indicated that Labour M-Ps. would vote for it. Butler's diplomatic 
skills were insufficient to prevent a division. Having offered to 
talk to the Chancellor of the Exchequer about it, he warned that, if 
he were defeated, it would not be in the interests of "this great 
reform which I hold in my hand. " Excitement mounted. There were 
shouts of "Divide! " Hogg warned that in the absence of a "set 
assurance" he would vote against the government. There were more 
calls for a vote. After more speeches Butler pleaded again for 
restraint, claiming that he could not direct independent salary 
negotiators to accept particular salary scales. He again offered 
to speak to the Chancellor. "You can still do that, " called an 
interrupter. "Yes, I could still do that afterwards, if I were 
still there, " retorted Butler. Thus he implied that the government's 
suryiYal, or at least his own, depended on victory in this vote. To 
emphasize the point he added, "I must put myself and the government 
30 H. C. Debates, vol - 398, cols. 1272-1312,28-3.44 
in the hands of the Committee". The amendment was carried by one 
vote, with 117 for and 116 against. Greenwood for the Labour Party 
as a whole, Bevan for the Labour left and Hogg for the Conservative 
rebels all rose to urge the government not to regard the vote as one 
of confidence. Anthony Eden replied that Butler had left the House 
in no doubt that it was. The next day Churchill himself spoke 
on the matter. The Commons must withdraw the whole amended clause 
now and the government would re-introduce its own unsullied clause 
at the Report stage. It was an authoritarian statement making the 
future conduct of the war dependent on the Commons coming to heel. 
The Commons somersaulted and the clause was withdrawn by a majority 
of more than 400 votes. Clearly the Bill was not to be amended, 
save on the motion of Butler himself. 
31 The Bill had its Third 
Reading in the Commons on 11 May and then went to the Lords. it 
received the royal assent on 3 August 1944. 
The parliamentary treatment of the Bill illustrated well the 
problems of the Parliamentary Labour Party as an instrument for 
educational reform. It also showed the consequences of the strategy 
adopted by the party leadership of not only taking part in acoalition 
government for the duration of the war, but also of allowing domestic 
legislation which was of prime importance to Labour to be drafted in 
circumstances which allowed Labour ministers little direct influence 
and yet reduced Labour's parliamentary strength. 
The dangers of this strategy had been noted by Harold Laski% the 
Labour leader who had' instituted the party's programme of policy- 
making for the post-war period, when he had warned that legislation 
passed now would last for twenty years and had advised that, if it 
were poor or inadequate, it might be better left unpassed for the time 
being'. 32 Laski's view was at odds with that of Attlee, who expressed 
31 Ibid., vol . 398 , cols . 1356-1396,28-3.44; cols. 1452-1457,148G-1524 29-3.44; cols-1578-1656,30-3.44 




his irritation in 1941 by explaining, "I am sufficiently experienced 
in warfare to know that the frontal attack with a flourish of trumpets, 
heartening as it is, is not the best way to capture a position". 
Whilst the Education Bill was still in Committee he gave a longer and 
more reasoned response to Laski's criticism in the form of a letter 
which he typed himself. A coalition for the prosecution of the war 
required that neither capitalist nor socialist pi7inciples could prevail, 
but that whoever governed after the war had the right to expect that 
some preparations had already been made. The new government would 
doubtless want to alter some things, "but a great number of matters 
must be settled now and will not be susceptible of much alteration 
because action will have to be taken immediately. " Turning specifically 
to domestic politics he wrote, "On home affairs there are a vast number 
of matters which do not involve party politics, but which are nonetheless 
important. There are other matters on which some agreement can be come 
to. There are others in which the party differences are so great that 
they must await a decision by the country. We have to work today with 
the House of Commons which we have got.,, 
33 The Education Bill was 
clearly not in his last category. It was a matter which did not 
necessitate a great party division. 
Attlee's defence of his position could be sustained in relation to 
education only if Labour participants in the coalition government worked 
successfully to promote Labour's objectives within that context. There 
is no evidence to suggest that any Labour ministers except Ede, Bevin 
and Tomlinson made significant attempts to influence the legislation. 
Bevin and Tomlinson at the Ministry of Labour consistently and strenuously 
tried to ensure an early raising of the laving -age to 16, but they failed 
to achieye its inclusion in the Act. The consideration of the proposed 
33 Quoted in K-Martin, Harold Laski, London 1953, -pp. 158-160 
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legislation by the Lord President's Committee and the War Cabinet 
was cursory and, Bevin apart, no Labourminister attempted to promote 
Labour's ideals. 
Ede's main contribution from a party point of view was to achieve 
the deletion of any reference to the three types of secondary school 
from the Bill. But, as we have already noted, his motiye was not to 
promote common or multilateral schooling, but rather to allow a great 
variety of institutions providing secondary education in accordance 
with local needs and to free local authorities from an imposed rigid 
pattern of schools. Yet he seemed to have a much more open attitude 
than that prevalent at the Board. As he explained in a speech in 
1944, "We have a large number of children, every one of which gives 
to the world gifts that are peculiar to the individual child. The 
child and not the subject becomes the centre of our education. 
04 
In his Third Reading speech he declared that the Act would bring 
education "as far as possible and for as long as possible in a common 
school.,, 
35 H. e had in mind a system free from financial obstacles 
in the admission of pupils to particular schools, and not the 
multilateral school, for he had rejected the notion of abolishing 
private preparatory schools, 
36 
was hostile to what he called a state 
monopoly in education, and constantly praised the virtues of variety 
both in the function of schools ahA the means of controlling them. 
Moreover his desire to delete the reference to the three types of 
school met with the immediate agreement of the Board's officials 
who wanted rigid segregation. Whatever Ede's motive, the Board's 
purposes were served as well as any other by the deletion of the 
reference. Nonetheless, and irrespective of Ede's motive, the 
legislative position by August 1944 was that, whereas there was no 
statutory obligation on local authorities to have multilateral schools 
or even parity between different types of schools, neither was there 
34A speech made to the Board of Deputies of British Jews. Butler 
also spoke; both speeches were printed as R. A. Butler, The Education 
Bill, London 1944; the quotation from Ede is on p. 11 
35 H. C. Debates, vol-399, col. 2142,11-5.44 
36 Supra P. 158 
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a statutory obligation to have a tripartite or any other particular 
form of secondary education. The new Minister of Education would 
have considerable latitude as far as legislative obligations were 
concerned. 
On the longer-established demands of the Labour Party, viz. 
that all secondary education should be planned on the basis of a 
school life lasting 'at least until. the age of 16 and that there 
should be no fees in any schools receiving public grants, Ede did 
not use his position to promote his party's aims. His relations 
with his party's educational reformers were not close. He was much 
more committed to the Board's policies than to his party's. As 
early as September 1941 he had indicated to Butler that, although not 
satisfied with the Green Book he "could not reject so overwhelming a 
consensus of opinion in its favour... if it represented the considered 
compromises arrived at by all the many interests to be consulted.,, 
37 
He seems to have seen his -function as that of supporting Butler and 
helping to achieve his goals, which differed little from his own. 
Thus he played a supportive role. Butler later expressed his gratitude 
for "the warm support of Chuter Ede who had been himself a teacher", 
and recorded his appreciation of Ede as "a loyal collaborator from the 
Labour Party. "38 The latter description seems especially apposite. 
Whilst being remote from his own party's education policy-makersl 
he was not an insider at the Board, living in a different world from 
his colleagues. Theirs was a world of close relationships bonded by 
school and university links, club membership, and years of collaboration 
at the Board. Whilst Parker, Labour's spokesman during the Committee 
stage, shared this world, Ede did not. Ramsbotham, Butler and Spens 
were all members of the Carlton Club. Norwood, Williams, Leeson 
(spokesman for the public schools) and Savage (L. C. C. Education Officer, 
whose "local authority" opinion was often sought) were members of the 
37 P. R. O. Edl36/215tEde to Butler, 10.9.41 
38 R. A. ButlersThe Art of the Possible, London 1971, p. 96 and p-100 
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Athenaeum. Butler and Parker had been pupils of Norwood at 
Marlborough College. Butler had been a fellow of Corpus Christi, 
Cambridge when Spens had been a tutor and was elected Master. 
Both Leeson and Parker had been undergraduates at St. John's College, 
Oxford, although before Norwood became its President. Apart from 
the Board's current officials, Leeson and Savage had both been Board 
officials, the former from 1919 to 1924, the latter from 1919 until 
1940. when he left as Senior Chief Inspector. Williams, who seems 
to have been the most influential contributor to the discussions, 
had been assistant secretary to the Spens Committee and was an 
assessor to the Norwood and Fleming Committees; no other man had 
his finger in so many of the appropriate pies. 
39 Ede did not 
figure in any of these relationships. 
Ede's diary conveys the impression of a man unmoved by the 
hopes and excitements which inspired the educational reformers of 
the time. Up-dating the administrative structures of the educational 
system seems to have been in his view the limit of what was needed. 
In this sense he was as much the prisoner of his long experience as 
were the Board's officials. The pattern of secondary school 
development had been established long ago, and Ede was now happy to 
help in the eradication of the inconsistencies and anomalies which 
had inevitably arisen. For the most part his approach was 
legalistic and his opinions were formed in the historical context 
of secondary education as it had evolved in the first part of the 
century rather than as part of a vision of the future. 
Thus, whatever the theoretical merits of Attlee's view, there 
is no evidence to suggest that Labour in the government contributed 
in any significant way to the advancement of the party's educational 
causes. The only major party decision, and indeed the only matter 
39 The many connections between these leading figures are shown 
graphically on p-289 
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on which the views of the Board's Officials did not hold sway 
(apart from the settlement of the dual system controve rsy, where 
they had no fixed view and were delighted at Butler's and Ede's 
diplomatic triumph in finding a via media)q was that on the direct 
grant schools. On this matter a Conservative Party view, which 
Butler did not share but which he could not changed, prevailed. 
The parliamentary proceedings werejong but they did not 
change the Bill very much on the major issues, and certainly not 
in Labour's favour. Holmes' dictum that the public at large 
could influence the legislation through their M. Ps. was quite 
disingenuous. He resisted vigorously any changes in the agreed 
plans. Churchill chose an amendment , which was on a side-issue, 
as the occasion to issue his ultimatum that, if he were ever, -defeated 
in the Commons, he would walk away from the war and leave some-one 
else to deal with the defeat of Hitler. The Labour Party was even 
more anxious than the Conservative Party to get the parliamentary 
proceedings over as quickly as possible, since their predominant 
feature was the almost daily pressing by Roman Catholic Labour M. Ps. 
of their church's case and the occasional internecine dispute when 
the non-conformist representatives were goaded into retaliation. 
The Act was neutral on the question of secondary school organisation, 
but was a defeat for Labour on the questions of the leaving age and 
fees in direct grant school, whilst parity of conditions in secondary 
schools was not even mentioned. 
c(%. / 
EPILOGUE 
Chapter 12: 1THE NATION'S SCHOOLS' - LABOUR'S DEBACLE 
The Education Act was regarded in 1944 and afterwards as a 
triumph for Butler and it is often identified by reference to his 
name. It is still in 1979 the principal legislation governing 
schools in England and Wales. Although it has been much amended, 
no government has brought forward a measure to replace it, and the 
greater part of the major re-casting of secondary education on 
comprehensive lines, which has been achieved under government 
direction since 196-5, has been carried out within the terms of 
the 1944 Act. There can therefore be no doubt about the importance 
of the legislation. It is wrong, however, to conclude either that 
Butler was the main architect of the measure or that it represented 
a radical change of educational policy in response to the egalitarian 
mood engendered by the war. 
Butler's main contribution to the passage of this legislation 
was his diplomatic skill which was most evident in his handling of 
the dual system negotiations. In addition his personal inclination 
to accept that the role of parental income in the allocation of children 
to post-primary schools should be reduced enabled him to co-operate with 
his political opponents, the teachers and the local authorities more 
easily than most of his party colleagues could have done. On this 
matter he carried his party, much of which was either indifferent or 
reluctant, failing only on the question of direct grant schools. 
On many important matters, however, he did not succeed in 
changing his officials' minds. It was they, and not he, who were 
the architects of the Act's provision for secondary education. 
Their view of public consultation, not his, prevailed. They issued 
their confidential Green Book, which was never officially disclosed 
to M-Ps. in general let alone the public at large, for consultations 
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with those branches of the education service which they considered 
to be in a professional relationship with the Board. Butler and 
Ede met many deputations, but no change was made in the main 
educational proposals of the Green Book. Legislation was in draft 
almost a year before its publication and, in spite of Eden's denial 
in the Commons on 16 July., whilst some of these deputations were 
still presenting their thoughts in good faith at the Board's offices. 
Committees were set up and their views, if they accorded with those 
of the Board, were publicised; whilst, if they did not, the report 
was. delayed or its authors denigrated. The only major changes 
eflected in Parliament itself were those belated amendments which 
Butler himself proposed to increase the rights of parents and to 
make a further financial concession to the voluntary schools. It 
was made clear beyond doubt by Churchill's diktat of 29 March 1944 
that Parliament was not intended to alter what the government had 
decided. The cabinet itself had given scant attention to the draft 
legislation. The Board was thus largely unsupervised by the two 
groups to which constitutionally it was answerable, the cabinet and 
Parliament. 
Apart from the proposals on the dual system and to a lesser 
extent those on the structure of local education authorities, the 
views of the Board's officials as finalized in May 1941 emerged 
largely unscathed in the Act of 1944. Those views were gauged to 
maintain the essential elements of a segregated and selective system 
of schooling for children over the age of 11 in spite of the 
egalitarian mood of the times which the Board's most politically 
shrewd official, R. S. Wood, saw might lead to a large Labour majority 
in Parliament after the war. The political objective of the Board's 
officials required that legislation be passed before that day came. 
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The Board's officials, with the exception of Cleary, were committed 
to the continuation of the Hadow re-organisation of elementary 
schools to provide post-11 education for the mass of children, whilst 
minorities were selected for academic or technical education in 
separate schools. They recognised that the admission of pupils to 
these selective schools according to their parents' ability to pay 
was no longer defensible in the prevailing social climate. Williams 
went further and enthusiastically embraced the view that selective 
schools should become much more rigorously selective in an academic 
sense, even advocating the abolition of fees in direct grant schools. 
The Board's officialss under R. S. Wood's guidance, had already made 
this advance between the publication of the S ens Report,, which they 
had promptly rejected, and the commencement of their planning for the 
future. But, apart from Cleary's two attempts to promote multilateral 
schools or at least common courses for 11-13 year olds, the Board's 
officials remained committed to Hadow. They successfully ensured 
that their views prevailed. 
The Green Book, the Act and the post-war development of secondary 
education were identical in all main respects. Secondary education 
was to begin at the age of 11. The re-organisation of elementary 
schools, so that children over 11 would be educated in separate 
departments if not separate buildings, was to remain the means by 
which the mass of children were to receive something beyond elementary 
schooling. Their education was to terminate at 15. That of 
technical college pupils was to last until the ages of 15 or 16, 
whilst grammar school children were to be provided with a school 
place until they were 16 or 18. Mistakes in selection were 
theoretically to be corrected by reviews of all Pupils' progress at 
the age of 13, although nobody ever stated this with conviction. 
Af t) 
Direct grant schools were to remain and to charge fees. The 
quite distinct objectives of the three types of school were 
r6lated to the stratification of employment into professional, 
technical and clerical grades, and manual work. There was no 
statutory obligation to have Parity of conditions between the 
three types of school. For secondary education the Act was a 
landmark on the evolutionary path which had begun in 1867, when 
tripartism began its life as the ide"*e fixe of English education. 
In that year the Endowed Schools Commission found a desire by 
parents for three kinds of school beyond the elementary level: 
public schools leading to the universities and the professions, 
endowed grammar schools for the middle class and business careers, 
and a third type, as yet non-existent, providing schooling for 
potential manual workers to the age of 14.1 By 1944 inroads had 
been made into the class exclusiveness of selective schools, the 
Yariety of state schools had been increased, and the length of 
school life for the majority of children was about to be increased 
by one year. On matters which were regarded by the Board's 
officials as purely educational, the triumph was theirs not Butler's. 
The most influential of those officials in the secondary sphere 
was G. G. Williams. In 1954 he looked back on the Act to which he 
had contributed so much. By then he was a knight and the retired 
Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Education. Reviewing the ten 
years of post-war educational development, he commented, "It says 
much for our political system that at no time was there any violent 
breach of policy. " He added that "the real explanation of its 
[the Act's] success is to be found in the existence of a united 
opinion both inside and outside Parliament such as is seldom 
found save in times of great crisis. 12 The consensus argument 
1 A. V. Judges, 'Tradition and the Comprehensive School' British 
, 
Journal of Educational Studies vol. 1l, no. l, November 19539P. 5 
2 G. G. Williams, 112r First Ten Years of the Ministry of Education', 
British Journal, 'TEdu cat ional Studies, vol. 111 , no. 2, May 1955, 
pp. 101-102 
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was still being used and to the same effect. Forgotten were 
Cleary's advocacy of multilateral schools and of common courses 
for 11-13 year Olds, the latter of which was also advocated by 
Norwood, the support for multilateral schools not only from 
Labour M. Ps. but also from Conservative M. Ps. and teachers, the 
anxieties of Butler himself about the earliness of selection and 
the difficulties of later transfers, the overwhelming support for 
the raising ot the leaving age to 16 which included both Spens and 
Norwood, the consensus in favour of the abolition of fees, in direct 
grant schools which included Williams himself, the local authorities 
and the teachers, and excluded only some Conservative M-Ps. and the 
schools in question, and the expectation indeed assumption that the 
new secondary schools were to have parity of conditions. The 
administrator's art was as influential as the politician's diplomacy 
in the making of the 1944 Act. 
The only one of the Board's aims for secondary education which 
was not mentioned in the Act itself was the central one of the 
tripartite division of secondary schools. This denoted not a change 
of policy but a difficulty with drafting. However, the new occupant 
of the ministerial chair had legislative latitude on this question. 
Events ensured that at the crucial time when local authorities were 
preparing their school development plans, the administrators' hands 
were strengthened by the arrival of weak ministers. 
In May 194-5 Churchill proposed that the coalition government 
should be maintained until the Japanese were defeated. This might 
be a very long time. Churchill was aware of the U. S. A. 's development 
of the atomic bombs which were to be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
and terminate the war earlier than expected. Attlee and the 
Labour Party were not. There was a trap here for Labour which 
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Bevin wished to enter and about which Attlee was uncertain. 
Churchill's timing was poor. The Labour Party Conference was 
in session at Blackpool and it was there that Attlee received 
the proposal., The conference was chaired by Ellen Wilkinson 
who had just returned with Attlee from San Francisco where they 
had taken part in the meetings to set up the United Nations. 
Labour delegaýes left their leaders in no doubt that they wanted 
an early election. Attlee still hesitated and offered Churchill 
a continuation of the coalition until October when a general 
election should be held. Churchill rejected this, dissolved 
Parliament and announced an election for july. 
3 The coalition 
government was thus ended and replaced by a caretaker Conservative 
government. This of course necessitated the appointment of new 
people to fill the vacancies left by departing Labour ministers. 
Butler moved from education to the Ministry of Labour, which was a 
promotion, for he was now in the cabinet. His successor in charge 
of education was not in the cabinet. 
Churchill's choice as the new Minister was Richard Law, the 
younger son of Bonar Law. He had been at the Foreign Office for 
most of the war and had not previously shown any interest in 
educational matters. , 
His Oxford college was St. John's, although 
he had been there before Norwood arrived as President. His Commons 
career was to end with the loss of his seat in the 1945 election. 
It could not be said of his Parliamentary Secretary that she lacked 
experience in the field of educational politics. Mrs. Cazalet Keir 
was the Conservative advocate of multilateral schools in the Commons 
debate on the White Paper, the proposer of the amendment to raise 
the leaving age to 16 when the Bill was in Committee, and above all 
the proposer of the amendment to bring equal pay for women teachers 
3 A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, Oxford 1965tP-595 
C. R. AttleegAs It Happened, London 1954, pp. 134-138 
H. Morrison, An Autobiography, London, 1960, p. 235 
H. DaltongThe Fateful YearsqLondon 1957, pp. 458-459 
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which had caused the government's defeat and so angered Churchill. 
She had little reason to expect preferment from Churchill, least 
of all in the field of education. Churchill's choice may be seen 
as an example of magnanimity towards an erstwhile thorn in his flesh, 
evidence of his sense of humour or testimony to his indifference 
towards education. When he telephoned her with his customary lack 
of consideration in the early hours of the morning, her first thought 
was that the telephone would bring bad news, such as the death of a 
relative in the war. She remembered little more of the conversation 
than Churchill Is comment that "there were just as many girls to look 
after as boys. " 
4 
Their one important act during this brief period of office was 
to issue a pamphlet entitled, The Nation's Schools. 
5 It did not accord 
with Mrs. Cazalet Keir's views. She did not contribute to its drafting. 
She, like every other M. P. , had an election to fight. It did accord 
precisely with the views of the Ministry's officials. Arguing that 
there was already a tripartite system of secondary schools and that the 
Act required enough changes without being extended to include new forms 
of school, the pamphlet caused particular offence by advocating a 
limitation on grammar school places. This had, of course, always been 
an objective of the Board's officials, for they believed that the failure 
of many grammar school pupils to stay at school until they were 16 and of 
an even greater proportion to obtain their school certificate was 
evidence of an excess of places. They clearly lacked the 
confidence of reformers that this would be altered as soon as financial 
barriers were removed and able but poor children were admitted in 
larger numbers. Their aim was also to divert able children to the 
technical colleges. It now seemed to many people, however, and - 
especially to Labour people, that little was to change as a result of 
the 1944 Act. Not only were the schools to remain much as they were 
already, but, at the very moment when the chances of working class 
4 T. Cazalet-Keir, From the Wings, London 1967, pp. 122-123 
5 Ministry of Education, The Nation's Schools, Iondon 1945 
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children being admitted to high quality secondary education 
were being increased, the number of places was to be limited and 
perhaps decreased. The pamphlet was an af front to the Labour Party. 
Richard Law and Mrs. Cazalet Keir were but transitory figures and the 
Ministry's timing was well-suited yet again to its own purpose, for 
its views had been published, as guidance to local authorities which 
were preparing their development plans, just before the election of 
a new government. The Ministry's action seemed to be an attempt to 
pre-empt the next government's decision. 
Within a fortnight of the withdrawal from government of the 
Labour ministers, a furious argument occurred in the Commons Supply 
Committee over two important questions: the authorship and nature of 
The Nation's Schools, and the effect on educational policy of the end 
to the party truce. It was initiated by Cove. His argument was that, 
in spite of the praise for Butler, the Act had reached the statute book 
because all parties in the Commons had supported it. But now, as soon 
as the coalition had been dissolved, a Conservative Minister had issued 
in The Nation's Schools, a party policy for secondary education. He 
saw this as "the Tory implementing of the Butler and Chuter Ede Act. " 
Law retaliated with the claim that Ede had had "far more to do with 
this pamphlet than I had. " Challenged by Lindsay to say how much of 
the pamphlet he had seen before leaving office, Ede admitted, "The 
whole of it. I saw it in draft. I suggested certain corrections. " 
He had also discussed it with Butler. Ede calmed the atmosphere by 
indicating that he expected to speak later in the debate. 
Ede's speech included an acceptance of responsibility for all that 
had been decided at the Board whilst he was Parliamentary. Secretary. 
In itself this was merely a statement of the convention that a minister 
accepts responsibility for everything done by his department, or he 
resigns. But he qualified the statement in two contradictory ways. 
On the one hand he claimed that he had been given "as much freedom 
of initiative" as any Parliamentary Secretary, thereby seeming to 
maximise his share of the responsibility. On the other hand his 
acceptance of "full responsibility" was delivered after a request 
to his listeners to bear in mind that the Conservatives had had "twice 
as many political supporters in the House as I had. " On the matter 
of secondary school places he did not consider that the committee 
should be "much concerned as to the exact proportion that may be 
provided in separate. schools, because I do not believe the separate 
schools will long survive. " In his own county of Surrey the education 
authority had had to provide grammar courses in modern schools and were 
now finding a demand for technical courses in grammar schools. III 
believe, " he concluded, "that the future lies with the school for which 
I wish we could find a better name ... what we call the multilateral 
school. " His assumption seemed to be that multilateral schools would 
just happen despite the Ministry's advice that separate schools should 
be built. 
6 
When the 1945 election resulted in a big I-abour victory, Attlee 
appointed Ellen Wilkinson as Minister of Education. She enjoyed a 
reputation as a fiery left-winger. Known as "Red Ellen", both because 
of her hair and her views, her chief claim to fame was as a leader of 
the Jarrow marchers. Her educational background was similar to Ede's. 
The daughter of a Lancashire cotton operative, she had attended 
elementary school, won a scholarship to secondary school and taken a 
degree at Manchester University. For a short time she had been a 
pupil-teacher. Her political affiliations had taken her from the 
Independent Labour Party, which she had joined in 1912, to the Communist 
Party in 1920 and then to the Labour Party, in- the interests of which 
she had been elected to Parliament in 1924. Churchill had included 
6 H. C. Debates, vol. 411, cols-: L332-134.5,1-357--l-358911.6.4.5 
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her in his war-time governments, first as Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Minister of Pensions and then as Parliamentary Secretary to 
Herbert Morrison at the Ministry of Home Security. She came to the 
Ministry of Education in 1945 with a reputation for long and hard- 
working service to the Labour Party and with junior ministerial 
experience. What she lacked was experience of the department to 
which Attlee had now appointed her as the only woman in the cabinet. 
She arrived in a hornet's nest. Not conversant with the issues 
which had pre-occupied others in recent years, she was even more of 
an outsider at Belgrave Square than Ede had been. He was very 
knowledgeable about the issues and a match for officials in discussions 
on regulations and legislation. She was not. The men with whom she 
had to deal were the same men who had been at the Board, in most cases, 
since the First World War, and who had spent the major part of their 
working lives during the past five years hammering out those policies 
which they had just issued for the guidance of local authorities. 
In the cases of both Mrs. Cazalet Keir and Ellen Wilkinson it was a 
question of insecure novice ministers under the direction of vastly- 
experienced and committed officials who knew exactly what they wanted. 
The fact that one was a Conservative and the other Labour was not so 
important. 
Ellen Wilkinson had an additional problem, for she had poor health. 
It is not clear to what extent illness undermined her political resolve, 
or her political problems and doubts were the cause of illness. Her 
friend and former Labour M. P., Leah Manning, dated her asthmatic attacks 
from her assumption of office at the Ministry of Education. Ellen 
Wilkinson's sister had long suffered from asthma and the Minister would 
often drive Leah Manning to visit her, but Manning had not previously 
heard of Ellen herself being a sufferer. On one occasion she had to 
leave the despatch box in the middle of an attack. She had arrived 
2ou 
late and breathless, apologising to members with the explanation 
that she had been opening an art exhibition. The thought of 
Ellen Wilkinson, who had a very poor dress sense and was on this 
occasion adorned with "the most appallingly funny hat", opening 
an art exhibition caused general merriment. She did not of course 
understand the reason for the howls of laughter, and left the 
7 
chamber gasping for. breath. In May 1946 she went to Switzerland 
to recuperate and during the' Summer her name appeared regularly in 
the Times' invalid column. 
8 
Ellen Wilkinson did not withdraw The Nation's Schools. She 
was constantly asked to do so. Cove led the movement to achieve 
this end. Wilkinson seemed to accept a rather naive brief, that 
to do so would amount to a repudiation of the 1944 Act, and stubbornly 
maintained her position. She has been defended on various grounds. 
Leah Manning has attempted to explain the quarrel in terms of Cove's 
personal jealousy and even suggested that he might have been the 
"instrument of a more powerful personality - one to whom a successful 
9 
woman was anathema. " It is not clear to whom this refers. She has 
also noted that Wilkinson's friend Herbert Morrison was very ill in 
hospital at the time and could not help her in her problem. It is 
curious that Morrison does not mention his former Parliamentary 
Secretary in his memoirs and it is known that he opposed her in cabinet 
6ver the raising of the leaving age to 15- In any case the allegation 
does not seem likely. Cove was stating the official party position 
when faced with a member of his own party who seemed to him to be the 
puppet of her Ministry at a crucial time in the development of state 
education. Her Parliamentary Private Secretary at the time, 
H-D. Hughes, has defended her as an able minister who carried through 
much of Labour's policies, notably the raising of the leaving age to 
15 in 1947, an increase in educational expenditure to more than 
7 L-Manning, A Life for Education, London 1970, pp. 203-204 
8 Times. 30.4.46, p. 4; 26-7.46, p. 4; 23.9.46, p. 4; 25.9.469p. 4 
9 L-Manning, op. cit., p. 204 
C100 million, the restoration of schooling after the devastation 
of war, and a reduction of 28% in the number of direct grant schools. 
He has explained the failure to promote multilateral schools in terms 
of uncertainty within the Labour Party, and has claimed that not only 
she but also her Ministry "Positively encouraged experimentation. " 
10 
This interpretation cannot be sustained. We have seen how the 
Board's policy evolved during the early 1940s, and especially we have 
noted that the Board's officials were policy-makers and not just 
administrators. In open discussion Proposals which did not conform 
to their plans were rarely rejected. A leaving age of 16, which 
had early been eliminated by Holmes as a desirable objective, was 
always held to be desirable, but not immediately attainable, in answers 
to the Board's critics. Similarly the door was never closed to 
"experimentation" with multilateral schools. Yet the whole burden of 
the Board's policies before 1944 and of the Ministry's policy after 
1945 was to make more rigid the tripartite segregation of post-primary 
education which it had long been the Board's aim to achieve. Only a 
very strong politician stood any chance of altering that policy. 
Ellen Wilkinson was not, and probably could not be dominant over her 
department. Labour's education policies were clear. The party wanted 
multilateral schools ideally, and equality between different secondary 
schools in terms of buildings, staffing and leaving age in the meantime. 
That was not consistent with the policies of Belgrave Square. Cyril 
Burt, who contributed much to the psychological rationale of the 
tripartite division in secondary education, later wrote that, "our 
English education system, like our constitution and our cathedrals, has 
grown by a slow process of irregular accretion. " 
11 The events of 1945 
to 1947 fit well into that picture. Ellen Wilkinson lacked the knowledge, 
experience, commitment and physical strength to change the face of such a 
longstanding edifice whose current architects were so well- established in 
10 H. D. Hughes, I In Defence of Ellen Wilkinson' , History Workshop 
Journal, 
no-7, June 1979, pp-157-158 
11 C -Burt ,I The 
Examination at Eleven Plus British Journal of 
Educational Studies, vol. Vll , no. 2, May 1959, p. 
9g. Burt's credentials 
and the integrity of his scholarship have recently been questioned. 
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the execution of their design and had already had their most 
recent blue-prints approved and despatched to their site forermn 
in the cities and counties. 
The 1945 Labour Party Conference passed a motion asking that 
Itnewly built secondary schools be of the multilateral type wherever 
possible. " At the 1946 Conference, held at Bournemouth - the cradle 
of the Gr 
. 
een Bo-ok, Ellen Wilkinson refused to repudiate The Nation's 
Schools, claiming, "That would mean repudiating the splendid work of 
my good friend Chuter Ede. " She considered that, by giving teachers 
the same pay and holidays and by providing buildings which were "as 
far as possible" as good, parity between schools would be achieved. 
"When we talk about three types of secondary school they [the Labour 
teachers] think that they are going to be first, second and third 
class secondary schools, " she said. "I do want to assure this 
audience that whatever may have been in the mind of the framerof the 
1944 Bill, that is not in my mind as an administrator of the Act. " 
Cove nonetheless proposed a motion asking the conference to repudiate 
the pamphlet. Arguing that the pamphlet was a coalition document, 
Cove rejected the view that to repudiate it would be to repudiate the 
Act or Ede. Mentioning Ede's reference to the huge Conservative 
majority in the Commons when he had been Parliamentary Secretary, 
Cove declared, "That fact no longer exists. " The Nation's Schools 
was "a fundamental pamphlet" from which all other ministerial circulars 
followed. Cove was supported by Lionel Elvin, at that time the 
delegate from Cambridge University Labour Partyl who commented, "I 
thought that she [Ellen Wilkinson3 was very complacent in assuming 
that parents would not now mind to which of these three types of 
secondar'y schools their children went. " At the end of the short 
debate Harold Clay, who had played a major part in formulating Labour's 
educational policies and who was that year's party chairman, made a 
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brief statement on behalf of the Minister. She had omitted to 
say that "she herself does not like the wording of the pamphlet 
in certain aspects. " Clay added, "I myself regarded it as very 
unfortunate. " The pamphlet was out of print and would not be 
reprinted in its present form. Ellen Wilkinson was not satisfied 
that her intentions had been clearly conveyed by that statement, 
and she returned to the microphone before Clay put the N. A. L. T. 
and East Lewisham motion to the vote. The only part of the ' 
pamphlet which she did not like was the section on the limitation 
of grammar school places. That section would be re-written, "but 
I do not want any of you to think that I have said that the pamphlet 
will be withdrawn, because that would be equivalent to repudiating 
the 1944 Act to which the party assented. " She asked conference 
not to pass the resolution. Cove refused to withdraw it. Conference 
then carried the motion which was in effect one of censure on the 
Minister. 12 Less than a week later Ellen Wilkinson made it clear that 
she had accepted her officials' view rather than that of her party's 
conference. Addressing the Association of Education Committees, to 
whom 
'The 
Nation's Schools had been in part addressed, she was reported 
as saying that "She disagreed with people who said that by talking in 
terms of three types of secondary schools ... the government were 
promulgating a wrong social philosophy. By abolishing fees in 
maintained schools they had ensured that entry to those schools would 
be on the basis of merit. Parents had to be made aware of the 
advantages of the modern school. They must not think that only the 
grammar school education was secondary.,, 
13 
Later in the month Cove returned to the attack in the Commons 
in the course of a general debate on the education estimates Of 
expenditure. ]Ellen Wilkinson had declared that her two prime goals 
were to raise the leaving age to 15 by 1 April 1947 and to establish 
12 Labour Party, Report of the Annual Conference 1946, London 1946, 
pp. 189-19-5; Times, 14.6.46, p. 8; M -Parkinson, The Labour Party and 
the Organisation of Secondaz-y_ Education 1918-19ký London 1970, 
pp. 40-41 
13 Times, 19.6.46, p. 2 
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a comprehensive school meals service. Then she turned to her 
quarrel with her own party, but her comments showed that she had 
not understood the point of her critics. "Secondary education 
does not and should not mean grammar school education for all, " 
she declared. People were used to thinking of a grammar school 
place as the only means of obtaining secondary education and some 
in her own party disagreed with the impression given in The Nation's 
Schools. 
. 
"I share their point of view, " she said, "but I must say 
that it is not a progressive, but a retrograde, step to say that the 
only alternative is identical secondary education for all. " 
"Nobody said that, " interrupted Cove. The Minister proceeded with 
her speech. There was a need for experiment. Some systems had been 
tried and proved whilst "others have been barely tried at all. " She 
left no doubt in the minds of her listeners. "The grammar school is 
well-known, and it will have a vital part to play in our national 
life, " she said. Having described the three types of secondary 
school she then allowed for experiments in other forms, stating, 
"We must take into account other possibilities - the multilateral or 
bilateral schools. I welcome experiments of this kind... They have 
some great attractions. " Cove was not mollified and took the 
traditional Commons step to censure the Minister, by moving an 
amendment to reduce her salary. It was a ferocious attack. III 
feel that I am expressing a feeling throughout the educational world... 
of deep disappointment with the Minister of Education. She has 
undoubtedly given the impression that she has not got to grips with 
her department, and that she does not understand ... the direction and 
drift of the educational policy she is pursuing. " He referred to 
the Labour conference and her speech to the A. E. C., and time and time 
again challenged her to repudiate The Nation's Schools. He offered 
to sit down, so that she could state her position at once. She 
ý %-ý _, P 
remained aloof. "Unless she repudiates not only this pamphlet... 111 
he declared, "but all the leaflets, circulars and pamphlets which 
flow from it, she no longer believes in the educational policy of 
the Labour Party. " Cove received no support from other M. Ps. and 
one, who like him was sponsored by the N. U. T., rose to dissociate 
that body from Cove's attack. The Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Ministry, David Hardmang who had not hitherto figured in the Labour 
Party's educational affairs nationally, although he was a prominent 
member of Cambridgeshire Education Commitee, replied to the aebate. 
He claimed that his Minister wanted "variety in education, and variety 
in development planning. " He exPOunded. Wilkinson's attitude to the 
pamphlet thus. "She was not responsible for the pamphlet. She 
thinks that a wrong impression may have been given in a certain 
passage, although ... she thinks that this has been exaggerated... 
She gave orders, some time ago, that no further copies should be 
issued. The greater part of the pamphlet is a mere statement of 
facts concerning the Act of 1944. In this case, repudiation would 
be meaningless. " A new pamphlet would be issued. 
14 
Later in July 1946 Ellen Wilkinson seemed to dig her heels in 
even further when addressing a public meeting in Sheffield. "She 
had no intention of imposing a single pattern of education upon 
secondary schools, " she was reported as saying. "There was room 
in them for as much variety as there was among the children attending 
them. The grammar schools were rightly jealous of their own 
achievements and had a vital part to play in national life. It was 
to them in particular that they looked for high standards of 
disciplined study, and they would be the main, though not the only, 
channel for entry into the academic courses of the universities. " 
15 
It was only a few days after this that Ellen Wilkinson succumbed 
to asthma and began to cancel engagements. Although she was to have 
14 H. C. Debates, vol. 424, cols. 1804-1812,183o-1834,1853-18,54,1.7.46 
15 Times, 17.7.46, p. 2 
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periods of good health which even allowed her to travel abroad, 
she was intermittently ill until 4 February 1947, when she was 
reported to have bronchitis. Two days later she died. Leah 
Manning much later described the death of her friend and former 
colleague as having occurred when she was "alone in her flat, with 
no one to help her in those last desperate hours when, fighting 
against an attack, she took too many of the pills which alone could 
give her some relief. " 
16 The event was reported differently at 
the time. On 6 February the Times reported that she had been 
admitted to St. Mary's Hospital, Paddington, and the following day 
that she had died of a heart attack. The burial took place at 
Penn Street I Buckinghamshire and was followed by a memorial service 
at St. Margaret's, Westminster, which was attended by Attlee, his 
cabinet, Churchill and the Archbishop of Canterbury who gave an 
address. Ten days later the Westminster coroner issued a press 
statement that an inquest would be held. This was quite normal 
after a burial, he explained, and there was no question of an 
exhumation. "The whole matter will be completed ... without sensation. " 
The verdict was one of accidental death, the cause being heart 
failure following bronchitis and pneumonia accelerated by barbiturate 
poisoning. The pathologist found evidence of a "gross overdose", 
and commented that insomniacs such as Ellen Wilkinson could take some 
pills, become stuporous and then unwittingly take more. 
17 It was 
the tragic end to an acrimonious controversy conducted in personal 
terms between two members of the same party. The point at issue 
between them was the most important to be decided in the field of 
secondary education. 
George Tomlinson was Ellen Wilkinson's successor, the third 
Minister since Butler vacated his chair in May 1945, less than two 
years earlier. He was more experienced in the sphere of education, 
16 L. Manning, op. cit. p. 204 
17 Times, 4.2.47, p. 2; 6.2.47, p. 4; 7.2.47, P. 7; 2492.479p. 2; 1-3.47, p. 2 
-- f 
having been a member of the Party's advisory committee and Bevin's 
collaborator at the Ministry of Labour in his attempts to bring 
about a leaving age of 16. But by the time he took office, local 
authorities were already working on development plans in accordance 
with the principles of The Nation's Schools. A few rebelled. The 
West Riding development plan of 1948 stated, for example, that, 
"They cannot ... agree that at the age of 11 children can be classified 
118 into three recognised mental types. Anglesey, a Conservative 
local authority, considered that multilateral schools were the only 
sensible form of secondary education in its island setting. Several 
Labour local authorities began to establish multilateral schools, in 
some cases, such as Middlesex, only to have the policy reversed when 
power was lost to the Conservatives at the next county council elections. 
London had decided, even before the Bill had completed its passage 
through Parliament, that it would aim to provide a unified system of 
secondary education. in place of the existing system of education given 
in London in separate types of school. " 
19 But in the absence of a 
national directive, indeed in the face of a national directive, only 
slight progress was made towards the achievement of Labour's objective. 
The 1944 Education Act was intended to strengthen and make more 
rigid the divisions between the three types of secondary school , and 
that it did. In many areas the technical element never existed on 
the scale intended in 1944, and in most areas it did not survive much 
beyond the 1950s. Thus secondary education for most children continued 
to take place either in a grammar school or a modern school. Those 
fortunate enough to gain a place in the IL"ormer had better-qualified 
and better-paid teachers, a longer school life, the satisfaction of 
knowing that they were amongst the chosen few, often better if more 
ancient buildings, 
20 
the validation of their success by public 
18 Quoted in R. Pedley, The Comprehensive School, Harmondsworth 1963, 
p. 40 
19 G. L. C., London County Council, Education Committee Minutes, 
General Sub-Committee. 11-7.44 
20 H. O. R. S. A. huts,, standing for "huts on raising the school age", 
were the educational equivalent of "prefabs, "in domestic housing, 
and were mostly on primary and secondary modern school sites 
L- %. / %0 
examinations and incomparably better career prospects. The 
decision at the age of 11 was based almost entirely on the results 
of examinations which were open to the same objections as the widely- 
condemned pre-war "special place" examination. Parental influence 
in the allocation of a child to a school was negligible. By the 
1950s there was mounting condemnation of the system. In 1964 a 
Labour government which was pledged to turn the system upside down 
was elected. Its aim was the eradication of selection in secondary 
education. But by that time the task was much more difficult, for 
it involved changing all that had been developed in the previous 
twenty years. Buildings, the training of teachers, curricula and 
examinations had all been developed to serve one system. Now the 
system was to be changed. H. C. Dent has commented, "If ever England 
had a chance to start afresh it was in 1945.1121 In the organisation 
of secondary education that chance was not taken. Having already 
largely lost the fight for the incorporation of its ideals in the 
1944 Act, the Labour Party suffered a defeat after 1945 which was 
the more tragic for being partially self-inflicted. 
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